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A NOTE ON LANGUAGE AND SOURCES
Transliteration of Islamic vocabulary in an English publication on Muslims 
in Germany is a matter of discussion as there are no fixed standards for an 
“Islamic-American English” or an “Islamic German” yet.
I have chosen to not make use of computer-generated Arabic script. 
This is because the women in this book mostly made use of the German or 
English spelling of the Arabic words. Islamic-American English – or rather 
Islamic-German – is part of how Islam is practiced and lived in Germany. 
In addition, I use both Arabic terms and English translations of Arabic 
terms. Translations (such as sometimes using God instead of Allah) is 
about making the text more accessible and avoiding constructing a radical 
difference.
Through this practice I also seek to avoid an unnecessary and unhealthy 
Orientalizing of the youth and the Islamic world. Further, there is a wide 
range of Arabic words that are by now a familiar presence in English 
publications.1
As there continues to be a divergence in how Arabic words are spelled 
in the English and German, I follow the standards suggested by Metcalf 
(Making Muslim Space in North America, 1996) in her work on translitera-
tion, though with some exceptions where I have preferred a more collo-
quial form. The main difference, however, is that I have opted to italicize 
the Arabic (as well as the German and Turkish) terms with the exception 
of some frequently used terms, such as Allah and imam. I also italicize 
German words and expressions. These terms have a bracketed translation 
the first time they occur in the text and some words will be translated 
more than once in the text to facilitate comprehension.
German organizations are referred to by their German acronyms in the 
text.
When I quote the writings of other authors, I follow their style of spell-
ing and italics. I present the plural forms of Arabic terms either in American 
colloquial forms or standard Arabic.
There is a short overview of Muslim organizations and mosques in 
Germany and Berlin in appendix I. The main purpose is to situate the 
movements in this book within the larger Islamic field in Germany.
1 For a longer discussion on the use of English versus Arabic terms, see Metcalf 
(1996: 1–3).

1 According to the Guardian, between 30,000 and 40,000 Muslims marched against the 
headscarf ban at schools in Paris, Marseille, Lille and other cities in France (the Guardian 
2004).
INTRODUCTION
So tell the tale – perhaps they will reflect.
–Koran 7:176
Arriving in Berlin, Germany, in the spring of 2004 for my anthropological 
fieldwork on youth with immigrant backgrounds, it was impossible to 
avoid the heated debate about Muslim women in the newspapers, particu-
larly the so-called headscarf debate: should Muslim women be allowed to 
work as teachers, administrators, or police officers while wearing a veil? 
I was struck by the media representation of Muslim women as oppressed, 
passive, or unwilling to integrate, at the same time as I observed headscarf 
marches in Berlin and in Paris (January and February 2004) where thou-
sands of young women and men marched for women’s rights to wear 
the headscarf.1 In my multicultural Berlin neighborhood of Kreuzberg, 
I observed groups of young women laughing and chatting playfully at 
street corners, some with headscarves, others without. “How do they feel 
about this constant media attention?” I wondered. “What impact does the 
constant media focus on their well-being and inner thoughts have on their 
daily life?” “What does it mean to be a young woman Muslim in Berlin 
today?” During my fieldwork with Muslim youth, I gradually came to 
struggle with a situation in which the media depicted Muslim women as 
submissive and indoctrinated, whereas the Muslim women I knew were 
making sexual jokes, contemplating which color of headscarf to wear with 
what shirt, and reproaching themselves for neglecting certain religious 
obligations. The tension between the media representations and my eth-
nographic experience deepened throughout my fieldwork as I listened to 
the views the young women themselves had about what they were doing. 
The apparently zero-sum affiliations that the media and others con-
structed between Muslim and German, religious and modern, collective 
practice or individualization, have guided my fieldwork and theoretical 
framework.
The emergence, re-emergence, and transformation of religiosity and 
Islamic identity among young Muslims living in European societies have 
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2 The term “Muslim” should not be used in a reductionist manner. Generally, the media 
and often current social research consider all people coming from, or having a background 
in, a country where the majority follows Islam to be “Muslims.” However, one must not lose 
sight of the fact that individuals differ substantially, and that people from a Muslim back-
ground may consider themselves non-believers or adherents of another faith (see Spielhaus 
and Färber 2006 for a discussion about this). In this book, I use the term “Muslim” more 
narrowly to refer to those who define themselves as a Muslim.
3 Studies about differences within the Muslim population in Germany and France that 
are particularly relevant include Al-Hamarneh and Thielmann (2008) Babès (1997), 
Klinkhammer (2003), Maréchal (2003), Maréchal, Dassetto, Nielsen and Allievi (2003), and 
Tietze (2001; 2006). According to the study by Şen and Sauer (2006, 20) on the religiosity 
of Muslims with a Turkish background, in 2005, 28 percent considered themselves very 
religious, 55 percent considered themselves quite religious, 11 percent considered them-
selves not very religious, and 6 percent considered themselves not religious at all. In 2000, 
been the subjects of significant attention in the last couple of years. 
Women’s participation in, and support for, Islamic organizations in 
Western, liberal, “disenchanted” or “post-secular” cities have particularly 
dumbfounded many, including scholars, media, and politicians. Young 
women who cover their hair with a headscarf have upset the public to the 
extent that political authorities in various European countries have codi-
fied regulations banning the headscarf from public arenas. For example, 
since 2011, anyone in France wearing the niqab or burqa in public has 
risked being fined. In Germany, after a Constitutional Court in 2003 
opened the way for distinctive laws by the Land (federal departments), 
several Land have gradually adopted laws that ban veiled teachers from 
state schools.
Muslim communities in Western Europe deal with a greater range of 
new and diverse challenges in their everyday life compared to Muslims in 
countries where Islam is a majority religion. Each European country pres-
ents distinct structural, political, legal, and institutional approaches to 
how they deal with Muslim minority claims, which in turn presents both 
opportunities and limitations in establishing Muslim institutions and 
encouraging religious practices. The continuous interaction between 
Muslim minority populations and non-Muslim majorities and institutions 
in different European countries affects how Islam is institutionalized and 
practiced. It also has an effect on young people who seek to live as reli-
giously devoted Muslims in European societies.
This book provides an in-depth empirical case study of young Muslim 
women who were born in Germany and who participate in one of the reli-
gious organizations in Berlin.2 Previous research has thoroughly docu-
mented the plurality of ways of being a young Muslim: there are both 
intra- and inter-generational differences within the Muslim population in 
Germany and the relevance of religion in their everyday practices varies.3 
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the numbers were 8 percent very religious, 65 percent quite religious, 11 percent not very 
religious, and 3 percent not at all. However, statistical research on Muslims’ relationship to 
their religion tends to bring forth different numbers and therefore needs to be handled 
with utmost care.
4 Scholars frequently divide the plurality of ways of belonging to Islam and of being 
Muslim into different categories of religiousness. (See e.g. Karakaşoğlu 1999, 2000, 2003b; 
Klinkhammer 2000, 2003; Maréchal 2003; Nökel 2002; Schiffauer 2006b; and Tietze 2001).
Whereas some consider Islam to be part of their cultural and ethnic heri-
tage, others confine religion to the private sphere. Yet others relate to 
Islam as a way of life, as part of both their private and public life.4 This 
study concentrates on a representative group of religiously inclined young 
women who care about the place of religion in their lives. In the future, 
this group is also likely to represent a visible manifestation of a nascent 
German-Muslim identity. This book investigates how these young Muslim 
women seek to live a devout life in Berlin, in a context of increasing politi-
cization and securitization of Muslims and Islam, and in an atmosphere of 
distrust in which the behavior, solidarity, and loyalty of Muslims in Europe 
are being questioned.
In the religious organization Muslim Youth in Germany (Muslimische 
Jugend in Deutschland e.V., henceforth MJD), young women from different 
national and ethnic backgrounds are engaged in the study of Islamic scrip-
tures to appropriate norms and behavior that they believe are significant 
to the crafting of their religious Selves. The youth produce their religious 
identity through religious education, experiences of rituals, and other 
events that produce social meaning. This book explores the forms of reli-
giosity among the youth and investigates one of the contemporary forms 
and religious orientations that circulate among young Muslims in Europe. 
I also examine how religious practices and beliefs take place both at an 
individual level and as part of a group socialization process. This analysis 
sheds light on the different paths and spaces that are available to individu-
als who seek to identify with Islam or act religiously, and avoids suggesting 
that they act homogeneously or inconsistently. As youth who participate 
in a religious organization or faith community are the main focus of this 
book, I ask not only why young people decide to participate in a religious 
organization, but also how this participation affects their religious 
practices and gender identification. As members of this religious organi-
zation, young people are presented with religious discourses and social 
expectations regarding their behavior: how does this affect how they con-
struct or craft their Selves as religious subjects in this faith community? 
How do religious beliefs and practices shape the way they view the world 
4 introduction
and behave in public life, and how does their milieu affect 
religious beliefs and activities? What types of actions and practices do 
the people involved consider Islamically correct, and how are these 
legitimated?
The rest of this introduction provides a short outline of past research 
on Islam and Muslims in Germany/Europe, focusing in particular on 
research on Muslim youth, and the scholarly presumption of an ongoing 
individualization of religion. It then moves on to situate the themes of the 
book within past research, before it introduces the concepts Islam as a 
discursive tradition, “community”, “crafting the Self”, “social field” and 
“social identity.” The last part of the introduction provides an outline of 
the book.
Research on Islam and Muslims in Germany/Europe—A Brief Outline
The focus and the analytical approaches in research on Islam and 
Muslims in Europe have undergone a change in recent decades. Until 
the 1980s, social science inquiry into migrant populations in European 
societies tended to concentrate on how the ethnic and cultural heritage 
of these populations persisted or changed in Europe. In the late 1980s, 
questions of the religious identities of the migrant communities were 
increasingly included in migration studies (Vertovec 2000). In particular, 
this change took place in the aftermath of the Rushdie Affair in 1989 when, 
to the surprise of social scientists and British politicians, thousands 
of British migrants protested in the street against the publication of “The 
Satanic Verses” by Rushdie (in 1988). The vehement public response 
from migrants against the book’s allegedly blasphemous references 
directed migration researchers’ attention to the importance of ongoing 
and changed religious attachments in the socio-cultural life of migrants 
and in their assertions of a particular ethnic group identity within 
European societies.
Since the 1990s, the fact that youth with migrant backgrounds born in 
European societies seem to increasingly “turn to Islam” as a locus of iden-
tity has received increasing attention both in research and in the media. 
There has been a tendency to represent Muslim women as “passive vic-
tims of oppressive cultures,” or as the “embodiment of a repressive and 
‘fundamentalist’ religion” (Dwyer 1998, 53). Simultaneously, the religiosity 
of the migrant population has increasingly been a feature of debates on 
cultural diversity, which includes issues such as the provision of special 
diets to meet religious principles, the hijab, and the building of places of 
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5 Both Grillo (2004) and Vertovec (2000) offer a good overview of the development of 
the research agenda during this period.
6 See in particular the work of Amiraux (2003), Bendixsen (2005, 2009b), Cesari (2002, 
2003), Fadil (2011), Khosrokhavar (1997), Jacobsen (2011), Jacobson (1998), Jouili (2009), 
Leveau (1988), Scott (2007), Tietze (2001, 2006).
7 Author’s translation from the original French: “qui sont plus ou moins exclus de la 
société et de quête d’un sens a donner a leur vie.”
8 Author’s translation from the original French: “recréer un lien social face au vide de 
l’immigration et aux frustrations de l’intégration.”
worship.5 The religiosity of young Muslims has gradually come to be 
understood as related to processes of social assimilation or segregation, 
questions about living between two cultures, or identity crises (Kepel 
1994; Rogers and Vertovec 1998). The scholars in the edited volume “Muslim 
European Youth” (Rogers and Vertovec 1998) rejected an understanding of 
Islam in Europe as a mere tradition relocated from the migrants’ home 
country to the new country, or as something that the youth either leave 
behind or embrace. With case studies from Denmark, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, and based on concepts such as 
hybridity, multiplicity, and cultural creativity, this work challenged the 
idea that Muslim youth in Europe embodied a “clash of civilizations” (à la 
Huntington’s 1993 thesis). Instead, the studies argued that Muslim youth 
were creating hybrid and complex identities and establishing new models 
of religious and cultural expressions.
Post 9/11 research has increasingly focused on how religion itself 
changes as a consequence of experiences of migration and the transfor-
mation of religious groups in Europe. This research also examines the 
continuation and transformation of religious identities among youth with 
immigrant backgrounds.6 The identification with Islam among youth in 
Europe has increasingly been seen as a solution to the youths’ social situa-
tion in European societies (Cesari 2003; Khosrokhavar 1997). Scholars 
have argued that Islam is one way that young people can shape, affirm, 
and situate their identity in a society in which they are not accepted as full 
participants (Venel 1999, 29). The religious identity of Muslim youth in 
France has been viewed as a solution for youth “who are more or less 
excluded from the society and who search for a sense of direction in life” 
(Khosrokhavar 1997, 39).7 In this view, by turning to Islam, youth can “rec-
reate a social bond in light of the emptiness of immigration and frustra-
tion of integration” (Saint-Blancat 1997: 51).8
In these studies, Islam is frequently viewed as a cultural sub-system in 
relation to which youth can develop a strong identity. Importantly, schol-
ars see religious identification as not necessarily leading to segregation, 
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9 Subsequent to her doctoral research, Nekla Kelek has altered her view of Islam as not 
necessarily leading to segregation in the German society, as signaled by her highly contro-
versial and populist books “The foreign bride. A report from the inside of Turkish life in 
Germany” (“Die fremde Braut. Ein Bericht aus dem Inneren des türkischen Lebens in 
Deutschland”) in 2005 and “The lost sons. Plea for the liberation of the Turkish Moslem 
man” (“Die verlorenen Söhne. Plädoyer für die Befreiung des türkisch-muslimischen 
Mannes”) in 2006.
10 This study does not situate Islam within the Euro-Islam perspective represented 
by scholars like Bassam Tibi, or within Europeanized Islam. The Euro-Islam perspective 
highlights the pluralistic and democratic character of the European public sphere and is 
critiqued for de-legitimizing the mobilization of Muslims that deviate from this “‘enlight-
ened’ European system of values” (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003, 52). Euro-Islam, an 
Islam that is compatible with the Enlightenment, universal values, and Western ways of 
life, appears to be a normative term with little empirical basis (Thielmann 2008). The 
Europeanized Islam perspective stresses the transformative and pluralist characteristics of 
Muslim organizations and social life. It also argues that there has been a privatization of 
Islam due to its entrance into secular Western societies (ibid.). Cesari is one of the scholars 
who work within the latter approach. Such perspectives, which primarily situate Muslims 
and Islam in Europe within the context of the European public sphere, are critiqued both 
for being implicitly Eurocentric and for constructing a homogeneous view of the European 
public sphere (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003; Peter 2006a).
but instead to potential integration (Kelek 2002).9 Youths’ religiosity or 
turn to Islam is often considered a response to a situation in which youths 
with migration backgrounds are “out of context” or discriminated against 
in Europe. Engagement with Islamic tradition becomes the starting point 
of an “identity politics” in which the youth not only reinterpret features of 
migrated traditions, but also start to oppose and assert specific identities. 
Conceptualizing the youths’ turn to Islam in terms of identity politics 
sheds light on Muslim youths’ efforts to demand rights and recognition 
within the various European states and the construction of new modes of 
political engagement and belonging. Yet these explanations consider 
Islam’s status as a minority religion and culture within democratic and 
secular European countries to be the main reason behind transformations 
of Muslims practices and youths’ relationship to Islam (Cesari 2005).10
Jocelyne Cesari (2005) suggests a more dynamic approach focused on 
the dialectical relationship between group resources and their social envi-
ronment. This is pursued in the edited volume”European Muslims and the 
Secular State,” in which scholars analyze “both the cultural and political 
principles that structure the organization of religion within Western 
democracies and the influence of these principles on Muslims’ adaptation 
to secularized societies” (Cesari 2004, 1). Additionally, Oliver Roy (2004) 
has drawn attention to the role of globalization and transnational pro-
cesses by arguing that we need to look beyond immigration and ethnic 
relations to understand the contemporary religiosity of young Muslims. 
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11 Amir-Moazami and Salvatore draw on Asad’s understanding of Islam as a “discursive 
tradition,” which I discuss in chapter 1. Asad points out that “although Islamic traditions 
are not homogenous, they aspire to coherence, in the way that all discursive traditions do” 
(Asad 1986, 19). Thus, discussions and debates about what is “correct” are part of the estab-
lishing a “domain of orthodoxy.”
12 This has been discussed in various studies in the 1990s, including Barth (1994a); 
Jacobson (1998); and Saint-Blancat (1997).
They highlight that in their religious involvement and performance, young 
Muslims in Europe frequently call on the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
tury reformist tradition and reshape it to the challenges posed by living as 
a religious minority in a contemporary European society. However, reforms 
of Muslim traditions are not limited to the modern or postmodern era. 
Rather, transformations of Islamic traditions have taken place from the 
beginning, as a consequence of Islam’s encounter with other competing 
traditions as well as of internal interventions in search for coherence in 
Islamic tradition (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003, 55).11 Salvatore, dis-
cussing the public participation of religious groups in what he calls 
“European post-national and post-secular public spheres” (Salvatore 2004, 
1029), argues that one should not talk about a sudden coming out of 
Muslims. Instead, the question of reform, renewal, or awakening of 
Muslim traditions needs to be understood as “entangled with colonialism, 
decolonisation, nation-state building, and class and gender relations in 
both their internal-metropolitan and external-colonial articulations” 
(ibid., 1015).
The idea of a “turn to Islam” can be seen as part of an Islamic process 
that not only occurs among Muslims in Europe, but also in several Muslim 
countries. The Islamic revival can be defined as “the reawakening of inter-
est in Islamic symbols, ideas, and ideals subsequent to a period of relative 
dormancy” (Husain 1995, 4). Historically there is a long tradition of Islamic 
revival (tajdid) and reform (islah) in the form of religious, social, and polit-
ical activism. The current Islamic revival manifests itself on three levels: 
the individual level (increased interest in Islam as a lifestyle and practice), 
the group level (Islamic grassroots or populist movements which seek to 
establish an Islamic system), and the national level (government-initiated 
programs that attempt to install Islam as the foundational ideology in 
society) (ibid.). The Islamization process brings with it social, cultural, and 
religious changes. One of these changes is a tendency to place emphasis 
on Islam as the basis for the construction of a collective identity.12
This book seeks to understand the modes of interaction within a 
Muslim faith community in Berlin, and how individuals relate to the 
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13 See Fadil for an extensive discussion about the individualization of religion and an 
elaboration of her understanding of religious individualization “as a particular form of gov-
ernance, which regulates the relationship between the self and religion in accordance with 
liberal-humanist registers” (Fadil 2008, 54).
14 That said, sociologically or anthropologically speaking, the act of individual choice is 
always socially situated.
15 According to the structural explanation, this discourse of individualization is the 
consequence of processes of functional differentiation. Such a society is contrasted to the 
pre-modern society, namely the segmental differentiated society that is divided horizon-
tally according to class or position (Luhmann 1986; Tönnies 2001 [1887]).
Islamic discourse taught in this religious movement. In doing so, it exam-
ines how the modes of interactions within a faith community must be 
understood as formed in relation to various segments of a Western society, 
as well as in interaction with global and transnational processes. As such, 
this book recognizes the importance of the socio-political context in 
which the youth are situated and that identification with Islam should 
also be understood within the framework of identity politics. However, 
the focus of the book is on tracing how youth who turn to Islam pursue 
the crafting of a religious Self within a religious faith community. It does 
so by examining the broader set of meanings that the youth assign to their 
religious identification.
As the idea of individualization among young Muslims in Europe is an 
important framework for my study, I briefly discuss how scholars working 
on Europe approach this idea. The idea of an individualization process 
among young Muslims in the West is a complex one and a full discussion 
of the concept is outside the scope of this book.13
Individualization of Religiosity
The perception that Western society has become increasingly individual-
ized is widely acknowledged and frequently thought to have emerged with 
the modern individual, who is said to be disembodied from social rela-
tions (Friedman 1994, 215). The process of individualization does not 
describe autonomous decision-making processes, but that the subject has 
become the main social actor within the dominant societal discourse 
(Laermans and Verschraegen 2001).14 This social actor is assumed to act as 
an autonomous person. Charles Taylor has argued that in the modern age, 
religious experience has become part of “expressive individualism” (Taylor 
2002, 83), which means that rather than merely pursuing a model imposed 
from the outside (by society, the older generation, or religious authorities), 
it has become important to search for one’s own way.15
 introduction 9
16 This includes in particular the studies Babès (1997), Cesari (1997, 1998, 2002), Nökel 
(2002), Roy (2004), Saint-Blancat (1997), Schröter (2002), and Stauch (2004). Peter (2006a) 
illustrates how individualization has become a key notion in research on Muslims in 
Europe. This notion, he argues, is usually utilized to highlight that Muslims are integrating 
and adapting to European structures. Consequently, a narrative in which secularization 
and integration converge is established where patterns of secularization among the 
Muslim population is constructed as not only the result of their move to Europe, but the 
degree to which this happens also becomes indicative of integration. In short, a perception 
is constructed where the more secular a Muslim is, the more integrated they are seen to be.
17 Roy (2000) nevertheless admits that an individual relationship to Islam is not per se a 
new phenomenon, since all religiosity presumes a form of interiorization. Roy adds that 
the individualization of religious practice has not brought forth an individualization of the 
religious frameworks (2000).
18 Other scholars (Mandaville 2004; Otterbeck 2010) have argued that authority has con-
tinued to be important, but that it has been transformed within the context of interna-
tional migration.
Several researchers have argued since the late 1990s that the Islamic 
religiosity of young Muslims in Europe is undergoing an individualization 
and privatization process.16 Scholars explain individualization as a 
consequence of migration and rural-urban mobilization (Schiffauer 1990). 
In the context of migration, individuals are thought to re-create the 
religious patterns of their daily life on an individual basis (Roy 2000).17 
Individualization is also linked to transnational and globalization pro-
cesses and new communication technologies (Mandaville 2004; Roy 2004). 
Young Muslim women’s participation in the individualization of religion 
as practice is thought to particularly relate to the dynamically interrelated 
processes through which youth choose to pursue Islam as a point of 
identification in a context of social and emotional detachment from their 
parents or extended family and a decline in the importance of traditional 
religious authority, including imams and Islamic scholars.18
Several studies that see women’s individualization of religion as mak-
ing it possible for them to “discover” Islam in Germany (Nökel 2002; 
Klinkhammer 2000, 2003) rely on these aspects of the individualization 
process. The individualization of religion, which is the process in which 
women are “discovering Islam and studying the religious sources [which 
in turn] offers them the chance to distance themselves from the parents’ 
generation, from prescribed Muslim identities and from the existing 
hierarchies in the mosque organizations” (Klinkhammer 2000, 281). 
According to Klinkhammer (2003, 269), large parts of what one may call 
second generation immigrants in Germany are only interested in an “indi-
vidualised appropriation” of Islam. Youths’ preferences are characterized 
by individualization and recognition of secularity. The women’s rational-
ized and individualized religious identity opens up for individualized 
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19 Cesari argues that the general tendency towards individualization that leads to a 
privatization of religion affects fundamentalism, which is “more often than not, a freely 
chosen identity, not something imposed by the community, tradition, or the family” 
(Cesari 2004, 54). By “privatization” she means “the restriction of religious practice to the 
private sphere and the relegation of religious values and rules to a secondary and compart-
mentalized role in the conduct of daily life” (Cesari 2005b, footnote 10).
positions through which they can be situated as part of modern 
society (Klinkhammer 2000). Klinkhammer (1999, 2000) argues that the 
new dynamics in the migration context strongly shapes the religious 
identities that the youth’s parents brought with them to Germany. She 
considers that the conceptualization of a religious self changes due to a 
re-evaluation of religious practices and an increased emphasis on reli-
gious identity in Germany. Simultaneously, others stress that growing up 
in Germany strengthens youths’ belief in Islam, their willingness to criti-
cize their parents’ traditional values, and also causes a re-interpretation 
and adaptation of religious rules to German daily life (Stauch 2004). The 
increased rationalization of everyday life affects youths’ moral inclina-
tions, causing generational gaps and conflicts (Schröter 2002).
These studies frequently argue that the religious practices of young 
women born in European societies must be understood in relation to 
modernity, as the women combine a “modern life with the Muslim faith” 
as Karakaşoğlu (2003b, 108) argues for France. For example Nökel argues 
that Muslim women in Germany demand a radical equality by emphasiz-
ing visible differences, such as the headscarf, and that Muslim women 
become autonomous citizens through Islam, forming a culture of citizen-
ship (Nökel 2002). The youth develop a strong identity and self-confidence 
by reinterpreting traditional norms, scientific interpretations of the Koran, 
and by independent Islamic study. In the context of this book, Islam is 
considered a latent resource from which to create a political and social 
identity. Furthermore, because Islam transforms the Self and everyday life, 
and provokes social changes, it can be compared to contemporary social 
movements.
In France, Jocelyne Cesari (2002) considers the Islam practiced by 
young Muslims an “individualized religious observance,” and she argues 
that this generation is distancing itself from their parents’ traditional piety 
and turning to a more individualized and privatized expression of religios-
ity (ibid., 41).19 By “individualization,” Cesari refers to
the appropriation of rights to personal choice in matters of religious 
belief  and practice. Its logical outcome is a shift away from authoritative 
tradi tions – in both interpretation and practice – toward idiosyncratic 
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20 It should be noted that Cesari’s early work differs from her later work with regard to 
the question of individualization. Her early work has a tendency to emphasize a decrease 
in religious behavior whereas her later work deals with more orthodox strict observers, for 
whom Islam embraces all areas of life (Cesari 2002, 2004).
21 From  http://www.europeaninstitute.org/February-2011/qpost-islamic-revolutionq 
-events-in-egypt-analyzed-by-french-expert-on-political-islam.html, accessed August 1, 
2012.
constructions of religious life-style. It transforms institutionalized religion 
into a common well from which each person draws with his own vessel for 
his own purposes in accord with his own needs. (ibid., footnote 9)
Cesari emphasizes that this individualization does not mean that Islam 
has become private, but that there is an individual responsibility in reli-
gious choice and a distrust of religious mediation by religious leaders or 
religious institutions (Cesari 2005b). According to Cesari (2002), the 
increase in individual autonomy contributes to a weakening of Muslim 
ethnic and family ties within the West.20
Likewise, Oliver Roy (2004) has called attention to how the believer has 
to make a conscious choice to follow Islam. Roy argues that:
Reconstruction of what it means to be a good Muslim in a non-Muslim 
society essentially rests on the individual. The first reason for this is that, as 
we have seen, neither the family nor the pristine communities suffices as a 
transmitter of traditional Islam. Traditional hierarchies, including that of 
age, are irrelevant. The second reason is the lack of social pressure that con-
strains believers individually to reconstruct for themselves what it means to 
live a pious life. (Roy 2004, 175)
Furthermore, Roy argues that “piety has become individualized; people 
practice their faith in a more personal way; they want a guide who preaches 
in term of self-fulfillment, like the Egyptian [Muslim evangelist] Amr 
Khaled; they are losing interest in the utopia of an Islamic state.”21 Similarly, 
Göle drawing on Taylor argues that “in the modern age, religious experi-
ence become part of ‘expressive individualism’, that is, it becomes impor-
tant to find one’s own way as against a model imposed from outside – be it 
from society, the previous generation, or religious authority” (Göle 2006b, 
124).
According to these studies, Muslim youth are distancing themselves 
from prescribed Muslim identities, and rely on a personal or individual-
ized orientation in their religious practices, which are shaped by individ-
ual decisions, rather than by religious authorities or their parents. The Self 
is seen as autonomous and as constructed in relation to individual study 
of the scriptures. Accordingly, young people’s claim to live according to 
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22 This is in contrast to the, in my view, equally simplistic media presentation in 
Germany of youth as being indoctrinated within Muslim organizations.
23 The idea that individualization emerges among Muslims in a European secular soci-
ety has also been critiqued by pointing to the similar changes occurring in the countries of 
origin, set off by factors which might be comparable to those initiating changes in the 
immigrant context (see e.g. Peter 2006a).
Islam implies a need to combine the religious basis of the family with 
“more modern lifestyles” (Karakaşoğlu 2003b, 114), and individuality is 
asserted through religion. Youth reinterpret religious norms using an intel-
lectual approach, which results in a synthesis of the secular and the 
Islamic tradition. Such scholarly analyses tend to suggest that an individu-
alization of religiosity is manifested in the independent interpretation of 
religious beliefs that young Muslims assert (individualization of religious 
beliefs).22 This presumes that individuals are independently choosing 
which part of Islam to make relevant in their life, and even suggests a 
cherry picking of elements of so-called Muslim, French or German and 
Arabic or Turkish behaviors.
In contrast, in this book I argue for a refocusing on the complex interac-
tion between the religious actor and her (or his) religious peers and reli-
gious community(ies). I suggest that the idea that Muslim youth are 
undergoing an individualization process ignores the continued impor-
tance of old and new religious authorities, faith communities, and reli-
gious organizations at a local, national, and transnational level. Most 
studies conclude that young women’s Muslim identity is self-adopted and 
individualized, and that it permits emancipation from parental authority. 
My own research resists this interpretation. Instead, my research supports 
the argument that although there is an ongoing individualization process 
among the youth in their relation to Islam, the youths’ religious engage-
ment must be understood as simultaneously situated in relation to group 
processes and religious mediations. Two intertwined processes are rele-
vant here: First, the current public focus on Islam and Muslims in Europe 
creates a dynamic that daily puts pressure on the youth I worked with. 
This has direct consequences for how the youth craft their religious Self. 
Second, and partly as a consequence of this dynamic, the youth continue 
to feel a need to position their religious Self in relation to their faith com-
munity’s understanding and teaching of Islam.23 The ongoing practice in 
which the youth distinguish between “tradition” and “pure” Islam makes 
it necessary for them to situate their religious practices and beliefs in 
relation to other religious actors, mediators, and to a religious discourse. 
Overall, this book fills in the lack of research examining how religion and 
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24 I am aware of the long-standing literature on the concept of community and 
the skepticism towards the use of the concept. These discussions are outside the scope 
of this book. That said, I agree with Ortner, who argues that the concept of community 
is “worth keeping” as long as we do not identify it “with harmony and cohesion, nor 
imagine that the sole form of community is a group of people in one place” (Ortner 1997, 
63–64).
25 By “active participant” I do not mean formal membership in the organization, but 
rather that the youth continuously took part (at least once a month) in MJD weekly meet-
ings throughout the period that I spent in the organization. Most of the youth I worked 
with attended religious activities organized by the Muslim Youth in Germany, though some 
were not MJD participants, but took part in prayer meetings and group discussions about 
the Koran and other Islamic texts in mosques or in friends’ homes. I do not attempt to 
provide a representative overview of young Muslims across Germany.
religiosity continues to be (re)learned, contested, (trans)formed, and 
practiced within religious faith communities in European societies.
Issues and Perspectives
This book engages with how young people craft their religious Self within 
an Islamic organization, MJD, which is a local religious faith community in 
Berlin.24 It explores how religious practices are formed within a group, in 
part through the development of collective identifications. It examines 
the continued interrelation between an individual’s identification with 
Islam and group identification processes.
By focusing on how young Muslim women in Berlin craft a religious Self 
and religious identity, the chapters explore the formation of a Muslim 
identity as a continuous negotiation between autonomy and group iden-
tity, while illuminating the ways in which the local Berlin context affects 
this religious identification. In order to investigate the processes of reli-
gious identity-formation—and in particular the effects of a group dynamic 
on shaping the attitude young women have towards their religion—I have 
chosen a sub-set of the Muslim population. I focus on women between 
14 and 32 years old, who live in Berlin, and who have chosen to participate 
in the Islamic youth organization MJD, which was established in the 
mid-1990s.25
Research on Muslim women has tended to focus on how they situate 
their Self and religious identity in relation to modernity and often 
describes the women’s action based on a liberal understanding of agency, 
freedom, and autonomy. In contrast, some scholars have drawn attention 
to how nonliberal religious women’s critique of the secular world, such 
as their goals for individual freedom and autonomy, necessitates the 
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recognition that these research accounts and analyses are based on secu-
lar liberal assumptions. For example, Saba Mahmood’s 2005 study of 
Egyptian women’s involvement in the mosque movement that is part of 
the wider Islamic Revival shows how liberal ideas about agency, freedom, 
and autonomy have been naturalized in feminist theory. In contrast, 
Mahmood argues that women’s engagement with religious studies and 
their desire to come closer to God is about developing autonomy to disci-
pline the self to religious practices. In a different religious and cultural 
context, R. Marie Griffith (1997) argues for a more multifaceted under-
standing of the concept of agency in her study of the Women Aglow move-
ment, an evangelical Christian prayer network in North America. Griffith 
argues that the evangelical women’s individual autonomy or fulfillment is 
not precluded by their submission to a patriarchal religious hierarchy. 
These and other scholars advance the study of religion by proposing that 
nonliberal women’s religious activities should not merely be understood 
within secular liberal conceptualizations and assumptions about the indi-
vidual, power, and agency.
I build on this scholarship while simultaneously proposing a different 
approach that enables a deeper understanding of the interrelationship 
between the youths’ individual religiosity and the religious discourse 
taught by their wider faith community. I also argue that a religious identi-
fication is a creative process that is continuously being crafted in relation 
to desires that are shaped within social spaces and structures. This book 
examines the complex and continuous process through which individuals 
(re)position themselves between their own perceptions of right and 
wrong and those of the group. In other words, this book asks how the Self 
is crafted in relation to the group and at the level of the individual. I exam-
ine how group identification is constantly renewed and how the individu-
alization of religious practices may occur at the same time as certain 
religious practices are made normative by the expectations of a faith com-
munity and its take on Islam. Importantly, I also focus on the impact of 
religiosity on how young people perceive their gender and ethnic identity, 
and show the complex dynamic between various sources of identification 
and self-perception.
This book examines how the youth practice Islam within a particular 
group situated in a particular socio-historical moment. Simultaneously, 
the youth are clearly not developing a homogeneous Muslim identity. 
I explore individual differences in how young people related to the weekly 
religious sessions, which is not only a matter of appropriation, but also 
of contestation and transformation. I also examine how these individual 
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26 My research refers to a particular phase in these women’s lives. I recognize that reli-
giosity often varies with age and family situation. This is thus a representation of one 
period in the religious careers of these youth.
27 All names of the youth in this book have been altered to comply with academic eth-
ics. Additionally, I have slightly altered people’s ages in order to further ensure anonymity. 
The age, provided in brackets after the name, refer to the age of the person at the point 
when I started my fieldwork. I have used the real names of prominent leaders of organiza-
tions, where they are public figures and in one case where the person is the author of books 
and thus used as a reference.
differences were negotiated within a specific religious social group.26 
Importantly, this religious group is not defined by one ethnic or national 
group, but instead intentionally draws participants from a variety of back-
grounds. Thus, by examining the Muslim identities of youth from a variety 
of backgrounds, this research also addresses the scholarly gap created by 
research on Islam in Germany having primarily been examined through 
“Turkish lenses.”
During my first period of fieldwork, I discussed media portrayals of 
Muslims with Fatima’s (31).27 She told me that the negative media focus on 
Muslims in Germany is one of the reasons why she felt attracted to MJD:
That is why we need this community [Gemeinschaft]. ‘Cause otherwise you 
start to think that you are the only one thinking like that and you feel so 
alone – so much more difficult. We are the minority here, you know. (…) 
I sometimes wonder how it would be if I lived where I would be in the major-
ity. (…) My sister once said that we should be happy that we are living here 
‘cause we are forced to think about our religion the whole time. Like people 
are asking us questions the whole time and we have to justify ourselves. 
Many in the Arab countries are not really behaving Islamically, also ‘cause 
they are not thinking about it continuously. It’s part of their life, like [every-
thing around them is Islamic, and so they don’t have to think about whether 
they are living Islamically or not]. And, because of that they sometimes do 
not behave or live Islamically at all. I sometimes wonder whether we live 
Islam correctly here. (…) I wonder whether, if the majority society didn’t 
attach so much importance to the headscarf, whether we wouldn’t either— 
I notice that I give my headscarf far more value ‘cause of that. I think that 
when someone is wearing a headscarf she must be strong, ‘cause it’s so dif-
ficult today, so much pressure at school and work, and to be like the others. 
But also, some think that it is enough, to wear a headscarf. Many think that 
someone who is wearing a headscarf is a good Muslim and someone who is 
not wearing it is not. And that is not true either. That is to simplify it.
Fatima’s comments shed light on five aspects of living as a Muslim in 
Berlin that I discuss in this book: first, the role of Islam in shaping the 
youth’s subject formation; second, that youth feel a need to participate in 
a religious community due to a context in which Islam is stigmatized and 
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28 For Germany, see for example Amir-Moazami (2007), Jonker and Amiraux 
(2006), Maréchal, Dassetto, Nielsen and Allievi (2003). For France, see for example 
Bowen (2006), Gaspard and Khosrokhavar (1995), Keaton (2005), Mas (2006), Silverman 
(2007).
because they feel required to think about being a Muslim in order to 
behave as one; third, the youths’ sense that they must justify or legitimate 
their religiously defined behavior in the context of being a minority; 
fourth, the continuous reflection on whether or not each youth behaves in 
an Islamically correct manner; and fifth, the symbols attached to being a 
Muslim. Certain signs, such as the veil, expose the youth as Muslim, the 
meanings of which are not exclusively religious, but are also shaped by the 
political context that has an impact on their (religious) identification and 
behavior in public space.
I concentrate on one main religious organization and a limited number 
of young women and their religious identification for several reasons. 
First, to study youth provides an opportunity to appreciate the creativity 
of religious agency and practice and how religiosity can change over 
time and space. Youth have appeared in studies on Muslims in European 
societies since the mid-1990s, but more often as potential adults rather 
than in their own right. Studying youth and their relation to religiosity is 
particularly important since this generation has begun to make demands 
in the public sphere. A deeper understanding of the conception of Islam 
that contemporary young Muslims are developing in European societies 
is also significant as this generation will in various ways socialize the 
religious beliefs and practices for future generations.
Second, this generation is also engaged in making Islam visible in the 
public sphere and in Islamic activism, as indicated for example by the 
increase in veiling. As Islam has become increasingly visible (through 
political debates, the growing number of mosques being built, and the 
practice of veiling), scholars have discussed the consequence of this 
“coming out” of Islam, both for European societies and for Islam as a 
religion. Some studies have focused on claims made by religious organiza-
tions, particularly in European cities, and argued that there are similarities 
between religious movements and social movements. Others have studied 
governmental responses, policies, and media images related to the heads-
carf.28 Working both on Turkey and France, Göle’s examination of the 
visibility of Islam in public space focuses on the sociological significance 
of the headscarf and women as symbols in the so-called “civilizing proj-
ect” in Turkey (Göle 1996, 5). She argues that the contemporary Muslim 
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29 See in particular Boos-Nünnig and Karakaşoğlu (2005), Karakasoglou (2003a, 2003b), 
Kelek (2002), Nökel (2002), Schröter (2002), Stauch (2004), Venel (1999, 2004).
30 This includes the studies by Karakaşoğlu (2003b), Klinkhammer (1999, 2000) Roy 
(2004), and Schmidt (2004b).
movement is comparable to other social movements, such as feminism 
(Göle 1997). Cesari’s focus, on the other hand, is largely on the social 
dimension of Islam being more visible through what she calls the 
“Islamization of French public space” (Cesari 2005a, 1039), and she looks at 
the resultant public attention and political debates. Bowen (2006) argues 
that the French decision to ban the headscarf in 2004 must be understood 
as a response to a large array of issues and concerns, including Islamic 
fundamentalism, anti-Semitism, the growing ghettoization in the suburbs, 
and the failure of order in schools; issues that are only distantly related to 
the headscarf. There is a need for an increased understanding of the effect 
that this intense public exposure continues to have on youths’ religious 
identification and their process of crafting a religious Self.
Third, several studies suggest that there are indications of reconfigura-
tions and re-formations of Islamic identities among youth. In discussions 
on Muslim youth, studies suggest that a new generation is rejecting 
the Islam of their parents, and that they are developing an autonomous, 
individualistic Islamic identity rooted in European societies.29 Several 
studies claim that a young woman’s views on Islam leads to conflict with 
her parents’ generation who, in the youths’ opinion, have a traditional 
view of Islam.30 In this view, young women are thought to challenge the 
traditionalism of their parents and appeal to a “pure religion” found in 
literature, lectures, and education and which is seen as distinct from 
“cultural” or “traditional” religion (Karakaşoğlu 2003b). Thus, both Sunni 
and Alevi young people are perceived to make an effort to live a pure Islam 
by reconciling Islam with more modern lifestyles, although a cultural 
reference remains important in their adherence to Islam. Yet Muslim 
youth still participate in Islamic organizations, and mosques shape their 
religiosity or religious Self in these spaces. What impact does this partici-
pation have on their formation of an individualized religious identity? In 
examining one religious movement and its participants, this study delves 
into the complex process through which youth develop their religiosity in 
relation to their socio-economic surroundings, peers, the religious scrip-
tures, and their faith community. I argue that in order to understand 
youths’ religiosity, we need to examine how the individual juggles and 
negotiates self-identification and group identification.
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31 Here the idea of being a Good Muslim is examined in relation to a religious discourse, 
and in relation to other Muslims rather than the majority non-Muslim society. Mahmood 
Mamdani (2004) discusses how the idea of “good” Muslims, who are secular and 
Westernized, and “bad” Muslims who are premodern and fanatical are part of the Western 
political discourse. After 9/11, President Bush started to distinguish between “good 
Muslims” and “bad Muslims,” where “bad Muslims” were responsible for terrorism 
(Mamdani 2004, 15). Mamdani argues that such judgments of “good” and “bad” do not refer 
to cultural or religious identities, but to Muslim political identities.
32 Discourse, Foucault argues, governs how a topic can be talked about in a meaningful 
way. It defines legible ways to talk, write, or conduct ourselves, and limits other ways of 
talking or conducting ourselves. Discourse produces meaning and meaningful practice.
The women I worked with belong to a part of the young generation who 
seek to become religiously proximate (Appelros 2007, 9) or what I call 
Good Muslims.31 Being “religiously proximate” refers to the degree to 
which an individual’s religiosity conforms to the religious practice consid-
ered to be at the center of the religion (and thus to the authorities and 
power). Here I think of the youth as trying to become religiously proxi-
mate in the sense that most make an effort to practice, understand, and 
perform the religiously-defined obligations, rituals, and actions in as 
“correct” a manner as possible. I also make reference to piety, which is 
understood as the perfection of virtuous behavior to become religiously 
proximate (Mahmood 2006). The correctness of their beliefs and practices 
is consciously or unconsciously evaluated by situating them in relation to 
the religious discourse displayed by their faith community. I draw on 
Foucault’s understanding of “discourse” as both language and practice, in 
that discourse constructs the topic and both defines and produces the 
objects of our knowledge.32
In trying to shift the focus towards the complex group dynamic that 
takes place in the formation of a religious Self, I focus on how young peo-
ple negotiate their religious identity and identification by reference to 
their religious social group (their faith community), family, peers, their 
ethnic group, the German public, and Muslim and non-Muslim strangers 
in the urban landscape. I suggest that the religious practices of these youth 
must be understood in relation to the need to articulate and legitimate 
their religious practice and belief within the religious social field in which 
they are situated. Thus, this study recognizes the need to treat people as 
contextualized social beings and to describe the thickness of their lives, in 
light of the knowledge that “people live in a world of relationships as well 
as a world of abstract social forces and disembodied images” (Ortner 1997, 




In my operationalization of Islam in this book, I make use of Talal Asad’s 
concept of Islam as a “discursive tradition,” which I first briefly introduce 
here. Furthermore, as the concept of community is a contested one in 
social anthropology, I provide a short clarification of my use of this term. 
Further, in the effort to understand processes of religious identification of 
young Muslims in European societies, the book is guided by two interre-
lated conceptions that need explanation: crafting the Self and identity.
Islam as a Discursive Tradition
No central authority defines or represents Islam theologically, unlike for 
example in Catholicism. The religious doctrine is based on sacred texts 
(the Koran and ahadith) and a set of customs. Religious interpretation is a 
combination of knowledge of divine truth and knowledge of how to put 
this into practice. While there is a tendency for each particular Islamic 
community to claim to represent the pure Islam, the fact that Islam can 
encompass a broad range of interpretations remains unquestioned. All 
Islamic communities have a source of religious authority. In Europe, there 
are competing voices who claim to represent Islam, including educational 
institutions, intellectuals, media, Islamic organizations, communities and 
websites. In Bringa’s words, the place of Islam in people’s daily lives “cre-
ates a community of Muslims and also communicates differences between 
Muslims in life-style, forms of religiosity, practices, and interpretations of 
the role of Islam in everyday life” (Bringa 1995, 197) Simultaneously, there 
is a continued debate over the correct interpretation, practice, and under-
standing of Islam: there are always some Muslims who assert that what 
others take to be Islam is not Islam (Asad 1986).
Too often, Islam is depicted by the media, politicians, and scholars in 
Europe as an unchanging unit with a particular set of characteristics 
(essentialization of Islam), or as haphazardly chosen rules of behavior 
that differ between the various socio-cultural groups (fragmentation of 
Islam). For example, Khosrokhaver (1997) argues that there is a process of 
a fragmentation or pluralization of Islam in France. He writes: “There is 
not one Islam in France, but several, each form following its own dynamic, 
and not letting itself be influenced by the others more than in a limited 
way” (ibid., 23).33 In showing the variety of ways that youth identify with 
33 Author’s translation from the original French: “Il n’existe pas un Islam en France, 
mais plusieurs, chaque forme obéissant à sa propre dynamique et ne se laissant 
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influencer par les autres que de manière limitée.” While this circumvents presumptions 
of Muslim cultural homogeneity and continuity, it simultaneously risks recreating new 
reifications and essentializations of Islam: by focusing on particular kinds of Islam it begs 
the question of which level of abstraction should be the starting point (local, national, 
gendered, individual) for each “type” of Islam.
34 The authors of these terms are as follows “Islam of the youth” (“l’Islam des jeunes”) 
(Cesari 1998; Kepel 1994; Khosrokhavar 1997), “neo-Muslims” (Nökel 2002), “Cool Islam” 
(Boubekeur 2005, 12), “Pop-Islam” (Gerlach 2006), and an “Islam of action” (“Islam d’action”) 
(Weibel 2000).
Islam, empirical studies have proposed that there is an “Islam of the 
youth”, “neo-Muslims”, “Cool Islam”, “Pop-Islam”, and an “Islam of action”.34 
The Islam of the youth is portrayed as new because it is “essentially a non-
ethnic Islam”: it is modern and shaped in the Western European urban 
centers (ibid., 24). In contrast, I agree with the social anthropologist Leif 
Manger’s critique of the artificial construction of a fragmented Islam. He 
writes: “[t]he fact that local traditions developed did not produce many 
Islams but rather many versions of a theme that was continuously devel-
oped in those local traditions, but within a greater tradition” (Manger 
1992, 53).
In line with this, I follow Asad’s (1986) approach to Islam as a discursive 
tradition. According to Asad, “Islam is neither a distinctive social structure 
nor a heterogeneous collection of beliefs, artifacts, customs, and morals. It 
is a tradition” (Asad 1986, 14). Drawing on McIntyre, Asad notes that:
A tradition consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitio-
ners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, pre-
cisely because it is established, has a history. These discourses relate 
conceptually to a past (when the practice was instituted, and from which the 
knowledge of its point and proper performance has been transmitted) and a 
future (how the point of that practice can best be secured in the short or 
long term, or why it should be modified or abandoned), through a present 
(how it is linked to other practices, institutions, and social conditions). 
(Ibid.)
By seeing Islam as a discursive tradition, we can recognize that practitio-
ners are induced to follow certain practices that are viewed as religiously 
correct because of how the practices are situated within a Muslim dis-
course that is oriented by perceptions of the Islamic past and future, while 
being focused on a present Islamic practice. It is a mode of discursive 
engagement based on the sacred texts. As a dynamic process, reforming 
tradition must account for the inherent search for coherence that is 
implicit in traditions (Asad 1998) and in relation to which internal reform 
might be compelled (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003). This conception 
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35 Yet I agree with Ismail (2007) that some difficulties arise from Asad’s analytical focus 
in that it favors the written traditions, and largely omits the oral traditions. As Ismail points 
out, “Muslims occupy differing and multiple positions in various social and national for-
mations that shape how they relate to each other and to their government” (Ismail 2006, 5). 
Ismail stresses the need to situate the representation or signification of belief as part of a 
system of meanings that interrelates with other systems of meaning that are pertinent in 
other social fields.
of Islam can be understood as a specific type of Foucault’s discursive 
formation, where the past is an essential condition for the comprehension 
and reformulation of the present and the future (Mahmood 2005). Like 
Foucault, Asad treats religious discourses as historically situated and 
produced in power relations.
The Islam being examined in this book is an Islam as it is practiced by 
people in daily life, which should not be confused with an examination of 
Islam as a conceptual system. This book looks at how Islam is practiced 
within a particular organization and in daily life, and the challenges the 
youth face when they seek to craft a particular Muslim Self in Germany. 
My account is committed to recognizing the interpretive tradition in 
Islam, and should neither be taken as an account of the complex general 
Islamic awakening, nor as part of the development of an anthropology 
of Islam. I conceptualize Islam as a discursive tradition because this sharp-
ens the focus on young people’s experience of Islam while avoiding a 
homogenization and simplification of Islam as a uniform theological body 
of reference.35
Community
Postmodernism displayed a healthy skepticism towards the presumption 
that an individual is merely a product of their ethnic or religious group or 
community. For a long time, studies of migrants assumed that the migrants 
were rooted in social and cultural collectives that consisted of the extended 
family and ethnic or trans-national networks. This position essentializes 
the individual and their relation to collectivities. Other research, such as 
Gerd Bauman’s (1996) work on group identities developed by the diverse 
inhabitants of Southall, London, go too far in dismantling the concept of 
community. Instead, this book argues for a continued concern with how a 
faith community can shape an individual’s understanding of right and 
wrong and how the community itself is produced through the interactions 
of its members. This argument draws upon the understanding that 
religious belief is not only an individual mode of believing or belonging, 
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36 Not all youth have a faith community and individuals relate to their particular faith 
community differently. People can also change their personal faith community over time.
but is also a collective venture that is communicated socially and is in 
need of regular affirmation (Hervieu-Léger 2001).
I focus on one local faith community, but also discuss interactions with 
and the importance of peers, other Muslim organizations, and imams for 
the youths’ religious identification and performance. Further, the strong 
individualist elements in religious experiences in modern times do not 
imply that the religious content will be individuating (Taylor 2002, 83); 
people will continue to connect to religious communities. I understand 
faith communities as social, religious groups that become the main refer-
ence point for individuals in their search for religious answers, norms, 
rules, ideals, and a space (physically and virtually) in which to share 
and shape their religious beliefs. I take up Ammerman’s call to consider 
religious organizations as “a shifting collection of persons, engaged in a 
complex set of actions and rhetoric, actions that are supported by and 
indeed define the collectivity they inhabit” (Ammerman 2003, 208). This 
description challenges a static view of religious groups and their activities 
and recognizes differences among individuals who participate in the same 
organization.36
This book is driven by a desire to better understand the aspirations, 
aims, and desires of these young women, while retaining a critical per-
spective on their conduct. The Muslim woman is under scrutiny by politi-
cians, the media, the (wo)man in the street, and scholars. Restricting her 
to a fixed position is a fallacy risked by sometimes well-meaning and 
sometimes less well-meaning politicians and scholars. To avoid this, 
I avoid dichotomies like traditional/modern and instead acknowledge the 
multiplicity of voices, which are themselves affected by being part of a 
faith community.
Crafting the Self
I seek to conceptualize the term “crafting of a religious Self” empirically, 
where becoming a virtuous or Good Muslim is the objective of the actor. 
Here, I refer to the crafting of the Self as a continuous, creative process 
(Kondo 1990, 48) through which the individual becomes a subject as she 
(or he) constantly positions her (or him) Self and is summoned into a 
position of interaction with a variety of discursive social fields. The con-
cept of “crafting” directs our attention to the creativity involved as well as 
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to the processes of a continuous formation of the subject. It also requires 
us to pay attention to the larger interactive field and social relations 
that an individual continuously relates to and which cannot be easily 
controlled.
I endeavor here not to situate the subject in a location, but rather exam-
ine how the subject actively envisions herself vis-à-vis a position or ideals. 
The cultural theorist Richard Johnson insists that “subjectivities are pro-
duced, not given, and are therefore the objects of inquiry, not the premises 
or starting points” (Johnson 1986, 44). Johnson and the anthropologist 
Kondo (1990) consider the crafting of the self as being context- and 
paradigm-specific, meaning that the self is simultaneously variable and 
temporary. Selves are never absolute, but are rather, as Kondo argues, 
“nodal points repositioned in different contexts. Selves, in this view, can be 
seen as rhetorical figures and performative assertions enacted in specific 
situations within fields of power, history, and culture” (Kondo 1990, 304). 
This approach can be critiqued for being reductionist in that it may be 
read as proposing a radical constructionism. In drawing on the concept of 
crafting, I am aware of this danger. I seek to avoid a reductionist approach 
to the subject by insisting on the interconnection of the crafting of the 
subject and structural dynamics (see McNay 2008, 9). I insist that subject 
formation and social structures are connected in intrinsic ways in that 
impersonal forces shape—often subtly—the requirements of everyday 
life. Furthermore, I also rely on concepts of social identity and identifica-
tion that recognize that the individual Self must be understood as formed 
in relation to socially relevant others and in relation to various nomos 
present in a multiplicity of social fields within which the subject acts. In 
short, the examination of the Self as crafted must be situated within 
spheres of power and group formation processes that shape, limit, and 
provide opportunities regarding how the Self is crafted.
We cannot derive selfhood from culture and we cannot derive the virtu-
ous subject from religion or religious texts. At stake here is the recognition 
that “culture can never simply determine individual agency, although it 
certainly sets out the patterns within which that agency becomes intelli-
gible, and is open to consideration and self-reflection” (Moore 2007, 36). 
Several anthropologists are critical of a portrayal the Self as being 
controlled, subsumed, or obedient to cultural categories.37 These scholars 
are developing an analytical framework that highlights how the Self is 
37 I am particularly thinking of Cohen (1994), Ewing (1998), Kondo (1990) and Moore 
(2007).
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38 To Cohen (1994), culture remains the main concept in anthropology, and he argues 
that self-consciousness is another way to study it.
39 In his later work on technologies of the self, Michel Foucault turned his attention to 
the question of how the self constitutes itself as a subject (see Foucault 1988, which was 
published after his death). Technologies of the self, Foucault argues, are found in various 
forms in all cultures.
40 One of the advantages of the concept of the field is that it makes it possible, par-
ticularly in the context of gender-related research, to conceptualize power relations that 
produced in interaction with culture and others, without being reduced to 
these relations or categories. Instead, a sense of invention, negotiation, 
and opposition is retained. On the one hand, we need to focus on the 
individual as self-motivated and not only responding to their social mate-
rial context.38 On the other hand, the Self is not autonomous or situated 
outside social relations of power. Rather, to craft oneself as a pious or 
Good Muslim implies a set of techniques of mind-body practices, norms, 
and ideals through which distinctive Selves should gain a particular kind 
of agency.
This book examines how young people continuously interact with an 
“Islamic discourse” (Asad 1986) in their crafting of a religious Self. The 
Islamic discourse that is given form within MJD represents a culturally 
and historically specific pathway to self-realization, but also possibly to 
domination of certain power structures (see Kondo 1990). Young women 
craft a religious Self through complex social realities. I consider this craft-
ing of a religious Self to take place though the “technology of the self,” 
namely as operations that one person performs on themselves in order to 
become a specific ethical subject (Foucault 1988). The term “technologies 
of the self” is discussed in chapter 4; suffice to say here that “technologies 
of the self” are practices by which subjects constitute themselves as 
subjects within and through systems of power (ibid.).39
Social Field
The crafting of a Self is a contextual and historically positioned act that is 
situated within power relations and that must be understood as crafted 
within “social fields” (Bourdieu 1990). Youth, like all social persons, move 
in different social fields (Bourdieu 1990; Grønhaug 1972), environments, 
and settings, and they meet other people face to face in these contexts. 
Bourdieu understands society as composed of a number of overlapping 
social fields of activity that are “relatively autonomous ‘worlds’” (Bourdieu 
1994, 73). Each social field has a different logic or structure of requi-
sites and significance, which is both the result and generator of the spe-
cific habitus proper to that field.40 Habitus refers to a set of corporal 
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are not embraced by the idea of the private and the public. The social field is not a deter-
minist category as “its internal relations are multidimensional and, as a generative princi-
ple, the habitus is able to react back upon the field and alter it, it ‘transforms that by which 
it is determined’ (Vandenberghe 1999: 50)” (McNay 2008, 13). All fields have a socio-political 
history and change over time (Grønhaug 1999).
41 The concept of habitus recognizes that subjectivity is realized through practice.
42 I recognize that a variety of social spaces, such as the school, family, and friends, 
advocate different disciplinary practices or technologies which may encourage a similar or 
yet another regime of the person (Rose 1996). The family is a particularly important site 
where Selves are crafted. The family is outside the scope of this project because in light of 
the current politicization of and suspicion directed towards Muslim organizations it is 
important to improve our understanding of what is going on within them.
dispositions and cognitive templates that are culturally and socially condi-
tioned (Bourdieu 1990, 2004 [1977]). These are acquired by individuals 
through their socialization and life experiences, which in turn produce 
social practices. It is a repertoire of neither entirely conscious nor entirely 
unconscious outlooks, values, perceptions, and orientations that direct 
personal goals and social interactions.41 Each social field is regulated and 
ruled by its own nomos, which is the field’s premise or its social laws that 
determine what is considered valid and significant. In short, different 
everyday spaces of activity operate according to distinct sets of rules that 
create the expectations to the self-presentation of individuals who shift 
into and between these spaces.
In this study, my main concern is how young people in MJD craft their 
religious Selves within a faith community that is situated within a larger 
religious social field. This larger field encompasses the various Islamic 
movements in Berlin at a local level, in Germany at a national level, and 
the worldwide Islamic movements at a global level. The Islam (as a discur-
sive tradition) that is taught and practiced within this faith community 
provides the main premises for what being a Good Muslim means for the 
youth in this study. I show that the youths’ religious identification and the 
crafting of their religious Selves must be understood as formed within a 
specific religious field. This social field is shaped not only by the particular 
socio-historical context of Germany and its history of migration, secular 
formation, and approach to integration, but also by processes of religious 
revivalism and dynamics of globalization and transnationalism.42
A subject’s effort to become a Good Muslim is continuously crafted in 
relation to their socio-economic context and historical time and space. 
Crafting a religious Self within a Sunni Muslim youth organization in 
Berlin will be different from crafting a Muslim Self in a public school in 
Cairo. What or who is pious or virtuous is evaluated by comparisons to 
what is impious or to those who are not virtuous (Turner 2008, 3). Everyday 
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negotiation, reflection, and resistance are situated within mechanisms 
and processes of power within which constituencies are formed. In this 
analysis, the Self is creative, relational, and reflective, but at the same time 
entangled in cultural and religious frameworks, including social, moral, 
and value discourses (see Moore 2007, 37) that regulate the various social 
fields.
Social Identity and Group Dynamics
Social identity is the understanding one has of who one is and who other 
people are (Jenkins 1996). Identity processes, whether involving individu-
als or collectivities, are always social. This means that they are established 
through interaction. As Jenkins argues, “others don’t just perceive our 
identity, they actively constitute it. And they do so not only in terms of 
naming or categorising, but in terms of how they respond to or treat us” 
(ibid., 74). Although identity is a construction that is always in process 
(Hall 1996a), I argue that identity cannot be developed or chosen freely, 
but rather needs to be understood as an ongoing process of constant inter-
action with one’s social environment (Gullestad 2002).
Self-image, the way one sees oneself and would like to be seen by oth-
ers, and public image, how one is categorized by others, do not necessarily 
overlap. Nevertheless, in the continuous making of social identity there is 
usually some relationship between self-image(s) and public image(s) 
(Jenkins 2000). The sense of self is developed from early childhood, partly 
through verbal and nonverbal dialogue between the child and socially rel-
evant others (ibid., 11). This dialogue is a multifaceted interaction of sepa-
ration from and identification with socially relevant others, which informs 
the child of who they are and what they should do. Even during the period 
of early socialization, categorization is part of constructing a sense of who 
one is. In the transition from youth to adulthood, both how young people 
see themselves (cf. Willis 1977) and how they are categorized by others 
shape their future. Additionally, youth experience life differently due to 
available resources. As youth grow up, “processes of identification begin to 
have material consequences” (Jenkins 2000, 12).
Although group identity presupposes collective internal definitions, it 
also includes categorization from others (Jenkins 1996, 84).43 Collective 
43 A category does not mean that its members are aware of their collective identifica-
tion. Most often, people would know that they have been categorized, but are not necessar-
ily completely aware of the impact and content of that categorization. Whereas a group 
is distinguished by the nature of the relations between its members, membership of a 
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category does not involve mutual recognition of that categorization, since this would 
involve the first step towards group identification (Jenkins 1996).
44 The question of how and why an individual achieves, consents to, or opposes parts of 
social identities, including gender, religion, class, and ethnicity, is one of the main features 
of the organization and experience of self-other connections (Moore 2007, 38). Moore 
remarks that the discourses on identity and self seldom intersect in anthropology. 
I have chosen to do so here as I agree with Moore that there is a connection between the 
Self and identification.
identities are generated both by group identification and by social catego-
rization. These identities are generated in transaction and interaction, and 
are thus, at least potentially, flexible, situational and negotiable (Barth 
1994b). At the same time, as Barth (1994b) argues, collective identification 
is inherently political.
I investigate how the various dimensions of social life—and in particu-
lar the cultural and political dimensions—come into play to different 
degrees, and I also examine how they inform the process through which 
youth identify with Islam. Further, I investigate how religious identifica-
tion informs how young people reach an understanding of their other 
social identities. How a person lives out their religious identity will 
have consequences for their gender and ethnic identification. What 
holds these identities together is a “superordinate, narrative, self-reflective 
self” (Moore 2007, 38). The self is the result of both identification 
with inner experiences and with groups, cultural representations, and 
other individuals. Identity, thus, is the “sense of self that results from 
identification” (ibid., 39). Such identifications can be social and subjec-
tive, meaning that they include both social and individualistic features of 
the self (ibid.).44
Rather than being concerned with the individual Self per se, this 
book aims to understand how social relationships are constituted and 
substantiated. As meanings are shared and asserted within smaller com-
munities, it is essential to recognize how individuals come together to 
shape these communities (Berger and Luckman 1967). Participants in MJD 
take part in forming a new social grouping with a specific system of soli-
darity, and as such the group helps bring forth new collective protagonists 
in the German public sphere. By recognizing internal conflicts and con-
versations, I highlight the continuous process of negotiation and reject the 
simplistic idea that youth are either indoctrinated within Muslim spaces 
or merely indifferent to these discussions. I explore both how a subject’s 
religiosity is informed by her social location within the group, and how a 
subject pursues available strategies and creative ways of acting.
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Outline
Chapter 1 situates and presents the key religious organization, MJD, in 
which most of the youth in this study participated. In order to position the 
organization in Berlin, as well as within the broader field of Islamic revival, 
this chapter details the organization’s aim, profile and characteristics. 
I briefly outline the process that led to MJD being scrutinized by the media 
and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt 
für Verfassungsschutz). This is followed by a discussion about the method-
ological and epistemological implications this scrutiny had for my 
research. This is a research account about participant observation (the 
access to the field), how I pursued my understanding of what the youth 
were doing, and the complexities I encountered in representing their 
practices.
Chapter 2 introduces the conceptual socio-geographical landscape of 
young Muslim women in Berlin through an empirical study of how reli-
giously devoted Muslim women in Berlin perceive religious spaces while 
seeking a religious mode of living and a religious way of inhabiting the 
city. I first explore the visual impact Islam has on public places and spaces 
in Berlin as Muslims seek to live religiously. I then examine how young 
women perceive their engagement with mosques and other local religious 
social spaces. I argue that in order to understand young people’s religious 
participation, attention must be paid to the youths’ ethnic backgrounds, 
their religious orientations, and their individual experiences.
Chapter 3 delineates the concept of the Other and examines how ste-
reotypical and Othering discourses about Islam and Muslims in Germany 
have multiple implications for the daily life and identification processes of 
the young Muslim women in MJD. At the weekly meetings, the youth are 
taught and give each other advice on how to best behave, which can be 
considered a way of becoming streetwise (cf. Anderson 1990). I suggest 
that practices such as reminders to each other to be friendly in public 
spaces, to help older women with bags, and to use humor, are part of 
everyday micro-politics that attempt to subvert stained perceptions of 
Muslims in the public sphere. I argue that the young women’s efforts to 
improve their knowledge of Islam and to practice how to best react can be 
considered a tactic (de Certeau 1984) that aims to challenge ingrained 
hegemonic power structures and improve negative images of Islam.
Chapter 4 examines how the youth craft a religious Self by reference to 
virtuous Islamic ideals presented in the MJD faith community. In this con-
text, the youth critique traditional practices by making a distinction 
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between pure and traditional Islam. I focus on three aspects through 
which the crafting of a religious Self takes place: learning to distinguish 
between culture and religion; emphasizing the relation between internal 
and external motions; and a focus on character. I examine the process 
through which these distinctions are established, and how they are 
actively learned, played out, and performed.
Chapter 5 discusses different trajectories of religious action available 
for a young woman who seeks to craft her Self as a Good Muslim. I suggest 
that young women are not crafting themselves in a uniform way with 
respect to what they are taught about religious ideas and ideals. This chap-
ter raises questions such as, which paths are open for an individual, and 
which do not undermine or challenge her religious Self? How can a young 
woman creatively craft a religious Self without challenging, contesting, or 
openly confronting existing religious norms? I illustrate how even if the 
young women are not always religiously diligent, they do not necessarily 
feel that they are failing their religious Self. The religious identity and 
identification with Islam is more complex than picking and choosing 
between Islamic concepts and values.
Chapter 6 illustrates how religious identification informs the youths’ 
understanding of gender relations and ethnic identifications. How do the 
youth do gender religiously? How do gender, ethnicity, and class intersect 
in the crafting of Muslim identities in Berlin? I examine how MJD meet-
ings cultivate a religious gender order and how young people’s response to 
this shapes a religious gendered habitus (Bourdieu 1990, 2004 [1977]). This 
chapter proposes that how young people perceive their ethnic and gender 
identification is a consequence of their religious identification, which dis-
tinguishes between a pure and a traditional Islam. I argue that at the level 
of group identification, women make a discursive change in their percep-
tion of gender roles from those of their parents’ culture and traditions, to 
a perception of gender roles defined by Islamic norms and ideals.
Chapter 7 investigates the motivating forces for the women’ decisions to 
participate in a religious organization while living in a secularized society. 
What motivates a young woman growing up in Germany to participate in 
a religious social space and to take up religious subject positions? I argue 
that their religious identification and practices must be understood both 
in relation to the socio-economic context and the meanings they give to 
their practices. Religiously defined meanings tend to be explained away by 
anthropologists by locating them in social and historical structures, or in 
psychology. I seek instead to take religiosity at face value, by paying atten-
tion to its social dimension, and to how belief in God can show the way to 
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certain practices and actions, without passing any judgment on this belief. 
In doing so, I contend that the experience of simultaneously coming of 
age and searching for a religious lifestyle needs to be included in any 
understanding of this religious subject formation, the identification with 
Islam, and the specific faith community.
The conclusion draws together the arguments from each chapter and 
provides an overview of the discussions and ethnographic findings. It also 
examines some analytical and theoretical contributions that this study 
makes to wider conversations in anthropology about religiosity and reli-
gious identity.
1 Whether or not MJD or members of MJD have links to radical or fundamentalist Islam 
is not the focus of this research. One of the few publications that has dealt with MJD in 
Germany is Gerlach’s “Zwischen Pop und Dschihad. Muslimische Jugendliche in 
Deutschland” (“Between Pop and Dschihad: Young Muslims in Germany”) (2006). However, 
this book is based on interviews and provides a very general impression of young educated 
Muslims in Germany from a more journalistic point of view. The author calls participants 
in MJD and this generation of well-educated and socially active youth “pop Muslims” 
(Gerlach 2006), a term I object to for two reasons; first, many of the youth I worked with 
discussed this book and felt that this terminology did not respect them and their activities; 
second, the term not only neglects, but also take attention away from, how the religiosity 
of the youth is part of a complex process where the youth actively interact with religious 
sources.
2 Rijk van Dijk and Peter Pels argue that “[e]thnographic dialogue is always contextual-
ised by an authority of power relations that conditions and inhibits it” (van Dijk and Pels 
1996, 245). The power relations are not unidirectional; whereas the researcher can (mis)use 
CHAPTER ONE
SITUATING THE FIELD AND METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
The documentary maker bends over and the world enters them, chance 
encounters, happenstance and surprise are their playgrounds. “Oh look,” 
someone says, invariably a stranger, they fill their life with strangers, and 
then they look. They make trips whose destination is unknown, and from 
which there are no return fares. When you come back, you never arrive at 
the same place. 
–Mike Hoolboom 2005, 100
This chapter is a research account about participant observation: I discuss 
how I gained access to the field, how I have approached young people’s 
understanding of what they are doing, and how I represent (or “translate”) 
this. The fact that MJD was being scrutinized by the media and that the 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz) suspected it of being connected to the Muslim 
Brotherhood turned out to have consequences for my fieldwork and epis-
temological foundation.1 How should the anthropologist deal with a situ-
ation where she is met with suspicion by both the organization being 
studied and the potential readers of the final research? The socio- 
historical context in which my fieldwork was positioned meant that I daily 
had to deal with discourses that were politicized differently by different 
actors. Both “researchers” and the “researched” might be aware of the 
difficulty of retaining social, cultural and even political objectivity.2 
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the voices of the researched, the researcher’s voice can later be used by the researched 
(ibid.). Thus, the power relations between the “researcher” and the “researched” are not 
straightforward; the “researched” can, in case of distrust or dislike, try to keep information 
from the researcher or avoid contact with her/him altogether.
3 According to its website, HDI is a member of the ZMD (Zentralrat der Muslime in 
Deutschland), an umbrella organization of Islamic organizations and communities. Their 
website also notes that HDI, within the framework of youth-work in Germany, works 
together with MJD. Thus, at infrequent intervals, MJD uses HDI’s premises, and members 
of MJD help with HDI’s youth work. See www.hausdesislam.de, accessed December 8, 
2007.
4 The Milli Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş, IGMG) is closely linked with 
political Islam in Turkey, including the Refah Partisi (Welfare party) and its predecessors 
(Henkel 2004). The nature and quality of this relationship is disputed. A report by the 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (1999, 164; 2000, 207) argues that the 
IGMG is an extremist Islamist organization that aims to hinder the social and cultural 
Further, the researched might ask questions about potential hidden agen-
das and particular viewpoints.
The first part of this chapter provides an overview of MJD, the primary 
religious organization in which most of the young second-generation 
migrants in this study participated. I discuss the organization’s goals, par-
ticipants, and public profile in order to situate it within the field of German 
Muslim organizations, and within the wider global trend of Islamic revival. 
The second part of the chapter reflects upon the discursive position of 
MJD in the German public sphere, my methodological choices, and the 
challenge of suspending judgment.
Introducing MJD: A New Generation of Muslims
MJD’s Beginnings
The religious youth organization Muslim Youth in Germany (Muslimische 
Jugend in Deutschland e.V., MJD) was established in 1994 under the “House 
of Islam” (Haus des Islam e.V, HDI) which is based in Lützelbach by eight 
young Muslims between 17 and 20 years old.3 Starting modestly with the 
idea of providing religious teaching and activities to youth born in 
Germany, the initiative later split off from HDI and registered indepen-
dently in a small village in Baden-Württemberg, which is in the south-
western part of Germany. Comprising approximately 50 branches 
Germany-wide, the organization is currently the second-largest Muslim 
youth organization in Germany, after Milli Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft 
Milli Görüş, IGMG).4 Fatima (31) told me that during a Muslim camp in 
1994, organized for youth from across Germany by HDI, a Muslim brother 
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integration of youth into German society. What is clear is that IGMG represents a more 
politicized version of Islam, endorsing Muslim activism in the public sphere, and asserting 
that in order to secure an Islamic life, Muslims must have political representation. See for 
example Şen and Aydin (2002). For a critical discussion about the regular accusations 
against IGMG as threatening the German national identity, see Ewing (2003). See also 
Schiffauer (2008) for a discussion of the relation between the Federal Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution and Islamic organizations, and Schiffauer (2004) for a dis-
cussion of Milli Görüş in Germany. Appendix I provides a short overview of the Muslim 
organizations in Germany, with a specific focus on the major organizations in Berlin.
5 The national British Muslim Youth Organization (YM UK, Young Muslims UK), which 
was established as a national youth moment in 1984, springs from the Islamic Youth 
Movement (IYM), which was established in the 1970s. It focuses on second-generation 
Muslims. It was inspired by the influential Islamic ideologue Khurram Murad, who thought 
the time was ready to “provide opportunities for the development of an educated elite that 
would provide ways of connecting with and provide leadership to a new generation of 
Muslim young people” (Hamid 2009, 4). For an analysis of that organization’s establish-
ment, structure and ideology, see Hamid (2009).
6 According to the MJD meeting pamphlet, there were 150 youth at the first MJD sum-
mer camp (1995), and in recent years around 750 youth have attended. In 2006, the organiz-
ers had to close the registration at 1,200 (MJD meeting pamphlet, available online at www 
.mjd-meeting.de, (accessed March 24, 2009).
7 Some authors suggest that FEMYSO is linked with the Muslim Brotherhood (see 
Vidino 2005). While there may well be links, in particularly ideological ones, the evidence 
for these accusations mostly consists of “guilt by association,” which I discuss further in 
this chapter.
from the United Kingdom told them about a youth organization for 
Muslims in England.5 Fatima recalls sitting around a campfire saying, 
“would it not be great if you were living in Hamburg, but were moving to 
Aachen, and you would know where you could find other young Muslims 
who actively practice their religion?”
Weekly MJD meetings attract few people—often less than 10 young 
women—but annual national meetings, such as the summer camps, are 
more popular, with an upper limit of approximately 1,200 participants.6 
Similar Muslim youth organizations exist in Austria, France, Italy, Norway, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, and MJD is represented at the European 
level by FEMYSO (Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student 
Organisations) which was established in Leicester (United Kingdom) in 
1996.7 According to a shura member and the MJD homepage, MJD is 
funded by an annual membership fee, events, donations (from previous 
members, parents and friends), and income from the religious bookstore 
“Green Palace,” which MJD owned since 2000–2001 and until it closed 
down in 2010. As I discuss further below, since 2003, the organization has 
faced negative media attention and suspicion, and in 2005, the Federal 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution included MJD on its list of 
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8 The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution officers monitors publica-
tions, statements and meetings to identify potentially violent radicals or terrorists; this 
includes monitoring explicitly non-violent Islamists. In the 2005 Federal report on extrem-
ists, 28 Muslim organizations (compared to 24 in 2004) – Arab, Pakistani, Turkish and 
Turkish-German – are categorized as “Islamist” (see Crisis Group Europe Report N°181 
2007, 16). A report that scrutinizes the work of the German Federal Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution argues that “[t]o arrive at the number of ‘Islamists’, authorities count 
those belonging (or paying dues) to these organisations. The federal Bundesverfassungss-
chutz estimates that roughly 1 per cent (32,100) of the Muslim population is Islamist, 
including 27,250 of Turkish and 3350 of Arab origin” (Crisis Group Europe Report 2007, 
14–15). The report concludes that “[a]t the very least, Bundesverfassungsschutz surveil-
lance is an overly blunt instrument that leads to stigmatisation and the lumping together 
of the many non-violent with the few potentially violent. Aggressive mosque raids and 
administrative exclusion of ‘undesirable’ (though actually law-abiding) interlocutors give 
fodder to extremists, who thrive on an antagonistic relationship with the state. (…). It is 
unlikely that the creation of Islamic milieus through Islamist organizations (such as week-
end trips, summer camps, sports groups, and computer courses) actually serve as effective 
‘recruitment’ areas” (Crisis Group Europe Report N°181 2007, 16).
Islamist organizations in Baden-Württemberg. In 2006, it was also included 
on the list for Hessen (where the annual national MJD meeting takes 
place).8
According to Fatima (31), one of the main reasons MJD was established 
was that young people did not feel comfortable in the mosques estab-
lished by their parents. Despite internal modifications in the late 1990s, 
the organizational structures of most mosques have largely remained eth-
nically determined and anchored in national or ethnic ties to the partici-
pants’ country of origin instead of linking to the worldwide Islamic 
community (the umma). Fatima recalled that as a teenager in the mid-
1990s, she and her peers found the mosques boring and many participated 
only to humor their parents. The seminars and religious lectures were 
given in the language of their parents, which not all of the youth were flu-
ent in, and answers were given by imams (formally trained prayer leaders) 
who were brought from their parents’ country of origin and who were 
therefore unfamiliar with the specific German socio-political situation. 
Fatima, and other religiously active youth, feared that this would have a 
negative effect on their own generation’s religiosity. She felt that religious 
education within the family had failed, and that this was partly because 
their parents were part of the “Atatürk generation,” which had not received 
a “proper religious education.” In her opinion, the older generation was 
unable to teach Islam properly, since they are uneducated and tend to mix 
religion with traditions from their villages. Further, the young founders of 
MJD felt that what they saw as an increased secularization among migrant 
youth would not lead to better integration in German society, but rather to 
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   9 Cesari (2003) suggests that the limited religious education within the family is a 
result of how their parents approached Islam during the early phase of migration. 
According to Cesari, the parents paid little attention to Islamic instruction as they viewed 
their settlement in France as temporary. She further points to the limited number of Koran 
schools in France where children could receive religious instruction, something that 
changed in the 1980s. Schiffauer (1988) suggests that the first generation of Turkish migrants 
also went through a process of change in their relation to Islam in Germany.
10 The concept of the umma is generally translated as community. However, it is a more 
complex concept within the Islamic discursive tradition. For a discussion of this term, see 
Asad (2003, 199) and Mandaville (2004).
11 In Berlin, the term “multi-culti” is politically thick, most often related to migration and 
integration policies targeting youth with migrant backgrounds living in Berlin and initia-
tives to integrate them. The youth make use of this term about themselves, mostly in a 
positive manner, and sometimes jokingly.
impolite, troubled and confused behavior by these youth. According to 
Fatima, what she called the second and third generations of migrants 
should be taught about the “pure Islam” (versus a “traditional” or “cultural” 
Islam), which would allow them to use Islamic ideas as a way to integrate 
(rather than assimilate) into German society.9 The creation of new spaces 
of and structures for learning and for developing and expressing youth’s 
religiosity should open up for new ways of identifying as Muslim in 
Germany.
The Structure of MJD
MJD is a representative organization, in that it exemplifies some of the 
general current changes in the religious identity of Muslim youth in 
European cities. Its structure and characteristics can be seen as a reaction 
towards the current situation of Islam in Europe, both internally (how 
Muslims are organized in Europe) and externally (how Islam is depicted 
by the majority society). Moreover, MJD can be considered part of a 
broader Islamic resurgence among young Muslims worldwide. Although 
MJD draws on Islamic authorities and knowledge from all over the global 
Islamic umma (the worldwide Islamic community), it seeks to instruct 
participants in how to best live as young Muslims in Germany.10
MJD differs from other Muslim organizations in Germany in four ways 
(Bendixsen 2009b). First, it considers itself “multi-culti” because most 
members of the group in Berlin are born or raised in Germany and have 
parents from different countries or ethnic groups, including Bosnia, Egypt, 
the Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iraq, Turkey, Palestine, Syria and Sudan.11 
The group is also frequented by children of mixed marriages (e.g. a German 
mother and an Egyptian father) and German converts. One of the main 
aims of the organization is that the youth should primarily identify as 
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12 The neighborhoods in Berlin with the highest density of Muslim residents are 
Neukölln, Wedding and Kreuzberg. Kreuzberg is nicknamed “little Istanbul.” The charac-
teristics of these neighborhoods are discussed in chapter 2.
13 The chairperson of MJD has always been male. The previous chairs are: Muhammad 
Siddiq (1994–1995), Rüstü Aslandur, Imran Sagir, Khallad Swaid (2001), Bilal el-Zayat (2003–
2005), Mohammed Nabil Abdulazim (2006–2008) and Hischam Abul Ola (2008). From 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslimische_Jugend_in_Deutschland, accessed April 20, 
2009 and http://www.mjd-net.de/steckbriefe, accessed August 6, 2012.
Muslims, and only secondarily by ethnicity or nationality, including as 
German. Secondly, the organization is German-speaking. Most of the 
participants are born in Germany and feel more proficient in German. 
One of the group’s main goals is to change the idea that it is impossible to 
be both German and Muslim. Thirdly, the organization has an elected 
shura (“consultation,” also translated as “committee”), but it is based out-
side a mosque and does not employ imams or educated religious teachers. 
Indeed, established mosques were initially skeptical to the idea that the 
young Muslims in the group would be able to combine references to the 
Koran, books, ahadith and the internet and TV instead of making use of 
imams. Fourthly, it is organized by and for young people between the ages 
of 15 and 30, with weekly local meetings organized by a leader elected 
from among the membership. The local groups have gender-divided 
weekly meetings: one day for the “brothers,” another for the “sisters.” The 
majority of its female participants do not live in Kreuzberg, but in other 
parts of Berlin, including Neukölln, Wedding and Spandau.12
The general structure of this particular religious youth organization 
consists of a national shura with ten members elected every two years by 
a membership meeting (in 2012, the shura consisted of seven female and 
five male members), and a male chairperson/president (Vorsitzender, 
Amir).13 The shura, whose members meet in different German cities or 
towns every four to six weeks, is responsible for all MJD activities and rep-
resents MJD at the national level. The shura deals with general questions 
from other organizations or local MJD groups, and plans MJD events and 
their religious content. Individual assignments are delegated to different 
AG (working groups), such as the Editorial AG, Organizational AG, 
Handbook AG (which develops the branch handbooks used by the differ-
ent local branches), Fun Day AG, Regional AG, Meeting AG, Dialogue AG 
and the newly (2008) developed Design AG. Anyone can become active in 
an AG. There are also one or two people responsible for contact with the 
press. In sum, MJD is, as far as I know, the only organized multi-ethnic 
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14 Though the age limit was set to 15, occasionally some of the participants at the meet-
ings and events were younger.
15 According to Şen (2007), 19 percent of youth (18–29 years old) with Turkish back-
grounds belonged to a mosque organization in 2005, compared to 21 percent in 2000. In the 
same period, 41 percent of the youth were using the cultural, social or educational activi-
ties offered by the mosque organizations (ibid., 24–27). Slightly differently, Şen & Sauer 
(2006, 35) suggest that 55 percent of Muslims with Turkish backgrounds are not members 
of a mosque organization, although 72 percent visit mosques occasionally and 40 percent 
make use of the cultural or educational facilities. Only 23 percent are members themselves, 
while 22 percent are affiliated with an organization through a family member.
16 Author’s translation from the German original in the leaflet ‘Selbstdarstellung der 
Muslimischen Jugend in Deutschland e.V’ (Self-representation of the Muslim Youth in 
Germany), published April 2003. MJD presents its goal as being “to assist in the integration 
of Muslim youth, by offering them a perspective from which to develop their creativity and 
religious social space in Germany for Muslim youth that offers religious 
knowledge in German and that is managed by and for youth.14
Profile of the Participants
MJD attracts young, well-educated, and upwardly mobile Muslims from 
immigrant families; participants are likely to be active in future represen-
tations of Islam in the German public sphere. For the first time, a large 
group of ethnically mixed Muslim youth in Germany is coming together to 
learn about Islam in German, while categorizing themselves as German 
Muslims. The majority is educated in a Western intellectual tradition, is 
socially and politically well-informed, and most are active users of the 
media and the Internet. On average, the youth I worked with had a higher 
level of participation in organized religious activities than that of the gen-
eral Muslim population in Germany.15 However, the young women who 
spoke with me differed in terms of their socio-cultural background and 
character. Some disliked but tolerated each other. Most had passed the 
Abitur (qualifying examination for university), although this did not apply 
to all. Some worked, others studied at university, in programs such as law, 
Islamic studies, social education, graphic design, education, or dentistry, 
or aspired to become doctors. The majority sought to acquire more knowl-
edge of Islam and religious practices, and searched for better ways to live 
according to Islam in a non-Muslim country. Thus, they represent a part of 
a young generation in Europe that is turning to Islam as a form of 
identification.
MJD’s main focus is on youth, and its stated goal is “to integrate Muslim 
youth by providing an opportunity to develop their creativity and talents 
as young German Muslims in the German language.”16 My impression of 
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talents as well as abilities and qualifications as young Muslims and to participate actively 
in the constitution of the society. At the same time, young Muslims should be supported in 
finding their identity” (author’s translation from the original German). See also MJD’s 
homepage: www.mjd-net.de.
17 Chapter 4 discusses what participants’ ideas about a “pure Islam” include and how 
the youth explicitly mention the traditions of their parents. I use this term as an emic 
(description of behavior or belief in terms that are meaningful to the actor) rather than etic 
concept (description of a behavior or belief by an observer), making no judgment as to 
whether or not their concept of a “pure Islam” is theologically more “correct” than that of 
their parents.
18 Telephone interview with member of the shura June 17, 2008. MJD’s Facebook page 
had 2,413 likes as of December 27, 2012. This official MJD Facebook page was founded on 
October 27, 2010.
19 The membership fee is 3 EURO monthly, which makes it financially accessible to 
most.
20 According to one shura member, some youth groups situated within mosque organi-
zations prefer to be unofficially associated with MJD. This is particularly the case when the 
MJD’s main activities fall into three categories: at the local level, it targets 
Muslim youth of both genders who want to live as religiously proximate or 
Good Muslims in Germany; as an organization, it seeks to attract young 
so-called “born Muslims” who are religiously inactive or who do not per-
form the “pure” Islam; and at a national level, MJD takes on a public role in 
representing Islam in Germany through dialogues with politicians and 
journalists, and in interfaith projects.17 From my fieldwork, I have the 
impression that most MJD activities target and attract young people who 
are already religiously oriented and who seek religious knowledge by 
attending weekly meetings.
There is an open door policy, and young members are encouraged to 
bring friends to meetings. According to the official membership numbers, 
there are 600 members nationwide (2008). This does not correspond to 
the numbers of young people who actually participate in meetings; 
according to the national MJD leader, only about 30 percent of the partici-
pants at annual conferences are official members.18 According to the 
leader of the shura, the organization does not actively promote member-
ship, as its goal is to provide religious activities to every young person 
rather than represent a particular Muslim community to public bodies in 
Germany. Participants may be reluctant to become members due to their 
personal financial situation or a perception that there may be personal 
consequences if they become formal members of a group that is under 
surveillance.19 Some Muslim youth groups situated within different 
mosques and organizations are unofficially associated with MJD.20
Despite the relatively low number of participants, MJD plays an impor-
tant public role within the larger religious social field in Germany and in 
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the German public sphere. They do so by inviting German government 
representatives to events, giving interviews in the media (TV, newspapers, 
and magazines), and as individuals representing the Muslim woman to 
the German audience. However, MJD members also involuntarily repre-
sent Muslims in the German public sphere through the negative media 
attention that the organization has been subject to from 2003 onwards, 
and which I discuss in this chapter. The educational level of its partici-
pants as well as the high level of activity that the organization and indi-
vidual members have in the German public sphere suggest that the group 
has more significance than its numbers indicate. Overall, MJD is a space 
that represents one of the possible roads that Islam in Europe may take in 
the future.
Most of the participants are so-called second-generation immigrants in 
Germany. The use of this term is problematic, as it may well, as Friedman 
argues, stand for “an official ethnification, jus sanguinis, of the immigra-
tion process” (Friedman 1999, 680, footnote 3). Although there are reason-
able criticisms of the term “second generation”, I use it here in the sense 
that most of the youth are born in Germany but have parents who migrated 
to the country. Several of the youth are socialized in a transnational space; 
in other words, they are embedded in familial and other relevant social 
relationships and networks through a biography formation in their par-
ents’ home country as well as in German society (Apitzsch 2003). Still, the 
“second generation” categorization only works as an overlapping bracket 
for specific positions and identity processes, which should not be general-
ized to all individuals with immigrant backgrounds, but be left open to the 
plurality of life-realities.
As noted, a high proportion of MJD participants belong to an upwardly 
mobile part of the migrant population, either because of their parents’ 
education, or because of their own success in the German educational sys-
tem. The organization’s structure may explain its popularity among highly 
educated youth: participants are expected to contribute with religious 
presentations and take part in discussions of how to understand religious 
knowledge. Everyone is encouraged to actively share in the administration 
of activities and (public) events. In many ways, MJD exemplifies a genera-
tional shift in the practice of Islam in Europe, both because of its approach 
mosque organization to which the youth group belongs is hostile to any formal affiliation 
with MJD. According to the shura member, unofficial cooperation with MJD is acceptable 
to MJD since it does not seek to represent any Muslim community in Germany. Telephone 
interview with shura member June 17, 2008.
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21 Several scholars have noted the distinction youth make between “pure” Islam and the 
“traditional” Islam of their parents. (See Amiraux 2001; Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003; 
Bendixsen 2009b; Cesari 2002; Jacobsen 2011; Jacobson 1998; Karakaşoğlu 2000; Nökel 2002; 
Roy 2004; Venel 1999, 2004).
22 See for example, Jacobson (1998) for the UK, Roy (2004) for France; Salih (2003) for 
Italy, Sanktanber (2002) for Turkey, and Mahmood (2005) for Egypt.
to Islam and because of its teaching methods. When teaching Islam, MJD 
participants make use of books that address Islam in a universal way, 
including sacred texts like the Koran and the sunnah (the way of living and 
acting as stipulated by the Prophet Muhammad). During seminars, the 
teaching and practice of Islam takes place within the quest for what the 
youth consider the pure Islam. This is contrasted to the Islam of their par-
ents, which the youth judge as mixed with tradition and superstition.21
The focus on knowledge and self-discipline as the correct way to Islam 
echoes similar processes taking place in several European societies and in 
Islamic movements in the Middle East and Turkey.22 Emphasis is placed 
on how individual actors can choose between various interpretations and 
make individual assertions in relation to Islam (Eickelman and Piscatori 
Figure 1. Participant with MJD logo at MJD summer camp 2004. Photo: Synnøve 
Bendixsen.
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23 Yusuf al-Qaradawi is considered one of the main intellectuals in the contemporary 
Islamic Revival (Mahmood 2005, 61). The controversial Swiss thinker Tariq Ramadan is 
often presented as one of the leading Islamic thinker among Europe’s second- and third-
generation Muslim immigrants. Critics of Tariq Ramadan argue that his hidden agenda is 
to promote fundamental religious viewpoints on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood.
1996; Mandaville 2002, 2004). This particular religious consciousness is 
usually understood as being realized through a process of modernization, 
where the expansion of literacy and education plays a role in diminishing 
the dependence on more traditional religious authorities to make sense of 
one’s religion (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Ismail 2004). Media and 
access to higher education have made it possible for an increasing number 
of actors to engage with and modify religious traditions. This has led to a 
democratized access to religious texts (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, 111) 
and a democratization of religious authority (Hirschkind 2001a)—a pro-
cess in which MJD takes part.
Local and National Connections
MJD does not promote ready-made religious instruction, but draws on a 
variety of authorities that they believe follow an “Islam of the middle way,” 
including Tariq Ramadan, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and the Egyptian television 
preacher Amr Khaled.23 The messages from these authorities are not fol-
lowed in their entirety; whereas some aspects of Qaradawi’s teachings, 
such as “women are allowed to travel alone,” are acknowledged, a recent 
call to jihad against Israel was rejected. Furthermore, whereas some mem-
bers might be attracted to Khaled’s profile, other members will find him 
objectionable and too populist. Like most organizations, MJD has devel-
oped a particular organizational culture and content, which successive 
shuras uphold with only minor modifications. According to the leader of 
the shura, changes in what is religiously acceptable or not (for instance 
whether or not hip hop is suitable at religious meetings) could be under-
stood to be a result of a situation where the organizers have gained more 
and more experience. They have become adults and thus are less afraid of 
doing something that may be considered incorrect.
At the national level, MJD sends out nationwide Friday emails; 
arranges  regional monthly seminars called Tarbiyah (i.e. education 
generally and the upbringing of children specifically); and organizes 
annual regional and national camps, which bring together Muslim youth 
from all over Germany. The establishment of new branches in cities or 
towns is either initiated centrally, meaning that a local member will be 
42 chapter one
24 Telephone interview with the national leader of MJD, June 17, 2008.
25 The project was founded by the German Federal Ministry of Family, Seniors, Women 
and Youth (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend). The main idea 
was to focus on young people from immigrant backgrounds who faced difficulties, and to 
try to strengthen their identity through the medium of Islam. The person behind this 
given responsibility for setting up a branch, or more organically by young 
people who approach the shura and want to establish an MJD branch in 
their region. The shura will then provide the youth with guidance and 
advice, a branch handbook with guidelines, and invitations to participate 
in seminars for religious education to become youth leaders.24
The local branches are connected to the national level not only through 
the larger national meetings, but also because each branch follows a hand-
book with suggestions about how to organize their weekly meetings (both 
in terms of logistics and content) and makes active use of the central MJD 
website, which by now is professional and continuously updated. If there 
are issues with the local government or a local mosque, one of the national 
shura representatives will assist the local MJD branch. Participants and 
members from various parts of Germany also meet regularly through MJD 
activities, including regional meetings, Muslim Girls Meetings, Brother 
Meetings, and the yearly summer camp (the latter is the highlight of the 
year, and participants from all over Germany come together for seminars 
on Islam, creative activities such as Calligraphy workshops and music per-
formances by famous Muslim singers, and speeches by well-known Islamic 
preachers).
Coming Out in Public: The Scandal
MJD had received little public attention before it ventured out of the mar-
gins by applying for and receiving public recognition in the form of state 
funding for a project on youth with immigrant backgrounds. One conse-
quence of entering the public arena was increased attention from non-
Muslims, including the media. Hostile media coverage resulted in the 
increased marginalization of the organization in the German public 
sphere. I have deliberately not focused on this “scandal” in this research as 
my interest lies elsewhere, but a short overview is needed in order to situ-
ate MJD in its German context.
The project “Ta’ruf/Kennenlernen!” (“Getting to know each other”) 
was developed by individual members of MJD in 2002, and aimed to 
counter prejudice and racism by having young Muslims speak directly to 
youngsters with immigrant backgrounds at different schools in Berlin.25 
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project told me that it was in fact a personal initiative, but he needed a partner organiza-
tion behind it to get funding. MJD had been the natural choice for him as he had been an 
active member for a long time.
26 Author’s translation from the original headline: “Muslimischer Verein missioniert in 
Schulen” in Tagesspiegel 6.11.2003. According to one of the participants in the project, the 
journalists had been first approached by a teacher at one of the schools in Kreuzberg in 
which the project had worked.
27 Together with KJG and the Federal Association of Jewish Students in Germany 
(Bundesverband der Jüdischen Studenten in Deutschland, BJSD), MJD participated in a 
multi-religious dialogue project “TRIALOG - Together in Difference” in 2003, funded by the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesinnenministerium). The media statement declared: 
“With regret we have to assert that in the internet archive there is a Friday-talk (Naisha) 
that can hurt [or offend] the feelings of our Jewish fellow men. We apologize for this.” 
Author’s translation from the original German. From online “Statement to the articles in 
Tagesspiegel of 6th and 7th of Nov. 2003,” dated Berlin November 7, 2003. The press state-
ment further deplores that Tagesspiegel did not wait with publishing its article until after 
the discussion it had arranged with the project leader, so as to hear his arguments against 
the accusations.
28 This did not go unnoticed by Tagesspiegel, which used the article headline “Ministry 
withdraws funding from the Muslim Youth, the organization corrects internet appearance 
and denies the accusation of Islamism” (author’s translation from the German original), 
Tagesspiegel November 8, 2003: www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/;art270,1987501, accessed 
October 20, 2004.
The project, which was one of only a handful of projects led by a Muslim 
organization with funding from a German state agency, was subsequently 
discontinued after a press-generated scandal that started with the 
headline, “Muslim organization evangelizing in Berlin schools.”26 The 
Tagesspiegel newspaper expressed fear that the “controversial organiza-
tion” was using the project to recruit “Islamists’ Offspring” in Berlin 
schools.
Suddenly, MJD was the focus of public attention, which increased when 
investigative journalists found a “Friday talk” (Nasiha) on MJD’s homepage 
that they claimed had anti-Semitic undertones. MJD publicly apologized 
for the text on its homepage and changed the online access of its members 
in order to restrict online publication of unmoderated posts. MJD also 
issued a statement defending itself from the media accusations, which 
was published alongside a supportive statement from representatives of 
the Federal association of the Catholic Youth Community (Bundesverband 
der Katholischen Jungen Gemeinde, KJG), who declared that they had good 
relations with the Muslim organization in question.27 Despite these mea-
sures and the support, public funding was withdrawn and the Ta’ruf proj-
ect was discontinued.28
During this process, connections between MJD and other Islamic 
organizations were brought into focus, as were individual members of 
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29 Following the media debate in which the Green delegate Özcan Mutlu claimed that 
there was “a clear link” between MJD and the Muslim Brotherhood, the potential connec-
tions between MJD and the Muslim Brotherhood were also discussed in the German 
Bundestag. The official transcript shows that the debate was characterized by a lack of any 
concrete information or knowledge about links between the two organizations, as was 
even admitted by the speakers (See Deutscher Bundestag 74. Sitzung. Berlin 2003, 
6360–6362).
30 There was also a focus on MJD’s connection to the prohibited Al-Aqsa organization. 
MJD publicly rebutted the accusation, which suggested that if MJD folded, its funds would 
be transferred to the Al-Aqsa organization. MJD stated that at an earlier MJD meeting, dur-
ing a period when Al-Aqsa was still a recognized charity, it had decided that Al-Aqsa would 
be one of the recipients of remaining resources in the event that MJD disbanded. MJD 
maintained that this position was changed after the Bundesinnenministerium included 
Al-Aqsa on its list of prohibited organizations. See de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslimische 
_Jugend_in_Deutschland, accessed February 20, 2008. MJD participants told me that this 
Wikipedia entry on MJD was written by MJD members.
31 See Pressemitteilung Nr. 119/98 des Ministeriums für Kulturs, Jugend und Sport 
Baden-Württemberg, July 13, 1998. For an overview of the process and debate, see Oestreich 
(2004). For a discursive analysis of the debate, see Sinclair (2012).
32 Ludin is no longer an active member of MJD (she is more than 30 years old) and in 
2006, she was a teacher at the Islamic Grammar School in Berlin (a private, state-funded 
school for 1–6th grade).
MJD.29 The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution classified 
MJD as Islamist and connected to the internationally controversial Muslim 
Brotherhood—a classification that MJD rejected. The link that the Federal 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution made to the Muslim 
Brotherhood was primarily based on a link by kinship: one of the MJD 
shura members for 2004 was the brother of Ibrahim el-Zayat, the presi-
dent of the Islamic Community Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft in 
Deutschland, IGD), who the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution suspected of representing the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Germany.30 The media focused on one additional member of MJD: 
Fereschta Ludin, who was born in Afghanistan, had fought a long legal 
case in Baden-Württemberg to be able to veil and work as a teacher. 
Fereshta Ludin was considered not suitable to be a teacher because of her 
reasons for wearing the headscarf.31 This was a trial that the media had 
followed closely, mostly with unsympathetic statements about Ludin’s 
arguments. She had been a member of MJD in Stuttgart for a long time. 
The media came to rely on a circular argument in which Fereschta Ludin 
was presented as a fundamentalist because she was a former member of 
MJD, and MJD was viewed as fundamentalist because Fereschta Ludin 
used to be a member of the organization.32 The logic of rumors (Schiffauer 
2006a) in this media campaign was reinforced by guilt by association or 
the practice of infection: any group that has contact with people distrusted 
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33 Telephone interview with a member of the shura, June 17, 2008. The authors whose 
books Green Palace published included Tariq Ramadan and Mustafa Islamoglu. The books 
sold included authors like Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Sayyid Qutb (an Egyptian supporter of the 
Muslim Brotherhood), Abdul ‘Ala Maududi, Ahmad von Denffer, and Amir Zaidan. Green 
Palace also sold Nasheed (songs with an Islamic angle) and religious music CDs by e.g. 
Yusuf Islam, and the German convert (with an Ethiopian background) Ammar 114, who is 
a hip hop artist.
34 See also Mühe (2007) for an overview of this critical event.
35 Ewing (2003) has also illustrated how the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution largely frame their accusations against the Muslim organization Milli Görüş 
on blurred images, including the presumption that Islamist extremists are hiding behind a 
rhetoric that includes multiculturalism, human rights and constitutionality in their 
endeavor to obtain followers and resources in order to influence and undermine govern-
mental power.
by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution was infected 
with the virus of Islamism.
Journalists also pointed out that the Islamic bookshop “Green Palace,” 
which was run by MJD until it was closed down in 2010, sold copies of the 
German translation of the Islamic scholar al-Qaradawi’s “The Lawful and 
Prohibited in Islam” (“al-Halal wal-Haram fil-Islam”).33 Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
is a well-known member of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, and is seen 
as an ideological link between MJD and the Brotherhood. Furthermore, 
the book refers to the death penalty for apostates. MJD insisted that 
99 percent of the book, which was published in Egypt in 1960 and is stan-
dard reading for many Muslims, was compatible with German legislation, 
and that the paragraph about apostasy was not considered relevant for 
Muslims in Germany. This did not alter the standpoint of the Federal 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution vis-à-vis MJD.34
The allegations brought against MJD remained based on generaliza-
tions about its ideological orientation, and appear to have been made 
without any serious and thorough investigation.35 Additionally, public dis-
cussion focused exclusively on MJD’s public national activities, disregard-
ing what MJD regards as its main work, namely local weekly meetings with 
young people. The negative media attention has apparently had less direct 
impact on local meetings, but public projects have become more difficult 
to pursue, including hiring public venues for larger MJD events. Possibly, 
MJD finds it harder to attract new members. However, there has been an 
increase in the number of members from the beginning of 2007, when 
MJD had 350 members, to the first half of 2008, when membership had 
increased to 600. According to one member of the shura, for MJD, the con-
sequence of the negative press and the stigma from the suspicions that the 
media and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution 
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36 Ewing (2003) suggests that these kinds of practices also hint that a Muslim identity is 
incompatible with a German identity.
asserted is not only that public funding for new projects will be problem-
atic, but also that MJD may not receive invitations to discussions with pri-
vate and public non-Muslim figures. Moreover, the media and political 
response towards MJD might prevent future Muslim organizations, includ-
ing MJD, from taking an active role in the German public sphere for fear 
that it would lead to more muck-raking by journalists, with little attendant 
space for the Muslim organizations to respond.36
This critical event, which occurred before my research began, turned 
out to have consequences for my fieldwork and writing. In order to explain 
the consequences for the epistemology of this research, it is necessary to 
first clarify how my methodology, my entrance to the field, and the field-
work itself, were informed by the particular context in which the people 
I studied were made to appear suspicious by the media, and in turn 
became suspicious of others.
Methodology: The Art of Fieldwork
Entering the Field
I was introduced to the Muslim Youth in Germany by one of their former 
members (Aishegül, a 31 year old Muslim woman) at an “Islamophobia” 
conference held by the German Henrich Böll Stiftung at Rosenthaler Platz, 
in Mitte, Berlin, in March 2004. When Aishegül told me about her religious 
community (MJD) and said that it was ethnically mixed, consisted of sec-
ond generation migrants, and that its activities took place in German, 
I asked whether I could visit one of their meetings. She agreed and con-
tacted the then-leader of the women’s group in Berlin.
Two days later, I met fifteen young women at a venue in Kreuzberg. 
Most of the women wore headscarves and long coats, although some had 
long loose hair and wore jeans and tops that ended above their hips. 
I talked about my research on Muslim youth with migration backgrounds 
in Berlin, and asked whether I could participate in their group for a period 
of time. I also explained the social anthropological concept of participant 
observation, and the leader and the participants agreed to let me partici-
pate. From this meeting at the end of March 2004, I conducted intensive 
fieldwork with members of the organization until February 2006, with 
more random encounters and visits until December 2007. I participated in 
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37 Had this been my focus, I would have had to significantly improve my knowledge of 
Islam and reconsider my methodological starting point.
MJD weekly meetings, MJD regional and national meetings, leisure activi-
ties, religious events and celebrations, weddings, engagement parties, pri-
vate parties, high school events, and shopping.
In addition to the empirical data gathered through the fieldwork, 
I make use of the organization’s publications, websites, brochures, news-
papers, and magazines, as well as semi-structured interviews and informal 
conversations. I have chosen to rely less on interviews with the young 
women I worked with and have instead sought to develop my understand-
ing and analysis of the role of Islam in their lives based on social situations 
and encounters with the women that could not be captured by collections 
of narratives or interviews. Participant observation enabled a broader 
understanding of the relationship between the particular context of the 
youth and their everyday choices, constraints and daily social acts.
Although the social space of the organization will necessarily be 
included in the analysis, this book focuses less on the organization per se, 
and more on its attendees. I am not interested in the possible (external) 
fundamentalist influences on the organization and its structure, or in how 
the organization positions the Islam it teaches within Islamic theological 
traditions.37 Instead, this book reflects on how learning about Islamic 
knowledge and practices within a religious organization shapes the way 
youth craft their Self. Although this necessarily includes an examination 
of the religiously defined knowledge, sources, and approaches of the orga-
nization, my attention is on how this knowledge and these practices 
become part of the youth’s subject formation.
This book focuses on the lived experiences of a group of young women 
in Berlin for whom Islam has become a nucleus of identification. I am 
conscious of the possible pitfalls of essentializing the participants by 
focusing mainly on one aspect of identification, namely Islam. A sole 
focus on religious identification tends to omit that the women are also 
young people who study, work or are unemployed, and are members of 
families. Identification as a Muslim cannot be understood by reference to 
Islam alone (Bringa 1995), as religious practices and beliefs are not the sole 
reference in their constructions of identity. Just as Othering discourses 
define the young people by their ascribed identities instead of by their 
social roles (see Allievi 2006, see also chapter 2), I am aware of the risks of 
reducing them to representatives of a religious category. I am aware of 
this danger and risk it nonetheless, because this categorization is a very 
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38 Here, I agree with Yuval-Davis (2006), who questions Butler’s argument that the 
process of signification is illimitable. Yuval-Davis suggests that “in specific historical situa-
tions and in relation to specific people there are some social divisions which are more 
important than others in constructing specific positionings” (Yuval-Davis 2006, 203). In 
short, I agree that some social divisions are relevant to most people in a large number of 
situations.
powerful one in their lives and MJD is a space in which this particular 
identity is developed and negotiated.38 That said, I also explore how gen-
der, class, ethnic background, and being young affect how the Muslim 
identity is negotiated and played out at different times and in different 
spatial contexts. The variety of ways these youth related to their religious 
identity is addressed throughout the book.
There are two main reasons that I decided to conduct fieldwork in this 
religious organization. First, its social space provided an accessible field 
where I could regularly connect with Muslim youth. Conducting fieldwork 
in an urban space comes with great methodological challenges for any 
researcher. How can the researcher access the vast range of experiences 
and forces shaping individual lives as urbanites participate in disparate 
and often private arenas? One additional difficulty about studying (mostly) 
veiled religiously oriented women is that they are less present in public 
space compared to men. Veiled women tend not to visit cafes, and do not 
regularly hang around in the street. Instead, when not at school or univer-
sity, piously oriented Muslim women frequently spend time at home, with 
family or friends, or sometimes shopping. Secondly, and more importantly, 
my interest lies at the interface between individual and group interaction 
and the effect this has on individual women’s religiosity. In other words, 
I am interested in how the acquisition of knowledge and the crafting of 
the Self play out within the context of a religious group. The form of reli-
gious Self that the organization calls on the youth to realize determines 
and modifies several aspects of the young women’s life-choices. This reli-
gious objective directly affects the youth’s perception of living in Berlin in 
terms of their identification as Muslim, their relation to the ethnic group 
of their parents, their perception of gender roles in public and private, and 
their marriage-related choices (see chapter 6). Overall, by directly observ-
ing this small group, I have been able to delve into the disconnect between 
common representations of Muslim women in the public sphere, and how 
they themselves envision their identities and social positions. I have 
also been able to examine how group attitudes are marked by an insider- 
outsider view of what makes the good life.
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39 First developed by Gluckman (1958) in his account of the opening of a bridge in 
Zululand, “situational analysis” was later defined by Mitchell as “the intellectual isolation 
of a set of events from the wider social context in which they occur in order to facilitate a 
logically coherent analysis of these events” (Mitchell 1987, 7). Mitchell (1987) recognizes 
three distinct epistemological elements of the social structure that must be identified by 
the analyst. First, the analyst must recognize the set of events that includes manners or 
actions which the researchers consider a problem or logically linked in one way or another. 
Second, the actors ascribe meanings to situation or activities. These meanings can be par-
ticular to the event and can be open for disputes or negotiations between individuals, and 
can thus facilitate an examination of the construction of symbols. Third, the analyst must 
identify the setting or the structural construct, which not all actors inevitably share or rec-
ognize (see also Roger and Vertovec 1995). Although I did not pursue a situational analysis 
entirely in the spirit of Mitchell, I remain devoted to the effort of a simultaneous investiga-
tion of the social setting or context of the youth and the meanings that the social actors 
give to what they are doing.
Making Use of Situational Analysis
Through participating in organized social events and more spontaneous 
social gatherings, I had access to how the youth actively deal with their 
identification as young people who are committed to their religion. 
Indeed, management of meaning—interpretation, negotiation and refor-
mulation—takes place in small groups of people, all with their “inner” 
lives (Wulff 1988, 27). During participant observation, I was inspired by the 
approach of the Manchester school of anthropology (Rhodes-Livingstone 
Institute) to the collection of data and analysis of society. Mitchell (1987) 
suggests that data-collection can be organized by the use of apt illustra-
tion, situational analysis, and extended case study.39 This book is built 
upon situations I participated in or witnessed, where I listened to the con-
versations between the youth, sometimes asking questions or trying to 
lead the conversation in a specific direction without guessing where it 
would take us.
By focusing on social situations, studying meetings between people as 
temporally and spatially bounded series of events, and observing 
sequences of events in a long-term perspective in which I followed the 
same actors through several social events, I seek to provide an understand-
ing of how the crafting of a religious Self and Muslim identification is posi-
tioned within various social fields and in relation to a number of social 
actors. The social construction of persons and social relations takes place 
in these different social situations. Throughout this book, I present con-
versations between the youth. When young Muslims talk with each other, 
they comment on, confirm, intensify, or dismiss certain images, represen-
tations, or identities. In such situations, they frequently say something 
about themselves in contrast to the Other. This is often one of the main 
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40 Here I think of performance in the broader sense, as Erving Goffman (1959) defines 
it in “The Performance of Self in Everyday Life”: as any public activity that influences other 
people. Goffman considers performance to include the moments of theatricality taking 
place in face-to-face interaction. The politics of identity are negotiated through perfor-
mance of the Self.
motives behind the conversations, even if other dimensions, such as ideal-
ism or the enjoyment of storytelling, should not be dismissed.
I analyze the crafting of the Self by paying attention to daily situations 
that the women experience and the meanings they ascribe to these events, 
both of which I interpret within their socio-structural context. Any social 
event must be seen in its social context and has to be treated with the 
same respect and attention as the extraordinary or dramatic (Garbett 
1970). The discourses made available through situational analysis are not 
idiosyncratic, but are largely shared between various groups of people. By 
studying what goes on in a smaller faith community, I can take account of 
larger cultural expressions and social discourses by thinking beyond the 
boundaries of the particular group. Thus, studying a smaller group is a par-
ticularly fruitful approach through which to gain access to social actions 
and cultural (re)productions in a society.
During MJD meetings, I sat in the circle, listened, observed the activi-
ties, and often participated actively in the social games. At social gather-
ings, I listened to the conversations among the youth, and sometimes 
asked questions and joined in. I sought to listen and learn rather than dic-
tate the agenda. I paid particular attention to novices in the group: What 
terminology appeared new to them and how were they welcomed in the 
group? Where had they heard of MJD and how did they introduce them-
selves to the others? Just like a child gradually learns its parents’ ideas 
about the world, many of the newcomers in the organization—and I with 
them—went through a process of learning new concepts, language, and 
un/spoken norms or standards. Activities in the group were about pro-
cesses of learning and correcting religious performances, as well as con-
testations and adjustments of this performance.40 In the process whereby 
the leader corrected a new member, a youth asked questions, or the young 
people performed a role-play about the “correct” religious performance, 
there was both an individual and a collective approach to creating a com-
mon platform of transaction (see Barth 1994a).
As often happens with ethnographers, my most valuable fieldwork data 
often emerged from encounters when my presence was accidental, and 
where fieldwork was not the defining object of the conversation, but 
the result of several months of participant observation that reduced the 
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41 Anthropologists generally emphasize that what a person says is not necessarily what 
that same person does. This is not to suggest that the person is lying. “Truth” is a relative 
term that is situationally conditioned. Sometimes the interview partner gives the answer 
that she or he expects that the interviewer would like to hear. At other times, it can be a 
matter of embarrassment, or the phrasing of the question that leads to a discrepancy 
between doing and saying. However, more importantly, doing fieldwork can lead to other 
types of questions beyond those that a researcher had in mind before entering “the field,” 
because the experience of a person’s life is of a different (emotional and analytical) sort 
than what is available through interviews. I do not deny that interviews can give different, 
and valuable, data and insight compared to participant observation.
42 See Hannerz (1969, 206) for a discussion on the drawbacks and advantages of a tape-
recorder while conducting fieldwork.
initial formality and skepticism. This form of participant observation, 
although time-consuming and sometimes frustrating, has provided me 
with insight into the young women’s lives and perceptions of living in 
Berlin that would otherwise not have been accessible, or that would have 
been easily overlooked had I limited the data collection to interviews.41 
Participant observation is unique in making available the complex ways 
social actors are oriented towards normative rules and material, bodily, 
and social constraints, and also how social practices are informed by un/
intentional strategies. Through this approach, I could observe the actors’ 
different attachments to their religious communities and the ways in 
which individual and group practices are affected by and form the indi-
vidual religious subjectification.
As I did not make use of a tape-recorder during the conversations that 
took place at MJD meetings, celebrations, on the subway, in the street or 
shops etc., the quotes are not likely to be exact renditions of what was 
said.42 Most of the conversations are not word for word transcripts, but 
rather recollections based on notes and memory. While I occasionally 
wrote keywords while the conversation was taking place, most of the time 
I rushed to take fieldnotes immediately after the event. While the loss of 
precise transcripts does have drawbacks (such as making cognitive or lin-
guistic analysis impossible), this is outweighed by gaining spontaneity, 
genuineness in the discussions among the youth, and the sharpening of 
the researcher’s senses. Moreover, my interest lies in the modes of every-
day interaction, group discussion, and processes of knowledge formation 
that cannot be gathered through interviews, but which are available 
through partaking in a variety of social situations where the use of a tape-
recorder would have been alienating for the youth and social actors 
involved.
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43 In her monograph “Never in Anger”, Brigg (1970) provides a remarkable reflection on 
how her personality affected her fieldwork. Yet, although such writing opens up our under-
standing of how the fieldworker’s person has a direct impact on what type of information 
is made available and how the fieldwork process take place, such reflectionist approaches 
can also overshadow the main analysis of the field.
The Social Position of the Fieldworker
The fieldworker’s status always affects the way that anthropological field-
work is conducted and the data that is “collected” in the field. In some 
ways, the anthropologist has similar qualities as the stranger; neither 
insider nor outsider, she or he is both anomalous and ambiguous, and can 
be a potential risk or threat. By necessity, my presence had consequences 
for what happened and thus for what I was able to comprehend. This can 
be called “consequential presence” (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 1995). For 
example, during one MJD weekly meeting, I sat on the floor with the young 
women. They were discussing which categories of people would enter 
heaven or hell in the afterlife when a girl asked whether non-Muslims who 
are nevertheless “good persons” would end up in hell or not. Should 
I understand this question in relation to my presence, as a consequence of 
the girl having non-Muslim friends at school or in her neighborhood, or a 
combination of both?
Self-reflection and contemplation about the consequences of autobio-
graphical issues, including my social position in the field, should be incor-
porated in ethnographic research (Ortner 2006). As Stuart Hall puts it: “We 
all write and speak from a particular place and time, from a history and a 
culture which is specific. What we say is always ‘in context’, positioned” 
(Hall 1996b, 211). Clearly, the interaction among the young people that 
takes place when the anthropologist is present is likely to be shaped by an 
outsider’s presence. The anthropologist is never invisible when observing 
events, and having an effect on the fieldwork situation is unavoidable. The 
challenge for the fieldworker must therefore be to reflect upon how they 
affect the social environment they study. That I am a Norwegian woman 
with a white, middle-class, and a secular (yet culturally Protestant) back-
ground has consequences for how others perceive me, as well as for how 
I perceive my surroundings. In addition, I have the impression that the 
researcher’s ability to express empathy or other aspects of their personal 
temperament, character or ego-identity, can be of equal importance in 
developing a personal relationship during participant observation.43 
The relevance of these more personal traits can be less straightforward to 
list or to reflect on.
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At the same time, the duration and process of fieldwork can change the 
attitude of the subjects towards the researcher, as can events. In the begin-
ning, the girls were sometimes shy, but mostly friendly towards me. 
I sometimes slept in mosques, listened to their conversations, and tried to 
hang out with the adolescents as much as possible. Throughout the field-
work, I was often approached with questions such as: “Why did you decide 
to write about Muslim women?” “Are you a Muslim?” “Do you believe in 
God?” and “Synnøve, do you pray?” Questions like these indicate that 
despite the increase in studies about Muslim women since the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, the youth did not find it plausible that some-
one would want to write about them. Yet they also suggest that my per-
sonal relationship to religion and God was of utmost importance in their 
relationship to me. Answering that I was brought up as a Protestant was 
usually sufficient, although some insisted on knowing whether or not 
I believed in God, which put me in a dilemma. As I realized that most of 
them would not trust someone who does not believe in God, I was reluc-
tant to admit to my emotional distance to God. After a few months, I was 
introduced to newcomers or strangers as “this is sister Synnøve. She is a 
sister, though not a Muslim yet.” Some of the women commented that, 
“you look more and more like a Muslim,” which reflected my increasing 
focus on how I dressed during meetings and leisure activities. In changing 
my mode of dress, I sought to not cause offence and to diminish feelings of 
discomfort both for them and for myself. That I was unmarried and with-
out children also made me appear more “like them.” However, in other 
discussions it made me an outsider or more like the “typical” German, 
since I was thirty years old—most of the Muslim women were married 
and had children by their mid-20s. My role changed throughout the period 
that I participated in MJD. For example, after one year of regular partici-
pant observation I wrote:
It is my second year on the bus trip to the yearly three-day MJD summer 
camp. The bus stops at a gas station in order for the youth to pray. Fadwa (23) 
shouts to me as I am walking to the bus: “Synnøve, we are praying now, are 
you coming?” As I remain silent, looking at her in surprise, she seems to 
recall and says: “Ah no, you are not praying, of course.”
Similarly, during my visit to Fatima’s (31) home, she noticed that her hus-
band was coming home, and was about to tell me to put on my headscarf 
before she recalled that, “of course, you don’t veil.” Despite these momen-
tary lapses in which the youth forgot that I was an outsider, even when it 
has become easier for the anthropologist to move around and conduct or 
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44 I avoid the term “informants” as I consider the fieldwork process to be more dialogi-
cal and I agree with Gullestad (2006b) that the term obscures the actual contribution of 
the so-called informants to the research process.
listen to conversations, she remains an outsider to a smaller or larger 
extent. Below, I discuss how access to the ethnographic field, the process 
of fieldwork, and the subsequent effort to gather relevant data for analysis 
can be affected by the wider social contexts of the particular ethnographic 
field in which the participant observation takes place.
Conducting Fieldwork in an Atmosphere of Mistrust
Here, I reflect upon pursuing ethnographic fieldwork with Muslim women 
in the context of the German media discourse post 9/11, and the German 
public’s general suspicion of Muslim organizations and mosques. How do 
anthropologists gain acceptance within the social context in which they 
are interested? This is not a matter of political or administrative accep-
tance, but a basic human acceptance where the task of building a relation-
ship of trust with the conversation partners must be done in ways that 
tread lightly.44 This question of trust is often directly related to the partic-
ular socio-cultural and historical context within which the research field is 
positioned and to how the fieldworker is located within that particular 
context.
Two aspects of the organization particularly affected my fieldwork and 
my writing about the youth. First, as mentioned, MJD was under investiga-
tion by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Second, 
MJD’s focus on constructing religiously virtuous Selves and emphasizing 
correct religious behavior initially made me uncomfortable about the goal 
of the organization. Three months into the fieldwork, Fatima (31) pointed 
to my discomfort when she commented: “You must find that some of what 
we are saying is quite conservative. What do you think about it?” One of 
the main reasons why liberals and feminists, myself included, find it diffi-
cult to deal with deeply religious movements is that these movements 
seek to enter the most internal part of the individual and form and shape 
the individual in a particular manner (see Mahmood 2001). Even if I recog-
nize that the secular state is not objective or neutral, and know that the 
secular body is subjected by discourses (Asad 2003), the religious body is 
more challenging for a secular researcher to deal with. The orientation 
towards creating a religious body—ultimately to conform the body to a 
“divine model of moral conduct” (Hirschkind 2001a, 27)—can, as Fatima 
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recognized, feel like a conservative project. In light of my academic and 
feminist position, in addition to not being religiously oriented, I found it 
difficult to understand some of the women’s decisions: Why do educated 
and urban young women decide to participate in a religious organization 
that can be said to enforce patriarchal structures and demand a submis-
sive conduct? Why does the organization encourage women to veil, even 
if they are aware of the social disadvantages involved, including problems 
with their teachers and difficulties in getting an internship or job? At the 
same time, for reasons which will become clear throughout the book, 
I realized that to place the young women within an academic discourse of 
either “submissiveness,” “force,” and “patriarchal structures” or of “free-
dom” and “being liberated” would be too reductionist and represent a sim-
plification of the young women’s lives.
Two specific episodes highlight the significance of the circumstances 
described above. The first episode took place in a conversation after one of 
the weekly MJD meetings, and involves what Geertz has called the “anthro-
pological turning point”—the moment when otherwise quiet fieldwork is 
interrupted and the researcher knows that it will either lead to a different 
stage of access to the field or it will constitute a “break” with the field. The 
second episode occurred at a workshop where I presented my initial ideas 
about the fieldwork and it is related to speech and being listened to. 
Whereas the first formed the social space I was given by the social actors, 
the second shaped my understanding of the social setting in which the 
youth are situated. Both had direct consequences for how I came to write 
about the fieldwork. Both events relate to conducting participant observa-
tion in an atmosphere of mistrust and to the “location of the speaker” and 
“where the speech goes and what it is doing there” (cf. Alcoff 1992, 23). It 
also reflects the current political climate around Islam in Germany and 
how this affects the public dialogue.
Who Is the Researcher?
The first situation, which was also the main turning point in my fieldwork, 
occurred six months after my first appearance in the field. Three of the 
older youth who were leading the MJD Berlin branch at the time, asked me 
to stay for a personal conversation when the weekly meeting was over. 
Once we were alone, one of the women said that the group had been very 
friendly towards me, and that she was now wondering how far I had 
come with my religious belief and whether the weekly meetings had made 
me reflect upon my religious conviction. I responded by repeating my 
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45 It is not new for the people the anthropologist is working with to perceive her as a 
spy. For example, Nilufer Göle (1996) has described the skepticism and suspicion that she 
met while interviewing Islamist women in Turkey. Ortner (2006), an anthropologist, points 
to the similarities between the two roles: both the spy and the anthropologist try to learn 
the language, seek to be treated as a member, and often do not ask direct questions. The 
significant difference is that anthropologists do not seek knowledge for treachery, but to 
shed light on humanity and possibly improve the social situation of marginalized groups 
(ibid.). However, the latter distinction is not necessarily obvious to individuals belonging 
to a social group that is often stigmatized and portrayed negatively both by journalists and 
social scientists (two examples of the latter are the recent works by Nekla Kelek, which 
I discuss briefly in chapter 2).
46 Any human relationship and interaction constantly changes, thus maintenance of 
the interaction can never really be assured (Wax 1977, 29). Some anthropologists have sug-
gested that there is a need for consent not prior to the fieldwork, but rather ex posto facto 
(ibid.). The formalization of this is a complex matter. I suggest that it can also be done 
through continuous conversation with the people one works with.
explanation of what it means to do fieldwork and of my research focus. My 
answers did not satisfy them, and I was told to not come everywhere with 
them and that when they were having sleep-overs in the mosque, they did 
not want me around. When I went home, I felt that I had failed as a field-
worker. However, the very next day Aishegül (31) phoned me and asked 
how things were going, as she did not participate in the weekly meetings 
after turning 30 and passing the age limit. When I did not mention the odd 
situation to her, she quickly said: “I heard about what happened yesterday, 
Synnøve, and I am so angry at them!” She advised me to call one of the 
leaders in order to discuss in more detail what I was doing and my research 
methods. “Some of them think that you are a spy,” she added.45
The event, I realized, highlighted the need for the researcher to contin-
uously renew approval for the fieldwork (Wax 1977, 29).46 Aishegül sug-
gested that I meet with four of the older participants to talk more 
extensively about my research methods and intentions. The following 
week, during a breakfast meeting in one of the women’s home, I succeeded 
in renegotiating my position within the organization.
Part of the mistrust was a result of the fact that I would sometimes jot 
down notes and that I did not conduct interviews—probably since they 
were used to journalists approaching them with specific, direct questions. 
Following this meeting, I stopped taking notes for a while. I also offered to 
make a presentation of my work. Aishegül remained the person who 
opened doors for me, and I was also helped by my status as Norwegian and 
hence partly an outsider in German society. Aishegül had coincidentally 
met my parents at Kottbusser Tor subway station in Kreuzberg during 
their visit, which provided her with a more extensive picture of who I was. 
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Her opinion mattered to the group, as she was highly knowledgeable 
about Islam and had participated in MJD for a long time. Spending time 
with the individual women and in the group as it organized religious cel-
ebrations, picnics, or at camps outside Berlin, I came to know the women 
better, and they me. Gradually, I developed friendships with some of the 
young women, whereas others remained more peripheral to me.
I also realized that the fact that the organization was under investiga-
tion affected the atmosphere and the readiness to trust outsiders. A couple 
of weeks after the above incident, Fatima (31) asked me: “How do you plan 
to write about ‘the scandal’?” She was referring to the intense media focus 
on the organization during the winter of 2003, a few months before my 
arrival in Berlin. Her comment was indicative of the uncertainty attached 
to outsiders writing about them, and to how I would understand the 
media’s accusations. Consequently, I made sure to ask those involved in 
the media episode about what had happened, while simultaneously mak-
ing it clear that the event would not be a central part of my study.
A few months later, a discussion with Fatima at her home enabled me 
to better understand the wariness towards my presence. Fatima pointed 
out that many of the women had thought that I would convert to Islam, as 
I was so enthusiastically involved. When they realized that there were no 
signs that I would convert, my status was again opened up for debate—
what was I really doing there? She also noted that one of the MJD Berlin 
leaders had only recently become religiously active, after moving to Berlin. 
This young woman had only recently started to veil and she was in the 
process of finding her faith—or to develop her faith. This was why she was 
uncomfortable with having non-Muslims around her, Fatima argued. She 
went on to explain that, “you are there, listening, writing… For her, every-
thing that happens there [at MJD] is very important—whereas you are 
only a spectator.” Several of the older MJD members had also thought that 
I would gradually convert to Islam and had become uncertain as to why 
I was not reconsidering my religiosity given that I was so actively part of 
the process through which they themselves were becoming more reli-
giously involved, both emotionally and in practice. In conclusion, Fatima 
noted that, “they [the young women] feel they have a great responsibility: 
they are representing Islam.”
In the long run, the confrontational episode and consequent dialogues 
altered my research in two main ways. First, it made me reflect further on 
participant observation as a method and how the young women and 
the organizations’ leaders felt about my presence. Secondly, it made me 
think more carefully about the possible consequences when a group is 
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47 For example, when I discussed the German media discourses on Muslims and 
second-generation immigrants with Aishegül (31), she said: “They [journalists] are not 
stupid—it is just that they are not open to information. They have their own fixed idea and 
thoughts about it, and they don’t ask to hear answers. (…) I used to spend so much time on 
it, just a waste of time and energy. You know, there is a 50 percent chance that they listen to 
you and write it or that they write what they want.”
stigmatized and made suspect without the opportunity to be heard. The 
mistrust was related to not only who I was, but, and perhaps even more, to 
how I would speak of them from my social location in the majority society. 
A speaker’s location (which can be understood as the social location or 
social identity) has “an epistemically significant impact on that speaker’s 
claims and can serve either to authorize or disauthorize one’s speech” 
(Alcoff 1992, 7). This recognition lies behind the well-known ethnographic 
dilemma of the problem of speaking for others (ibid.). As MJD is often 
asked by the media and the public to talk about Muslim issues, its older 
members were semi-professional when talking about themselves, but also 
suspicious because of their continuous disappointments with journalists 
and with social scientists through the latters’ public reports on Islam in 
Germany. These experiences had induced a general distrust towards 
“friendly strangers” among the participants.47 The challenge of “talking” 
and being “listened to” became even clearer in the second situation.
Who Are the Listeners?
During my second year of research, I participated in a workshop on “Spaces 
of the Second Generation of Immigrants” at the Europa-Universität 
Viadrina Frankfurt/Oder, Germany, with twelve German participants with 
different academic backgrounds. I had been invited to talk about how MJD 
can be regarded as a life-space (Lebensraum) where the youth find a space 
of belonging in the city. I argued that participation in the Muslim youth 
group affects at least four aspects of identity work for the youth, namely 
education, emancipation, finding a suitable husband, and establishing a 
social network. Overall, I considered MJD a space where the young wom-
en’s performances as young modern Muslims are constructed, negotiated 
and re-corrected (Bendixsen 2005).
Immediately after my presentation, a workshop participant asked in an 
aggressive tone about MJD’s view on shari’a (Islamic law) and their rela-
tionship to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and stated that in his view, 
the young participants were passively absorbing Islamic fundamentalism. 
He also brought up the negative focus on the Ta’ruf project and the “Friday 
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48 Author’s translation from the original German. The official recognition letter is avail-
able online at MJD’s homepage, www.mjd-net.de, accessed October 15, 2005.
49 See in particular Calhoun (1992), Fraser (1990), Hischkind (2001) and Mahmood 
(2003).
talk” (Nasiha). My analysis of MJD was ignored, as the workshop partici-
pant indirectly suggested that I asked the “wrong questions.” MJD’s own 
efforts to dispel negative opinions were not mentioned, and neither was 
the fact that MJD had received the “Heinz-Westphal Honor Prize” in 2002 
for their voluntary engagement in “youth work” to “improve the distorted 
image of Islam in the public sphere and to explain Islam as a way of life.”48 
The intervention drew my attention to how the presentation of my 
research would be situated in relation to the academic discourse on Islam 
and migrants in Germany and in relation to what may be called “political 
correctness” (Friedman 1999); all of which defines the questions that 
should be asked and what can be concluded. Moreover, it made me 
grasp how difficult it must be for the women to speak and to be listened to 
when they participate in the public sphere, in podium discussions, or in 
interviews.
The bias of the public sphere needs to be taken seriously by the 
researcher. Early Habermasian theories underline the communicative and 
consultative features of the public sphere, and consider it open for ratio-
nal subjects to freely exchange ideas. In contrast, several scholars have 
drawn attention to how the public sphere also creates specific subjects 
and encourages particular capabilities and points of reference that facili-
tate the subjects’ involvement in the public sphere.49 Discussing secular-
ism in the European public sphere, Asad reminds us of the pre-dispositions 
behind what we call free speech:
If one’s speech has no effect whatever, it can hardly be said to be in the pub-
lic sphere, no matter how loudly one shouts. To make others listen even if 
they would prefer not to hear, to speak to some consequence so that some-
thing in the political world is affected, to come to conclusion – these are all 
presupposed in the idea of free public debate as a liberal virtue. But these 
performatives are not open equally to everyone because the domain of free 
speech is always shaped by pre-established limits. (…). They [the performa-
tives] are also intrinsic to the time and space it takes to build and demon-
strate a particular argument, to understand a particular experience – and 
more broadly, to become particular speaking and listening subjects. The 
investment people have in particular arguments is not simply a matter of 
abstract, timeless logic. It relates to the kind of person one has become, and 
wants to continue to be. In other words, there is no public sphere of free 
speech at an instant. (Asad 2003, 184)
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50 In this regard, Lila Abu-Lughod warns: “We need to have as little dogmatic faith in 
secular humanism as in Islamism, and as open a mind to the complex possibilities of 
human projects undertaken in one tradition as the other” (Abu-Lughod 2002, 788).
Through my own experience of not being heard, I could better understand 
the doubts some women had about my presence. Even if I was listening 
and asking questions, it was unclear how I interpreted what they were 
doing and what I would write about them in the end. Moreover, I realized 
the impossibility of my research being able to circumvent the ongoing cri-
tique and suspicion of Islamic organizations. Saba Mahmood (2001) sug-
gests that there is a distinction between political demands on researchers 
who aim to understand Islamists and Muslims and those working on ques-
tions of a secular-humanist sort. She argues that researchers who work on 
Muslim religious movements are expected to condemn Islamist move-
ments for all the problems they are perceived to have caused or else risk 
being labeled as apologists. Researchers on secular humanists and secular 
projects are not expected to make such statements.50
Suspending Judgment
Marianne Gullestad emphasized the need to suspend judgment in order 
to know more about the actor’s point of view. This is a practice, she argued, 
that “we need to guard intensely in the present climate of populist journal-
ism and reaffirmation of stereotypes” (Gullestad 2006b, 921). Although 
this position may be interpreted as entering a discourse of relativism, this 
is only superficially the case. Researchers do not have to choose between 
cultural relativism—a position which is thought to result in indifference 
or too much tolerance and “generous betrayal” (Gullestad 2006a)—and a 
critique of “negative” aspects of immigration and Islam based on moral 
universalism. Such a distinction ignores the difference between relativism 
as a moral position and relativism as a methodological approach (Jacobsen 
2008). As a methodological approach, “descriptive relativism” can facili-
tate a sharpened contextualization of the research themes and open up 
for new understandings of the set of meanings expressed by people in the 
study.
Muslim women’s voices are rarely taken seriously in the public sphere, 
unless they speak about topics such as forced marriages or honor killings. 
The use of dichotomies like tradition and modernity, harems and free-
dom, veiling and unveiling is a form of “associative thinking” (Frieman 
1999) that has been used by the West to construct itself as superior 
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51 This “politics of associative thinking” (Friedman 1999) is also used by relativism, 
which then inverts the terms or equalizes them. It is the logic of association and the rela-
tion of power that is supposed to be maintained by this logic, which is combined in what 
Friedman (1999) calls political correctness.
52 Schmidt (2004a, 34) writes that most of her young informants in the US emphasized 
that Islam was part of their family heritage, whereas others considered their religious prac-
tices to be a result of being stigmatized as “different.” Nevertheless, she found that all young 
people, independently of their various social and ethnic backgrounds, stressed the aspect 
of choice in their embrace of a Muslim identity (ibid., 35). Further, Schmidt (2004a, 34) 
points out that “[w]e invest in and choose certain styles of consumption, convinced that 
we fabricate and state our individuality, our true selves, through them. To state oneself by 
reference to aspects of tradition and collective lifestyles is mostly considered archaic, 
repressive and even undemocratic.”
(Abu-Lughod 2001, 108).51 These terms also form parts of what Said identi-
fied as the dogmas of Orientalism (ibid.) and what Spivak (1988) described 
as the “protection” of the woman. This woman, the “third world woman” 
Spivak directs us to, “becomes the signifier for the establishment of a good 
society, which must, at such inaugurative moments, transgress mere legal-
ity, or equity or legal policies” (Spivak 1988, 298). The status of the woman 
has become the means to evaluate a society’s position on the scale of 
modernity (Göle 1997) or the articulation of differences between civiliza-
tions (Göle 1996). Moreover, as chapter 3 examines extensively, this fram-
ing of Muslim women has a direct impact on how young people talk about 
themselves and represent themselves to journalists and researchers.
As mentioned, several studies point out that Muslim women from vari-
ous social and ethnic backgrounds who live in Europe frequently stress 
their individual choice regarding their religious identity (Schmidt 2004a, 
34).52 Schmidt argues that the emphasis on choice is a consequence of the 
individualization of a person’s life within contemporary Western dis-
course. She claims that the ability to choose a career path and whom to 
marry are important elements in Western society. In the construction of 
the Self, being able to choose is not only a human right, it is a feature 
of being a well-developed individual. Giddens asserts that in a consumer 
society, freedom is turned into necessity so that “we have no choice but to 
choose” (Giddens 1994, 75). Similarly, Bauman contends that individual-
ization is “a fate, and not a choice (…) the option to escape individualiza-
tion and to refuse participation in the individualizing game is emphatically 
not on the agenda” (Bauman, 2002, xvi). Young Muslims I met emphasized 
autonomy and personal conviction in relation to their practice of Islam. 
Time and again, veiled women quickly said, “it was my own choice to wear 
the headscarf” before I had even mentioned the issue of the headscarf. 
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53 This conforms well with the conclusions of several researchers who have found that 
Islam is a conscious choice and related to individual reflection (i.e. Jacobson 1998, 158) in 
which religious belonging is considered a matter of moral choice and faith (see Babès 1997; 
Dassetto 1996; Marchal 2003; Roy 1999). However, I argue for a need to also contextualize 
the framing of what religious youth say they are doing.
54 It should be noted that the current German public debate no longer resembles a 
binary of “minority” and “majority” actors, as the voice of the majority includes support 
from certain minority actors. I am thinking in particularly of the media archetype of the 
secular and socially mobile daughter of the Gastarbeiter (“guest worker”) who critiques her 
“own” community. These speakers legitimate and are legitimated by their position as 
“speaking from within the community” and tend to encourage the simplified idea that the 
“Woman in Islam” is submissive and/or oppressed. Their presence allows public debates to 
claim to be diverse and maintains the impression that the debates do not start from a par-
ticular “majority” definition of the forms of speech that are valid. These actors provide the 
public sphere with a perception of being diverse and open for a plurality of voices. 
A good example of this is Kelek, whose recent books provide simplified pictures of Islam, 
“Muslim women,” and “Muslim men,” and which partly seek to present Kelek’s own autobi-
ography as the child of a Turkish Gastarbeiter as a true image of the situation of Muslims 
in Germany. She legitimizes (consciously/unconsciously) her monolithic analysis of 
Muslim lives in Germany by referring to her own negative experiences of Islam.
55 In the 1970s, Grønhaug (1979) claimed that in the relationship between Norwegians 
and migrants, it is how the situation is defined that needs to be changed, not necessarily 
people’s attitudes.
Their identification with Islam was presented as a rational decision, 
and as one choice among several different ways of living.53 By de- 
emphasizing the role of their parents and kin in their decision, and by 
stressing their independent process of reflection on their decision to 
follow an Islamic lifestyle, the youth may reduce potential critiques. 
Processes of personal autonomy and self-confidence can be advanced by 
highlighting that one’s choices are the result of intellectual enquiry 
(Schmidt 2004a, 35).
My research suggests that the weight young people place on choice has 
to be understood within the framework set out by Asad, where the public 
is never an “empty sphere” in which debates take place openly, but is com-
posed of what he calls “‘sensibilities – memories and aspirations, fears and 
hopes of both speakers and listeners” (Asad 2003, 185). With modernity 
comes the idea that our actions must be presented as choice. I argue that 
the voices of the Muslim youth must be situated within a majority- 
minority relation in which majority practices are left unmarked, whereas 
the minority is expected to substantiate and legitimate their actions and 
choices as having been chosen.54 Seeing the unevenness or inequality of 
the discourse (Grønhaug 1979) remains essential in order to understand 
the discussion about Muslim women in Germany and to understand how 
many Muslim women themselves talk about their headscarves.55
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56 An additional point here is that most of the women I worked with are socially 
upwardly mobile in that they are pursuing or have completed college (Abitur) and many of 
them have entered University. Their social status may affect their aspirations to be consid-
ered rational.
57 Many anthropologists, Abu-Lughod (2002) included, have rightly included white 
women among the current “saviors.” In the aftermath of 9/11, the logic of colonialist femi-
nists who speak on behalf of or advocate for the “saving” of “subjugated” Muslim and Arab 
Women from patriarchal cultures has re-emerged. The Bush administration’s invasion of 
Afghanistan was partly legitimated in the media through the logic of colonialist 
feminism.
Certain argumentative styles are accepted, while others are not. In dis-
cussions about Muslims, German secularism is perceived as a neutral 
starting point for the debate, overlooking the fact that secularism is also a 
specific ideological viewpoint (see Asad 2003). Proficiency in German is 
not enough to participate in a public debate. In order to be listened to, one 
must argue from a particular standpoint, which means that the young 
Muslims’ way of talking must be situated within a European or even 
German framework and perception of what makes the good life. In my 
research, young people argued from such standpoints, making use of argu-
ments that promote a discourse of “choice,” in direct contrast to the 
media’s image of “force.” The young Muslims also commented that “it’s my 
own choice”—in contrast to the media characterization of “submission”—
when talking about the headscarf and their identification with Islam both 
amongst themselves and with more public figures, including researchers.
In discussions about the headscarf, dialogue is already restricted by a 
binary perception that something is either “voluntarily” or “involuntary.” 
In order to participate in public conversations, young women have to 
(consciously or unconsciously) draw on references to choice, accept cer-
tain premises about the meaning of freedom and self-realization, and 
focus on perceptions of individual decision-making.56 In a context in 
which Muslim women are to be “saved” from their own men (see Spivak 
1988), the available or legitimate frames of the discussion (“freedom” and 
“self-realization”) is provided by the German “secular” majority.57 The 
challenge is to construct conceptions of the public sphere and politics 
that take into account significant differences in the desires and complexi-
ties of groups and individuals. The issue here is not only whether or not 
youth submit to religious norms and ideals (which I discuss further in 
chapter 4 and 5), but that the way that the Muslim youth frame the discus-
sion and explanations of what they are doing is structured by dichoto-
mies. I contend that the public discourse is shaped in such a way that it 
obscures desires and motivating forces other than those of choice or the 
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quest for freedom and individuality. In light of this current social and 
political situation, how can we recognize and talk about differences 
“within women” (Lauretis 1987, 2), within “womanhood,” and between 
young women?
The discourse of choice, I argue, is not sufficient to understand what 
takes place during the weekly meetings or to understand the women’s reli-
gious practices. Rather, the fulfillment of the Self must be understood as 
formed within certain socio-historical strictures and includes implemen-
tations of latent boundary-making techniques. During my fieldwork, it 
became clear to me that it is too limiting to think about veiling or the 
efforts involved in following an Islamic lifestyle as questions about force 
and choice. I realized that to understand the decision to veil, I had to look 
beyond the first utterance of “it’s my free choice.” Through the analytical 
framework in which I situate the youth in relation to these discourses and 
by avoiding dichotomies such as “choice” or “force,” “resistance” or “sub-
mission,” I seek to avoid projecting a simplified image of the youths’ iden-
tification processes as well as of their process of forming or crafting a 
religious Self.
As Way of Conclusion: On Conducting Fieldwork
The social anthropologist Reidar Grønhaug once compared conducting 
ethnographic fieldwork to letting oneself sink down in a bath, to come up 
again with a completely different experience. Research is about giving 
oneself the possibility of being surprised; conducting fieldwork is a par-
ticularly appropriate methodological form for fertile discoveries 
(Grønhaug 2000). As anthropologists, we have to be prepared to find that 
our ideas and concepts are disputed and even transformed in the process 
of fieldwork. It is a challenge for anthropologists to transmit this insight 
to readers, who are not all social anthropologists. The increase in trans-
disciplinary conferences and workshops, and the role played by the media 
challenge our work of speaking with or for and being listened to when 
writing about “people at home.” The concepts we use and the meanings we 
attach to them are particularly important as they can sometimes be used 
by others. Ethnographic knowledge may have the power to transform, but 
with this comes the risk that it is ignored, blocked or misappropriated 
(Ortner 2006). The space for talking or listening is neither neutral nor 
empty.
Friedman reminds us that “[e]thnography renders the other’s identity 
to ourselves and, via the conditions in which it is executed, back to the 
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other. By speaking him [or her], or for him [or her], we ultimately force 
him [or her] to speak through our categories” (Friedman 1994, 168). The 
concepts of “desire” and “moral agency” and how “we” (non-Muslim, 
Western and secular subjects) look at “them” (Muslims in Europe) is 
related to epistemology and to the fact that the different ways of writing 
about people who “we” perceive as acting or making different choices, has 
ideological consequences. How we see “them” informs how “we” look at 
ourselves. If how we describe “them” will form how they perceive them-
selves and affect intercultural relations, it is ultimately an exercise of 
power that should never be pursued light-heartedly.
1 The term “guest worker” is by no means neutral–rather, it draws attention to the ambi-
guity of the status of the migrant (Mandel 2008). Guests are, by definition, only temporar-
ily present and are expected to return home. Guests should also follow the rules and 
regulations of the host. The second part of the word, workers, underlines the economic and 
use value of the migrant only in terms of her or his labor. It reduces them to their functions, 
and as Mandel powerfully argues, “it marginalizes and objectifies migrants, leaving limited 
conceptual, social, or linguistic space for meaningful incorporation into the society” 
(Mandel 2008, 55).
CHAPTER TWO
MAKING SENSE OF THE CITY: THE RELIGIOUS SPACES OF YOUNG 
MUSLIM WOMEN IN BERLIN
…in the city, different people with different projects must necessarily strug-
gle with one another over the shape of the city, the terms of access to the 
public realm, and even the rights of citizenship. Out of this struggle the city 
as work – as an oeuvre, as a collective if not singular project – emerges, 
and new modes of living, new modes of inhabiting, are invented. 
–Mitchell 2003, 18.
Introducing Berlin
In 1989, the two parts of Berlin were again joined together as the capital of 
Germany, at least administratively. Since then, the city has undergone 
transformations in which politicians, city-planners and the media have 
promoted the many faces of Berlin: Berlin as a capital (Hauptstadt) of the 
unified Germany, city of culture (Kulturstadt) of Europe, and struggling to 
be a world city (Weltstadt) globally. The image of Berlin as “multi-cultural” 
(or “multi-culti” in Berlin slang) is another characterization that is either 
promoted or fretted about when media and politicians discuss migrants’ 
loyalty (or lack thereof) to Germany. It is also used to explain social prob-
lems, or as “proof of a policy gone wrong.”
Since the arrival of the so-called guest workers (gastarbeiter) in the 
1960s, immigration to European urban centers has been a change factor in 
the urban landscape, and an introduction to new modes of living.1 Today, 
Islam is increasingly visible in European societies. This visibility is partly a 
result of the growing popularity of the headscarf among young Muslims, 
and partly a result of the provisional courtyard or factory hall mosques of 
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2 Of these, 2.25–2.5 million are foreign Muslims, mostly Turks, and around 800,000 
“German Muslims,” meaning German citizens, i.e. naturalized Muslims of various origins. 
This is only a rough estimate since precise statistical data do not exist, primarily because 
the German government does not keep statistics on or make distinctions concerning reli-
gious affiliation. In order to make estimations, statistical details about foreign nationals 
from predominantly Muslim countries and the number of naturalizations of former 
Turkish citizens are taken into consideration (Spielhaus and Färber 2006).
the 1970s having been replaced by purpose-built mosques since the late 
1990s. The new four-story minaret-topped Omar Ibn al-Khattab mosque 
serving the al-Ahbash community officially opened in 2010 at the Görlitzer 
Bahnhof in the middle of Kreuzberg 36. It is merely one example of a pre-
viously hidden Muslim community now making its presence felt in Berlin 
with a multifunctional building that provides space for shopping, child-
care, and prayer.
Estimates suggest that the Muslim population in Germany is approxi-
mately 3.2 million to 3.5 million—around four percent of the overall 
German population currently living in Germany (Bundesministerium des 
Innern 2007). There are around 213,000 Muslims in Berlin; an estimate that 
includes immigrants from countries where Islam is the main religion and 
German converts.2 The accuracy of the figure is problematic as it includes 
Figure 2. Ibn al-Khattab mosque at the Görlitzer Bahnhof, Kreuzberg. Photo: 
Synnøve Bendixsen
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3 Shiites are also known as Shia Muslims. There are several differences between the 
religious practices of Shiites and Sunnis, including conceptions of religious authority and 
interpretation, as well as the role of the Prophet Muhammad’s descendants. Around 
85 percent of the worlds’ Muslims are Sunni, and 15 percent are Shiite, although this 
estimate fluctuates slightly. According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Religious Monitor 
(2008) interview sample of 2,000 Muslims in Germany, 69 percent classified themselves as 
Sunnis, 9 percent as Shiites and 8 percent as Alevis. Notably, 11 percent answered “other 
denomination” and 8 percent “don’t know/no answer.” Not all Muslims recognize Alevis 
as fellow Muslims. Sufi orders embrace mystical practices and can fall within either the 
Sunni or the Shia tradition. Some Sufis may accept teachings from both traditions.
4 Compared to the considerable focus on Sunni Muslims, there is relatively little focus 
on the around 60,000 Alevi in Berlin, a large percentage of whom are Kurds. One may ques-
tion whether this is related to their relatively low visibility. The Alevi communities use Cem 
(cultural houses) rather than mosques. Because Alevi have fewer food and dress restric-
tions, this religious community is visible in Berlin in what may be considered “cultural” 
terms, including through restaurants with music performances and staff in ethnic clothing, 
but less in visibly “religious” terms. For example, only a few Alevi women in Germany wear 
the headscarf. Yet this perception of invisibility is only true to some extent: Mandel (2008) 
points to how the Alevi habit of concealment in Turkey (due to security concerns) has 
been broken in Berlin where they can be open and visually mark their cultural centers.
5 According to a study by the ZfT (Centre for Turkish Studies) 42 percent of Muslims 
with a Turkish background visit a mosque once a week; 21 percent never, or almost never; 
and 7 percent on holidays (Şen & Sauer 2006, 28).
people who do not necessarily personally adhere to Islam; how to count 
Muslims is both a political question and a research dilemma (Spielhaus and 
Färber 2006). Among the two major branches of Islam, Sunni and Shiite, 
I focus on the Sunni branch, which represents approximately 90 percent 
of the Muslim prayer rooms in Berlin (Spielhaus and Färber 2006: 9).3
Berlin caters to a variety of organizations, mosques, and groups repre-
senting the varied interests of religious and secular migrants. Organizations 
specifically for Turks in Germany include Milli Görüş, DITIB (The Turkish 
Islamic Union of the Foundation for Religion), the followers of Kaplan 
(State of the Caliphate), the Refah Party, Süleymanci (Association of 
Islamic Cultural Centres), and Alevi organizations such as the Anatolian 
Alevi Cultural Centre (see appendix I). Religious spaces, such as mosques, 
provide services to the increasingly heterogeneous Muslim communi-
ties  in Europe.4 Although it is estimated that around 40 percent of the 
Muslim population of Turkish origin in Germany visits a mosque at least 
once a week, there are no reliable figures; many prefer to pray at home, 
others see mosques as a social space where ethnic social networks are 
strengthened.5
Currently, the building of mosques is a highly controversial topic in sev-
eral European cities. One of the central themes in the contestation 
over sites of worship is the semiotic role that such buildings play in the 
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articulation of opposing social identities in urban spaces. The construc-
tion of mosques continues to be controversial partly because it lends a 
greater visibility to Islam in the landscape of European cities, which to 
some conveys the message that the new community is “here to stay” and 
thus takes on a symbolic significance.6 In general, funding for building 
mosques is a topic of government concern as it relates to questions of the 
potential future religious, social, and political influences of Islamic donors 
both within and outside Europe. The heightened visibility of Islam has 
also led to vehement discussions because it raises questions of who 
belongs in the city, what the role of religion should be in the city, and 
whose city it is.
The perceptions and experiences of the young users of mosques and 
religious organizations have not yet been the subject of serious research. 
This chapter attempts to deal with part of this gap by examining how ideas 
and perceptions of Muslims spaces, and in particular mosques, are inte-
gral parts of the process by which young people craft a religious Self. Thus, 
I seek to further an understanding of mosques as “sites of practice” (de 
Certeau 1984) for young Muslims in their daily urban life. This involves 
going beyond the historical, architectural and geographical mapping of 
mosques. The analysis includes an examination of the social services and 
facilities (such as language and computer courses and women’s reading 
groups) available in those spaces, and of which groups take advantage of 
these services and facilities.7 However, my focus here is on the social pro-
cesses involved in a young person’s adherence to and use of religious 
places, such as mosques. Who uses which religious spaces and why? What 
factors are at play in the processes through which young Muslims identify 
with religious social spaces in Berlin? What can an understanding of 
mosques as spaces contribute to our understanding of the religious iden-
tifications of youth in Berlin?
When personal experiences and meanings are attached to religious 
places, the place of the mosque or religious organization becomes a social 
space. The distinction de Certeau makes between space and place is 
6 See for example Cesari (2005a), Eade (1996) and Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di 
Friedberg (2005). In Berlin, Jonker (2005) has examined how the struggle over the Mevlana 
mosque, situated only meters away from the well-known subway station Kottbusser Tor, 
went on for several years. According to Jonker, the conflict escalated due to opposing inter-
pretations between the municipality and religious leaders about the use and nature of the 
space, in addition to cultural misunderstandings.
7 Spielhaus & Färber’s edited volume (2006) provides a good overview of such services 
and facilities in Berlin mosques.
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crucial here. “Place” is the elements of the location, the “instantaneous 
configuration of positions” (de Certeau 1984, 117). “Space,” on the other 
hand, is the effect of “the operations that orient it, situate it, temporalize 
it, and make it function in a polyvalent unity of conflictual programs or 
contractual proximities” (ibid.). In short, it is “a practiced place” (ibid.). 
This distinction points to the significance in understanding the youths’ 
social and cultural experiences of the (religious) city in terms of space, 
rather than place. Social practices reside in, make use of, and give social 
meaning to or a “sense” of places. The social and cultural existence of a 
place is the arrangement of “spatial practices” or “proxemics.” These prac-
tices are organized at different levels, from urban built environments to 
the micro level of daily social events, such as the experience of walking 
(Stokes 1994, 22). The city is saturated with religious spaces that are vari-
ously experienced by Muslim youth. In order to understand how some 
places become religious spaces we need to pay attention to people’s social 
practices and experiences.
My focus in this chapter is twofold. First, the chapter introduces the city 
of Berlin and the religious organization MJD, which together form the 
main contexts for this book. I ask how the city as a space and social arena 
of interaction is continuously shaped, changed and imprinted by new 
social practices introduced by a new population – migrants from Muslim 
countries. With time, this population is also changing its relationship to 
the city and country of residence. I argue that these imprints on the city 
need to be understood as the visibilization of social practices that, on the 
one hand, seek to fulfill certain everyday social and religious needs, and, 
on the other hand, establish social spaces with which migrant populations 
in Berlin identify. Second, the chapter takes a close empirical look at the 
social spaces of mosques as contested spaces, both for non-Muslims and 
for Muslim youth. My focus here is on how religiously devoted Muslim 
women in Berlin experience and relate to mosques, and how they are 
establishing their local religious social spaces through this process. This 
will shed light on how particular spaces in the city, such as mosques, 
inspire associations and usage patterns that differ not just between the 
different groups of people living in Berlin, but even between members of 
what otherwise could be considered a homogeneous group of “young 
Muslims.” The various ways that youth understand mosques draws our 
attention to the process through which mosques as places are becoming 
heterogeneous and complex spaces. Here, I analyze young people’s narra-
tives about their personal experiences of mosques, and consider how the 
stories transform these places into (subjective) spaces. In light of the 
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heated views aired in the media and by political actors and intellectuals 
about mosques and religious organizations, the wide range of experiences 
that young people have with regard to the same—and different—spatial-
ized mosques, becomes a relevant research question.
The two parts of the chapter tell parts of the story of how the city as an 
oeuvre (Mitchell 2003) continuously emerges, and how people relate to 
the different social spaces available. While the historical or visual map-
ping of physical space calls to mind the idea of fixed references and mea-
surements in the urban landscape, such mapping cannot summarize how 
people view their spaces (Chambers 1993). As Chambers eloquently states:
The city plan is both a rationalization of space and time; its streets, build-
ings, bridges and roads are temporal indices. It permits us to grasp an out-
line, a shape, some sort of location, but not the contexts, cultures, histories, 
languages, experiences, desires and hopes that course through the urban 
body. (ibid., 189)
Social relations and processes create places in a material sense, but simul-
taneously produce meanings that people connect to places (Massey 1994). 
Social space, which includes a personal relationship with the space, is 
both produced and maintained by discursive and material practices (de 
Certeau 1984). Different actors relate to urban religious spaces, such as 
mosques, in different ways that can be read as “spatial stories” (ibid.), or 
that can be understood in terms of “mental mapping.” The short narratives 
I present, combined with other ways that the youth recollect, share, per-
form, alter, form, and merge their experiences and understandings of 
Islamic movements, form part of how the young people in this study iden-
tify as Muslims and frame and make sense of their (religious) life in Berlin.
Changing Sociological Landscapes
City Spaces Phase 1: The Arrival of Non-European Guest Workers in Berlin
In 1777, following an official visit to Berlin in 1763–4, the representative of 
the Sublime Porte, Resmî Ahmed Efendi, reported to his Sultan Abdul 
Hamid I that “the population of Berlin recognizes the prophet Muhammed 
and would not be afraid to accept Islam” (quoted in Thomä-Venske 1988, 
78). His visit was part of the effort to improve the economic, political and 
military relations between the Ottoman state and Prussia. Although the 
population of Berlin did not convert to Islam, smaller Muslim groups con-
tinued to exist in the city (ibid.). Some years later, the death of the Ottoman 
ambassador to Berlin Giritli Ali Aziz Efendi in 1798 marked the opening of 
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8 The old Ahmadiyya Mosque, which was initiated by Muslim diplomats, was erected in 
1927 in the borough of Wilmersdorf. It was badly damaged during the Second World War 
and was placed under preservation order in 1993.
9 In 1955, the federal government signed a recruitment agreement with Italy mainly 
benefiting the agricultural sector.
the Muslim cemetery at the Colombiadamm. The German government 
financed a wooden mosque for the Muslim prisoners of war in Wünsdorf 
(Brandenburg) in 1915, which was demolished in 1930 (Höpp 1997). A more 
organized Muslim society developed in the 1920s, with the founding of an 
Islamic community (Islamische Gemeinde Berlin) in 1922, in which Muslims 
of forty-one nationalities participated. It presented itself as an association 
of all Muslims residing in Berlin and Germany (Thomä-Venske 1988). Their 
efforts to construct a mosque on the Kaiserdamm failed for economic rea-
sons. In 1924, the Ahmadiyya community, which was newly established, 
started the building of a mosque in Brienner Strasse. This mosque was in 
operation from 1926–7.8
Islam’s presence in the broader German society gradually grew as part 
of an immigration process: Turkish and Kurdish guest workers arrived fol-
lowing the bilateral recruitment agreements signed between Germany 
and Turkey. During the 1950s, West Germany experienced a tremendous 
post-war economic growth with full employment by the 1960s (Green 
2004). In 1961, Germany and Turkey signed a recruitment agreement in 
which the latter would provide guest workers to West Germany.9 This was 
shortly after the construction of the Berlin wall, thus ending the influx of 
East German labor. Labor migration did not become a topic of public dis-
cussion, which must be viewed in light of the fact that Germany needed 
foreign labor. Labor shortages were impeding economic growth and, con-
sequently, living standards. Additionally, the agreement did not intend to 
introduce permanent residence in Germany for the migrants; the workers 
from Turkey should ultimately return to their home country after a period 
of two to three years, to be replaced by new workers. Even though the first 
generation of Turks and Kurds received social benefits and similar employ-
ment rights as German workers, they were not expected to be involved in 
German society outside of their work place (Helicke 2002). The workers 
from Turkey were generally housed in company-owned hostels. As the 
main concern of the workers was to save as much capital as possible in 
order to return to Turkey, their social lives were largely focused around the 
workplace and they lacked the social rootedness family life can offer. The 
German population perceived this first generation in particular as a group 
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10 The ban on recruitment remained in force until 2002.
11 The term “Überfremdung” was also used by Nazis to describe Jews and other “undesir-
ables” in the Third Reich (Mandel 2008). Chapter 3 discusses the negative stereotypes 
about migrants in German media.
of homogenous “Turks.” This presumption of homogeneity among the 
guest workers, who also included Kurds from Turkey, was reinforced by 
their lack of family life and institutional support.
In Berlin, a large number of immigrants were more or less assigned to 
live in the Kreuzberg neighborhood, an area that in the late 1960s was 
scheduled for regeneration. Originally, the intention was that immigrants 
would only temporarily inhabit this densely built neighborhood, which 
comprised late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century houses built for 
working-class families who settled in Berlin during the industrialization 
period (Häussermann and Oswald 1997). Nonetheless, with the prolonga-
tion of employment contracts these soon became permanent residences. 
Rather than sending workers back after a couple of years to receive new 
“fresh” workers, as the recruitment agreement had originally intended, 
employers found it more efficient and productive to continue to employ 
those who had already settled and trained instead of “returning” them and 
receiving new ones.
Unemployment grew among the German population as a result of the 
oil crisis in 1973. The German ban on recruitment (Anwerbestopp), which 
barred further recruitment of overseas labor, made it more difficult for for-
eign workers to leave West Germany and re-enter on an employment con-
tract.10 Fewer Turks and Kurds in Germany considered returning home a 
viable option, particularly in light of the continuing job offers from 
German industry. Instead, they made use of family reunification rules 
(Familiennachzug) and brought their wives or husbands and children 
over. From the end of the 1970s, an increasing number of non-working 
dependents—women and children—meant a corresponding increase in 
demand for basic social services, such as education and housing. From this 
period onwards, the media gradually expressed more concern about “for-
eign infiltration” (Überfremdung) and claimed that the “German boat is 
full” (Mandel 2008, 53).11 The notion that Germans and Turks shared 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, that the Turkish presence in Germany was 
simply a temporary phenomenon, turned out to be erroneous. This notion 
had long-lasting effects on the social position of Turks and Kurds in 
Germany, as policies that could have eased the social interaction between 
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12 Egyptian authorities estimate this number to 24,000 people in 2007 (Baraulina et al. 
2007). None of these numbers include Egyptians who have acquired German citizenship. 
This migrant group has a high naturalization rate as well as a high percentage of marriage 
with Germans (Gesemann 1995).
13 Most Egyptian migrants in Germany study languages and cultural sciences, engineer-
ing, and natural sciences (Baraulina et al. 2007).
the newcomers and the populations already living in Germany (like lan-
guage courses) were postponed.
The Socio-Historical Situation of Migrants from the Middle East
While migrants in Germany are often understood as synonymous with 
“Turks,” and since the twenty-first century with “Muslims,” the category 
also comprises people from the Middle East. Here, I provide a brief account 
of the migration process from the Middle East, as several of the active 
members and leaders in MJD have parents who are originally from Egypt, 
while other participants have Palestinian backgrounds or are Kurdish ref-
ugees from Iraq and Syria.
The migrants with Middle Eastern backgrounds have a somewhat dif-
ferent socio-historical relation to Germany compared to the Turkish and 
Kurdish immigrants. It is difficult to give an estimate of the number of 
people of Middle Eastern origin living in Germany. Various sources indi-
cate numbers between 280,000 and 400,000. These figures comprise citi-
zens of Middle Eastern countries, ethnic Arabs who are naturalized 
German citizens, people with dual citizenships, and stateless Arabs 
(Al-Hamarneh 2008, 26). Most are originally from Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, Tunisia, and Syria. The migration narratives of migrants from 
the Middle East tend to focus on the political and socio-economic situa-
tion of the countries from which they have migrated: people from Morocco 
and Tunisia have parents who came as labor migrants to Germany through 
the bilateral governmental agreements; most people from Palestine, Iraq, 
and Lebanon arrived as political refugees; and a large part of people from 
Syria and Palestinian Arabs came as students and stayed (ibid.).
There are approximately 14,500 Egyptian citizens in Germany (Baraulina 
et al. 2007).12 Traditionally, Egyptian immigrants in Germany were pre-
dominantly male students from upper-middle-class backgrounds who 
began to arrive in the 1950s.13 This migration based on educational aspira-
tions still takes place. Some of these migrants represent the religious intel-
ligentsia who left Egypt in the 1950s after the attack on President Nasser. In 
Germany, they became part of the Islamic elite and founded mosques and 
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14 It was named Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V, in 1982. It opened Islamic 
centers in Nürnberg (1984), Marburg (1986), Frankfurt (1989), Stuttgart (1992), Köln (1998), 
Braunschweig and Münster (2001). In 2003, it maintained 12 of its own centers and was 
coordinating its activities with more than 50 other mosque associations.
took over leading positions in several Muslim organizations. For example, 
the Islamic Community Germany (IGD) was first established as a mosque-
building initiative in 1958 by Egyptian Muslim activists. Today, it has estab-
lished branches in several German cities.14 It is thought to represent the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Germany. The presumed and sometimes proved 
connection between Egyptian Muslim activists and the Muslim 
Brotherhood has also had an impact on organizations with a large repre-
sentation of Muslims with Egyptian backgrounds, such as MJD. The high 
number of youth in MJD with Egyptian backgrounds has undoubtedly 
had, and continues to have, an impact on the organization’s characteris-
tics and Islamic teaching. Another consequence of their presence is that 
many of the youth have high educational ambitions, the effect of which 
will be reflected upon throughout the book.
City Spaces Phase 2: Ethnic Businesses and Infrastructure
The gradual transformation from temporary workforce to settlement went 
hand-in-hand with the increase of “community” structures. By the mid-
1980s, Kreuzberg’s infrastructure was dominated by its Turkish and 
Kurdish population; small grocery stores and shops for household goods 
were set up to meet demands for familiar provisions from the migrants’ 
country of origin. In an effort to prevent ghettoization, foreigners were 
banned from living in certain parts of the larger cities in the period 
between 1975 and 1977 (Green 2004), as it was believed that an area with 
more than 12 percent of foreigners would be “outside of the limits of toler-
ance of the infrastructure and social peace” (Bade 1994, 54). Yet this restric-
tion had little practical effect, due to the simultaneous trends in family 
reunification. In contemporary Berlin, more than 25 percent of the resi-
dents of the city-district (Bezirk) of Neukölln, Wedding and Kreuzberg 
(restructured as Kreuzberg-Friedrichhain) are not German citizens.
With time, the first generation also faced social problems if they did 
return to Turkey. No longer considered “Turks” but “almanyali” (“German-
like”) by their relatives and neighbors in Turkey, the idea of return came to 
be not only an economic issue, but also a socio-cultural one since many no 
longer felt at home in Turkey (Mandel 1989). Throughout the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s, Kreuzberg became known as Europe’s “Turkish ghetto” and 
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15 Taksim is an upper middle class area in Istanbul where the most popular shopping 
street is located.
tourist busses drove through the neighborhood to allow tourists to gawk at 
the streets filled with restaurants and shops with signs in Turkish, street 
markets, women with long coats and headscarves, and men with mous-
taches playing with their worry beads. At the same time as the most 
dynamic cultural and alternative scene was located in Kreuzberg, the eth-
nic population gradually became a more visible part of this neighbor-
hood’s urban image. Certain streets in Kreuzberg became (in)famous 
because of the establishment of businesses with names such as “Taksim” 
restaurant or “little Istanbul” hairdresser; today, these are well-known 
Berliner landmarks, with Wrangelstraße and Oranienstraße as oft-cited 
examples.15 Ethnic grocers, bakeries, newsstands, clothing stores, and spe-
cialist suppliers, including specialist travel agencies, and football clubs 
functioning as coffee shops open only to members, serve an ethnic com-
munity and at the same time visibly express the community’s presence. 
Ethnic businesses are often family run, and ethnic networks—people 
from the same village, city or region in their country of origin—are often 
mobilized.
Figure 3. Fruit and vegetable stand at Kottbusser Tor, Kreuzberg. Photo: Synnøve 
Bendixsen
 making sense of the city 77
16 Whereas the average unemployment rate in Germany was 10.1 percent in 2007, among 
the foreign population it was 22 percent (von Below and Karakoyun 2007, 34–42). In Berlin, 
it is estimated that the business start-up rate is twice as high among Turkish nationals 
as among Germans. In 2002, there were about 5,200 businesses owned by self-employed 
persons of Turkish descent (Pütz 2008).
17 Sassen (1999) compares this to industrial cities where more universal categories 
such as the working class, salaried employees, private employees, and civil servants 
are reinforced, thereby diminishing—at least to some extent—ethnic and cultural 
differentiation.
18 “Muslime sind die Besten. Es lebe Allah” and “Muslime lieben am besten,” author’s 
translation.
The second generation continued the early tendency towards “ethnic 
businesses”—partly due to a lack of alternative job opportunities. 
According to the Center for Studies on Turkey (CfST) at the University of 
Essen, job security and independence are the most frequently mentioned 
reasons for the trend toward self-employment among Turks.16 Although 
Turkish-owned businesses often try to remain independent from German 
state control, entrepreneurship also represents a possible means of inte-
gration, as they need to operate according to rules defined by the German 
state. Berlin followed a trend found in most European metropolises 
wherein employment opportunities largely reflected ethnic, religious and 
social status. One consequence of this urban organization was that ethnic-
ity became increasingly bound up with class. Saskia Sassen (1999), amongst 
others, argues that in global cities this tendency is reinforced, thereby to 
some extent preserving ethnic distinctions.17 Although not a global city, 
Berlin has several similar characteristics, suggesting that the fusion of eth-
nicity and class also takes place in cities not defined as global. Importantly, 
this process had already started with labor migration in the 1960s: two-
thirds of Turkish migrants came from rural regions and when they arrived 
in Germany, they occupied mostly badly paid and unpleasant jobs. 
Consequently, they came to occupy the lowest socio-economic and occu-
pational positions.
City Spaces Phase 3: “Immigrants” and “Turks” Become “Muslims”
Islamic religious markers have become more noticeable since the late 
1990s, both through the increasing focus on Islam by the media and politi-
cians and through the social practices of Muslims. Islamic graffiti “imprint-
ing” on the Berliner urban landscape, such as “Muslims are the best. Long 
live Allah!” or “Muslims love best” (Kaschuba 2007, 83), challenge urban 
spaces of belonging.18 The number of what I call “religious businesses” in 
Berlin neighborhoods in Wedding, Neukölln, and Kreuzberg has increased 
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19 Permission for the slaughtering of meat in the correct Islamic way is the result of a 
long process of negotiation with the German government. Butchers can also apply to an 
Islamic organization for a certification that they sell halal meat. Still, regardless of whether 
a butcher has a certificate, there are discussions among Muslims about which butcher is 
“really” halal.
20 Many groceries contain the additive E441 (used in ice cream, chocolate, candies and 
different food products), which is produced using pork skin. E47-E474 also contains pork 
products.
21 Mandel (1996) has described how shopkeepers in Kreuzberg “use” the fear of haram 
(forbidden) meat and what is considered obligatory or halal (permitted) to their advan-
tage. The result is an increase in shops that cater exclusively to Turks, creating a Muslim 
space in Germany, subdivided by Sunni or Alevi. This commercial orientation, she points 
out, also creates a place for migrants on their own terms. For a discussion about the com-
modification of religious items, see in particular Lukens-Bull and Calbeck (2006), and 
Metcalf (1996).
over the last ten years. This includes the introduction of more fast food 
restaurants with signs advertising “halal döner” (kebab made with meat 
slaughtered according to Islamic dietary laws), Islamic butcheries, and 
cafes with signs that say “no alcohol to be drunk here.”19 Many restaurants 
in these neighborhoods also have “Ramadan specials” where anyone can 
get a complete meal for five Euros for Iftar (the first meal at the end of a 
day of fasting during Ramadan). Information on which of the “Turkish” or 
“Arabic” Imbiss (snack bar) are religiously “correct” is passed via word-of-
mouth among religious customers. Internet sites offer lists over which 
additives are religiously acceptable to eat and which groceries one should 
avoid due to the availability of pork products in one form or another.20
Overall, the previous and more general immigrant identity has become 
more characteristically Muslim and is increasingly competing for a posi-
tion in the public sphere. In the Neukölln neighborhood, Islamic books, 
CDs with readings of the Koran, “religious” toothbrushes, candies without 
gelatin, Muslim newspapers in German (Islamische Zeitung, IZ), Mecca 
Cola, a guidebook for food purchasing for Muslims in Germany, and hijab-
Barbie (Barbie with a headscarf) can be bought while listening to Yusuf 
Islam or Ammer 114 (a German convert who is an “Islamic” hip hop 
artist – the number refers to the amount of verses in the Koran). By creat-
ing a particular atmosphere in the shop and in the neighborhood, shop-
keepers can establish a religious brand and reputation among their 
customers. This also illustrates an increased commodification of Islam, 
through which the religious economic market turns piety into a commod-
ity.21 Partly, “religion becomes something which can be bought and sold” 
(Lukens-Bull and Calbeck 2006, 307). At the same time, this should not be 
dismissed as merely a commodification of or capitalization on religious 
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objects, because when someone buys the item she or he ascribes meaning 
to it, through which the object again may become a religious article.
The increasing number of young women donning the headscarf has 
resulted in the introduction of women-only hairdressers in these districts: 
the windows are covered to protect those inside against the glances of 
passers-by, and men are prohibited from entering. Wedding dress shops 
offer what is considered to be correct Islamic white dresses with matching 
headscarves. Allegedly, the assortment and prices of headscarves at the 
“Turkish market” situated on Maybach-Üfer (Kreuzberg) on Tuesdays and 
Figure 4. Bakery close in Reichenbergerstrasse, Kreuzberg. Photo: Synnøve 
Bendixsen
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Fridays can compete with those found in Istanbul. In recent years, the 
market has been renamed “BiOriental,” which plays on the educated mid-
dle class Berliner preference for organic (Bio) products and Germany’s tra-
ditional, rather fetishist, fascination for the “Orient.” Will the renaming 
cause a social upgrade of the market—making the claiming of space by 
certain businesses and consumers more acceptable? It remains to be seen, 
but the saying goes that the gentrification of a neighborhood is most visi-
ble when an organic grocery (Bioläden) moves in.
Gender-divided wedding parties or henna parties (engagement parties) 
are held in otherwise public spaces by covering windows from the gaze of 
outsiders, thus enabling women to dance with spaghetti strap dresses and 
without headscarves. German public swimming pools offer “women only” 
hours, which are frequently used by young veiled women and sometimes 
by their mothers. Young well-educated Muslims are establishing Internet 
platforms for Muslims in Berlin that collect information on religious, 
social, and political topics, and present ongoing projects in Berlin. Other 
educated women are establishing Muslim kindergartens or work as teach-
ers in Islamic schools. These creative inventions and initiatives indicate 
Figure 5. “Light of the Orient”, wedding dress shop in Wedding. Photo: Synnøve 
Bendixsen
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22 Such “Muslim spaces,” Metcalf (1996) maintains, include the use of certain spoken 
and written Arabic words (such as “Bi’smi’llah” [in the name of Allah]) and photographs of 
calligraphy in homes.
23 I discuss media and public opinion about “Muslims” in Germany and the effect of 
these discourses on the youths’ identification processes in chapter 3.
how, as Göle points out, “Islam carves out a public space of its own, 
embodied in new Islamic language styles, corporeal rituals, and spatial 
practices” (Göle 2006a, 6). In Europe, it is also a consequence of civil, soci-
etal, and even market forces through which Muslim actors create “Muslim 
space[s]” (Metcalf 1996, 2), seeking visibility and legitimacy in the national 
public sphere.22
Simultaneously with the carving out of religious urban spaces there has 
been a general re-categorization of Muslim migrants in the media and 
political debates. While a large part of this population used to be catego-
rized as “Turkish” or (more rarely) “Kurdish,” or as “migrants,” they are now 
categorized as “Muslims,” independently of whether they would define 
themselves as Muslim or not. Consequently, the “immigrant” and his or 
her children and grandchildren are increasingly viewed as part of a 
(homogenized) “Muslim community,” the content of which is defined by 
non-Muslim media, politicians and even researchers. This reduction of a 
heterogeneous population to a simplified notion of “Muslim” denies part 
of the population the right to be viewed and evaluated as a worker, mother 
or father, musician, or writer, etc.
The discursive change from “migrant” or “Turk” to “Muslim” must be 
seen in light of at least two developments. First, by now it is a truism that 
the relationship between the (Christian) West and the (Muslim) East took 
on a new (“religious”) dimension in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
in New York in 2001, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005. This new dimen-
sion was also a factor in the categorizations of the “migrant” population in 
Europe as “Muslims.” Debates on conflicts of interest, social problems, and 
immigration in European cities generally shifted to a cultural and sym-
bolic level. Although the media turned to the image of Islam as the enemy 
after these global events in particular, Schiffauer (2006a) suggests that the 
negative focus on Islam and Muslims was already latent. These events 
provided legitimate reasons for expanding on the enemy images.23 What  
is clear is that in the last decade, political actors, media, and scholars 
have  centered their attention on assumed Islamic particularities. 
Second,  the increase in visible religious community structures, such as 
prayer rooms and mosques, evidences the end of the German and 
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24 The secularization thesis, to which Berger’s “The Sacred Canopy” (1967) is central, 
holds that societies were “progressing” through modernization and rationalization, and in 
this process religion would lose its authority in daily life, society, and governance. Berger 
later strongly modified his view of the decline of religion. Some scholars have argued that 
secularization is a sociological “myth,” or that Europe is the “exception,” but this discussion 
is beyond the scope of this book.
Turkish  “myth of return” of the guest workers. Islam has become part 
of the city and its migrant population in a more visible manner. This brings 
to the fore questions concerning the relationship between visible religios-
ity and the urban. For a long time it has generally been presumed that 
modernization, including urbanization, would mean a decline of religious 
involvement. People in large cities and administrative and industrial cen-
ters were supposedly most likely to be less religiously involved.24 Whether 
or not one agrees with the idea that religiosity or the role of religion has 
diminished, there has been a broad acceptance of the idea that the urban 
has been considered a non-space for religious markers, with the exception 
of church buildings and spires—which in any case to a large extent have 
become socio-historical rather than religious urban markers.
Religion and the Urban
Urbanization and industrialization in the nineteenth century transformed 
the social role of religion in the cities: secularization and a religious “indif-
ference” dominated among the professional and commercial middle class 
in Germany. The movement of people from the country and into cities and 
industrial areas made the populations in urban centers in Europe more 
diverse. For the newcomers to the city, priests and ministers became 
important spokesmen and social network figures in ethnic communities. 
Churches were frequently the main basis for the communal life of the 
immigrant and adherence to a church represented a point of identifica-
tion. As McLeod asserts: “To be a Catholic, a Protestant—or, for that mat-
ter, a socialist—was not only to believe certain doctrines, and behave in 
certain prescribed ways. It was to belong to a community with its own 
sense of common identity, and vigorous pursuit of common interests” 
(McLeod 1997, 78). It seems that already in the 1830s and 1840s the edu-
cated middle class in Berlin was rather detached from the church: “They 
belonged to the church, but each person made up his own religion. For the 
practical man, the church was an acceptable form of external display, 
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especially for family celebrations” (ibid.). However, the “home-based 
piety” could still be found among the lower middle class, while aristocrats 
as well as clerks and officials remained relatively church-oriented. Still, 
religious observance in several German cities was at such a low level that 
the variation within the urban population mattered less: “there seemed to 
be a clear contrast between the secularization of the cities and the piety of 
many peasant populations” (ibid., 102).
Historically, the design of places of worship in urban spaces has repre-
sented the most controversial and symbolically laden theme when it 
comes to religious acceptance of a minority religion. Migrant groups set-
tling in a new milieu ultimately have to organize their own places of wor-
ship within a particular historical and socio-political context. Such 
religious claiming of space has often not taken place without conflicts and 
disputes. The organization of Islam in Europe is no exception, although 
the scale of the conflicts may well be new. Muslim migrants in Europe had 
already begun setting up mosques in the early 1970s, both to create a sup-
portive community structure and to raise children so “they would not be 
lost” to the “other” culture. The organization of collective Muslim identi-
ties and increased Muslim representation in urban public spheres have 
caused anger and anxiety in European societies. This response is admit-
tedly not only because of their religious Otherness as a non-Christian 
religion or Islam as an “un-European” religion, but also because public 
expressions of religiousness position them as the ‘other’ of European secu-
larity (Casanova 2006). Indeed, in Berlin, as in many other European cities, 
the influence of the Christian church declined significantly in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. In the 1960s, immigration to the cities did 
bring about a growing religious diversity. However, simultaneously as the 
religious culture in West Berlin was increasingly fragmented, in the 1970s 
and 1980s more and more West Germans declared themselves to be with-
out religion and did not replace their rejection of religion with any other 
rival belief systems. As McLeod (1997, 146) asserts: “In an age of individual-
ism more people felt strong enough to go it alone – and indeed resented 
the loss of freedom that any kind of commitment seemed to entail.” Thus, 
the Muslim youths’ everyday life must also be contextualized as positioned 
in an urban space where historically faith and religiosity have been seen as 
out of place.
At a national level, although Germany has been “secular” for some 
time,  the religious authorities were not separated from the political 
powers as early as in other West European countries such as France and 
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25 In the federal district of Northrhine-Westfalia, churches run 80 percent of the kinder-
gartens (Karakaşoğlu 2003b, 121).
the Netherlands. While Germany adheres to the concept of secularism, it 
is not radically secular in the French style (French: laic). The Christian 
roots of the society are still apparent: there is no strict separation 
between religion and politics, and the Christian churches and the Jewish 
community have official representatives in social and political commit-
tees. Christian churches, and in particular Protestant churches, continue 
to be involved in public initiatives, including the construction of the 
German national education system in the nineteenth century (Mannitz 
2004a).25
That the position of the church in Germany is privileged is a fact often 
ignored (Schiffauer 2006a). It has been suggested that the problem Muslim 
organizations face in Germany is related less to whether or not Germany is 
a secular society and more to Islamic religious institutions wanting similar 
rights as the church. The German Basic Law (Grundgesezt) guarantees reli-
gious freedom, including freedom to create religious communities. Such 
religious communities have the right to organize and determine their 
internal structure and decision-making process, and have the right to par-
ticipate in the political life of Germany. However, to benefit from the rights 
associated with these provisions, the religions have to be registered as 
“public law corporations” (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts). Achieving 
this status entitles them to receive a share of the religious tax revenues 
that the state collects from their members, to operate as a civil service 
employer, to apply disciplinary power, and to produce documents (Warner 
and Wenner 2006). It also includes other benefits, such as the right to be 
consulted on relevant public policy matters. Regulations on the prerequi-
sites for registering as a religion includes that it must “be an established 
church,” “have a hierarchical organization,” and have its clergy be 
“appointed independently.” These rules exclude Sunni Islam from being a 
recognised corporate religion in Germany. Religions that have achieved 
this status include the Roman Catholic Church, the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, and Judaism. None of the many Islamic associations are public 
law corporations, but are instead registered as associations (eingetragener 
Verein e.V ) or as foundations (Stiftung). This status conveys some benefits, 
but these do not approach those afforded to public law corporations. 
Because Islamic communities in Germany have no public legal status as 
religious communities, they are not allowed to open schools or social 
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26 In 2000, a German court ruling granted the Islamic Federation Berlin (IFB, Islamische 
Föderation Berlin e.V., an organization of mostly Turkish Muslims in Berlin) the right to 
outline and implement a curriculum for Islamic instruction in the public schools of Berlin, 
with the prerequisite that the curriculum complies with Berlin school laws and is super-
vised by the school administration.
27 This was followed by other Muslim organizations with different religious, social and 
political agendas to demand similar institutions, including the Turkish state’s Diyanet 
(short for Diyanet Isleri Turk Islam Birligi, or DITIB), and the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs.
28 The German Basic Law (Grundgesezt) guarantees every person the right to express 
her or his opinion in words, written material, and pictures. Article 4 [Freedom of faith, 
conscience, and creed] in the German constitution states that “(1) Freedom of faith and of 
conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed, shall be inviolable. 
(2) The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.” From online access of the 
German constitution: www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#4, accessed August 10, 2008.
29 The ‘”Reli” campaign was led by Christoph Lehmann and backed by Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and her ruling center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party, the 
Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the churches. The city-state’s government ruled by the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Left Party dismissed the proposal, arguing that all 
students should follow ethics classes in order to learn a common set of values.
activities with financial support from the state.26 However, in Berlin Milli 
Görüş was allowed to establish a German Islamic school.27
“Trust in God” is referenced in the preamble to the German constitution 
as a common moral basis and, in contrast to France, religious education is 
still guaranteed as a subject in state schools.28 Berlin and two other federal 
states are exempted from this. After the “honor killing” of a young Turkish 
woman in 2005, the government of Berlin introduced a non-religious eth-
ics course the following year. In 2009, there was a referendum on whether 
students should be allowed to choose between ethics and religion classes.29 
Ethics class is compulsory, while religion classes are optional extra courses. 
The debate prior to the referendum was less about whether or not God 
should enter the classroom, and more about how Muslims fit into Berlin 
and, ultimately, whether religious teaching fosters or hinders tolerance. 
Perhaps indicatively of Berlin’s long secular tradition in contrast to south 
Germany, the proposal was rejected, with a low 29.2 percent of all eligible 
voters casting a ballot.
Structuring Islamic Communities
In Germany, several of the many Muslim organizations are not hierarchi-
cally—or even horizontally—linked to each other. In contrast to the situ-
ation of the Catholic and Protestant Evangelical Churches in Germany, 
there is no single organizational focal point for the adherents of Islam. 
Islam being a decentralized and generally non-hierarchical religion that 
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30 It should be added that Shiites are much more centralized and hierarchical. However, 
there are few Shiites in Germany and in Europe in general. In contrast to Catholicism, 
Sunni Muslim religious leaders are not in possession of any enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure obedience from their adherents; there are no sacraments in Islam that can be with-
held from Muslims in order to achieve obedience towards the imams or other “clerics” 
regarding policy decisions that the imams encourage or condone. The same is true of Shi’a 
Islam (Warner and Wenner 2006).
31 This Council can be said to have adopted the religious, social, and political discourse 
in Germany. Helicke (2002, 186) argues that the Council frames its discussions “in terms of 
human rights, modern individual needs, religious freedom, and human dignity, concepts 
which the German state and court system can understand.” A discussion of the institu-
tional spaces made available for Islam in Germany is beyond the scope of this book.
has multiple and often competing schools of law and social requirements 
can partly explain this.30 While German media and government are more 
concerned with the population being “Muslim” than with their ethnic 
background, ethnicity frequently plays a role when it comes to Muslims’ 
emotional and structural adherence to mosques and religious communi-
ties. Nevertheless, in realizing the need for longer term planning, some 
mosque representatives have increasingly been working together in order 
to achieve political recognition from German authorities. Over the past 
ten years, there has been an increase in cooperation and communication 
between the ethnically oriented mosques and the religious organizations, 
partially because a new generation is now more active within the organi-
zational structures. Simultaneously, both the Turkish and German states 
have continued to try to bring Muslims under a greater degree of state 
control. In 1994, the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) was established on the 
model of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. It aspires to represent 
the needs of the Muslim community by operating within a German legal 
framework.31
Established in April 2007, the Co-ordination Council of Muslims 
(Koordinierungsrat der Muslime, KRM), includes the four largest Muslim 
umbrella organizations: the Central Council of Muslims in Germany 
(Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V., ZMD), the Turkish-Islamic 
Union for Religious Affairs (Turkish-Islamische Union der Anstalt für 
Religion e.V., DITIB, which represents 52.3 percent of organized Muslims 
with Turkish backgrounds), the Council of Islam (Islamrat für die 
Bundesrepublik e.V., IRD) and the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers 
(Verband der islamischen Kulturzentren e.V., VIKZ, which represents 
13.6 percent of organized Muslims with Turkish backgrounds). (For a short 
explanation of these organizations, see appendix I). The Co-ordination 
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32 There are around 2,500 to 2,600 Muslim mosque organizations in Germany (Şen & 
Sauer 2006, 35). Most of these belong to one of the umbrella organizations that represent 
the “Muslim population.”
33 Author’s translation from German: “In welche Richtung sich der Islam in Deutschland 
entwickelt, das bestimmen weder die in der Islamkonferenz Versammelten noch die im 
Koordinierungsrat der Muslime zusammengeschlossenen Dachverbände”. In September 
2006, the Federal Minister of the Interior, Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, initiated the German 
Islam Conference which aimed to function as a negotiation and consultation process 
between representatives of the German state and Muslim communities. The state initia-
tive has proved controversial and has been subject to much critique—in particular in 
terms of the Muslim and mosque actors that have been included and excluded. See the 
homepage of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, “Deutsche Islamkonferenz,” at 
www.bmi.bund.de, accessed March 18, 2007.
34 October 3 has been the Day of the Open Mosques (TOM, Tag der offenen Moschee) in 
Germany since 1997, when it was initiated by Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat 
der Muslime, ZMD). On this day, several hundred mosques in Germany, and 15–18 
mosques in Berlin, keep their doors open for visitors and put on a special program for 
Council attempts to coordinate the interests of the member organizations 
and represent them vis-à-vis the state and the public. According to their 
own estimates, the Co-ordination Council of Muslims represents around 
410,000 believers from approximately 1,530 mosque organizations (Şen & 
Sauer 2006).32 However, as Barbara John (2007, 63) argues: “The direction 
that Islam will take in Germany, is decided neither by the gathering at the 
Islam conference [DIK, Deutsche Islam Konferenz] nor by the Co-ordination 
Council of Muslims [KRM] of the affiliated umbrella organizations.”33 The 
role of Islamic communities and organizations has changed over time, in 
relation not only to the alteration of the status of migrants, but also in rela-
tion to the social and religious needs of the younger generation born in 
Europe. In most European cities, there are an increasing number of social 
and cultural events taking place within mosques and religious organiza-
tions. According to Cesari:
Such events tend more and more to be aimed at both the Muslim and the 
non-Muslim populations of a residential area. This inscription of the reli-
gious at the heart of non-religious activities is often incomprehensible to 
European secularised minds for whom the religious is most often confined 
to places of worship. (Cesari 2005a, 1028)
Since the mid-1990s, there has been some effort in Germany to make 
mosques more open to non-members. This has included more contact 
with other organizations in the neighborhood (Jonker and Kapphan 1999). 
The annual “open mosque day” (Tag der offene Tür) arranged on October 3 
(the day of unification and a public holiday in Germany), is part of a strat-
egy to make the mosque symbolically more open.34 Nonetheless, when 
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non-Muslims. The mosques arrange tours of the mosques, podium discussions, book exhi-
bitions, and food stands.
35 To analyze the complex relationship between Islamic communities, European states, 
and Muslims, Yükleyen (2007, 56) introduces a heuristic tool he calls the “Islamic market 
model.” With “religious market” he points to the “production, reproduction, and distribu-
tion of religious views in a population” (ibid., 52). In Europe, there is a strong correlation 
between the religious communities and organizations, religious demands from the com-
munity, and the various state policies through which a religious market emerges (ibid.). 
Yükleyen argues that religious organizations constitute a “Muslim Faith Market” where the 
different spaces become known for a field of specialization (such as the teaching of Koran 
recitation among the Süleymanci) and thus attract a particular type of followers. Although 
the term remains controversial, the concept points to how various Muslim spaces emerge 
(or perish) in interaction with the demands from Muslims.
explaining my research I often received comments from non-Muslim 
Germans who were surprised and asked whether I had access to mosques. 
This suggests that there are ongoing, and in some cases well-founded, pre-
sumptions that mosques are not “open” to non-Muslims.
Practicing Muslims have always been able to choose between commu-
nities and organizations with various interpretations of Islam. Today, this 
range is larger than ever. The numerous associations, foundations, infor-
mal study circles, and institutions (mostly divided along ethno-national 
lines) contribute to a diversity of interpretations and practices among 
Muslims. To some extent, Islamic organizations and communities com-
pete to attract followers in Western settings.35 Compared to the first gen-
eration of migrants to whom kinship and regional loyalties were more 
crucial in the choice of religious spaces, the younger generation born in 
Europe is largely leaving these loyalties behind. Instead, and to varying 
degrees, they select among and switch between Islamic organizations 
depending on different considerations, including their personal, familial, 
ethnic, national, age, and political and religious outlook. Muslim youth are 
not merely passive consumers of religious messages, but participate in the 
process of interpretation and choosing where to participate in religious 
practice. In this process, as I will suggest, they relate to mosques as social 
spaces and incorporate religious communities in their mental mapping of 
Berlin.
Mosques: Contested Religious Spaces
The social role the mosques play for migrants, particularly in establishing 
social networks, has been recognized in social research since the 1970s. 
Within the mosques, participants can find sport clubs, women’s and youth 
associations, “after-school” or computer help, and advising and translation 
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36 A mosque is not a holy building like a church, but symbolically it is very import to 
Muslims. There are two types of mosques: the main mosque is called jamaca or Cami, and 
this is where the Friday prayer is conducted. The jamacas are often richly adorned. The 
other type of mosque is masjid or Mescit, houses of worship, and these are mostly local and 
smaller places. Nearly all mosques in Berlin are Mescit, but are nevertheless called Cami 
(Jonker and Kapphan 1999).
37 Mosques and religious organizations and institutions are difficult to measure and 
estimates need to be handled with care (Spielhaus & Färber 2006).
38 The increase of visible, purpose-built mosques may well include other (religious, 
economic, social and political) changes in the religious movements, a question which is 
beyond the scope of this book.
39 Yet this is only true of the former West Berlin. There is a clear difference between how 
the migrant population relates to former East and West Berlin. Few migrant structures are 
established in the former East and it is only recently that some communities have started 
agencies (Jonker and Kapphan 1999; Spielhaus & Färber 2006).36 In Berlin, 
extensive research on Muslim religious organizations and prayer spaces at 
the end of the 1990s estimated that there were 80 mosques in basements, 
shops, factory halls, decrepit buildings, and private apartments (Jonker 
and Kapphan 1999). More than 70 percent of these were located in 
Kreuzberg, Neukölln, and Wedding. Today, there are approximately 120 
mosques or prayer spaces, many of which have moved beyond their for-
mer locations, and a few of which are built with minarets (Spielhaus & 
Färber 2006).37
Despite the increase in the number of mosques, the construction of 
religious buildings with minarets remains particularly controversial. 
German media commonly cite fears of either “Islamization” of Berlin 
neighborhoods due to an increased visibility of a religious community, or 
of alienating the non-Muslim population living in the area, as grounds for 
objections to the building of a new mosque. The increased visibility of 
Islam in the cityscape is perhaps less the result of an Islamization or an 
actual increase in religious adherence among the Muslim population, and 
more a consequence of religious communities moving out of hidden 
spaces and entering the “mainstream” area of the city. For Muslims who 
attend mosques, the architectural inclusion of purpose-built mosques in 
the cityscape may well bring with it an improved self-esteem (Kaschuba 
2007). Religious sites represent new Muslim entries into the public sphere 
and provide symbolic references for an Islamic life in a city where the 
majority of the inhabitants are non-Muslims.38 Nawar, a 17-year-old born 
in Berlin to Egyptian parents, told me that what she likes about Berlin is 
that “there are spaces for everyone here.” She added that Berlin is the only 
place in Germany where she would want to live, as the city offers her 
the  necessary choices of living spaces.39 Next, I look closer at how this 
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to build mosques in former East Berlin, and this turned out to be quite controversial. In 
October 2008, the Ahmadiyya community opened the Khadija mosque in former East 
Berlin (Pankow-Heinersdorf). It is the first purpose-built mosque in East Germany. In 
March 2007, there was a fire on the land that the mosque owns. The opening was accompa-
nied by considerable police protection.
40 Islamic Relief (IR) is an Islamic international relief and development nongovern-
mental organization that was founded in the UK in 1984.
41 For several years, MJD Berlin used the premises of the bookshop and publishing firm 
“Green Palace.” When this publishing firm was reorganized in 2010, they left the premises. 
Consequently, MJD had to find a new meeting place. For a while, MJD borrowed the prayer 
rooms of the Bosnian mosque in Kreuzberg, but after some months they started to hold 
their meetings in the rooms of the Bilal Mosque (where the German-speaking DMK is also 
located) in Wedding. For a while, MJD in Berlin had an additional meeting every second 
Wednesday for the older participants who wanted to work more intensively on religious 
education. My impression is that the teachings were more structured during these meet-
ings. For example, participants were given homework consisting of memorizing parts of 
the Koran. My focus during my fieldwork was on the weekly meetings, which were more 
open to non-members and included a broader spectrum of participants in terms of age, 
and religious aspirations.
plurality of religious spaces is felt and experienced by young women who 
practice Islam. After introducing three different religious spaces in which 
I conducted fieldwork, I continue to examine how young people experi-
ence the mosques as social spaces in Berlin.
Identification with Religious Social Spaces
Every Monday, young women, some alone and some in groups, leave a sub-
way station in the middle of Kreuzberg and walk along a trafficked road, 
but deserted sidewalk, passing a window with the sign “Islamic Relief,” and 
stopping next door at a Muslim bookstore with green signs above the win-
dow.40 As they enter, bells from the door are heard. Inside, bookshelves 
line the wall, and there is a tall counter under which veiled Barbies (named 
Fulla) and halal candies are arranged for sale.41 By 5 p.m. young women 
are still arriving here at MJD, a Muslim youth organization. On some days, 
there is a small line of young women waiting for the bathroom in order to 
perform their ritual washing for the prayer (salat). Others take off their 
shoes and enter the back room where they grab two green pillows—one to 
sit on and the other for their backs—before finding a place on the floor, 
chatting. The small, carpeted room is decorated with the 99 names for 
Allah in Arabic as a “wallpaper” border and has a blackboard on one of the 
walls. On a regular day, there are 10 youth, on a busy day there may be 
more than 25 young women from all over Berlin. For some it takes only a 
20-minute walk to arrive, others have spent more than one hour on the 
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subway. The young women are here to attend a religious gathering with 
Islamic lectures, discussions, and Koran readings.
The meeting starts with a reading of the Koran, first in Arabic (with one 
woman correcting the Arabic pronunciation), followed by the translation 
of the reading in German and a tafsir (commentaries to the Koran). 
Afterwards, the girls do a round of introductions whenever there are new-
comers. The girls and young women introduce themselves first by their 
name, age, nationality (which is often a mix), and what they do. The meet-
ings continue with presentations about religious books and PowerPoint 
presentations on, for example, the contemporary value of different ahad-
ith in their own lives in Germany. The participants (especially the women 
of Egyptian descent) tend to either have a middle class family background 
or be upwardly mobile due to their success in the educational system. 
Many of the women over 18 are university students; the younger ones are 
often pursuing Abitur (diploma from German secondary school qualifying 
for university admission), or are still attending compulsory school. The 
ethnically mixed group speaks German, not only during presentations but 
also in everyday friendships. If someone starts talking in another language, 
one of the other youth usually demands “German please!” as she also 
Figure 6. Outside the MJD premises. Photo: Synnøve Bendixsen
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wants to understand what the others are laughing about. Participants give 
the religious presentations themselves, and the meeting is led by a young 
woman of the same age as the participants. The young attendees often 
interrupt the presenter with questions, additional information or correc-
tions. This willingness or expectation that the young people take on 
responsibility for organizing events, presenting religious topics, and pro-
viding Islamic knowledge to their peers is particular to this space, as 
I found out after visiting another youth group in Finnowstrasse, Neukölln.
The youth group Youth Club Assalam (Jugendtreff Assalam, IKEZ) in 
Finnowstrasse is situated some subway stops away from MJD. On Friday 
afternoons, young people walk towards one of the many courtyard 
mosques in Finnowstrasse, located in an area with residential apartment 
buildings. Turning left by a gas station, passing the green football field, the 
young women enter a tall gateway leading to the inner court. During some 
events, a sign that is drawn as a traffic light and says “STOP. Only for sisters. 
Entrance forbidden for brothers” hangs on the door leading down to the 
basement (where there is also a sport room). On a regular Friday, the girls 
and young women enter the main entrance, leave their shoes on the racks, 
bypass a small food shop and walk the stairs two floors up. Chatting 
amongst each other, most make jokes in Arabic while putting their chairs 
in a circle. The youth are here to listen to religious topics.
The youth organization in Neukölln exists within the mosque struc-
tures, makes use of imams, and attracts a more ethnically homogeneous 
group of participants, most of whom have an Arab background. The 
majority of the participants live in the surrounding neighborhood. 
Presentations are introduced by older, religiously educated women or an 
(male) imam, and are in German. During the religious lectures, the young 
people are expected to answer questions, but are rarely asked to contrib-
ute with presentations. Two of the youth leaders, Fahra (23) and her 
25-year old sister “grew up with MJD” and brought with them the knowl-
edge and some of the structure to this other youth organization. Fahra 
emphasized that the participants in this youth group cannot be expected 
to take on the responsibility of presenting religious themes and religious 
content, as she did not consider them as mature as the participants in 
MJD. Additionally, I noticed that even though the age range is similar to 
that in MJD, the educational and career ambitions are more limited. When 
introducing themselves at a Friday “spending the night” at the mosque, 
I observed that the participants had different future prospects compared 
to most members of MJD. The majority had no intention of pursuing 
Abitur (diploma from German secondary school qualifying for university 
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admission), and certainly did not plan to attend university. To the ques-
tion of “where they see themselves in five years,” most mentioned mar-
riage and children. This contrasts with MJD, where most emphasized 
future employment or educational plans.
During the round of introductions, I also observed that the youth did 
not mention their ethnic backgrounds. When I expressed my surprise 
about this to Fahra, she pointed out that although their parents came from 
Jordan, Egypt or Syria, “they are in any case all Arabs.” Compared to MJD, 
which emphasized their “multi-cultural” characteristics, Fahra explained 
that ethnic background is rarely a topic here because being of “Arabic 
descent” is the main identity marker. The panethnicity of “Arab people” 
includes all Arabized people of the world defined genealogically (tracing 
ones ancestry to the tribes of Arabia and the Syrian Desert) or, more 
importantly today, linguistically (Arabic being a person’s first language 
and by extension, their cultural expression).42 In several religious circles 
in Berlin, I noticed a feeling of pride among youth of Arabic descent, 
Figure 7. Inside the courtyard, entrance to the mosque and Youth Club Assalam. 
Photo: Synnøve Bendixsen
42 The youth identify as “Arabic” to various degrees.
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43 The Moroccan preacher Abdul Adhim is a controversial figure in Germany. He is 
widely known in Germany due to his sermons and commentaries on YouTube. In 2009, the 
German news magazine Focus presented him (under the name Abdel Hadim Kamouss) as 
one of the German Islamists and as a “star” on the Islamic scene. According to Focus, the 
Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) investigated “Kamouss and other 
extremists” in the social environment of the Al Nur mosque because they were supposed 
to have founded a terrorist cell. Kamouss was found not guilty in 2005 due to lack of 
evidence.
44 I often heard of, and personally observed, German Muslims who converted in this 
mosque. Although probably exaggerated, the newspaper Die Zeit argues that each week 
five people convert to Islam in this mosque (Die lässigen Gehirnwäscher, by Julia Gerlach, 
October 4, 2007), www.zeit.de/2007/41/Islam-Prediger, accessed January 20, 2009. Youth 
I talked with argued that this was the main reason that the German media write so nega-
tively about the mosque: it represents a space where Germans are becoming Muslims.
which was often primarily explained in terms of their mastering the lan-
guage of the Koran. At the Youth Club Assalam, during the evening with 
food and fun, no one complained if someone chatted in Arabic—except 
Fahra, who asked everyone to speak German as their guest (meaning me) 
did not understand Arabic.
In contrast to the two spaces described above, further north of Neukölln 
one of the largest gatherings of Muslim women in Berlin meets on Sunday 
afternoons in the Al Nur mosque. This mosque, which is housed in a for-
mer factory building, is located on a road leading to an industrial area. It 
attracts a variety of Muslims from all over Berlin, including regulars from 
the two above-mentioned spaces. While most of the female participants 
are between 15 and 35 years old, older women are also regular attendees. 
The male and female participants have their own entrance and areas. Girls 
and women sit on the carpet on the second floor, where they can follow 
the charismatic Islamic preacher Abdul Adhim (who sits among the men 
on the first floor), through a live feed on a TV screen.43 Many take notes 
while listening to the presentation, which is in German interspersed with 
Arabic quotations from the Koran. There are no introductions among the 
attendees; this event is not a space where the women are expected to get 
to know each other. Most sit in small groups of friends with different eth-
nic backgrounds, including German converts.44 This is a different type of 
meeting from the two above, performed in a preaching style and with little 
opportunity for discussions and direct questions about what is being said. 
The presentations are often emotional, evoking Paradise and Hell, and 
sometimes tears can be seen in the eyes of the women. The lecture series 
is also available on CDs that are for sale. At the end of the sermon, women 
(and men) can write their questions on a piece of paper that is collected 
by a child and brought to the imam on the first floor. The women follow 
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the TV screen with high expectations as he reads the questions and pro-
vide answers.
These three religious groups represent a small selection of the diverse 
religious spaces available in Berlin. Young people who seek knowledge 
about Islam and who, to varying degrees, identify as Muslims, visit these 
spaces. However, what is taught, how it is taught, and what effect it has on 
the attendees varies. Although I spent most of my fieldwork with MJD, 
I participated to some extent in all three of the above-mentioned organi-
zations, talking and listening to the women’s narratives and experiences of 
the religious spaces they visited or that were part of their daily lives. These 
stories tell us about how religious places become spaces for individuals 
and part of the lived experience of the youth. Lived religion is partly made 
up of the practice of people turning these “stories” into everyday acts 
(McGuire 2007, 197). An understanding of these spaces is thus part of the 
larger picture of the youth’s identification with Islam in Berlin and of how 
they craft a religious Self.
Current research on mosques in Europe frequently presents a homoge-
neous and uniform image of the various Muslim communities. This 
ignores how the ever-more complex, multiple and diverse religious 
Figure 8. Entrance to the Al Nur mosque, Neukölln. Photo: Synnøve Bendixsen
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associations and organizations make it increasingly necessary for 
active users to find ways to orient themselves. Pluralization and decentral-
ization are two characteristics of Islam that have become even more 
pronounced in the modern age (Casanova 2001). The complexity of 
Islamic  organizations in Berlin is related to migration processes and 
the  subsequent transnationalization and urbanization of religion, and 
to  new educational possibilities for the generation born in Germany. 
Islamic teaching in Berlin is inspired by authorities in the Middle East, 
Turkey, or other European countries that are frequently made available on 
cable TV. The increasingly important role played by transnational Muslim 
networks, make cities like Berlin, Paris, and London part of interconnected 
religious cities.
Additionally, migration to Germany brought with it a new relationship 
between society and the religious community that migrated, as it was 
also a move from rural areas to an urban context. The urban represents a 
larger and more heterogeneous pool of religious options to choose 
between and a reduction of the social control of where individuals partici-
pate religiously. That access to religious education has widened, not 
only  for families who have migrated, but also within countries such as 
Turkey and Egypt, also adds to the fragmentation of religious authority. 
The complexity of the global Islamic revival makes it difficult, for Muslims 
and non-Muslims, to generalize about Muslim institutions and religious 
movements and their participants and discursive practices. Looking 
more closely at the reasons the women give about why and where they 
participate is instructive for an understanding of the urban experience 
of religious lifestyles in contemporary Berlin. Through participant obser-
vation, I was able to gain an understanding of young people’s experiences 
of mosques and religious organizations in Berlin, and of how the youth 
make sense of these institutions. I realized that in their engagement with 
the different religious spaces available, the city becomes a negotiated 
reality.
For these young women, most of whom were born in Germany and 
belong to the Sunni branch of Islam, mosques are places where they can 
perform their religious practices, pose questions, and meet people of the 
“same kind.” Physical proximity remains relevant for women in choos-
ing  which mosques to attend regularly. In my experience, while some 
mosques are tied to a city-district and primarily have participants who 
live close by, other mosques attract Muslims from all over Berlin. Several 
of the women did not attend a particular mosque even if they “really 
like the imam” because “it’s too far away” and so “it takes too long to get 
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45 This should not be considered representative of all Muslims living in Berlin. Among 
the older women and men there may be other perspectives and factors involved. Insofar 
that people can change their loyalty or allegiance to one particular mosque or religious 
organization, this mental mapping has to be understood as fluid, not static. Perceptions 
can change with age, marriage, and because participants in a mosque change. Furthermore, 
although I focused only on mosques and semi-public religious organizations, there are also 
private Koran reading groups in homes, and some individuals prefer to practice their reli-
gion alone. I focus on those Muslim youth who choose to participate in a mosque on a 
regular basis, to learn about Islam and be part of a religious community.
there!” Nevertheless, when discussing where they would regularly go, in 
general the women stressed who were there (ethnicity, mixed or whether 
their friends or family attend), what was taught (the branches, which 
school of thought, and whether it is strict), and how it was done (i.e. how 
the gender division during the service is solved). I found that a combina-
tion of three aspects is particularly relevant to the youth’s experiences of 
the religious spaces: their identification with their ethnic background, 
the reputation of the religious space, and the teaching and presentation 
style in the religious space. I discuss all of these aspects in the next 
three sections.45
Ethnicity-Based Religious Spaces
Since the mid-1990s, young Muslims born in Germany have either called 
for modifications in the established mosques or established their own reli-
gious inter-ethnic, “multicultural” spaces where the ethnic or national 
belonging of their parents is put aside. For migrants, ethnic belonging has 
long played a special role in the organization of religious social spaces. 
Mosques and religious communities and organizations are most often 
divided by their members’ ethnic or national origin. In Berlin, there are 
amongst other Albanian, Arab, Bosnian, Kurdish, Indonesian, Palestinian 
and Turkish mosques or religious associations. Ethnically or nationally 
oriented mosques conduct the religious services and presentations in 
Turkish, Arabic or Bosnian—all conforming with and reinforcing the eth-
nic community of the participants.
Over the last few years, there has been a tendency among younger gen-
erations of Muslims to distinguish between their parents’ Islam, which 
they see as traditional, and the “pure” or “de-culturalized” Islam (Roy 2004) 
which focuses on the worldwide religious community—the umma. 
Although ethnicity remains important for some, others feel uncomfort-
able within the religious, ethnic, or national structures of their parents. 
As many younger Muslims make a sharper distinction between ethnic 
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46 The word “fitna” comes from an Arabic verb that means to “seduce, tempt or lure.” 
There are many variations of meaning, but usually they all refer to a feeling of disorder.
47 There are around seven religious organizations in Berlin with German as the main 
language of instruction (Özyürek 2007).
and religious identification—in contrast to their parents’ generation— 
youth consciously refuse the ethnicization of Islam as fitna (van der Veer 
2004, 12), which in modern usage is frequently used to describe forces that 
cause fragmentation, chaos or discord within the Muslim community.46
In this contestation, the language of religious instruction becomes par-
ticularly relevant: learning about Islam in German is crucial because many 
young people feel more comfortable with German than with Turkish or 
Arabic. In addition, gaining Islamic knowledge in German makes it easier 
to explain Islam to non-Muslim Germans. In organizations like Inssan 
and MJD in Kreuzberg, or the German-speaking Muslim group Berlin 
(Deutschsprachige Muslimkreis Berlin e.V., DMK) in Wedding, the religious 
teaching, presentations, and discussions are in German, except for the 
reading of the Koran, which continues to be in Arabic, usually followed by 
a translation in German.47 Several organizations and mosques attract a 
mixture of ethnic or national origins, including Egyptians, Pakistanis, 
Palestinians, Turks, and German converts, as they teach in German. The 
increase in the teaching of Islam in German also potentially plays a part in 
restructuring the relevance of an individual’s ethnic background in the 
religious sphere.
Yet ethnically oriented mosques remain the majority, and for some 
youth their ethnic belonging continues to be relevant for their experience 
of the religious spaces. The following assertion from Azhaar (25) suggests 
this:
Sitting in a mosque in Wedding, Azhaar said: “Sometimes it is nice for me to 
also have presentations in Arabic. Like, I have attended DMK since 1998, and 
I am very pleased with it (…).” She was interrupted by women around her 
who laughed and teased her, saying that it sounded as if she was making a 
commercial for a washing product or the like. Azhaar continued: “But it is 
like that! But sometimes I also like to hear it in Arabic, and so I go to the 
mosque in Neukölln [the mosque in Finnowstrasse].”
Here, the importance Azhaar places on Arabic is less about it being the 
holy language of Islam, and more about Arabic as an emotional aspect of 
her religious practices. While a regular in a German-speaking mosque, 
Azhaar also attended an Arabic-speaking mosque—thus she alternated 
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between two different religious spaces depending, at least partly, on her 
emotional frame of mind.
Identification with one’s own or parents’ ethnic identity also emerged 
in situations where others criticized this ethnic group, as in the following 
exchange between Amal (22) and Latifa (17):
After the weekly MJD meeting during Ramadan, Amal and Latifa decided to 
go for the prayer in a small Turkish mosque located at Kottbusser Tor, and 
I joined them. When the prayer finished, Latifa looked displeased and said 
quietly: “That was quick!” I asked: “You think it was too quick?” Latifa 
responded: “I will tell you later.” The room was completely filled by women 
speaking in Turkish. There was a line to get our shoes, and then a line to get 
out of the mosque. Outside in the courtyard, the men were standing around; 
some were waiting for their wives, sisters or mothers. Several cars were lined 
up along the road. Afterwards, at the subway station, Latifa and Amal talked. 
Amal said: “It is not Sunna to sing in between the prayer-cycles (rekâts) and 
that is not how it should be. (…) They were reading too quickly, you don’t 
have time to understand what is being said! So you don’t really know what 
you are reciting. You just do it. It is not the point to do it that quickly; one 
should also understand it.” Latifa seemed a bit insulted. “It is like that among 
us,” she claimed. She started to talk about which school of law DMK, which 
both of them were attending at the time, belongs to and which school she 
belonged to. Amal was not satisfied with this answer and said: “I will go and 
tell my husband [he is Arab] that the Arabs have really developed it. That 
theirs are better. He will be happy.” Not leaving the topic, Latifa argued: 
“Maybe it is Sunna! You don’t necessarily know every Sunna.” Amal replied 
that she will ask at home. She was pretty sure that it is not. Latifa said: “It is 
how we do it. It’s not wrong!” She added that the first time she was in a 
Turkish mosque it had not been as quick as today: “It was also quick, but not 
as much as here.”
Growing up in Berlin with Turkish parents, Latifa had only recently 
become religiously active when I met her, and had not been very active in 
Turkish mosques before she came to the ethnically mixed MJD and DMK. 
She seemed equally surprised and displeased as the German convert Amal 
when we left the mosque. Yet, as Amal started to talk negatively about the 
“Turkish” way of reciting the prayers, Latifa gradually started to defend her 
“ethnic community’s” way of praying. She began to talk about “among us,” 
referring to her ethnic religious social field, and emphasized “we” when 
she said: “it is how we do it.” Here she was not defending Islam, but was 
rather defending the way “her” Turkish compatriots practiced the Islamic 
prayer from criticism from a German convert (who was married to an 
Arabic imam). For Latifa and Amal, the space of the mosque becomes 
both Islamic and ethnically defined through this discussion, but whereas 
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48 The German-based Turkish organization Milli Görüş is on the list of the German 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and is viewed as a “threat” to German 
democracy. The Federal Office considers Milli Görüş to represent Islamic fundamentalism 
Latifa felt emotionally attached to the ethnic religious group, Amal con-
tested the correctness of how the prayer was carried out and insisted on 
the “un-Islamic” performance that took place in this ethnic religious social 
field.
The Reputation of Religious Spaces
Despite the continuation of ethnically homogeneous mosques and asso-
ciations, cooperation across ethnic lines and between different Turkish 
mosques is on the increase. Simultaneously, most mosques and religious 
organizations are careful when selecting the partners they cooperate with. 
I have already mentioned the element of contamination within the media 
and the German public: if one organization that is considered “moderate” 
works with an organization that the German Federal Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution considers “fundamentalist,” this can have 
negative consequences for the reputation of the “moderate” organization. 
The young participants discussed such fears of contamination and paid 
attention to the reputation of the mosques with which they were involved. 
The following discussion after the regular Friday service among women 
active in several Muslim organizations is indicative of this:
During a tea and cake session after the Friday prayers in the German-
speaking mosque DMK, a woman expressed regret about the recent German 
newspaper reports in which DMK was suddenly tagged as “fundamentalist” 
and in which the German journalist argued that there were extremists in the 
congregation. One of the women, Heidi (31), who worked in DMK, pointed 
out that that they [DMK] had even voted no to a project initiated by Inssan 
[a project that included several Muslim organizations] because Milli Görüş 
was involved in the project.48 They [DMK] wanted to be “careful with whom 
they cooperate, who is in the project,” she recalled disappointedly. Aishegül 
(31), who was personally familiar with both DMK and Inssan, responded: 
“Yes, but with Milli Görüş it’s just their reputation which is bad, not the peo-
ple. And now DMK is also considered to be fundamentalist!” Heidi agrees, 
but points to the fact that DMK is not on the Federal Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) list like Milli Görüş 
is. Aishegül pointed to the paradox: “DMK didn’t want to cooperate with 
Inssan. Now [after the newspaper article], maybe Inssan doesn’t want to 
cooperate with DMK. (…) They didn’t want to cooperate on the project 
promoted by Inssan because they were afraid of the cooperation they had 
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and to prevent immigrants from participating politically in German society. It also reports 
that the daily newspaper Milli Gazete, which is viewed as the main publication of Milli 
Görüş supporters, have published anti-German and anti-Semitic statements. See Yurdakul 
(2006, 155–157) and Schiffauer (2004). For a discussion on Inssan and the focus the German 
public has on this organization, see Bendixsen (2006).
with an organization which is under observation by the Protection of the 
Constitution, and now people might not be going to DMK, because they get 
afraid.” She further hinted at the impossibility of following the Federal Office 
for the Protection of the Constitution in deciding whom to cooperate with 
or not since it kept changing who it believed to be suspicious and because it 
tended to have a weak basis for its accusations.
The above discussion shows how the “politics of contamination,” or 
the “associative thinking” (Friedman 1999), which works both among 
majority and minority groups, affect internal Muslim networks, potential 
co-operations, and partners. It also affects individual mosque participant’s 
choices about where to attend religious services, as many were afraid that 
the reputation of the mosque could “spill over” on to their individual per-
son. Yet the discussion also indicates that a potential consequence of such 
associative thinking when it comes to Muslim organizations is that Muslim 
citizens may at some point stop trusting the pronouncements of German 
governmental bodies as they may believe that the decisions these bodies 
make are not based on facts, but rather on (exaggerated) fear.
Still, the reputation of a mosque, among Muslims and in the German 
media, played a role in the individual youths’ decisions of where to receive 
Islamic instruction. For example, Aishegül told me that since she lived 
very close to the Al Nur mosque in Neukölln, she sometimes prayed there, 
but some of her friends, who would never visit this mosque, asked if she 
was not afraid that “they” (German media and authorities) might take pic-
tures of her there. Some youth avoided mosques that were under surveil-
lance by the German police or media because they feared being linked to 
“dangerous” spaces by the German government. Hawa (22) told Fatima the 
following when asked why she had not come to the overnight event at 
DMK that MJD had organized the previous Saturday:
My mother does not like me to sleep over at unfamiliar places. They are 
afraid of raids against the mosque. So much is happening these days. So 
much is written in the media about what is supposedly going on in the 
mosques. They [her parents] don’t know what is being said there and who 
are there. There are so many mosques that are under surveillance. They 
think about my career. They don’t want to risk me being put on a list 
with extremists. My parents are very social. They don’t want to risk that I am 
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49 For a more detailed overview of the different schools of jurisprudence see e.g. Murata 
and Chittick (1994).
connected with the wrong names. I would like to be more active, but the 
entire media storm is making us limit our activities. It is such a pity.
The current political discourse about mosques in Europe places certain 
restrictions on the leeway organizations and mosques have with regard to 
cooperating and interacting with each other, but they also restrict reli-
gious actors who need to know who is under suspicion at various times in 
order to decide how to relate to that particular space. Individual worship-
pers mainly hear about these issues via rumors, discussions, and “warn-
ings” from other worshipers. The extent to which such reputations actually 
prohibit a person from attending a specific mosque depends on various 
individual and family factors, including one’s career aspirations and rela-
tion to German society.
Teaching and Presentation Style of Religious Spaces
In Islam, there are four major Sunni schools of jurisprudence (madhahab): 
the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali Schools. There are also different 
theological traditions (Kalam) and numerous varieties of congregations.49 
The Islamic “sub-communities” have particular political orientations, 
such as political Islam, or are influenced by movements such as Hamas or 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Whether or not the imam (who is often 
officially employed by the mosque) is a figure of authority and reverence 
for the young women was particularly important when they decide which 
mosque to attend regularly. However, I found that the young people 
I spoke to formed an impression of individual mosques based less on the 
particular theological tradition per se, and more on whether they consid-
ered the mosque to be “strict,” “relaxed,” or “open.” The young Muslim 
women seemed broadly knowledgeable about which religious discourses 
to expect in different mosques, and whether they would feel that these 
religious meanings and concepts would be imposed on them (by mosque 
participants, the imam, or religious leaders) in the various mosques. The 
following statements from the women I worked with illustrate this:
Sitting in a German-speaking mosque in Wedding, Jannan (20) said: “What 
I like about DMK is that it is so open, that they do not follow particular 
meanings [interpretations] which are then pushed on you. There is space for 
you and for different meanings [interpretations]. And it is not obligatory—
you can come when you feel like it.”
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Another young woman, Riffat (20), started to attend the youth group 
Jugendtreff Assalam (Youth Club Assalam) in Finnowstrasse because her 
mother had heard from their relatives that it was a good place for youth:
I never go to Al Nur. They are so strict there! I have a friend who is there. 
Once, on a day trip, they were going to cross the Kurfürstendamm and every-
one had to wear a headscarf! I do not wear a headscarf! With Finnowstrasse, 
when we are going out, like eating together, I don’t have to wear a headscarf. 
At the other place, they immediately ask me why I am not wearing the 
headscarf. Here [Youth Club Assalam], the woman asks also sometimes 
“when are you going to wear it? Soon, inshallah (God willing)” and I always 
answer, “when I get married.” Here they are completely relaxed. (…) It’s the 
best here, they [the leaders] are also young, so they understand us better!
In contrast to Riffat, Helene (33) said the following about Al Nur:
I have been going to this mosque for one year. I used to go to the Turkish 
[mosque], but didn’t like it because [they were too strict]. Here it is ok that 
I am not wearing the headscarf, they do not look down on you because of 
that. Because they say that the most important thing is that you pray. (…) 
The Turkish [mosques] put more stress on my wearing the headscarf.
Their awareness of expected behaviors within the individual mosques 
became relevant as they chose between the various religious spaces 
(Bendixsen 2007). What is striking is that rather than referring to schools 
of jurisprudence or to the Islamic authorities taught in the religious 
spaces, most of the women had a perception of whether a mosque was 
“open,” a “free space,” or “too fundamentalist,” “closed,” and “strict.” 
Additionally, the youth’s perception of the social expectations that other 
mosque participants place on them as female religious actors, specifically 
in regard to veiling, also (re)produces the relevance of gender and sexual 
difference to how they related to these spaces. This is partly based on indi-
vidual perceptions.
The different appraisals of the same religious spaces suggest that per-
sonal orientations or preferences between various ways of reciting, per-
forming the prayer, and conducting the Islamic teaching and seminars, 
also shaped the youths’ mental mapping of the religious places and are 
part of the decision they make about which religious community to attend. 
As Riffat and Helene’s statements point to, some women considered a 
place to be “too strict” while others believed that the very same place was 
“open,” thus showcasing two different experiences of the space. Indeed, 
I found that many young women had very different views and feelings 
about the same mosque. Whereas Amal (23) said about Al Nur: “It’s my 
favorite mosque, I became a Muslim there,” and one of her friends, Ines 
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(20), often went there because she enjoyed the charismatic imam’s Sunday 
sermon, another friend, Somaya (17), explained that she did not like the 
atmosphere in that particular mosque. This, she said, is because the “Arab 
girls” there “group” themselves together so she did not feel welcome. She 
preferred DMK, she said: “Even if it is so small. They could do something 
more with the rooms. But there, when you come, you feel that they wel-
come you.” However, Aishegül (31) stopped attending DMK at one point, 
because she found their religious seminars and events “too boring.”
The young women often visited different religious communities recom-
mended by friends or family before they became regulars in one particular 
organization or mosque. Their choice of a mosque was explained with 
comments like “you learn so much there,” “I like the atmosphere,” “the 
imam there is highly respected,” and references to how approachable they 
found the other mosque participants. The women avoided certain 
mosques for reasons such as, “the other women are not friendly,” “they only 
have uninteresting presentations,” “the imam prays too quickly during 
Ramadan,” or “there, they only speak Turkish.” While the latter statement 
is indicative of the importance of the ethnic make-up of the mosque and 
is also a practical matter (this person does not understand Turkish), and 
while some point to the authority of the religious leader in the mosque, 
frequently the characterizations of the spaces are emotionally based.
Almost all of the women I spoke with had a clear idea of their favorite 
or preferred religious space(s). Fatma (28) and Aishegül (31) were two 
exceptions in this regard. Aishegül (with Turkish parents) told me:
I never went to only one mosque. A lot of people go to one particular 
mosque, like to a Turkish or Bosnian one or so on, and belong to that. I don’t 
do that. I go everywhere.” Though Aishegül attended DMK more regularly, 
she said: “During Ramadan, we pray together, you know. And then I usually 
go to the one close to where I am. Sometimes I go to an Arab mosque. They 
recite very nicely, read beautifully. But there are always so many children 
there, and they make so much noise that sometimes you cannot even hear 
what they say. That is why I sometimes go to the Turkish mosque. The 
Turkish are really strict. And they have fewer children with them. They do it 
in 20 prayer cycles, but they read so quickly that you cannot really listen to it. 
The Arabs read 12 times, but they read it very slowly so it takes longer than 
with the Turks. It is so beautiful to hear. And sometimes I go to the Bosnian 
mosque. There, they read one each and then you can hear the differences in 
each reading and they read so beautifully, some are really good. That is, all 
are good, but some are even better. And you would like to see who is reading 
it. There you can see the men, because the women and men are not divided. 
They have only one room—that is why. And also there are not that many 
[attendees], so it is possible.
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50 Each of the five daily prayers can be performed in a few minutes for those who are 
familiar with their complex configurations. Nonetheless, each prayer session can be 
extended by adding extra prayer-cycles or a more personal prayer (du’a, supplication) 
(Henkel 2005). For ethnography on prayer in Turkey, see Henkel (2005). He suggests that, 
“within the Hanafi madhab (which is followed by the great majority of Turkish Sunni 
Muslims) there are slight differences in the performance as it is prescribed for men and 
women. Strictly speaking there are, of course, also nuances in the performance that vary 
between one person and another and even from one performance to another” (Henkel 
2005, 492).
51 At the age of 10 to 12 years old, children finish primary school and are recommended 
by the teachers for one of three high school tracks, of which only Gymnasium grants the 
diploma (Artium) needed to enter university. After graduating from Hauptschule and 
Realschule, youth can go to university by attending continuing education programs. In gen-
eral, graduating from “the lowest track” of secondary education (Hauptschule) has been 
devalued in recent decades, putting young people in a disadvantageous position when 
applying for vocational training or jobs, whereas the “intermediate type”, (Realschule), pro-
vides better prospects for vocational training. In 2002/2003 43.8 percent of young migrants 
attend Hautpschule, and only 13.9 percent of them attended Gymnasiums. Among ethnic 
Prayer in Islam is highly formalized with certain components that are 
clearly defined, although there are some differences among the four 
schools of Sunni Islam. The five daily obligatory prayers comprise a spe-
cific number of prayer cycles (rekâts), which each have a sequence of posi-
tions.50 Being a keen mosque attendee, Aishegül was knowledgeable and 
had specific expectations about how the prayer would be performed in 
various mosques. These expectations, which she partly related to the eth-
nic or national identity of the mosque, contribute to shaping her religious 
map of Berlin. For Aishegül, the emotional experience of visiting and 
praying in the different mosques determined her feelings about the spaces 
and ultimately the choice of where to attend. Aishegül visited mosques to 
perform her religious duty, but her choice among the religious spaces was 
partly determined by the feelings and emotions the space stirred in her. 
The level of education of the mosque attendants or religious group as well 
as the individual person also mattered. For example:
Fahra (23) exclaimed that although she grew up with MJD and learned a lot 
there, she felt more comfortable in Finnowstrasse, Neukölln. She said: “It is 
normal that most of the women there [MJD] have a college degree. (…) 
When you are only doing vocational training yourself, it can sometimes 
make you feel uneasy, even if the others are not making a fuss about it. Here 
[Finnowstrasse], it is not that normal that they go to college. It feels better.”
As she herself had “only” completed vocational school, she preferred a 
religious organization where the majority of the participants had a similar 
level of education.51 Social class or social capital (Bourdieu 2004 [1977]) 
thus also informs individual mappings of the religious spaces.
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Germans, only 18.6 percent attend Hautpschule, and 32.3 percent attended Gymnasiums 
(von Below and Karakoyun 2007, 34–42).
52 Though I do not deal with it here, I expect age also matters.
53 Another space for religious knowledge and identification that I have not touched 
upon here, but which is increasingly important, is the internet. Today, Muslim youth can 
find websites with competing authorities, some self-appointed, others more educated 
experts. This contributes to establishing a new sphere of transnational Muslim communi-
ties with debates that cross localities, cities, and nations.
Making Sense of Religious Spaces in the City
The spatial incorporation of Islamic communities in Berlin, both in the 
form of the material urban environment, such as the presence of religious 
buildings, and everyday urban practices and cultures, such as veiled 
women in the street and halal butchers and restaurants, create and rein-
force religious markers in the urban space. Such religious spatial practices 
are transforming urban space, and are part of an increasing range of sites 
and spaces of belonging.
Religious actors perform a complex mental mapping when they make 
sense of the variety of political, social, ethnic, and national orientations in 
religious places, a process through which places become spaces to which 
the actors turn. An individual’s perceptions and spatial practices become 
part of their mental maps, which produce their experiences of mosques 
and the city. Michel de Certeau (1984) argues that the experience of walk-
ing in the city will depend upon which city you walk in, why you are walk-
ing, and who you are. Experiences of a specific mosque likewise depends 
upon which mosque you attend, for what reasons you are there (religious 
teaching, or being social), and your personal characteristics. Identification 
with a religious space depends on an intersection between ethnicity, lan-
guage, religious orientation, gender, and social class.52 As some of the faith 
communities, including MJD, have branches in different cities, such spaces 
of faith also represent a (potential) social network, linking German cities 
through the religious spaces and their followers.
Young Muslims’ religiosity continues to be constructed in relation to 
both the collective religious spaces and their personal feelings towards 
these communities. I have suggested that mosques are contested spaces, 
potentially “dangerous,” not only with regard to funding and building 
permissions, but also as social spaces for young Muslims seeking a local 
faith community.53 One consequence of distinguishing between a “pure” 
and “cultural” Islam is that German becomes more attractive as the lan-
guage of instruction, again appealing to followers with various ethnic 
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backgrounds. It also facilitates religious communication and discussions 
with non-Muslim Germans. The ethnic orientation of a mosque still mat-
ters, as whether or not someone is emotionally or socially attached to her 
ethnic community informs the decision of whether to attend an ethnically 
homogenous mosque. Nonetheless, the presumed “openness” or “close-
ness” of the Islamic teaching and teachers, the events and seminars, as 
well as its regular attendees, are all important factors when choosing the 
faith community in which to participate. The youth did not explain this 
orientation in theological terms, but related it to emotional insights and 
past experiences, whether personal or from family members and peers.
Parents still play a role in recommending or opposing places. However, 
while many are used to establishing ties to religious social spaces through 
their family (Ehrkamp 2005), this process has become more individual-
ized. This individual decision-making is deeply embedded in and shaped 
by the socio-historical and political position of Muslims in Europe. What 
has also become clear is that the German context and the manner in 
which the German government responds to the different Muslim organi-
zations and mosques ultimately have a direct impact on how young 
Muslims interact socially with these spaces. The continuous gaze from the 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution inform their mental 
mapping and for many it necessitates an extensive up-to-date knowledge 
of how various religious spaces are assessed by this office and how these 
spaces relate to yet other religious spaces. Another option is to “not care” 
about the viewpoint of the Federal office. In general, though, reputation 
matters to followers. The German context also shapes what is taught and 
discussed within the religious spaces—which I examine in more detail in 
chapter 3.
CHAPTER THREE
NEGOTIATING, RESISTING AND (RE)CONSTRUCTING OTHERING
City air makes you free*
The way that young Muslims in Germany identify with Islam or develop 
a specifically Muslim identity is influenced by how they feel that German 
society perceives and represents them. In this chapter, I examine the 
effects of the current Othering of Muslims and Islam in Germany on 
the  everyday experiences of the youth in MJD. I briefly discuss the 
current  German national and public discourse of cultural “Otherness.” 
I subsequently discuss how they actively and creatively deal with these 
discourses—whether consciously and unconsciously—through the use of 
tactics (de Certeau 1984). Through this, I seek to understand how the 
discourse of the “Other” becomes part of the young Muslim women’s pro-
cesses of identity or identification. Yet my contention is that the youth 
are not passive recipients of discrimination or racism, but that they in vari-
ous situations also transcend discriminatory or stigmatizing discourses.
In chapter 1, I discussed how the way Muslim youth talk about their 
decision to be involved in religion is shaped by the dominant discourse 
about choice. I also reflected on the effects of minority voices not being 
heard in the public sphere. Here, I examine how Othering discourses also 
shape the youths’ identification processes and, more importantly, how the 
young women respond to these discourses in multiple ways. In other 
words, although the youth are clearly not actors who stand outside histori-
cal structures, discourses, and limitations, they should not be understood 
as passive subjects entirely shaped by external processes outside their 
control. What effects do Othering discourses have on how young women 
form their identities, and in particular on how they identify with Islam 
and as Muslims? How do they deal with, or dismantle, the Othering pro-
cess? And how, if at all, does stigma itself become an integral part of the 
Islam with which these young women identify?
* The German saying “Stadtluft macht frei” (“City air makes one free”) dates to back to 
the Middle Ages, in particular to the development of town charters that stipulated that 
anyone (particularly farmers) who lived in a free town for one year and one day would 
become free from customary rural obligations to lords and community. 
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1 I do not consider this to be an exhaustive study of the construction of Otherness in 
German society. Yet the material provided here should be sufficient to show that Muslim 
women are being Othered in Germany.
2 With the term “Muslimwoman” Cooke (2007) has drawn attention to both the recent 
conflation of gender and religion, and the construction of “Muslim woman” as a primary 
identity, whether chosen or not, for women of Muslim origins after 9/11. While I am reluc-
tant to use the category “cosmopolitan” identity for Muslim women, I appreciate Cooke’s 
effort to illustrate how women have become a “visual assumption of an Islamic identity” 
(ibid., 153) while they simultaneously make claims in the public sphere.
I examine the complex social realities within which the young people 
I worked with maneuver and the spaces they carve out. This means taking 
into account specific stereotypes and Othering discourses that frame 
Muslim youth and Islam in Germany, and asking whether, and if so how, 
the youth accommodate these discourses. It also means considering how 
youth use everyday mechanisms of resistance or “tactics” (de Certeau 
1984) in these everyday encounters and situations. First, I illustrate the 
changing constructions of the Other in Germany by pointing to academic 
research, media reports, and political statements.1 Second, I consider the 
ways in which the young women experience Othering on a daily basis in 
urban spaces. Third, I point to some of the ways that the young women 
resist, negotiate, deconstruct, or accommodate the Othering they face in 
the streets by using various everyday tactics.
Examining how youth resist Othering processes is particularly impor-
tant, since even if identities must be understood as created within dis-
course, individuals are not merely called into a social position in the 
discursive structures (Hall 1996a, 13). It is always important to investigate 
how individuals defy or refuse to submit to the definitions laid out for 
them by hegemonic power structures. In the process of refusal, or of resist-
ing the Othering discourses that are used in social interactions, the youth 
negotiate a “presentation of the self” (Goffman 1959). The various ways the 
youth resist or adopt stereotypical images of what it means to be a Muslim 
in Berlin are part of a management of representation. It shows how the 
young women navigate in public urban space in relation to efforts to inter-
pellate or construct them as Others. Still, as the youth resist or negotiate 
the Othering discourses, they risk embracing other powerful collective 
ideas of what it should mean to be a Muslim woman today. By taking up 
ideals of the Muslim woman, they may well enter positions in which they 
restrain themselves in order to act and perform ideals of the Muslim 
woman, thus becoming disciplined bodies.2 Is the religious identity of 
the youth transforming their experiences of the city, in that the city takes 
on qualities commonly characterized as those of a village, such as social 
surveillance, social control, and a lack of anonymity?
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3 As Zizek, writing about the psycho-social perception of the Other, puts it: “In short 
what really bothers us about the Other is the peculiar way in which it organizes its enjoy-
ment: precisely the surplus, the ‘excess’ that pertains to it – the smell of their food, their 
‘noisy’ songs and dances, their strange manners, their attitude to work (in the racist per-
spective, the Other is either a workaholic stealing our jobs or an idler living on our labor, 
and it is quite amusing to note the ease with which one passes from reproaching the Other 
with a refusal to work to reproaching him for the theft of work)” (Zizek 1990, 54). I discuss 
how the youth construct stereotypical and Othering images of the “German Woman” in 
chapter 6.
4 The capitalization of “Woman” emphasizes the symbolical conflation of gender, sex 
and sexuality. Discussing gender within religious systems, Sered (1998) distinguishes 
between “women” and “Woman.” Whereas “women” are female agents who can, to various 
degrees, claim rights, negotiate, or protest, “Woman” is a symbolic conflation of gender, sex 
and sexuality. “Woman” comprises allegory, ideology, metaphor, fantasy, and men’s psycho-
logical projections. The two distinct categories are not necessarily related, meaning that 
The Occidental and Oriental Other
The notion of the Other is used in various disciplines ranging from phi-
losophy and psychoanalysis to postmodernist theories in anthropology. 
Though each of the theories are different, most theoretical approaches to 
Othering are based on the notion that our ideas about who and what 
Others are (the characteristics assigned, the kind of life they are suppos-
edly living) are closely linked to our ideas of who and what we are 
(Wilkinson and Kitzinger 1996, 8). There is a general tendency to consider 
Others to be absolutely and essentially different. This idea of difference 
enables hierarchical and stereotypical thinking, which is why the effect of 
Othering resembles racism. An Other is someone who is not compatible 
with the “mythological norm” (Lorde 1980, 2); that is, she or he diverges 
from the societal schema of an average woman or man. One consequence 
of Othering is that a person is viewed as unacceptable when he or she does 
not meet established socio-cultural and normative standards.3
In postcolonial theory, which is my starting point, Othering refers to the 
discursive production of the Other. This is a process typified by the way in 
which Europe produces an Orient-as-other (Said 1979), also described as 
Othering (Spivak 1996 [1985]). Here, I only provide a short overview of the 
Othering processes in German majority society, while recognizing that 
some Muslim youth also construct simplified images of non-Muslim 
Germans. In recent years, scholarship on Occidentalism has cast light on 
the negative stereotypes which are constructed about the people and cul-
tures of the West in a parallel process to Orientalism. In both Occidentalism 
and Orientalism, the Other Woman and one’s “own” Woman are central, 
and the former is usually abhorred while the latter is idealized.4 Indeed:
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the experiences of women might not have much to do with Woman. However, within 
religion these are often conflated. In the theological and mythodological structures in reli-
gious traditions, Woman as symbol often plays a profound part, and these structures 
imprint the lives of the women involved in those traditions, and submit them to the patri-
archal structures that often characterize religion.
Occidentalism and Orientalism are thus discourses of power that ultimately 
serve as mechanisms of control over women in the West and the East; both 
these discourses of domination use the comparative method of describing 
women’s inferior status in the East or West to convince “native” women that 
they should be content with the status quo because they are “better off” or 
superior to “those” women. (Parameswaran 2003, 330)
Positions of superiority are built through misinformed cultural compari-
sons that construct simplified images. These conflicting positions of supe-
riority redirect the focus away from the parallel processes controlling 
women in both worlds (Nader 1989).
I do not here discuss how the youth and their Muslim or ethnic com-
munities may construct Othering images of German society and the non-
Muslim German Woman, because my main focus is on how the youth 
respond to the feeling of being Othered in Germany. This is a process that 
I found to be important to the youth in their daily conversations. For 
example, Fadwa (23) told some of the young MJD participants and me, “I 
was opening the car and something fell down, and then a woman passing 
by was staring at me. I felt like saying ‘it’s my car.’ She was staring as if it 
wasn’t my car, you know.” As I show in this chapter, this was not a singular 
event: similar events occurred weekly.
The youth may respond to Othering processes in the streets that are not 
produced primarily by the media, but rather relate to their personal expe-
riences as children and while growing up. Additionally, Fadwa’s percep-
tion of the gaze may well be an extension of her interpretation of the 
media rather than ill will from the passer-by. I am aware of the ethno-
graphic challenge of how to interpret the gaze. Clearly, sometimes the 
gaze may be assigned intentions that are not there. Here, I focus on how 
I understand the youth to perceive the gazes and statements in their dis-
cussions and comments about such gazes. Indeed, “[s]mall and trivial 
racializing incidents with no hateful intentions can still have a negative 
effect on the people who experience them over and over again” (Gullestad 
2004, 185). Likewise, Fanon (1986 [1952]) has famously noted the effect it 
had on him when a young boy looked at him and said “Look, a Negro!” 
Before I examine the effects that Othering processes have on the youth, 
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5 Similarly, Kapfere (1988, 191) argues that: “Nations must multiply likeness, not differ-
ence, otherwise national identity is weakened.”
6 Said has been critiqued, and rightly so, for constructing a too simplistic conception of 
the colonial reality. Drawing on a Foucauldian notion of discourse, Said contributed to a 
new understanding of colonialism. Nevertheless, his work on Orientalism promoted a 
binary thinking, which reified the existence of two rigid entities, the Occident and Orient, 
I briefly discuss the role of the construction of the Other and the current 
images of Muslims in German society. 
The Role of the Other in Constructing the Nation
The Othering of Muslim migrants within European nation-states must be 
understood within the context of nationalism and the extent to which this 
ideology has dominated the modern European imagination. Kaschuba 
(2006) calls attention to the eighteenth century cultural identity politics 
or politics of differentiation, when the European states constructed “das 
Eigene,” (the own) or the Self, through the construction of “des Fremden” 
(the stranger). The nation developed into an imagined community 
(Anderson 1983) of solidarity, and developed clear territorial boundaries 
with political, social, and economic rights as collective goods. The concept 
of national citizenship is based on increasing ties of dependency linking 
the individual to the state. The construction of national unity requires the 
limitation or even elimination of all other loyalties and divisions that are 
thought to conflict with the idea of a continuous homogenous national 
population. As Bauman (1990) forcefully argues, subjects are construed as 
natives by nation states, and uniformity is encouraged.5 Those who are 
thought to deviate in their cultural practices from the norms that are used 
to define the nation are considered potentially dissident and malfunction-
ing within the order built by the nation-state, and are expected to adopt 
the so-called national traits (Anderson 1983).
As will be discussed, in Germany, as in several Western societies, Muslim 
identities have increasingly come to signify “the Other” after September 11, 
2001. This has contributed to Muslims becoming “the victims of discrimi-
nation, harassment, racial and religious profiling, and verbal and physical 
assault” (Peek 2003, 271). Simultaneously, the Muslim as the contemporary 
Other must also be seen in light of European colonization in the nine-
teenth century. Edward W. Said examined the phenomenon of Othering 
and assigned the term “Orientalism” to a style of thought in which 
the West assigned negative patterns of behavior to the East, which was 
constructed as inferior compared to the so-called Western superiority.6 
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while also largely ignoring discourses in the “Orient.” See for example Varisco (2007) for a 
critical discussion of Said’s work.
7 Bullock’s analysis of the role of the veil and the impact of the Orientalist viewpoint in 
colonialist discourses is particularly helpful when trying to understand the contemporary 
perception of the veil in the West (2007, 1–34). She argues that the veil was singled out 
because it prevented European men from looking at local women, leading to a European 
male fantasy of the Orient and exotic women. Fantasy versions of the East were presented 
to Europeans, for example through the inclusion of a Cairo street at the Stockholm World 
Exhibition in 1889, and several European travelers went to see “the real thing” in the “time-
less” space of Egypt, Morocco, or Algeria.
8 For example, the French woman Eugénie le Brun, who was married to an Egyptian 
man, urged the Egyptian activist Huda Shaarawi (1879–1947) to take off her veil (Badran 
1986, 80). Shaarawi removed her veil publicly in 1923.
Said’s Orientalism (1979) illustrated how the West constructs representa-
tions and portraits of the East as the Other, and how the ideology of 
Othering is formed through art and literature. The European colonizer, 
man and woman, writer, politician or traveler, considered Islam to oppress 
women. The veil or headscarf became the ultimate symbol of Muslim 
women’s allegedly confined and submissive role within colonized societ-
ies, and it was argued that the only way to modernize Muslim women and 
their cultures was through the spread of Christianity and the removal of 
the veil (Bullock 2007; Fanon 1969). It was thought that:
Short of Christianity, no teaching can elevate the character and position of 
Muhammedan women in any land; for, as long as she accepts the Koran as a 
rule of faith, she will unhesitatingly acquiesce in the mutilated life to which 
she is condemned. (Crawford [1863] quoted in Mabro 1991, 182)
As a strategy to obliterate potential resistance, the French government tar-
geted Algerian women and suggested that they would be emancipated 
under French rule. Solidarity societies were formed to promote the unveil-
ing of Algerian women (Fanon 1969).7 In 1958, public displays of women 
taking off their veil or headscarf became the ultimate signs of the European 
role (or duty) of bringing enlightenment and modernity to the colonized 
countries and of Europe liberating colonized women from colonized men. 
European women travelers, both secular and Christian, were convinced of 
the superiority of Western civilization, and urged Muslim women to 
reform their society by unveiling and refusing polygamy.8 In short, the 
colonial as well as national elites in the colonized societies sought to 
remove the veil as a way to promote progress, civilize the society, attempt 
to reveal the harem, and to enhance governmental control over the indi-
vidual, colonized subject (Bullock 2007; Fanon 1969).
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   9 SPD is a left-wing party that originally represented the working class and trade 
unions.
Migrants Entering the European Nation-State: The Cultural Other
The immigration to Europe from the 1960s onwards of people who came 
to be perceived as culturally different Others was increasingly viewed as a 
threat to the perceived cultural homogeneity of the nation-states. 
Immigrants were categorized as inherently different outsiders. Clearly, the 
group(s) that represents the Other within a nation-state is not constant, 
and the attributes assigned to it and constructed as the problematic differ-
ences, are not static. Rather, the content of the difference changes in time 
and space—closely intertwined with a nations’ socio-historical location. 
In the 1970s, Germany’s ultimate Other were Turkish guest workers (Soysal 
2003) who, it was thought, seemed to never return where they came from. 
Family reunification and the increase in asylum seekers between 1975 and 
1980 contributed to a feeling of increased competition on the labor market 
and partly fuelled a fear of foreign infiltration (Überfremdung) through 
which Germans would become strangers in their own country (Thränhardt 
1988). The Heidelberg Manifesto published in 1981 indicates the then 
latent xenophobic atmosphere: fifteen academics called for protection of 
the cultural and linguistic purity of the German people (Green 2004). The 
previous year, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemocratische 
Partei Deutschlands, SPD) Minister-President of Hesse, Holger Börner, 
pledged during the election that “there will be no more Turks coming to 
this state as long as I’m in charge” (quoted in Green 2004, 43).9 By the end 
of the 1980s, the Foreigners’ Entry Law and a tightening of the rules on 
family reunification aimed to safeguard the national characteristics of 
Germany. It was argued that further immigration could lead to the:
abandonment of societal homogeneity, which is primarily determined by 
membership of the German nation. Germany’s common history, heritage, 
language and culture would lose their unifying and defining nature, the 
Federal Republic would develop little by little into a multinational and mul-
ticultural community, which would over time be weighed down by the result-
ing problems with its minorities. (BMI 1988, 23, quoted in Green 2004, 61)
The proposed legislation turned out to be controversial and was aban-
doned. Yet it suggests that whether or not a person has formal citizenship 
is largely irrelevant to the question of whether that person is perceived 
as German or not in everyday encounters. Culture and descent are in 
this respect more important than civil rights and duties. In consequence, 
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10 Before 1993, the term for “Spätaussiedler” was “Aussiedler.” The Federal Expellee Law 
(Bundesvertriebenengesetz, BVFG) of May 19, 1953, regulates the rights of German refugees 
or immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe and the definition of who is a Spätaussiedler 
is found in section 4. Generally, “Aussiedler” are considered to be German because they 
migrated from Germany in the 1760s (and later) to Russia, Poland, and Romania, some-
times continuing to practice German culture and speak German. During WWII, Stalin sent 
the German minority to Siberia and Central Asia, as they were considered Hitler’s fifth 
column.
11 A firebombing of Turkish families in Mölln on November 23, 1992 and in Solingen on 
May 29, 1993, killed eight people in total. See also Green (2004) for a well-researched analy-
sis on the difficulties surrounding reforms of asylum and citizenship legislation in this 
period.
12 Frisch also asked all Muslims in Germany to send their daughters to school without 
the headscarf (Collet 2004).
13 As Amir-Moazami (2011) asserts, it is not coincidental that the test was written and 
introduced in Catholic-oriented Baden-Württemberg. The headscarf debate that centered 
on Fereschta Ludin (see introduction) also began in the same federal state (Land). The 
government of Baden-Württemberg was the first to introduce the law banning headscarves 
for teachers based on the state’s constitution and its emphasis on Germany’s Christian 
tradition.
invisible social barriers are created in which German citizenship is of little 
relevance to participation in social life.
In the 1990s, the unification of Germany, the end of the Cold War, and 
the collapse of Yugoslavia led to an increase in the arrival of ethnic German 
immigrants (Spätaussiedler) and asylum seekers.10 In the same period, 
extreme right-wing parties were gaining in popularity, and German soci-
ety was shocked by a series of racially motivated attacks on foreigners in 
former East Germany (Hoyerswerda and Rostock).11 At the end of the 
1990s, the president of the German Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution, Peter Frisch, claimed that Islam would become the largest 
problem for Germany’s domestic security. He also argued that the wearing 
of headscarves could be read as a sign of how Muslims were consciously 
excluding themselves from German society (Collet 2004, 121).12 This style 
of argument would turn out to be typical for future public debates.
Migrants Born in Germany: The Religious Other
At the end of the 1990s, there was a narrative shift through which the 
Other moved from being the Turk or guest worker to being the Muslim. 
This shift in categories was heavily perpetuated through media discourses 
(Schiffer 2005), German political discourses and policies (Spielhaus 2006), 
and global events (Allievi 2006). The citizenship examination introduced 
in Baden-Württemberg in 2006—which has become known as “the 
Muslim test”—indirectly focuses on a general presumption that Islam and 
Western democracy are incompatible.13 Originally called “discussion 
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14 When introducing the text, Heribert Rech, the Minister of the Interior of Baden-
Württemberg, argued that it was based on “publications by authors like Seyran Ates, Necla 
Kelek, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and Bassam Tibi […], according to which in the center of Germany, 
the human rights of thousands of Islamic women are violated because they are treated like 
slaves by their families. This can no longer be ignored in the processes of naturalization.” 
Press note, Ministry of the Interior, July 18, 2007.
guidelines,” the test is taken in Baden-Württemberg by applicants for 
German citizenship from 57 Islamic countries (approximately 60 percent 
of immigrants who apply for citizenship in this federal state) and is sup-
posed to reveal whether the applicant shares “democratic values.” Through 
the test, the representatives of the German bureaucracy are supposed to 
assess potential new (Muslim) citizens’ allegiance to German culture and 
values, by questioning applicants’ political, cultural and social views. 
Themes include views on religious freedom, equality of the sexes, homo-
sexuality, freedom of expression, the concept of honor, and forced mar-
riage.14 It contains 30 questions, including “do you think a woman should 
obey her husband and that he can beat her if she is disobedient?” “Would 
you allow your daughter to participate in sports and swimming classes at 
school?” “What do you think of the fact that parents forcibly marry off 
their children? Do you think such marriages are compatible with human 
dignity?” In Germany, the test was referred to as the “Muslim test,” as it was 
obvious from the questions that the initiators of the test presumed that 
Muslims were the potential new citizens who would oppose what is con-
sidered to be the liberal democratic gender regime of Germany.
Researchers argue that German schools reinforce the continuing 
assumption that Germany has a largely homogeneous population by 
marking certain citizens or migrants as outsiders in German society. 
A study led by Mannitz and Schiffauer (2004) compares history teaching 
and textbooks from France, Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands to see 
whether and how the construction of Otherness occurs in schools. They 
argue that in Germany, the idea that students with a Turkish background 
are Others is reproduced in textbooks. In the construction of the nation, 
the German people are characterized as “a community of descent and cul-
ture” (Mannitz 2004b, 250). History textbooks reproduce the idea that 
Muslims have come to live “among us,” where “us” are Christians. In addi-
tion, pupils speaking Turkish in the classroom is perceived as “an expres-
sion of ‘Otherness,’” where the pupils(s) is considered to inhabit a cultural 
niche (Sunier 2004, 153). The youth’s foreignness (Fremdheit) is reproduced 
by the fact that she or he is speaking Turkish. By considering culture to 
equal mentality, migrants are constructed as Others, and at the same time 
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15 The term “Leitkultur” has been coined by conservative politicians and claims to 
encompass the essences of German culture. The concept was introduced to the political 
debate by Friedrich Merz, the leader of the German Christian Democratic Union 
(Deutschland Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU)/Christian-Social Union (Christlich-
Soziale Union, CSU) Fraction in the Bundestag. In an interview with the newspaper Die 
Welt (October 25, 2000), Merz held that immigrants should adapt to the dominant culture 
(Leitkultur) of Germany. Leitkultur was later defined as “adherence to the normative values 
contained in Germany’s Basic Law” (Green 2004, 119).
16 “Framing” refers to the social construction of a particular phenomenon by the media, 
in which the rhetorical approach to a topic advances select interpretations and rejects 
other interpretations.
an idea of Germanness and Leitkultur (the leading culture or the domi-
nant culture) is upheld although the content of these remains vague.15 In 
sum, in German schools no (symbolic) space is given to citizens with a 
Muslim background or to immigrants in the construction of German 
national identity; instead they are negatively assessed as non-Germans, as 
Ausländer (foreigner) (Mannitz and Schiffauer 2004).
The media also play a prominent role as mediators in the process of 
identity formation and Othering processes. The media is a powerful source 
of referential power, and the identity of the Other is partly shaped by cer-
tain signs that the media present and that entail particular ideas of 
national, ethnic, cultural, or sub-cultural identities. The perception of the 
Other is further shaped by the readers’ interpretation of these signs 
(Spencer 2006). Although clearly not operating in a vacuum, the media 
effectively constructs, informs, and authenticates social boundaries in 
German society. Media studies scholar Sabine Schiffer has suggested that 
German media frames Islam as Islamism and Terror, and constructs Islam 
as a form of strangeness (Fremdheit; Schiffer 2005).16 According to Schiffer, 
a chain of associations, by now unconscious, has been constructed in 
which Islamism and the oppression of Muslim women are symbolized 
through the continuous use of references to or images of the headscarf. 
This representation, she argues, is related to stereotyped, preconceived 
ways of looking as well as to media perspectives and media’s overdetermi-
nation of the headscarf (Schiffer 2004; 2008).
Today, German media and several German politicians do not consider 
“headscarf girls” to be emancipated. Rather, these young women are 
thought to be reluctant to participate in German society and are con-
structed as active when considered unwilling to integrate and as passive 
when viewed as being forced to wear a headscarf by their parents or hus-
band. For German politicians, media, and the majority of the non-religious 
population, the use of the headscarf (by migrant women) in the public 
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17 The categories “Other Germans” (Andere Deutsche) or “German-Turks” (Deutschtürken) 
are sometimes used in the media to categorize identifications not contained in “being 
German” (Mannitz 2004b, 298). But also “deutsche Ausländer” (German foreigners) or “aus-
ländische Einheimische” (foreign natives) are used in the media.
18 “Rätsel Islam,” in Der Spiegel Special, Nr.1/1998 and “Allahs rechtlose Töchter. 
Muslimische Frauen in Deutschland” in Der Spiegel, Nr. 47, November 15, 2004; my transla-
tion. Der Spiegel is not the only magazine engaged in this discourse. Similar stories can be 
found in, for example, the weekly political and social magazine Stern.
19 My translation from German. Accessed online: Der Spiegel online, www.spiegel.de/
politik/deutschland/0,1518,442656,00.html, October 15, 2006, accessed October 20, 2006. 
After the Green Party member of Bundestag, Ekin Deligöz, challenged Muslim women in 
Germany to remove the headscarf, she received anonymous death-threats.
sphere has become a sign of the failure of integration.17 The German polit-
ical (and originally left-leaning) weekly magazine Der Spiegel frequently 
publishes sensationalist Orientalist front covers with images of veiled or 
Burqa-wearing Muslim women under headlines such as “The puzzle or 
mystery of Islam,” and, after van Gogh’s murder, “Allah’s daughters without 
rights. Muslim women in Germany.”18
Here, I provide one example from the German media: under the head-
line “Prominent German-Turks have called upon Muslims [women] in 
Germany to take off their headscarf as a sign of their willingness to inte-
grate: those who veil deliberately separate themselves from German soci-
ety,” Ekin Deligöz, Member of the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) 
for the Green Party, is quoted as telling (the tabloid newspaper) Bild am 
Sonntag: “The headscarf is a symbol of the oppression of women. Those 
who demand that a woman covers her head and hair are making her into 
a sexual object.” The article continues, “Deligöz speaks to Muslim women: 
‘arrive to today, arrive in Germany. You live here, thus take off the heads-
carf!’ SPD member of the German Federal Parliament, Lale Akgün, criti-
cized the headscarf as discriminatory and called for equality for Muslim 
women: ‘It is unacceptable that a Turkish man can walk in modern cloth-
ing in the street—and his wife next to him must wear a nondescript, floor-
length coat and a headscarf.’”19
Several themes are apparent here. In this article, the idea that a woman 
can actually choose to wear the headscarf is completely disregarded by the 
speakers. Instead, the only two reasons why a woman is veiled are because 
she is forced by external pressures or because she is traditional and not 
modern. This resembles the colonizing practices in Algeria, where women 
were asked to remove their headscarves as part of a so-called emancipa-
tion and modernity process. Today, the veiled women are not located 
in  (former) colonies, but within Germany. Wearing a headscarf is still 
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20 In part, the meaning of the veil or headscarf that is constructed by such media stories 
exists independently of the reasons given by women for wearing the headscarf, although 
such media representation may well affect how someone thinks about her headscarf.
considered to be incompatible with being German, or with having really 
arrived, not just physically, but mentally and spiritually, in German soci-
ety. In this article, the speaker also produces a particular gender structure 
within what is imaged as the Muslim family: whereas the man is fashion-
able, he does not allow his wife to be fashionable, thus victimizing Turkish 
Muslim women. At the same time, Turkish Muslim men are constructed as 
oppressors.
The role of the headscarf in the current framing of Othering in Germany 
is clear: the headscarf has become the ultimate sign of oppressive gender 
structures. This discursive move constructs veiled women as representa-
tives of gender inequality and as primary signs of the Other. The headscarf 
has come to symbolize the assumed fundamental differences between 
East and West. As Göle asserts, “no other symbol than the headscarf recon-
structs with such force the ‘otherness’ of Islam to the West” (Göle 1996, 1). 
The headscarf is perceived to signal the woman as being out of time and 
out of place in European societies.
Additionally, the fact that the proponent of this idea was an unveiled 
woman of Turkish origin adds another dimension: to the German public, 
she casts herself as the “good migrant” who shows that it is possible to 
integrate in German society—in sharp contrast to the anonymous veiled 
women on the street. While the theme of the “good migrant” is interesting 
and deserves further consideration, in this chapter I look at the “bad 
migrant”: the Muslim woman who has no intention of removing her 
headscarf. Furthermore, rather than reducing the discussion to how the 
young women are shaped by the various classifiers (policies, the German 
school, media, and politicians) that construct her as the Other, I intend to 
examine how the youth contest some of the stereotyping images.20 My 
focus in the rest of this chapter is on how the youth deal with these public 
perceptions of the headscarf.
Islamism has been viewed as a form of collective and political manage-
ment of Goffmanian “spoiled identity” by several researchers who write 
about young Muslims in Europe. The idea is that young migrants turn to 
Islam as a reaction to discrimination and racism. Drawing on Goffman’s 
discussion of stigma, Göle argues that the Islamist movement “turns the 
‘undesired differentness’ of being a Muslim into a voluntary adoption of a 
stigma symbol that is overtly claimed and offensively communicated in 
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21 As the focus of my research is the perception and life-worlds of Muslim youth, I have 
not examined how similar situations may affect or impact the notion of “Muslims” among 
the non-Muslim population. This is a gap in current research.
22 Othering processes resemble interpellation. The interpellated person, according to 
Althusser, is forced to become the subject that the interpellation is hailing.
public” (ibid., 16). I agree with Göle that the stigma of Muslimness shapes 
how the youth identify with Islam and craft a Muslim Self. Still, Göle and 
other researchers do not analyze the complex processes through which 
the youth resist or make use of creative tactics to challenge the stigma of 
being traditional or submissive—which the headscarf is understood to 
signal in German public space. In other words, how do the Othering dis-
courses in politics and media become socially relevant in women’s every-
day identification processes? How does the discourse shape the women’s 
social practices in urban spaces? What are the available spaces for maneu-
vering or for using creative tactics to counter the Othering discourses?
Looking at the Headscarf
Here, I focus on social interactions in which what the youth perceive as a 
construction of Muslim women as the Other becomes relevant in every-
day face-to-face encounters in the subway, in shops, or on the street. Just 
as Simmel’s stranger is a social form, the Other is not an individual, but a 
relationship (Tabboni 1995) that is part of a pattern of interaction. The 
process of Othering takes place in everyday social situations. By looking at 
these everyday situations, we can identify how Othering processes shape 
experiences of everyday life and how social actors are not passively sub-
jected to the essentializing Othering processes (see also Bendixsen 
2009a).21
The processes of Othering that I discuss here have similarities with 
Althusser’s idea of interpellation. Althusser emphasizes how subjects are 
being constructed and subjected to certain cultural and historical dis-
courses within which they are expected to operate. Althusser’s famous 
example of ideological interpellation is that if a policeman calls out “hey, 
you,” this interpellates the person who is being called as a subject under 
the law, as the person will turn and recognize this interpellation as refer-
ring to him or her.22 As will be seen, this resembles the processes of 
Othering that the youth go through in their everyday urban encounters.
According to Althusser, interpellation takes place through language. 
What Althusser does not consider, as Butler (1997) eloquently points out, 
is why the individual accepts the subjectification and normalization 
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brought into effect by the voice that calls out. Importantly, Butler also asks 
how the individual can negotiate, redefine, or challenge the conscious or 
unconscious efforts of interpellation. I discuss some of the tactics that are 
available to youth when they confront the interpellation or Othering. 
I argue that how young women use these tactics tells us a great deal about 
how identification processes take place (Bendixsen 2009a).
During my fieldwork, everyday conversations made it clear to me that 
the youth were regularly stopped by strangers on the street who asked 
them whether they were forced to wear the headscarf, or who hurled 
insulting remarks, such as, “you look stupid with the headscarf”, “Taliban!” 
or “another one of those Mummies.” Verbal abuse was a frequent topic of 
conversation among the young friends, and provoked amusement, frustra-
tion, and incredulity. Verbal abuse suggests that people in general consider 
the young women in this study to be representatives of Islam who have an 
obligation to respond to questions that are perceived to be related to Islam 
(be they cultural, social, or political). For example, Sarah (15), whose par-
ents arrived from Turkey in the 1970s, told me:
“The nice thing about the World Cup (was that people were talking to 
her). Not only about Turkey, but about all Arabic countries, and then slowly 
the conversation would move to be about terrorism. All of that because of 
this.” She pointed to her headscarf, continuing, “people would say ‘I have 
been to Algeria’, and I would say, ‘ah, nice, I haven’t’.” She laughed, and added, 
“they say that to show me that they know people like me, it is meant to be 
friendly.”
Although Sarah saw the fact that strangers were talking to her as a positive 
development, the conversation also demonstrates the association strang-
ers made between Sarah and Arabic countries (although Turkey is not an 
Arabic country) and even terrorism. Sarah considered the development of 
the conversation to be a direct consequence of her headscarf. Yet, rather 
than being insulted or feeling Othered, Sarah responded to them jokingly, 
interpreting their statements as uninformed rather than hostile. When 
she recounted the episodes to me, she even excused the statements that 
contain simplified and partly stigmatizing elements, implying that people 
do not know better. What could have become a series of social situations 
where Sarah would have felt Othered, she indulged and interpreted as 
clumsy efforts to be friendly.
Frequently, the young veiled women were treated as non-German and 
as Others. The relationship between veiling and being perceived as a non-
German was particularly clear when talking to German converts to Islam: 
they felt that both the Muslim and non-Muslim population considered 
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23 Veiled women who insist that they too are German potentially challenge not only 
who is a German or a European, but also the idea that one must embrace a single identity 
in order to fit in with the cultural constellations that together make up the nation-state. 
The idea of trying to be both German and Muslim may well discomfort the nation-state 
constellation and may be felt as threatening the pureness of the nation-state. However, 
these claims need to be examined in greater ethnographic detail.
24 I discuss the religious career of Ines in more detail in chapter 7.
them to no longer be German once they donned the headscarf. The heads-
carf seemed to eradicate their Germanness, erasing the fact that they were 
born in Germany, spoke German fluently, had German grandparents and a 
German education. Apparently, their religious identification made them 
incompatible with existing German cultural spaces of belonging.23 Those 
who were born Muslim also felt a difference in how people at large per-
ceived them after they started to veil. For example, Ines (20) believed that 
when she started to wear the headscarf it changed the way she was per-
ceived by people around her:
Sometimes on the subway, there are like three people sitting across from 
you, and they stare, look at you like this [she looks at me from head to toe] as 
if they were in the Zoo and I, like, think, come on hey, stop looking at me like 
that, as if I am a monkey in a cage! And sometimes you are also imagining it, 
like, that (you think) they are looking, and then there is maybe no one who 
is really looking at you, it drives you crazy. (…) And then they ask why for-
eigners become criminals? Like, imagine, I feel it like that, and I am not even 
a foreigner, I am German. And they still don’t treat me as a German. Imagine 
how it must feel for a real foreigner, someone who is not a German! (…) 
I have been German since I was able to think, and now, from the moment 
when I started to wear a headscarf, I am not German anymore. They treat 
you differently, you can just feel it.
Ines felt that there was a clear change in how (anonymous) non-Muslims 
reacted to her and behaved towards her after she started to veil. She per-
sonally did not see any contradiction in being German and being veiled, 
but experienced that she was treated as a foreigner as a result of wearing a 
headscarf. Growing up in a small German town where she seldom social-
ized with people with migrant backgrounds, Ines had mostly ethnic 
German friends before the age of 14. After a turbulent youth, she turned 
more religious and decided to veil.24 Until then, she said, she had no prob-
lems considering herself German, a feeling that changed after she visually 
showed that she is Muslim and the subsequent external reactions towards 
her. In the above conversation, she particularly emphasized the experi-
ences of being Othered through receiving looks from strangers.
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25 The hospital was the first area where the surveillance techniques and the normaliz-
ing gaze were introduced. The early schools turned out to be a kind of examining appara-
tus, where the student is subjected to examination, thus promoting visibility and linking 
this to knowledge and power (Foucault 1995 [1977], 187).
It was pointed out to me that Othering gazes do not only come from 
ethnic German non-Muslims, but also from those who were born Muslims 
or from secular Muslims. Julie (28), a German convert, told me that she 
sometimes found that she was perceived to represent a political move-
ment, as “the Islamist,” “the Extremist,” or “the anti-feminist.” She inter-
preted the gazes or negative looks from non-practicing Muslims or 
“seculars” in terms of their feeling threatened in their emancipation or 
feeling judged by a “moral apostle with headscarf.”
What do (anonymous) gazes do? In his research on medical practices at 
the end of the sixteenth century, and later in his work on the prison sys-
tem, Foucault (1995 [1977]) points to how the gaze becomes a technique 
embedded in power. He points to five operations that the normalizing 
gaze of modern scientific reason leads to: comparison, differentiation, 
hierarchization, homogenization, and exclusion. The gaze is not neutral; 
it has a starting point (ibid., 182–84).25 The (anonymous) gazes that 
the youth feel others them, have social effects that are similar to the 
normalizing gazes within the state apparatuses Foucault described. 
Figure 9. Young women with headscarves, Kreuzberg. Photo: Synnøve Bendixsen.
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26 Here I discuss “the gazed upon” and not “the gazer”—thus, I analyze the feelings that 
the gaze brings into play, and disregard the intention(s) behind the gaze.
27 Although I am inspired by Foucault’s theoretical focus on how subjects also form the 
subject positions, I agree with the critique that Foucault tends to consider the body as 
being passively inscribed by a subjectifying power (McNay 1991). In her assessment of 
Foucault’s perception of the docile body, McNay (1991) argues that the focal point of 
Foucault’s analysis of the disciplinary techniques is on those in control, largely disregard-
ing those being controlled. This weakness leads to an exaggeration of the efficiency of dis-
ciplinary forms of control. In consequence, Foucault falls short of expanding a “notion of 
resistance” by the subjects of disciplinary power. Foucault contends that oppression always 
produces resistance: “There are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all 
the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of 
power are exercised” (Foucault 1980, 142, in McNay 1991, 134). Yet, Foucault’s historical 
Foucault points to how the pursuit of visibility advanced when the exami-
nation technique was introduced at the end of the classical age. In this 
examination technique, the power of an observing hierarchy merges with 
that of a normalizing judgment. The examination becomes “a normalizing 
gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify and to punish. It 
establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates 
them and judges them” (ibid., 184). It seems to me that the gaze on the 
street bring similar operations into play for the young Muslims—namely 
that of comparison, differentiation, hierarchization, homogenization, 
and exclusion, where the veiled woman is represented and perceived as a 
deviation from the norm.
Reflecting upon how the urban represents a space where Othering dis-
courses and normalizing gazes take place does not provide a sufficient 
understanding of the complexities of these youths’ everyday social life 
and identification processes.26 This part of the story only emphasizes the 
socio-historical constraints and discourses, pointing to the positions to 
which the young women were (sought) summoned in their lived social 
experience. A deeper understanding needs to include insight into how the 
young women identified or did not identify with the positions they were 
imagined to represent. It must also analyze how they shaped, transformed, 
created, and performed these positions.27 In short, what are the different 
ways that the young women creatively dealt with the Othering gazes and 
interpellations on the street?
The Tactics of Muslim Women
Through my fieldwork, it became clear to me that the young women and 
teenagers did not unconditionally accept the Othering behavior they 
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studies suggest that the body does not materially resist the processes of power. In Foucault’s 
analysis, power inscribes itself on the body, which remains a passive vector (McNay 1991).
28 To understand how, if at all, the young women take up the external social discourses 
or interpellations, I make use of a Goffmanian situational analysis. As several researchers 
have noted (e.g. Calhoun 1994), in the dramaturgical theory of social relations, Goffman 
describes everyday social encounters and interactions as too intentional, calculating and 
strategic. I seek to circumvent the radical intentionality that Goffman has rightly been 
criticized for by drawing on Michel de Certeau’s concept of “tactics” (1984) which also rec-
ognizes unconscious acts. The distinction de Certeau (1984) makes between a strategy and 
tactic makes it possible to avoid the models of over-reflexive or rational negotiations of 
Goffman.
29 In the words of de Certeau: “A strategy assumes a place that can be circumscribed as 
proper and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it. 
(…) I call a ‘tactic’, on the other hand, a calculus which cannot count on a ‘proper’ (a spatial 
or institutional location), nor thus on a borderline distinguishing the other as a visible 
totality. The place of a tactic belongs to the other. (…) A tactic insinuates itself to the other’s 
place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a 
distance” (de Certeau 1984, xix).
30 See also Foucault on tactics (1980, 90; 95), and strategy (1980, 92–95; 1994, 346–348).
encountered from strangers in urban situations. Rather, they made use of 
techniques or tactics to project an alternative self-image that challenged 
or negotiated the Othering encounter. While these tactics do not necessar-
ily control the encounter, they do shape them. I find de Certeau’s and 
Goffman’s concepts useful in explaining the Othering that the youth faced 
and their reactions or (non)identification with the essentialism in the 
encounters. The youths’ reactions can be considered “techniques of 
impression management” (Goffman 1959), or as various tactics or strate-
gies (de Certeau 1984).28 The term “tactics” refers to acts that are deter-
mined by the absence of power, whereas “strategies” are organized by the 
postulation of power. De Certeau distinguishes them by the types of oper-
ations and the role of spaces: “strategies are able to produce, tabulate, and 
impose these spaces, when those operations take place, whereas tactics 
can only use, manipulate, and divert these spaces” (ibid., 29). Tactics pro-
duce space through frequent maneuvers so as to transform spaces into 
chances or opportunities.29 In daily social situations, people can (re)claim 
autonomy by using tactics that contest oppressive forces, such as Othering 
processes. Tactics are everyday practices, for example altering ways of 
walking, producing, speaking, reading, and dressing, which together can 
interfere with or confront the prevailing regulatory social system.30
Whereas some of the social techniques I want to address here are highly 
individual, others are learned or practiced within a group. To clarify this 
point, I provide two examples of individual creative tactics that I noticed 
during my fieldwork:
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Kiraz (24) told a group of friends about a recent event: She had been sitting 
on the subway reading Goethe when a woman next to her asked, “are you 
really reading that?” Kiraz had answered with a playfully invented and 
feigned foreign accent: “I no German speak” (“Ich keine Deutsch spreche”). 
As she told us the story she laughed, content with her playful response.
The second event was told at the MJD premises:
After a weekly MJD meeting, Naila (17) told another MJD participant and 
me a story: as the only veiled woman in a group of female friends, she 
had entered the department store KaDeWe at Kurfürstendamm. She 
explained that “they [the other customers and employees] were staring and 
I said aloud [so that everyone around her could hear] ‘you would think that 
they had never seen anyone with a headscarf before!’”
In the first situation, Kiraz was making fun of the woman, playing with the 
stereotype that the woman based her question on. In this way, she assumed 
control of the situation and, disregarding whether her audience under-
stood that Kiraz was making fun of her, dismantled what could have been 
an experience of Othering. Instead, Kiraz gained a sense of satisfaction. In 
the second situation, no one confronted Naila directly, but she felt the 
gazes judge her. So while Naila was not facing anyone in particular, she 
faced the whole atmosphere, most likely strongly shaped by the particular 
social setting of KaDeWe, with its exclusive image. If we take a second look 
at this situation as a scene in a play, with this small performance or reflex-
ive improvisation, Naila turned the situation around, talked back to her 
audience, and ridiculed and challenged the gazes, at the same time as she 
confirmed her difference. Yet in this situation, she controlled her own 
difference.
A performance is intrinsically interactive and risky as it can either 
(completely or partly) fail or be successful (Schieffelin 1998). Whether or 
not it is successful depends on the relationship between the different per-
formers in the interaction. It may well be that I only heard about situa-
tions which were (partly) successful. However, it is my impression that 
small performances like these often take the other person(s) by surprise, 
and the interaction comes to an embarrassed and even confused halt. That 
said, Ines told me a story that was similar to Kiraz’s, but where the con-
frontation ended differently:
Once I was sitting on the subway reading. I was reading Noam Chomsky and 
then I noticed that the woman next to me was reading in my book, looking 
at what I was reading. And so somewhat before my stop, I closed the book so 
that I would have some time to talk to the woman before I got off, and I put 
the book on my lap so that she would see the title, and I said, “Noam 
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Chomsky” and the title, and then I said, “do you know it? It is very interest-
ing.” And the woman said like, “it is very good that you are reading such 
books.” And I did not really understand what she meant, and said that “yes, 
he is very interesting; he is a Jew, but also defends the Palestinians.” And she 
said, “no, what I mean is that it is very good that you can read.” And I didn’t 
want to say something and insult her there on the subway, and just said, “yes 
[it is important to read].”
The effort Ines made to initiate a conversation with the woman failed, and 
Ines was taken aback by the woman’s response. The woman focused on 
Ines being able to read German and not on the content of her book. The 
stranger did not see Ines as a potential partner in an intellectual conversa-
tion in the way Ines hoped. Instead, the woman acted condescendingly to 
a veiled Muslim woman who she thought was fortunate to know how to 
read. I believe that the difference in the responses that Kiraz and Ines 
received can partly be explained by the fact that Kiraz was more self-
assured, older, and enjoyed telling jokes, while Ines was more timid, quiet, 
and generally shy. Tactics like these will necessarily be related to personal 
dispositions, individual characteristics or narrative identity (Taylor 1991), 
and to the particular context, such as being together with close friends—
like in Naila’s case.
Not all individuals chose to react: sometimes the youth were confronted 
with Othering gazes or interpellations too suddenly, and left the situation 
feeling hurt, not knowing at that very moment how to respond. At the 
same time, silence can also be a way to question the legitimacy of the 
authority called upon in the confrontation and by the stranger. It can also 
be an effort, as Butler, referencing Nietzsche puts it, to “circumscribe a 
domain of autonomy that cannot or should not be intruded upon by the 
questioner. As a narrative withheld, it either refuses the relation that the 
inquirer presupposes or changes that relation so that the one queried 
refuses the one who queries” (Butler 2005, 12). Silence can thus also be a 
rejection of what feels like differentiating and hierarchical inquiries, a per-
formance through which the youth may reinstate their self-respect.
The techniques I want to focus on here take place or are learned and 
practiced within a particular religious social space, namely the MJD youth 
organization. The tactics mentioned below need to be considered in light 
of the fact that the members of MJD seek to be perceived as religious 
or pious, both by themselves and by others (non-Muslims and Muslims). 
This necessarily affects their self-confidence and the space they make 
available to themselves for improvisation. I focus on three tactics that the 
young women mainly used in conversations with or about non-Muslims: 
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joking, rehearsal, and normalization. Finally, I examine a fourth tactic—
corrective practices—which was used with other Muslims, including 
strangers and family, friends and acquaintances.
The Joking Tactic
I found that what I call a “joking tactic” was often used within the group. 
The joking tactic is characterized by the use of irony, satire, jokes, and wit 
as a conscious or unconscious means to mediate and overcome prevailing 
discourses. During their leisure activities like picnics, ice-skating, parties 
in homes, and during lessons the youth mocked some of the Othering pro-
cesses and interactions that they faced in the street. For example, amongst 
themselves, the young women referred to themselves as “terrorists,” a 
“headscarf-band,” used the phrase “Scheiß Ausländer” (“damn foreigner”), 
played with the concept of “modern,” and made fun of the Turkish-German 
accent. The following episode illustrates this well:
At a picnic in Potsdam, we were constantly told by the police in the park that 
we could not sit here or there. One of the girls finally commented that “they 
think that we are going to have a picnic and leave everything behind. 
[Immigrants always act] like that on television.” The same day, three of the 
girls joked about walking in what they called “a group of headscarves”: “It 
was a quiet Sunday in Potsdam. Nobody knew what was going to happen. 
Perhaps the next minute a bomb would explode….” Everyone laughed.
The playful references suggest that the perceptions others have of their 
identity also actively constitute it, as others name, categorize, and respond 
to or treat the youth according to their perceptions of the youths’ identi-
ties. It is also indicative of the social effect an interpellation or Othering 
has on its target. Indeed, most “jokes are expressive of the social situations 
in which they occur” (Douglas 1968, 366). The youths’ jokes indicate that 
they believed that how they were looked upon or treated in a situation or 
were perceived by non-Muslim strangers in the street had direct links to 
the representation of migrants in the media. At the same time, by joking 
with the stereotypes that they knew exist, the young women shared them, 
took ownership of them, and subverted them. This technique exposes the 
content of the stereotype, ridicules the meanings, and as such reduces its 
power when they do encounter such normalizing gazes or utterances from 
strangers. These types of jokes or utterances worked within this group 
because the youth had the same semantic points of reference. 
Simultaneously, such tactics were part of efforts to redefine the content of 
the “Muslim” category that they were placed in, so that even if they could 
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31 The joking and negative reactions of the youth vis-à-vis the public images of 
“Muslims” in Germany also strongly suggests that these public images do not represent 
how youth conceive of their own social reality. Whether or not the media stereotypes 
reflect a reality of the Muslim youth is not relevant, as the youth do not recognize these 
images as representing their reality. I reiterate that my focus here is on the effect of images 
that the youth view as negatively stereotyping them.
not bring about positive changes in the public view of this category, they 
could at least label it for themselves in a way that they could control.31
The Rehearsal Tactic
Second, a more direct dealing with Othering processes is what I call a 
“rehearsal tactic,” which took place during the weekly meetings. The 
women learned how to deal with different situations, and developed a 
specific kind of knowledge about how to (re)act in public. During the reli-
giously oriented meetings, the leaders sometimes initiated role-plays or 
workshops on how to best answer some of the most typical questions that 
the women were confronted with, such as “how do you react if a friend is 
at your doorstep, and is suddenly not wearing her headscarf?” or for 
example:
During one weekly meeting, the youth conducted a workshop on “What do 
you say when someone comes up to you and asks if it isn’t hot under the 
headscarf?” Two participants volunteered to provide their responses. The 
first, a 19-year-old German convert, answered that, “I tell them that I am 
proud of my headscarf. That I feel naked without it. That even if it is hot, 
I wear it with pleasure.” The second, Latifa (17), who has a Turkish back-
ground, said, “I would tell them that though it is hot here, it is nowhere near 
as hot as in hell.” A discussion followed about what the young women could 
answer and what would be the best thing to say in such situations.
The confrontational quality of Latifa’s answer surprised me, as she 
had only recently become more religiously active. What does she want 
to achieve with this answer, I wondered? In addition to her answer 
partly being a consequence of her recent donning of the headscarf, I also 
came to realize that while non-Muslims might consider her answer aggres-
sive, for her it emphasized that her decision to wear the headscarf was 
related to her perception of Paradise and Hell as two realities or space-
dimensions that informed her actions and choices. By wearing the heads-
carf, Latifa believed that she increased her chances of entering Paradise 
after death. Thus, while it may be an earthly practice which caused some 
discomfort, this earthy discomfort was nowhere as discomforting as end-
ing up in hell in the afterlife. In contrast, the German convert emphasized 
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32 Goffman argues that practicing is important: “In a performer’s acquisition of a par-
ticular competence, the first step attempted is often easier and simpler than any he will 
take in the serious world (…). The first phase of training thus affords the learner some 
protection from the anxiety produced by incompetent performances…” (Goffman 1974, 
64–65). In a similar way to MJD, Jehovah’s Witnesses also go through a practice of role-
playing their answers to questions, a fact that Tuomas Martikainen made me aware of.
33 I draw on the term “street-wise” as defined by Anderson (1990). In his ethnography of 
blacks and whites living in the same American neighborhood, he portrays how they 
develop ways of the street and learn to maneuver in the urban environment.
what the headscarf provided her with on earth: pride and pleasure, which 
were parts of her self-confidence as a Muslim woman in Germany. The 
differences in the two answers show the vast range of potential reactions 
that various individuals can use.
At another weekly meeting, the MJD group created role-plays about 
how to best react in particular urban situations:
In introducing the role-play, the leader Fadwa (23) said, “this one is on the 
subway, we all know this situation.” Nawar (17) responded that, “ah, yes, 
finally at a specific place and also the subway—such an important place.” 
Hamida (17) volunteered and Fadwa gave her instructions: “You are sitting 
on the subway, and we are non-Muslims and you are yourself.” Two of the 
girls started staring at Hamida, whispering to each other, and continuing to 
stare [though they were both shy, so they sometimes only laughed]. “Just a 
second,” Hamida said, getting up for her cellphone and putting the head-
phones in her ears. “I forgot this! I am always listening to music on the sub-
way, so that I don’t hear what they are saying.” One of the girls said that, “she 
is doing the right thing.” Afterwards, the group discussed how they would 
react in such a situation, which all the young women recognized.
This sort of role-playing can be understood as a way of practicing how to 
react and feel more secure in the urban sphere.32 MJD represents a safe 
place where reactions to potentially disruptive or Othering situations can 
be practiced and improved upon, thus allowing the youth to acquire a cer-
tain competence. Practicing how to react also facilitated improvisation 
and acting in a less conscious manner in similar real situations. The com-
ment that Hamida was “doing the right thing” indicates that ignoring or 
responding in silence to the gazes or talk can sometimes be the best solu-
tion. Through practicing within the group, the women developed a kind of 
street etiquette; a cultural capital (cf. Bourgois 2003, 135) or a savoir-faire 
that they could apply in different situations. In this way, MJD participants 
learned how to be streetwise as Muslim women in Berlin.33 Experiences 
from role-playing simultaneously shaped how the youth interpreted and 
negotiated the public spaces in which they maneuvered.
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34 During the meeting and discussions, the tactics were mostly focused on daily situa-
tions with non-Muslims. A few discussions focused on situations with other Muslims and 
the “unhealthy habit” of judging too quickly, particularly in relation to the behavior of 
other Muslim women. It was repeatedly stressed that one should not judge someone’s 
actions without having enough information—that one should first know the context of the 
action that “seems to be un-Islamic.” Social control, including gossip and judgmental 
rumors, seemed to be an internal problem within the larger Muslim communities in Berlin, 
a point I return to later.
Although many scholars see city life as characterized by anonymity 
(Simmel 1980 [1903]), forms of social interaction are to a large extent 
driven by the recognition of clues or imprecise identity markers, including 
those related to ethnicity, class, occupation, age, and sex. The street oper-
ates differently depending on who is there. In fact, this is very much related 
to the urban conditions where categorization and clues function as an 
alternative and independent system of public identification (versus, for 
example, occupational categories) in order to manage street encounters 
(Hannerz 1980). This also shapes the social performance of social shun-
ning and practices of territorialization (Smith 1984). The qualities associ-
ated with these clues vary between societies (Hannerz 1980) and, I would 
add, within the same societies the meaning can vary over time (Bendixsen 
2005).
MJD organizers recognized that social interactions in the street did not 
take place in an abstract space, but rather in a place entwined with social 
codes and possible uncertain interactions. They also recognized that 
social practice is something that can be learned. Knowing how to behave 
in public is about more than relating to faceless others, or merely accept-
ing the stereotyping gazes or the feeling of being Othered. By learning how 
to behave in the street within a safe space such as MJD, the youth became 
skilled at presenting their self-image in public, which is also a form of 
street capital. This street capital might be a non-translatable cultural capi-
tal, but the feeling of mastering situations in the street, which is the aim of 
this rehearsal tactic, can provide the youth with an increased sense of 
safety or self-confidence in relation to what they perceive to be normaliz-
ing gazes.34
Notably, there were never any suggestions about how to act in the for-
mer East Berlin, except to avoid that area, or in a worst-case scenario “get 
in and out quickly.” Being streetwise in East Berlin was more a matter of 
knowing where the border between the former East and West runs and 
then avoiding the former East Berlin. Such ideas were more related to sto-
ries and images of racism and Nazis operating in Eastern areas than to 
first-hand experiences. The stereotypes that migrants and the second and 
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35 It is also a form of identity politics that I discuss more in chapter 7.
36 Notice here the similarity to the Nike commercial “Just do it.”
third generation had of the former East Berlin constructed spaces as safe 
or dangerous depending on perceptions of how the people living in these 
areas responded to those who are perceived to be foreigners or Muslims. 
Yet, having previously lived in Friedrichhain (former East Berlin), I noticed 
the increase of veiled women walking in the streets around the vivid café 
and restaurant life of Warschauerstrasse and Simon Dach strasse from the 
mid-2000s. Large parts of the neighborhood have been gentrified, and are 
attracting various businesses such as nightclubs, groceries, and clothing 
and design stores. Many of these new cafés, restaurants, hairdressers, and 
hotels are run by Turkish and Kurdish entrepreneurs, although interest-
ingly the waiters or shop assistants are frequently ethnic Germans and the 
name and interior design of the places are more often than not ethnically 
non-specific. This suggests a change of perception of some parts of the 
former East Berlin among persons with a migrant background. In the lon-
ger run, this might also change the negative assessment of this area among 
the larger population with migrant backgrounds.
The emphasis MJD placed on practicing forms of self-presentation as 
spatial tactics fits well with what seemed to be an underlying aspiration 
for the organization, namely assisting youth in becoming self-confident 
Muslims who know how to perform and talk about Islam in the German 
public sphere.35 During the meetings, this micropolitics about street com-
munication took different forms, including reminders to smile to other 
women with headscarves, or to make references to messages in the Koran, 
or a hadith, in everyday situations. For example, one of the organizers, 
Leila (21) gave a presentation, in which she said:
“When we are sitting on the subway and there are no other Muslims there, 
we feel like an outsider and do not dare to take out the Koran to read. 
Why are we ashamed to do that? People are looking anyways.” Leila then 
refered to a verse in the Koran and a story from the life of Muhammad where 
the moral is that one should be proud to be who one is, including in front of 
other people. She asked, “what did Umar Ibn al-Khattab [the second Caliph] 
do when he took up [converted to] Islam or what did a young man do at 
a university—praying in the middle of the university? When everyone is 
doing this, there is a [positive] chain reaction. Trust yourself. Just do it”.36
The negative looks that someone reading the Koran on the Berlin subway 
may receive, might equally well happen to those reading the Bible, thus 
the gazes might be a reaction towards the religious act and not specifically 
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37 Thus, the extent to which the Othering of the Muslim women should be understood 
only as a consequence of their being Muslims specifically, rather than more generally being 
religious in a society where religion is supposed to be confined to the private sphere, 
remains a question open to investigation.
38 In addition to the five daily ritual prayers, different du’a prayers are performed, for 
example when undertaking a journey, or before and after a meal, or when ending a 
towards Islam. Yet the youth interpreted such situations as targeting Islam 
exclusively. In this conversation, Leila made a direct link between histori-
cal time and today: born in the year 580, Umar converted the same day 
that he planned to assassinate Muhammad, and later became the second 
Caliph (634–644). His conversion made Muslims more confident in prac-
ticing Islam openly, as nobody dared to obstruct Umar’s prayer at the 
Ka’ba (Islam’s central house of worship, located in Mecca). The women in 
MJD were also encouraged to be self-confident and to not be ashamed of 
openly practicing Islam through a (direct or indirect) emphasis on their 
being part of the larger Muslim society (the umma). Their daring to per-
form their religious practices openly in the street was perceived to poten-
tially inspire other Muslims to perform their religion openly. Openly 
professing one’s religion can be a form of da’wa, which means “call” or 
“invitation” in Arabic and is an invitation to Islam (not unlike the Christian 
notion of evangelizing). Thus, the religious dimension cannot be omitted 
here. It forms part of the emphasis within the youth group that it is normal 
to be a practicing Muslim and that this should be the starting point of an 
effort to take Islam into the public sphere and make it common.
As mentioned, negative reactions towards displays of religion in Berlin 
may potentially be less directed towards Islam per se, and rather target 
religion in general. Expressing religiousness openly in what is typically 
viewed as a secular-minded city might provoke different reactions com-
pared to cities in the south of Germany, where religion plays a more nota-
ble part of people’s everyday life (for example in the common form of 
greeting). One can therefore question to what extent any public display 
of religiosity by youth would provoke negative reactions, regardless of 
whether they were practicing Islam or any other religion.37
While this is a question that remains to be answered, in the particular 
case of these women, the visibility of their practicing of Islam became a 
feature of their struggle for recognition. For them, the visibility of their 
religiosity could become a source of power, and the invisibility or suppres-
sion of the visible act could in turn be seen as a sign of subjugation (see 
Fraser 1999, 119). This struggle for recognition can be seen in the following 
du’a, which concluded one of the weekly meetings:38
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meeting. In the Berlin MJD, the youth always performed a du’a to end the weekly meetings. 
In MJD, it took the form of a combination of ritual words in Arabic, and more personal 
phrases in German. This was sometimes performed by all of the participants contributing 
one sentence each, sometimes by one youth alone.
39 Although the process is different it is worth mentioning the early civil rights move-
ment’s strategy to change the connotation of the sign “black” from “Black = despised”, to 
“Black = beautiful.’ See also Göle (1996) for a discussion of Islamist movements as social 
movements, a process that asserts that “Islam is beautiful” (1996, 15–18).
Ya Allah, help us to be active… Allah, help us to be self-aware so that we can 
walk the street without people being able to do what they want with us. 
Ya Allah, help us to improve our knowledge of Islam, so that we can answer 
questions well.
The tactic of rehearsing forms of self-presentation can also be understood 
as a way to challenge the content or representation of Muslim women in 
German society in general. This is a struggle over meaning or a “politics of 
the image” (Hall 1997); a contestation of what is represented in the 
media, which fixes the meanings attached to Muslims. These struggles 
for “recognition of difference” (Fraser 2000) are efforts to challenge the 
stigmatizing gazes or media representations. It suggests that people who 
are constructed as deviant have the opportunity to strategically challenge 
the stigma and to fill their category or representation with positive 
content.39
Learning how best to react can also be understood as practicing da’wa. 
This group of women saw it as their religious obligation to improve, cor-
rect, or renegotiate the stereotyped image of Muslims in Germany so that 
more people would be attracted to Islam. The women sought to make 
people appreciate their religion by showing good behavior. Everyday 
micro-politics that the young women performed, such as being especially 
helpful or practicing how best to answer questions about Islam, are indic-
ative of how Othering discourses shaped their identification process and 
daily activities, but also of the potential techniques available to counter 
the discourses.
The Normalization Tactic
A third tactic is to emphasize normality. I was alerted to this intentional 
and conscious tactic by Julie, a German convert. Julie (28) told me that she 
sometimes attempted to accentuate normal or unexpected behavior to 
break the wall of Othering and thus strived to make the headscarf be of no 
importance or forgotten in the situation. Signaling that “I am normal, 
I am like you,” is an effort to neutralize the starting point of the situation. 
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40 One of the reasons that she mentioned this popular Swedish children books and 
television series from the late 1970s can be related to my long red hair, which is similar to 
Pippi Longstocking’s, and that I am from Scandinavia. It may also be because most 
Germans know and enjoy this program.
41 Göle (1996, 84) argues that in Turkey, the black veil symbolizes the “return to premod-
ern Islamic traditions” and that it “acted as an expression of the active participation of 
women in political demonstrations.”
This can also be illustrated by Fatima (31) who, while in DMK one Friday 
evening, suddenly asked me:
“Do you know Pippi Longstocking?” I said that I did. Fatima continued, 
“I sometimes tell them [the Germans], that I also grew up with Pippi 
Longstocking, you know. I grew up here and have seen the same the chil-
dren’s shows and have the same childhood memories as them. I was born 
here! They don’t realize it. They see my headscarf, and don’t understand that 
I have grown up here as well, just like them.”
This practice is an effort to actively establish common points of biography 
with people in her generation who do not consider themselves to have any 
biographical similarities with Fatima, since she is Muslim.40 Another rel-
evant question that is brought to light here, is who has the right to decide 
when being a Muslim woman should be relevant. By pointing to Pippi, 
Fatima insists that being German/Western and Muslim is not a contradic-
tion. She also indirectly asserts that her religious identity is not always the 
most relevant aspect of her life story in a social interaction. With her 
emphasis on common children’s television programs, she tries to con-
struct a common frame of reference with Germans who are not Muslim.
German converts often took this translation work particularly seriously. 
For example, the German convert Margit (24) told a story to other mosque 
participants about a time she was in a doctor’s waiting room:
They came out and asked for Margit Heinrich, and looked at everyone, 
except me. When I said, “that’s me,” they looked at me, and then checked my 
identity card to see the name. [She is wearing a headscarf in her passport 
photo]. Many converts take on a Muslim name when they become Muslims. 
But I wanted to keep my German name so that they can see that it is not only 
foreigners who are Muslims. There are also [Muslim] Germans, more and 
more.
Similar practices that assert “normality” include awareness of types of 
clothing and the use of colors. Some women very consciously did not wear 
black during interviews or in public discussions because they believed 
that black could present a negative image or impression of fear vis-à-vis 
non-Muslims.41 For example, on the day before sitting an examination, 
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Rüya (21) discussed with Jenny (26) and Fadwa (23) whether her dress 
style “looks too extreme.” She explained that she was wondering whether 
she could dress like this for her examination and what her examiners 
would think of her. Rüya was wearing an ankle-length skirt in dark blue 
that had no ethnic or national associations. Jenny said that maybe she did 
look too fundamentalist and Fadwa suggested that Rüya wear a long shirt 
instead of a skirt.
Such discussions and reflections on their outer appearance suggest that 
the youth also adapted to the media images and discourses in their every-
day social practices. For many, wearing a headscarf that matched the over-
all outfit was not only about personal taste. Rather, it was a matter of 
signaling that they were not fundamentalist or oppressed, in contrast to 
what the media and politicians suggested. Their matching dress is intended 
to show that they are modern, fashionable, and at the same time wear the 
headscarf. Yet while the youth tried to reverse some stereotypical images, 
they reinforced and adapted to others. For example, the youth displayed 
stereotypical images of other Muslims in Berlin, for instance about those 
belonging to what the youth considered more traditional and ethnic ver-
sions of Islam. At one point, Ines told me that she did not feel like going to 
a Kurdish wedding since, she claimed, these weddings usually ended in 
fighting. She explained that there were always some youth who were not 
“really Muslims” and that the fight would start when someone looks at 
their women or throws a bottle. Ines here viewed an ethnic group as more 
likely to become violent at a celebration, referring to stereotypical views 
about gender relations within a specific ethnic group. Moreover, she 
believed that not all of them were “real Muslims,” although culturally they 
were Muslims, and she believed that this in turn increased the chances 
that a fight would take place during the event. Though non-Muslims gen-
erally do not distinguish between”real Muslims” and “cultural Muslims,” 
these youth tended to explain social problems and unwanted behavior 
within specific ethnic and national groups in terms of a failure to under-
stand Islam or un-Islamic behavior.
Politics of Representation
The effort to present an ideal or improve the image of Islam in the public 
sphere increases the pressure on the youngsters within a religious team. 
“Team” is here defined as “any set of individuals who co-operate in staging 
a single routine” (Goffman 1959, 79). In his work on stigma, Goffman (1963) 
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42 Alberoni (1984) points out that in the nascent state, the process of restructuring 
fields of experiences to new ends is the foundation for a shared affinity among the partici-
pants as well as that which mark their distinction.
43 Likewise, Fraser directs our attention to the moral pressure on individual partici-
pants in the effort the group makes to present a genuine, self-confirming group identity 
(Fraser 2000, 112). She asserts: “Stressing the need to elaborate and display an authentic, 
self-affirming and self-generated collective identity, it puts moral pressure on individual 
members to conform to a given group culture. Cultural dissidence and experimentation 
are accordingly discouraged, when they are not simply equated with disloyalty” (ibid.). 
This is remarkably close to Goffman’s arguments about the pressures that exist when iden-
tifying with a group.
contends that the burden of idealized conduct can be found in particular 
among marginalized individuals. Their deviance may compel them into 
“discredited” or “discreditable” groups, founded on the character of their 
stigma (Goffman 1963, 42). Managing the impression they make becomes 
more important among these individuals because, being discredited, they 
often try to tone down the tension their stigma causes in order to produce 
a more successful interaction with others. Inadequate social interaction 
leads to feelings of ambivalence and alienation for the discreditable per-
son who struggles to pass and utilizes disidentifiers in order to establish 
her or himself as normal. Emphasizing an idealized, normative identity 
and behavior in order to gain recognition from the larger population 
simultaneously limits the discredited person’s capacity for interaction. 
Thus, when a person has to struggle with a stigma of any type, this will 
change the nature of their impression management and, therefore, their 
interactions with others change.42 This is particularly the case when one 
identifies with a group that is marginalized and discredited. The need to 
present a genuine, self-affirming collective identity may well involve a 
moral pressure on individual group members to perform in relation to a 
specific group culture. A dissident may be viewed as disloyal towards the 
effort of building up a positive group image.43 How does the fact that 
the youth belong to a discredited larger group of Muslims, and identify 
with the smaller MJD faith community, affect their public appearance and 
self-projection?
These youth were highly conscious of stereotypes and partly under-
stood how these affected their daily lives. Both the Othering discourses 
and the tactics the youth practiced are gendered processes. Women who 
are defined as belonging to minority groups frequently struggle with this 
catch-22 dilemma: they derive self-realization and strength from their col-
lective identity that enables them to oppose stereotypes or normalizing 
systems, but by adhering to a collective identity, they simultaneously risk 
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44 This may also be viewed as the acting out of a “performative reflexivity,” “a condition 
in which a sociocultural group, or its most perceptive members acting representatively, 
turn, bend, or reflect back upon themselves, upon the relations, actions, symbols, mean-
ings, and codes, roles, statuses, social structures, ethical and legal rules, and other sociocul-
tural components which make up their public ‘selves’” (Turner 1986, 24).
undermining their own room for action. In other words, minority women 
tend to try to defend their collective group against discrimination and 
subjugation, but in doing so they risk setting themselves up as representa-
tives of the symbolic “Woman”. The effort to defend their group, or to bring 
about a self-affirming collective identity, may bring with it restraining or 
repressive aspects (see Yuval-Davis 1992, 224) in view of their social posi-
tion (as Woman) within the group. Indeed, the ambition to make an ideal-
ized impression on their observers (Goffman 1959, 35) leads to individual 
and peer pressure on the young women and their public behavior.44 One 
consequence of this is that youth who emphasize the need to correct neg-
ative stereotypes among the non-Muslim population try to modify other 
young women’s public behavior through peer pressure in order to get 
other youth to conform to specific behaviors.
This limits the space a young woman has for individual self- 
understanding, since instead of soul-searching she sets herself up as an 
ambassador for a wider identity she cannot herself control. Selma (19), an 
unveiled woman I interviewed, had decided not to veil because, she said:
I don’t look very Muslim! Like, look at the way I dress, with short skirts and 
such, and also my behavior is not always that Islamic. You know, when you 
are wearing the headscarf you are representing Islam in the street, it’s a 
responsibility that I don’t know whether I am ready for.
Selma’s comment illustrates the relationship between internal (she is 
Muslim) and external (not looking or performing as a Muslim) aspects of 
being a Muslim. My main point is that Selma felt that there were external 
expectations about veiled women in the urban space. She believed that a 
decision to veil was not only a personal choice, which an individual could 
take either on her own or with input from her family; rather, she believed 
that such a decision would also bring with it certain representational obli-
gations that Selma did not know whether she was ready to take on. This 
shows the tension between the strength the young person may acquire 
from veiling and the additional limitations and peer pressure she will have 
to accept as a consequence of wearing a headscarf. For many of the Muslim 
women who seek to live a pious life, this religious path does not only mean 
following the religious norms and practices. It also means living up to 
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certain expectations in the public sphere, as being perceived as a Muslim 
woman comes with a variety of expectations regarding their social behav-
ior, both from Muslims and non-Muslims - although in different ways. The 
silent expectations and concrete social reactions from Muslims are illus-
trated in the following story from Noreen (16):
My father has seen sisters with headscarves together with brothers. They 
were not married, but were holding hands in the street. It made him so sad. 
In the next speech [in a mosque] he said to the brother and the parents that 
this is not right—when it is like that they should rather marry. If they do that 
[holding hands], they are probably ready for marriage. And if they do 
not dare to go and talk with the father of the girl, then they should come to 
him and he would go with them.
Here, Noreen is expressing pride in her father, although this might be 
more to do with the role her father played within the religious communi-
ties than his views about gender relations. More importantly, her com-
ment shows that religious authorities reflect on what goes on in the street, 
and try to correct within a religious field what they perceive to be incor-
rect behavior, in this case through a talk in a mosque. The social pressure 
and consequent feeling of community policing (Dwyer 2000) cannot be 
underestimated. Through such social interactions, the performance of 
one’s identification (i.e. with gender, Islam, or both) is guided and partly 
structured. It also suggests how, according to Althusser, as a consequence 
of an interpellation (the “summoning into place”) in a social situation, the 
person in focus (the interpellated person) is becoming the subject of the 
interpellation. However, this line of argumentation neglects the negotia-
tions or tactics that social actors can make use of, leading me to a fourth 
tactic that I call a “corrective tactic.”
The Corrective Tactics
The corrective tactics were mostly directed towards Muslims—both 
known and unknown—who know which acts are generally considered 
acceptable or correct in Islam. Corrective tactics focus on paying conspic-
uous attention to how particular acts appear to other Muslims. These tac-
tics can be used both to conceal acts which otherwise would be frowned 
upon, or to preserve appearances where an act would be (considered) reli-
giously correct, but which could be misunderstood as not correct. For 
example, during a wedding celebration Aishegül (31) told me that:
My little brother is here, and I wanted to hug him, but then I couldn’t because 
the [Muslim] brothers were there and they might not know that he is my 
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45 This is also a creative form of agency: an action that conforms to norms appropriate 
to the situation can also entail new and unfamiliar paths of actions (Joas 1996, 233).
46 Discipline, as Foucault (1995 [1977]) has illustrated, is not externally imposed but 
rather is performed internally; discipline does not function at the level of the entire society 
but at the level of detail, and not by forcing or restraining individuals and their acts but by 
producing them.
brother, and think that we are married. Or they know that I am not married, 
and wonder what am I doing? And so instead I squished his hand like that, 
and then there was a German brother who saw it.
To not risk that people misunderstood her action (in case they did not 
know that he was her brother), Aishegül abstained from hugging her 
brother. As Aishegül was seeking a husband, it would have been unfortu-
nate if men believed that she was married. Moreover, it could give her a 
negative reputation within the religious and ethnic social sphere should 
there be rumors that she hugged a man (who not everyone knew to be her 
brother) in public. Being religiously knowledgeable and virtuous can 
constitute symbolic (and cultural) capital, which is important with regard 
to marriage, when the families make inquiries regarding a potential hus-
band or wife within their social spheres. Thus, to appear to behave 
correctly when in public becomes important in order to not damage one’s 
reputation.
Concern for appearances can also make youth modify their actions in 
cases where they know they are actually breaching religious norms in the 
public sphere. For example, when friends and I left Rüya (21) alone with 
her future fiancé in a restaurant, she later explained that she borrowed her 
sister’s ring so that it would look as if she and her future fiancé were mar-
ried. Such a corrective practice is employed to “safeguard the impression 
fostered by an individual during his presence before others” (Goffman 
1959, 13); here towards other unknown Muslims, since those acquainted 
with her knew she was not married, and non-Muslims would not care.45
Both the corrective and the rehearsal tactics are ways of performing 
within an impression management context that can be considered a dra-
maturgical discipline (Goffman 1959, 216). “Dramaturgical discipline” can 
be understood as the necessity for every individual associated with a group 
to make individual efforts to maintain or improve the performance of the 
group’s external image in order to maintain group coherence. In the pro-
cess of improving the Muslim image in Germany, the young women risk 
becoming self-regulating subjects in a Foucauldian sense, and to turn into 
self-observing subjects.46 The corrective and rehearsal tactics partly 
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47 By “ethnoscape,” Appadurai (1996, 33) means “the landscape of persons who consti-
tute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest work-
ers, and other moving groups and individuals constitute an essential feature of the world 
and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto unprecedented 
degree.” With this concept, Appadurai draws our attention to how the reproduction of 
group identities is changing socially, territorially and culturally as a consequence of migra-
tion and a regrouping in new locations (ibid., 48).
48 Similarly, in her research on Turkish migrants in Germany, Nökel has pointed out 
that “[t]o be successful despite wearing a headscarf is the ultimate sign of personal recog-
nition and personal identity politics, different from simply assimilating” (Nökel 2006, 430).
uphold or frame a particular image of the Muslim Self to others and one-
self, and partly circumvent negative sanctions from ethnic and religious 
social fields in which performing in a non-normative manner risks regula-
tive punishment—which in this particular community may take the form 
of a getting a bad reputation.
The Headscarf as Social Capital
Thus far, I have focused on situations where the women felt that they were 
being Othered or felt interpellated. I want to briefly discuss situations that 
did not start from the point of the Othering discourses, but where being a 
Muslim woman was a form of symbolic capital or a resource. There were 
certain moments or interactions where wearing the headscarf felt advan-
tageous or where spaces were translated into ethnoscapes (Appadurai 
1996).47 In a discussion about Othering, Julie emphasized that she also 
experienced positive reactions on the street, including admiration and 
comments from other Muslims:
She recalled comments from other (unveiled) Muslims who told her that 
“I also want to wear the headscarf at one point.” “As a veiled woman in the 
street,” Julie argued, “one can also be perceived as a moral role model; every-
thing that someone—whether male or female—morally, spiritually or reli-
giously has not (yet) achieved is projected onto the women.”
The headscarf can help present the women as positive and important 
Others for other (non-veiled) Muslims. Julie added that she sometimes 
met particularly encouraging and friendly non-Muslim faces in the street, 
something that for her may have indicated a certain solidarity with the 
stigmatized.48
Being religious and having a migration background can be turned into 
relevant experiences for some positions or jobs. In some exceptional cases, 
veiled young people are preferred as employees, either because a shop 
owner wants to portray a religious image or because she or he personally 
142 chapter three
49 Karakaşoğlu (1999) suggests that several second-generation Muslims with Turkish 
backgrounds would like to be teachers, a career in which they can use their traumas con-
structively. She found that several intend to provide assistance for the coming migrant gen-
eration in the German educational system through their particular knowledge and 
institutional and life experiences. Many feel an obligation to be role models for migrant 
youth and to show the majority non-Muslim society that they can participate in the domi-
nant society.
prefers her or his employees to be veiled. When Ines decided that she 
wanted to become a social worker and tried to enter an Evangelical School 
for this program, she told me:
There are not many Muslims doing social work, or there are some, but they 
don’t bring their religion with them in their work, ‘cause they don’t practice 
it, or they don’t know how to pass on their religion correctly. Like when the 
children ask about it, they should be given the right answer and not the 
wrong answer. And it’s important. You know why? ‘Cause when you say 
where you come from, you are talking about belonging, and like, when you 
ask me who I am, I don’t really know. Like I am not German, I am not 
Lebanese, and I am not Palestinian. I don’t know where I come from. Like, 
it’s important to look where your parents come from, to know the culture, 
the history and such. I don’t know my own language well; I have not been 
raised with it. (…) Like, my parents thought it was important for me to be 
integrated here, and that is why I have a German name and such. But I still 
miss something. Like, that is why you have these young criminals and such; 
they have problems, ‘cause they don’t know where they belong. (…) I said 
this at [the interview for] the Evangelical school—I said that it is important 
and she said that she would write very positively about me. I am so excited.
Here, Ines emphasizes her migration background, which became a moti-
vational factor for her choice of education and future employment.49 The 
way she was raised is also brought to the fore as a main reason that she felt 
somewhat out of place in Germany. She felt that using religious knowl-
edge as well as her personal experience of growing up as a migrant was 
important when interacting with immigrant youth. Ines sought not so 
much to become a role model for immigrant youth, but to draw on her 
experiences in order to assist troubled immigrant youth. In this work, her 
goal was to create spaces of belonging in Germany for the youth that she 
herself was missing.
Many of Ines’s friends who also wore headscarves asked her whether it 
would not be difficult to be accepted by a Christian school. Ines argued 
that on the contrary, they paid attention to her voluntary work and her 
personal intentions during the interview. Ines was accepted by the school 
and turned out to be the only one wearing a headscarf at the school, which 
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50 It is noticeable that in this instance, Ines drew on her knowledge of Islam in her 
school work. Most of the time, such knowledge is a symbolic capital within the religious 
(and ethnic) social field. This is one of the few instances I have seen where a young person 
converted their religious knowledge into symbolic capital outside of the religious or ethnic 
social field.
51 Clearly, the reactions of the youth may also be about playfulness as it can be fun to 
play against stereotypes. By provoking reactions and then responding to them, one may 
feel confrontational which, among other things, reduces the feeling of being a “victim.” 
Nevertheless, in the political climate such an individual playfulness is intertwined with a 
group-oriented struggle to define what Islam is.
is located in former East Berlin. For a long time she had difficulties finding 
friends, something that changed once she got back her first homework, for 
which she used her knowledge of Islam and got a top grade. Subsequently, 
the other students started to talk with her and wanted to work with her. 
She realized afterwards that they “were afraid” and did not know how to 
talk to her. She explained that “before they considered me to be different. 
After all, I am different!” Thus, while she was able to turn her religiousness 
(it was an Evangelical school) and her migrant background into a form of 
symbolic capital or resource during the admission process to the social 
work program, she gained acceptance from the other students through 
her intelligence and academic success.50
Contesting Representations
The young women identified with a group (MJD) that is conscious of the 
ruined image of Muslims and that emphasizes the role of Muslim women. 
This made the youth feel that it was a religious duty to negotiate and 
change the negative stereotypes of Islam of which the Othering is a symp-
tom. The youth were highly aware of the viewpoints and opinions about 
Muslims and Islam in the wider German society; such views are clearly 
expressed by the media and politicians. The religious social field is deeply 
informed by German public discourses about its Muslim population, dis-
courses that are situated in a specific historical and social context. At 
times, the youth and group leaders also accommodated these Othering 
images. Simultaneously, the teenagers and young women can manipulate 
or transform events to turn them into spaces of resistance or negotiation, 
and thus reject a passive discursive construction or interpellation of them-
selves as predefined Muslim subjects.51
What are the consequences of the tactics that reply to the perception of 
the Other to which the women I worked with respond? Will the woman on 
the subway change the ideas she has of Muslim women in one way or the 
other after her meeting with Kiraz? Does it represent a new experience for 
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52 Brunt argues that there are two questions that need to be asked in relation to repre-
sentation. One, “how are identities represented in and through culture, and assigned 
her and will she consequently test and modify her knowledge through this 
situation? The identity a person seeks to communicate must be accepted 
by her or his social environment and socially relevant others (Barth 1969; 
1981). Zizek (1991) reminds us that the subject can never completely con-
trol how she or he appears or incite changes in others. Few actors have 
complete power over how the other person in a social interaction will 
interpret and reflect on their impressions of them. Additionally, unequal 
power relations permeate any micro-interaction. Unfortunately, thus far 
there have been few studies done on the (potential) changes in the major-
ity perception of the Other.
What I have called attention to here is the use of tactics to resist 
Othering discourses and the impact of such experiences and interactions 
on the young women I worked with, particularly in relation to how the 
women present themselves. The impression management efforts I have 
described illustrate the performative aspect of a religious identity, which 
is embedded in social practices. Tactics can also lead the actors to identify 
“new positions from which to act” (Strathern 1988, 320) as they develop a 
micro-politics related to the stigmatizing Othering they encounter in daily 
interactions. Youth are not merely passively receiving or submitting to the 
negative discourses or stereotypes. Rather, at the experiential level the 
youth challenge, subvert, and even partly transform the stereotypes or dis-
criminatory practices.
The discourses of Islam that the youth relate to in crafting their reli-
gious Selves make them part of a group-oriented struggle to improve the 
current negative perception of Muslims. To some extent, youth who veil 
are searching for a differentiation, which in turn is confirmed by the nor-
malizing gazes. It is the judgment and its hierarchical effect that the youth 
contest, reject, and seek to alter. The normalizing judgment the veiled 
youth face brings with it an assignment of specific attributes, such as being 
submissive, oppressed, traditional, and the ultimate Other. The ongoing 
stereotyping and homogenization situate all women with headscarves as 
representatives of “Muslims,” a category that the youth view as in Germany 
taken to mean potential terrorists, non-Germans, and products of a “tradi-
tional” immigrant culture.
In this process, youth take part in a struggle for a “recognition of 
difference” (Fraser 2000), which is part of identity politics. The starting 
point of any identity politics is representation (Brunt 1998, 152).52 
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particular categories”, and two, “who or what politically represents us, speaks and acts on 
our behalf” (Brunt 1989, 152). The latter refers to community representation and the prob-
lem that one “representative” represents people of very different categories with some-
times conflicting experiences but have in common that they are “disadvantaged.”
53 Habitus is an arrangement of acquired patterns of thought, behavior, and taste. It is 
the link between social practices (or action) and social structure (Bourdieu 2004 [1977]). 
I discuss habitus further in chapter 6.
By “representation” I refer to the efforts to change the negative stereotypes 
and categorizations; to alter what “Muslim” means in the German public 
sphere. In this public struggle of representation, MJD and its participants 
become, or strive to become, part of a struggle to define what and who 
is a Muslim. Seeing representation as a collective struggle recognizes 
that members of a group are joined together, both by means of a general 
understanding of the past as a narrative of discrimination and as a felt 
necessity to overcome the historically destructive social meanings 
advanced by such a narrative (Williams 2000, 181). Identification with a 
faith community situates the individual within a larger community of 
Muslims. This involves reflecting on being part of a “Muslim” category, 
or even community, which also entails a feeling of having to represent 
this category to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
These tactics to deal with a lack of confidence through training and 
improvisation can also be considered to be practices of resistance. 
Resistance questions the constituted order by putting it on trial or by 
insisting that it should be put on trial. The reactions of the young women 
are sometimes informed by their past experiences and are sometimes 
improvised. The process by which a young woman learns how to react dur-
ing the weekly meetings becomes part of the crafting of the youth as 
Muslims living in Berlin. These tactics also open up for notions of changes 
in habitus.53
As urban actors, young women rehearse, learn, or improvise a variety of 
tactics to perform in their encounters with strangers, in part to gain more 
control over the situation and consequently potentially shape it. Both the 
young women and the strangers may reinforce existing stereotypes, or 
develop new ones. In the long run, the young generation may establish 
new social patterns and norms of tolerance, thus encouraging a daily ordi-
nary civility, if not social harmony. Tactics like these interrupt, disturb, and 
prevent the individual from being placed in a position in which they are 
subjectified by Othering discourses. Subjects are clearly formed by inter-
pellations or Othering, but cannot be reduced to their submission to these; 
rather there are moments and movements of autonomy and creative acts, 
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through which the young women emerge transformed. In this process, 
youth are starting to play the role of a marginalized group that disrupts 
power relations and produces moments and spaces of belonging. The 
youth are not trying to dominate public space, but, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, aim to shift normative standards. MJD represents one place 
where they can do this with less cost and risk involved compared to other 
places. It is a serious game, where the (consciously or unconsciously) 
selected tactics must be understood as molded by several constraints, 
including gender, age, and internal group culture. In their efforts to 
challenge their Otherness, the youth restate their identities as Muslim 
women defined by a specific faith community. This risks creating a Self 
that is self-scrutinizing and self-disciplining. Taking up a position through 
affirming their identity as Muslim and struggling to modify or trouble 
the representation of that identity also risks situating them within other 
calculations of power and knowledge, which I discuss further in the next 
two chapters.
1 Wudu’ (the minor ablution) is the ritual cleaning before the prayers. To perform the 
ritual prayer (salat), which is the second pillar of Islam, Muslims need to be in a state of 
ritual purity (tahara). Wudu’ is done by rinsing the hands, the mouth, the nose, the right 
and left forearms, the face, the head, the ears, and the right and left feet with water – in that 
order (Murata and Chittick 1994).
2 The question “can you pray” can of course be understood as “do you know how to 
perform the prayer,” but most of the time when asked of women it indicates whether or 
not they are allowed to pray that day, since a woman is not allowed to pray when 
menstruating.
3 Depending on the prayer time, the youth either read the Koran first or prayed first. 
Those who can pray can also read from the Koran. Some argue that a woman who reads the 
Koran regularly is allowed to recite from the Koran while she is menstruating, as long as she 
is not holding the Koran in her own hands. The Koran is divided into different chapters, 
called sura (“a fence, enclosure, or any part of a structure”). Each sura is divided into ayahs, 
which are short passages (Murata and Chittick 1994, xvii). During the weekly MJD meet-
ings, five ayahs were read, regardless of how many participants were reciting from the 
Koran that day. Sometimes the same five ayahs were read twice in order for everyone to 
practice reciting from the Koran.
CHAPTER FOUR
CRAFTING THE RELIGIOUS INDIVIDUAL IN A FAITH COMMUNITY
The pursuit of knowledge is obligatory upon every Muslim man and woman.
–Hadith
It is Monday afternoon in MJD’s small meeting room, which is located at the 
rear of the Green Palace bookshop, along an anonymous street in Kreuzberg. 
The leader of the meeting, Fadwa (23), is eager: she wants to start as they are 
already running late. She asks, “do everyone have wudu’?1 Who can pray?” 
Turning to Leila (21), she repeats, “can you pray?” Leila says, “yes, I have 
learned how to pray.” The other girls laugh. Fadwa says impatiently, “no, 
I mean are you allowed to pray?” Leila responds, “ah…” She nods, laughing. 
[It is obvious that Leila understood what Fadwa meant, but was making 
fun.]2 Fadwa continues, “can someone hand out the Koran so we can read.” 
Naila (17) gets up and asks who are praying today. The young women raise 
their hands, and Naila hands out the Korans. Leila reads the first of the five 
ayahs (verses), starting where they ended last weeks’ reading.3 Almost every-
one reads one ayah and one woman is responsible for correcting their Arabic 
pronunciation. As Leila closes her book, Sevda (25) protests, there is a fifth 
line that should be read. “But it was finished,” Leila argues. But Sevda insists: 
“no, you have to read one more line for it to be correct.” One of the older 
participants quickly says, “ok, then I’ll read it.” She reads it while Leila holds 
the book (as women who are menstruating cannot touch the Koran). Fadwa 
then asks, “can someone read the translation, ‘cause we don’t have anyone 
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4 In order to prepare for this, most youth borrowed the book “The meaning of the 
Koran” (“Die Bedeutung des Qur’ans”, 1998, SKD Bavaria Verlag & Herdel GmbH) from 
MJD one week in advance of their presentation.
reading that to go along with the explanation about what it means.” 
Afterwards, one of the participants gives a presentation. Some of the partici-
pants have brought biscuits, chocolate bars, fruit, and cakes that all enjoy in 
the last part of the two-hour meeting, which is when administrative issues, 
upcoming events, a social game, and chatting take place. The meeting ends, 
as usual, with a du’a (supplication), where the first and last part is in Arabic, 
followed by a more spontaneous and personal part in the middle, in German.
During the weekly meetings, I observed how the youth educate them-
selves by reading from the Koran in Arabic and then in German “so that 
they can understand what they have read.” This was followed by a tefsir 
study (Koran commentary or exegesis) prepared by one of the youths, 
sometimes by the use of PowerPoint.4 The agenda continued with presen-
tations on how to be a Good Muslim or on issues relevant to everyday life 
as a young Muslim in Germany, including the application of different aha-
dith to contemporary life. The meeting also included a topic of the day, for 
example the history and social situation of their parents’ home country 
“since we are such a multicultural group” as one of the leaders put it. In the 
period I spent there, presentations included such topics as Amr Khaled’s 
“What the West means for Muslims,” and “What do Europeans think of 
Muslims?” Other presentations were about the wives of the Prophet 
Muhammad, the life of the Prophet (called Sira), stories about the differ-
ent Prophets, and a presentation on “Time-management,” which empha-
sized how important a time youth is, because “it does not last forever.” Yet 
other meetings addressed questions about when and how to do da’wa (call 
or invitation to Islam), and “Muslims’ contribution to Science.” In the 
period before Ramadan, two of the older members presented on what is 
allowed and when one theologically speaking breaks Ramadan (by per-
forming religiously incorrect actions). The tefsir, presentations, and short 
games were prepared by different participants each week and were often 
organized as PowerPoint presentations. The current leader(s) decided on 
the weekly program (presentations and themes) by seeking inspiration 
from the MJD website, following the handbook provided by the national 
organization, incorporating their own ideas, and asking the participants 
about their interests.
This chapter deals with how the young people learn and relate to a par-
ticular religious ethos that they study, negotiate, and practice within the 
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religious space of MJD. The main focus is on how religious discursive prac-
tices and ideals are presented to the youth, and how these practices are 
incorporated into the crafting of their bodies. How do the youth learn to 
become religious subjects within this space? Through debates, events, and 
presentations, as well as ideals, principles, and standards drawn from 
Islam, they were taught how to achieve “religious proximity” (Appelros 
2007, 8), which is how to behave as religiously correct as possible. Which 
rules and forms of conduct were promoted in the youth’s crafting of a reli-
gious Self?
What is deemed a correct performance involves specific ideals or nor-
mative expectations as provided by a religious authority or by a faith com-
munity’s understanding of Islamic tradition. The young Muslim women 
I  worked with strived to become pious, virtuous, or correct Muslims. 
Familiarizing themselves with the religious ideals, practicing these, and 
correcting their daily behaviors led to an awareness of what was expected 
in order to be or become good or correct Muslims. This ultimately shapes 
their continuous crafting of a religious Self. What were the expectations to 
the youths’ performance of their religious identity? In this process, how 
was a specific religious faith community forming a religious subject and 
what were the youths’ responses towards this religious subject formation? 
In short, how is the religious crafting of the Self simultaneously an indi-
vidual and a group-oriented process? These practices can be viewed as 
cultivating pious behavior. Are these discursive practices totalizing or part 
of forming a subject who is not free?
In my examination of how the young Berliner women I worked with 
learned religiously defined ideals and norms I analyze how these young 
women situated themselves in relation to the religious norms they were 
taught and show how these norms were used in the crafting of the Self as 
a religious subject. I look at the content of the religious norms and ideals, 
and pay attention to how the correct religious knowledge, behavior, and 
appearance was taught and discussed within the religious space of MJD. 
Finally, I question whether these techniques of the Self form a submissive 
subject. My inquiry into the crafting of a religious Self takes place within a 
Foucauldian inquiry into how different social and political spaces and 
times produce different ideas and ideals of the subject, in relation to 
which the subject seeks to craft herself and through which subjects with 
diverse characteristics, sentiments, beliefs, and contradictions are pro-
duced. Becoming pious or Good Muslims includes the perfection of virtu-
ous behavior, a process which is akin to the Foucauldian techniques of 
the self (Mahmood 2005). I understand here the techniques of the Self as 
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5 World religion here encompasses Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, 
Islam, and Judaism (Sharot 2001, 5).
particular practices that, when performed by the subject, allow her to take 
up certain subject-positions—in this case, that of the virtuous Muslim 
woman in Berlin.
A Religious Ethos
The theological structures of almost all world religions contain rules, obli-
gations, and rights.5 Suggestions on how to develop and acquire a particu-
lar Muslim personal character have always been formulated within 
Muslim societies (Metcalf 1984). According to Islam, a series of perfect 
revelations, ending with the Prophet Muhammad and the Koran, brought 
a prophet who provided a visible and accessible example of the revela-
tions. Many Sunni Muslims consider the Prophet to be the realization of 
the truths of the Koran, and view the moral exemplification of the practice 
of the Prophet as the ultimate representation of how to live as a Muslim. 
The effort to obtain a complete moral state of being is not left to historical 
figures, but is expected of Muslims in the present. Moreover, each indi-
vidual has the responsibility to seek to attain the internal capacity and 
sensibility of a religious tradition (al-sunna al-diniyya) in which the indi-
vidual person stands alone on the Day of Judgment and must account for 
her or his life (Asad 2003, 91). In order to achieve moral fulfillment or to 
become a good or better Muslim, the Muslim subject needs to deal with 
the norms and obligations provided by Islamic tradition.
Most of the youth I worked with sought and ultimately expected to 
improve their religious subjectivity through their participation in a reli-
gious organization. MJD promotes Islamic practice among youth as par-
ticularly relevant in light of the many temptations youth face, such as sex, 
alcohol, fashion, music, religiously inactive friends, and TV, through which 
youth risk diverting their attention away from religious ideals and obliga-
tions. Leisure interests, such as dating and intercourse before marriage, 
use of alcohol and drugs, and going to clubs and parties are common 
among many youth in Germany, but these are strictly forbidden in 
Islam. Many Muslim youth consider easily available visual pornography 
(e.g. semi-nude pictures on billboards or on the cover of German newspa-
pers, and improperly dressed men and women on the street during the 
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6 As my main focus is not the religious movement per se, but rather the attendees of the 
movement, I do not refer to how organization situates the knowledge within Islam.
7 See in particular Briggs (1970), Elias (2000 [1978]), Kondo (1990), Lutz (1988), and 
Scheper-Hughes 1994.
summer) as haram for the eye. Overall, the struggle for Muslim youth is 
both spiritual and existential (Zine 2001, 401).
Throughout my fieldwork, I paid attention to how youth learned to craft 
themselves as a particular religious subject, in relation to specific ideals 
and ethos, and with the goal of becoming good Muslims. Recognizing that 
Islam is a discursive tradition makes it possible to think of these ideals or 
ethos as normative without dismissing their religious legitimacy or 
authenticity. What makes the teaching and religious practices part of an 
Islamic tradition is not whether or not they conform to a specific rigid 
model, but rather that the practice(s) in its current organization, judg-
ment, and presentation relate to authoritative discourses and past stan-
dards situated within that tradition (Asad 1999, 1993; Hirschkind 2001a).6 
Being or becoming a good Muslim encompasses a large variety of body 
comportments, value orientations, and moral behaviors that in sum con-
stitute a subject formation. This subject formation works through the con-
scious cultivation of certain practices considered central in the creation of 
a religious Self (see Mahmood 2005). I show that in the process of becom-
ing skilled at these practices, the young women simultaneously craft their 
Selves as particular religious subjects who come to understand themselves 
as members of a religious faith community.
The Religious Body
Anthropologists have long studied how bodies, comportments, and 
expressions of emotions are culturally and socially shaped, and how the 
differences vary between genders, ages, groups, etc.7 In tracing the “civili-
zation” of manners and personality in Western Europe, Elias (2000 [1978]) 
shows us how individuals with different social positions were instructed 
in different codes of bodily conduct, including manners, etiquette, and the 
self-monitoring of bodily functions and actions. Likewise, Mauss (1979 
[1935]) gives an account of how different cultures organize the body as a 
technical tool differently. With the concept of habitus, Mauss invites us to 
study the body not only as a vehicle of symbolic connotations, but as an 
assemblage of embodied capacities (Asad 1997). In an effort to avoid the 
Cartesian dualism that distinguishes between the mind and the objects 
that the mind perceives, Mauss sought to view the human body as neither 
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8 Bourdieu makes no reference to Mauss in his later coining of the concept of habitus, 
which others have explained in terms of his conceptualization of the idea being different 
to that of Mauss.
9 Although also critical of Butler, Mahmood’s analysis is partly an empirical demonstra-
tion of both Foucault’s and Butler’s theories on subject formation, where the subject 
achieves a self and comes to recognize herself within certain historically defined struc-
tures. She contends that feminist writers fail to consider how women’s desires (as those of 
men) are socio-historically constructed and that they thus falsely universalize the liberal-
humanist interpretation of freedom and agency.
a passive recipient of “cultural imprints” nor an active source of “natural 
expressions” (ibid., 76). Instead, Mauss argued that we must look at the 
body as the medium through which to realize a number of human inten-
tions, including manners of physical movement (for example walking), 
forms of emotive being (for example modesty), and styles of spiritual 
experiences (for example self-transcendence).
Later, Bourdieu (1990, 53) famously used the concept of habitus as a 
system of durable, transposable dispositions. He viewed the body as a 
mnemonic device where the essential culture—the repertoires of the 
habitus—is impressed and encoded through a process of socialization.8 
Bodily hexis denotes the deportment of actors, including their stance, 
walk, and gestures. Dispositions and political mythologies are made per-
manent, embodied, and realized in bodily hexis.
There is a limit to Bourdieu’s rationalist perspective in that it provides a 
too socialized and collective view of the connection between social repre-
sentations and the body (Moore 2007). Consequently, he disregards indi-
vidual experiences, desires, self-awareness, and motivations and fails to 
include the formation of desires that are not rational (Friedman 1994). 
In her study of pious Muslim women in Egypt, Mahmood (2005, 139) 
rightly criticizes Bourdieu for neglecting to investigate the process through 
which subjects become specific subjects, and specifically how the habitus 
(as embodied dispositions) is learned through pedagogical processes. 
Mahmood argues that one of the consequences of this negligence is that 
Bourdieu overlooks how particular conceptions of the self call for particu-
lar bodily capacities. She demonstrates how the participants in the wom-
en’s mosque movement in Egypt struggle to follow a particular ideal in 
order to construct themselves as religious subjects, a process that might 
appear irrational.9 Likewise, the continuous process of becoming good 
Muslims for youth in Berlin includes perfecting behavior that is consid-
ered correct. This process resembles the Foucauldian techniques of the 
self: in other words, the specific practices through which a subject comes 
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10 According to Nixon (1997), it is through these contentions that Foucault shifts away 
from his previous more limited focus on how discourses produce historical identities. 
Foucault turns his attention away from how the subject is regulated and disciplined, to 
embrace a more complex view of agency. “Techniques of the self” continue to be carried 
out in fields of discourses and power-knowledge, but the practice of a discursive subject 
position is situated in ways that highlight that this process is dynamic. Drawing on 
Foucault, Butler (1993) argues that norms are not merely social obligations that limit the 
subject, but are the foundations through which subjects are realized. The subject is created 
(or produced) through power relations, and these power relations simultaneously form the 
conditions of the subject’s possibilities. Foucault calls this the “paradox of subjectification” 
since the processes through which a subject realizes her or himself also contributes to her 
or his subordination (Butler 1993, 1997; Foucault 1980).
11 This is similar to the Protestant tradition in Christianity.
12 During regional and local seminars and weekly meetings, references were made to 
the different madhhabs (schools of law or jurisprudence) in Sunni Islam, leaving individu-
als to decide for themselves which one of these (preferably within Sunni Islam) they 
choose to follow.
to constitute her or himself as a subject (Foucault 1988; see also Rose 
1996).10 Foucault asserts that the technologies of the self:
permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, con-
duct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality. 
(Foucault 1988, 18)
The way an individual experiences, comprehends, assesses, and performs 
her or himself take place within and through systems of power that appear 
to be either natural or imposed from above.
Here, I focus on how the Muslim youth craft a religious Self within a 
religious faith community where particular religiously defined ideals are 
presented and taught. In Sunni Islam, each follower is considered latently 
competent to take up the religiously defined ideals and is also individually 
accountable for the self-discipline required to realize this goal (Meltcalf 
1984).11 An individual should endeavor to apply the highest ideals possible 
in order to achieve religious proximity in their everyday life instead of 
removing themselves in a segregated community, or an established reli-
gious order, which is the case in certain strains of Christianity, Hinduism, 
and Buddhism (Mahmood 2005).
Religious ideals and a religiously defined ethos were promoted in the 
weekly MJD meetings through debates, presentations, lectures, com-
ments, and the everyday expectations of the participants. At MJD gather-
ings, events and seminars, attendees listened to presentations on practices 
that (Sunni) Muslims consider to be duties, such as prayer and fasting.12 
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13 I rely both on “religiousness” and on “piety,” even if the women in Berlin rarely 
referred to themselves as pious or used the German term “fromm.” Piety is a particular form 
of religiousness, which is considered not only a state of the soul, but also a practice. In 
recent anthropological research on Muslims in the Middle East, the term pious has been 
used in order to make the term mutadayyin (which could be understood as sincere or 
“fromm”) understandable, although often without defining it (Hirschkind 2001; Mahmood 
2005).
14 In her ethnography of the construction of selfhood in Japanese companies and fami-
lies, Kondo (1990) makes use of the term “crafting self,” which I also use here. The concept 
of crafting, Kondo argues, “implies a concept of agency: that human beings create, con-
struct, work on, and enact their identities, sometimes creatively challenging the limits of 
the cultural constraint which constitute both what we call selves and the ways those selves 
can be created” (Kondo 1990, 48). See also the introduction.
To varying degrees, participants sought to learn these ideals in their 
endeavor to be or become pious and Good Muslims.13 The meetings 
focused not only on gaining knowledge, but also on the youth working on 
her outer appearances, religious performances, and the relationship 
between internal and external comportment. Religious ideals that are 
considered universal are, at the same time, made local by the specific 
examples used by the participants and by the contextualization of the 
actual difficulties, contestations, and opportunities that emerge from 
living in Berlin as a Good Muslim. In the course of my fieldwork, I realized 
that the youths’ efforts to submit to religiously defined norms and rules 
were part of a process that required them to be actively involved, rather 
than passive actors. Their active interaction with, or submission to, reli-
gious laws and norms was part of their self-formation. In this chapter, I 
seek to expand our understanding of this process by shedding light on the 
creative processes by which people constantly craft, construct, and enact 
their Selves within a socio-historical space.14
The notion of “crafting” calls attention to the creativity involved, and 
opens up the process(es) of the continued creation of the young women 
as subjects, without ignoring the social constraints and relations that indi-
viduals continuously relate to and interact with in Berlin (see Kondo 1990). 
In looking at the processes within which the crafting of a religious subject 
takes place, I seek to remain aware of the religiously defined norms, while 
avoiding constructing a perception of a homogeneous, ahistorical Muslim 
subject.
Objectification and De-Culturalization of Religion
Several scholars have argued that the immigrant generation(s) born in 
Germany, and in other Western European societies, relate to a different 
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15 See Cesari (2002), Karakaşoğlu (2003a, 2003b), Klinkhammer (1999), Nökel (2002).
16 See in particular Amir-Moazami (2007) Hermansen (2003, 309) Jacobsen (2011), Jouili 
(2009), Roy (2004) and Thielmann (2005).
17 In the twentieth century, Wahhabism, Tablighism and Salafism were all searching for 
a “pure” Islam and a standardization of the practice of Sunni Islam around an orthodoxy 
dissociated from local cultures (Roy 2010). Yet, the Tablighis and the Salafis are not the only 
ones to consider the “pinnacle of devotion” to be emulation of the Prophet. In fact, many 
Muslims try to follow the Sunna of the Prophet.
18 The distinctions that Muslims born in Europe make between religion and culture 
have been discussed by several researchers. (See for example Bendixsen 2009b; Cesari 
2003; Fadil 2008; and Roy 2004).
19 Some scholars refer to this as a de-culturalized Islam (Roy 2004), and others refer to 
it as a de-traditionalization of Islam (Fadil 2008). I refer to it as a de-ethnicized form 
of Islam because this term is more neutral in regard to the form of Islam that the youth 
claim that their parents practice. Calling a young person’s form of Islamic practices a 
religious orientation than that of their parents.15 A major distinction is 
the rejection of culture that can be found in many Muslim youth move-
ments and among individuals, and in which pure Islam is situated above 
everything cultural.16 Already in the early 1990s, researchers interviewing 
young South Asian Muslim women in England found that the women 
established a clear division between religion and culture. This distinction 
was, according to the youth, largely incomprehensible to their parents 
(see Knott and Khokher 1993). The practice of distinguishing between 
religion and culture can be found within religious reformist movements, 
and within more fundamentalist religious movements, in several European 
countries (Roy 2004).17
Likewise, most MJD participants considered the practices of their par-
ents’ generation to be a cultural, impure, or traditional Islam that mixed 
religious premises with traditional, ethnic, or national cultural practices. 
In contrast, the young Muslims sought to perform a true or pure Islam 
detached from ethnic and national traditions and culture.18 This is a gen-
eral tendency among second and third generation migrants in European 
societies (Cesari 2003) since the late 1990s. Most of the youth who entered 
MJD aimed to learn about a pure Islam, while other youth became increas-
ingly aware of this distinction as it was drawn by the leaders in the presen-
tations and discussions. By going back to the sources (the Koran, hadith, 
and Sunna), the youth sought an Islam beyond a particular national or 
ethnic religious tradition and community, and emphasized the world-
wide umma (the world-wide religious community). Youth saw this form of 
de-ethnicized Islam as more theologically correct and objectively more 
religiously proximate than the traditional or cultural Islamic orientation 
of their parents’ generation in Germany.19
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This de-ethnicized form of Islam is in part caused by immigration. 
Immigration always changes how religion is transmitted. Social alienation 
and frustration related to migration have an impact on ethnic and reli-
gious identification. In addition, in the process of moving, “religion and 
tradition cease to be prearranged identities” (Göle 2003, 813). Furthermore, 
as Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) point out, migration familiarizes immi-
grants with different ways of performing a ritual or religiously defined act, 
and they become aware of outsiders’ (frequently critical) views of their 
performance. Socio-cultural changes, such as access to higher education 
in the new country of residence, increase the generational gap and, to 
some extent, contribute to the deconstruction of the authority of the older 
generation and to an individualization of religion.
Yet migration alone is not the only cause of the practice of distinguish-
ing between culture and religion. The current practice of marking this dis-
tinction needs to be understood in an ongoing, world-wide process of 
theological change. The idea of a Europeanized Islam that emphasizes an 
individualization of religion highlights that residence in Europe itself 
shapes the character of Islam, and as such demonstrates how an under-
standing of the performance of Islam needs to be socially contextualized. 
New religious aspects or developments are often considered a result of 
Islam’s entry into European societies. However, as Amir-Moazami and 
Salvatore (2003) have suggested, it underestimates both the particular dia-
sporic situation and the fact that the available space for reform and change 
must be approached from within Muslim traditions. Changing religious 
aspects are often appropriated within an intellectual and Muslim 
Reformist tradition, which for a century has dealt with the challenges of 
modernity by means of Islamic sources.
Following a socio-historical approach, Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 
consider the role of Islamic reform movements in the second part of the 
nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire. Then, as now, there were 
Muslim reformers active in the public sphere who critiqued local customs 
and called for a revivification of the sacred text. Prominent Muslim figures 
(such as Abdallah al-Nadim 1845–1896) targeted good Muslim women. 
Thus, considering youths’ attitude to Islam as a return to tradition, a re-
Islamification, or a coming out as Muslims (notably using a similar dis-
course as gay movements), or merely as a consequence of being a minority 
in Europe, fails to notice critical aspects of Islam as a discursive tradition. 
de-culturalized Islam or a de-traditionalized Islam risks presenting the youth’s practices as 
theologically or objectively more religiously proximate than those of their parents, and this 
value judgment is not the role of social scientists.
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20 Chapter 6 deals with these factors.
21 This can also partly explain why Berliner Muslim youth use some approaches that are 
similar to those used by Muslim women in Egypt (Ismail 2003), Turkey (Saktanber 2002), 
Indonesia (Brenner 1996), and France (Jouili 2009; Amir-Moazami 2007). Hermansen 
argues that “[i]nternationalist Muslim revivalist movements such as Jama’at Islami and the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimoun) have encouraged this concept of a ‘culture-
less’ Islam around the world” (Hermansen 2003, 309). He further notes that these organiza-
tions incorporate identity by insisting on being “Muslim and proud of it” (ibid.). Without 
specifically mentioning these organizations, in an interview with Mahmood, Asad (1996) 
suggests that the new Islamist movements place importance on proper bodily practices 
and aim for this behavior to be reintroduced in places where it has broken down and to be 
maintained anywhere it subsists.
Instead, the practice of the de-ethnicized Islam has to be situated within a 
longer process of the discursive Muslim tradition that is continuously sub-
ject to internal transformations (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003, 54). 
Islam as a discursive tradition is a mode of engagement with sacred texts 
(Asad 1986). The reform of tradition is a dynamic that must also account 
for the inherent search for a coherence of traditions (Asad 1999), which 
produces a drive to self-reform. Thus, the need to feel that there is continu-
ity in an internal logic of interventions within traditions must be taken 
seriously. However, the consequences this distinction has in Germany, and 
the effect the idea of a pure Islam has on the youths’ ethnic identification 
and their relation to their German identification, must be situated within 
the specific European migration context.20
In this context, MJD attendees are participants in similar processes to 
those taking place in different European societies and further across the 
world, and which have been called a revival of Islam.21 Such an orientation 
towards Islam resembles that of the objectification processes found in the 
religious imagination among Muslims in the Middle East in the 1990s 
(Eickelman 1992; 2000). The objectification of the religious imagination 
calls attention to the conscious process by which Muslims become aware 
of their identity as Muslims. In this process, the subjects ask themselves 
explicitly, “what is my religion? Why is it important to my life? and, How 
do my beliefs guide my conduct?” (Eickelman 1992, 643; 2000, 130). The 
process of objectification does not mean that religion becomes uniform or 
monolithic, even if that is how some religious actors subsequently per-
ceive it. Rather, these questions continue to shape the activities and dis-
courses of Muslims. Some try to legitimate their beliefs and practices by 
claiming to return to allegedly authentic established traditions (Eickelman 
1992). The so-called objectified consciousness is realized through a pro-
cess of modernization, where the expansion of literacy and education is a 
factor that supposedly decreases the need for young people to turn to 
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22 Yet, the practice of distinguishing between true or pure and false Islam reemphasizes 
the importance of religious authorities and authoritative sources for the youth. This is dis-
cussed in chapter 5.
23 Muslims believe that their life on earth is only a preparation for the eternal life, either 
in Paradise or in Hell, which they will enter on death.
religious authorities to make sense of their religion.22 How is objectifica-
tion of Islam, or de-ethnicized Islam, played out and formed within MJD?
Knowledge Formation in MJD
As young people familiarize themselves with the religious ideals of what 
is expected of a Good Muslim, and as they practice these ideals and cor-
rect their daily behavior, they consciously engage in the continuous craft-
ing of a religious Self. In order to cast light on the religious knowledge 
formation in this religious faith community, I investigate four focal points 
of MJD’s teachings: 1) learning to distinguish between culture and religion, 
2) highlighting the relationship between internal motivation and external 
motions, 3) practicing how to have the correct desires, and 4) focusing on 
Islamic character. McLaren (2002, 15), referring to Foucault, points out 
that the practices of the Self are always oriented towards specific goals: 
the desires that motivate specific subject formations. The motivation for 
participation in MJD is discussed in chapter 7. Here, it suffices to note that 
I suggest that one of the main goals behind the crafting of the religious 
subject in MJD is that youth try to please God, and to fulfill a desire to 
enter Paradise when they leave their lives in “this world.”23 While this 
chapter examines the formation of a Self in relation to certain religious 
discourses, chapter 5 deals more extensively with the negotiations, diver-
gences, and tensions that arise as youth relate to these discourses.
Distinguishing between Culture and Religion
Here, I examine the process or pedagogy through which the youth learn to 
mark a distinction between their parents’ ethnic culture and religion, and 
how the youth perform this distinction. The following excerpt from one of 
the weekly MJD newsletters, sent as a group email, illustrates the organiza-
tion’s general view:
MJD-Nasihamail: our principles regarding the reform of the Umma (Part 2)
Asalamu alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh,
Our principles regarding the reform of the Umma (part 2)
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24 Email received March 5, 2006. My translation.
25 Similarly, Hirschkind, who conducted ethnographic work in Egypt, found that sev-
eral of the people he studied were concerned “that people are crying during sermons for 
the wrong reasons” (Hirsckind 2001, 542).
Every reform needs principles. Values towards which the reformers orient 
themselves at all times. I would now like to pass on to you a small package of 
principles:
5. Principle
Most of us have grown up with two cultures. One, the German culture and 
the other the culture of our parents’ home. Sometimes there are traditions 
that are in conflict with Islam. Unfortunately, many of us then give prece-
dence to tradition. Thus, things like honor killings happen, which are publi-
cized through the media. We have to be aware that Islam is our primary 
culture. The culture of our parents is our secondary culture. When this one 
is in conflict with Islam, then it is obvious that we give Islam priority. We are 
not allowed to adhere to traditions like honor killings or traditions that con-
tribute to oppressing women, to preventing them from studying or working, 
because this is not consistent with Islam.24
This group email, which was sent to everyone who had signed up on the 
MJD homepage, emphasizes that Islam should prevail over any cultural 
norms. The differentiation between traditions that their parents adhere to 
and Islam as a pure religion is central to the email. This suggests that the 
youth and their parents represent two different epistemological traditions 
in defining what true Islamic knowledge is. In order for such a distinction 
to take place, people must know how to distinguish between religion and 
culture or tradition. This knowledge is not readily available to them 
through their parents, as the above text implies, because parents represent 
culture or tradition. Through talks, presentations, monthly seminars and 
leisure activities, the participants are told either directly or indirectly that 
there are right and wrong ways of performing religious activities and ritu-
als. For example:
At one meeting, Fadwa (23) emphasized that some, in particular older 
women, exaggerate their tears when praying during Ramadan or funerals, 
constituting more of a “performance” or “a competition” to show who is the 
most religious, or who was the closest to the dead. “This is tradition,” she 
argued, and not “correct religious behavior.”
Here, the division between right and wrong is touched upon within the 
broader framework of distinguishing between culture and religion.25 
Reflections such as those Fadwa makes here illustrate that a correct per-
formance is recognized through normative standards, against which 
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26 The youth made use of the words “wirkliche” (real) and “richtige” (right) Islam in 
German. Chapter 5 deals more extensively with how the youth legitimated their own and 
others’ activities as religious or not. MJD’s search for religious truth parallels similar pro-
cesses that new movements go through, as Alberoni (1984) discusses. In the birth phase of 
movements, groups are frequently apt to generate a unanimous view or model about the 
essential issues. The movements search for the truth, the unique truth, against old institu-
tions (Alberoni 1984).
flawed performances are distinguished and assessed. An act has to be 
explained “in terms of the conventions which make it meaningful as a par-
ticular kind of activity, one enacted for certain reasons and in accord with 
certain standards of excellence and understood as such by those who per-
form and respond to it” (Hirschkind 2001b, 633).
In MJD, efforts to perform a pure Islam were based on going back to the 
sources (Koran, hadith and Sunna), obtaining knowledge, and under-
standing the religious practices. It also meant reflecting on where knowl-
edge comes from in order to judge whether or not it was valid.26 I noticed 
that newcomers in particular asked questions that sometimes made the 
other members laugh. The kind of knowledge that many novices brought 
with them from home was often dismissed or corrected as a mixture of 
religious knowledge and cultural beliefs or as superstition originating in 
their parents’ village. In such discussions, the young women used a kind of 
religious logic when dismissing what they considered cultural practices, as 
in the following:
A newcomer, a German convert, said that her (Egyptian) husband had told 
her that she must wash before shaving her body. She thought that this was a 
bit strange and could not really understand why. When she asked the group 
whether it was true, the older participants replied, “why should you wash 
your hair before shaving it?” The newcomer explained her husband’s point 
of view: “Well, he says that it’s no good when you remove something that is 
not clean.” One of the long-term participants responded with a smile, “but 
we do that when we go to the toilet, for example.” The girls laughed.
Here, the young women reject the husband’s view by pointing to a specific 
line of reasoning. Rather than offering a yes/no answer, the discussion 
encourages a particular type of logic. Frequently, as in the above conversa-
tion, participants were asked to explain where they got their knowledge 
from and to explain their ideas. In the mosque or during events, the youth 
often asked each other, “where have you heard that from?” “Where does it 
say that?” “Is it an innovation?” This would be followed by discussions and 
even heated arguments about what the correct answer was. The youth 
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27 Nielsen has argued that the promotion of a universal Islam is a consequence of the 
ethnic and cultural heterogeneity of Muslims in Europe, as “it became necessary to identify 
those aspects of the way of life which were culturally relative and to categorise them apart 
from the central Islamic core which must remain absolute” (Nielsen 1992, 65). I find this 
argument too Eurocentric in that he only considers the impact of the European context on 
Muslim identity and ignores the internal dynamic of Islam as a discursive tradition.
28 Doing good deeds (al-amal al-saliha) secures God’s blessings and aids in the forma-
tion of virtuous dispositions (Mahmood 1998, 102–104). Again, the good deeds must be 
were rarely reserved or meek when it came to disputing someone else’s 
religious knowledge. For example:
One of the new participants said that she had heard that if you laugh during 
prayer, then the prayer is invalid. Somaya (17) responded, “yes, but try to 
remember where you have heard that from, ‘cause remember that hearing 
something is not the same as it being correct.”
When uncertainty or discussions of different opinions emerge, the orga-
nizer would stop the discussion, saying, “I will check that for next time,” or 
would ask the attendees to “check it” with an imam or in a book. The con-
tinuous religious authority of imams, even when none are officially linked 
to the organization, is revealing. The youth were encouraged to ask ques-
tions, to seek answers in books, on the Internet, and to participate in orga-
nized events. MJD also occasionally invited a young imam for a dedicated 
Question & Answer meeting in which the youth were invited to ask spe-
cific questions. The legitimacy of a certain practice generally depends on 
whether it can be traced to sources that address Islam in a universal way 
(Koran, the Sunna, and the commentaries of the ulama). Understanding 
their Islam as universalistic, the youth made reference to global authori-
ties, rather than to only Turkish or Arabic authoritative figures.27
Merging Internal Motivation and External Motions
Within this religious group, it was not considered sufficient for a person to 
merely perform a religious act externally, meaning that one’s body move-
ments and the conduct of the performance are correct. Even if one con-
ducts a religious act, such as prayer, in a physically or bodily accurate 
manner, these bodily movements had to be accompanied by the correct 
conscious or mental orientation. The youth often said that if someone per-
forms a good deed “just in order to tell others” and to demonstrate “how 
good they are,” this deed does not lead to good points (as a good deed for 
Allah) since such an act must be performed with the correct intentions.28 
The internal, one’s mind and thoughts, had to be included in the act in 
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performed with the right sincerity of intent (al ikhlas). Similarities can be found in 
Christianity. The passage in Matthew 6:1–6 reads: “Beware of practicing your piety before 
men in order to be seen by them; for then you will have no reward from your Father who is 
in heaven.”
29 This conversation did not take place during Ramadan. The youth occasionally fasted 
throughout the year as an act that gives good points, but also in order to fulfill their 
Ramadan as women have to break it during menstruation.
30 During Ramadan, there is a heightened attention to adherence to the right conduct. 
It is a situation in which Muslims should strengthen their ability to do right without being 
controlled by others (at-taqwa – fear of God), and exercise the virtue of patience (sabr), see 
www.islam.no/newsite/content, accessed May 3, 2007.
order for it to be judged a religiously moral act (also see Mahmood 2005). 
At one meeting, Fadwa (23) said:
“I was thinking that from next Monday on we should fast, but I don’t know if 
people are motivated?” One of the girls exclaimed, “if we know that twenty 
of us are fasting, should that not be motivating enough?” Fadwa agreed, and 
another young girl enthusiastically noted that “fasting is also slimming” as 
an incentive to fast. In response, Somaya (17) wrinkled her nose and empha-
sized that “dieting should not be a reason to fast.”29
A feeling of community can strengthen individual incentives to perform a 
religiously motivated act like fasting. Moreover, Somaya’s comment 
reflects the idea that the act of fasting is only religiously valid in so far as 
the person conducts the act with the correct motivations and virtues.30 In 
cultivating these dispositions, the young participants learned to differenti-
ate between performing practices that were motivated by religious experi-
ences or religious sentiments, compared to those motivated by secular, 
materialistic, traditional, or fashion sentiments. Not eating or drinking 
was not in itself seen as sufficient for the act to count as religiously valid. 
In their view, fasting is only religiously valid in so far as the person con-
ducts the act with pure motives. The youth frequently argued that whether 
or not someone has the correct motivations, “only Allah knows.”
The link between inner motivation and external performance was par-
ticularly emphasized with regard to the act of prayer. Presentations on the 
prayer referred to how the Prophet Muhammad sat during his prayer (i.e. 
how he placed his feet) as an ideal. Furthermore, the discussions stressed 
the importance of being concentrated when praying. Muslims must keep 
the right intentions in their hearts during prayer. During one MJD weekly 
meeting, the youth were impressed by a story of a companion of the 
Prophet who, while at war and when no anesthetic was left, asked the doc-
tor to operate on his foot while he prayed because he would be so concen-
trated on the prayer as to feel no pain. “I have goose bumps,” Hawa (22) 
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said after listening to the story, stroking her arm. Many of the young 
women were awed by the story, as it clearly exemplifies a unique internal 
orientation to God, and a standard towards which all Muslims should 
strive. Several youth complained about the difficulties they had in concen-
trating when praying. Hawa once remorsefully said that sometimes in the 
last prayer cycle, the thought “what should I cook afterwards?” suddenly 
enters her mind. She said: “It is so annoying! Then the whole prayer is not 
valid!” Later in the discussion, Hawa expressed admiration for Muslim 
converts because they tend, she argued, to perform the prayer with a fer-
vor and concentration that she envied.
Gender- and age-specific difficulties or tensions can emerge for a young 
person trying to fulfill the religious ideals. For example, Fatima (31) told 
me that after becoming a mother, she found it more difficult to really focus 
on her prayer when her child was crawling on the floor, since she was con-
stantly worried that something would happen to her daughter. This was a 
new situation that she had to work to master. Another younger woman, 
Naila (17), relayed the following story:
The previous year, Naila had gone to the “Finnowstrasse” (a mosque) during 
Ramadan to pray, “‘cause he [a man she had become interested in during 
another religious event] was going there. Even if I knew the whole time that 
it wasn’t right. Probably the prayers are not even valid.” She shook her head, 
obviously discontent with herself.
Here, Naila demonstrated that she was increasingly reflecting on her past 
religious practice. During the previous year, Naila had become aware of 
the importance of both internal motivation and external movements in 
the act of praying. Still, being a teenager in love can make this ideal diffi-
cult to reach. Naila reassessed her own behavior as not having a religious 
motivation: visiting a mosque in order to get a glimpse of a man she was in 
love with did not fulfill the internal motivation that would lead the prayer 
to be religiously correct. Her story also illustrates potential tensions 
between being young and in love, and being a religiously correct Muslim.
Generally, the difficulties over concentration during prayer were con-
sidered understandable, although an imperfection or weakness that the 
young people needed to work on. The youth made the following skit deal-
ing with this issue:
At one weekly meeting, Fadwa (23) wanted to show what Leila (21), Ismail 
(16), and her friends had learned at a religious seminar during the weekend. 
Fadwa partly tucked her long top into her pants. When some of the girls 
wanted to fix it, she said that, “it is supposed to be like that.” They dimmed 
the light and Fadwa and Ismail (the latter had loosened her headscarf) laid 
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31 The prayer consists of a specific number of prayer-cycles (rekâts), each of which con-
sists of a sequence of stations that include different movements of the body. In the third 
and fourth station of one rekât, the person praying goes down on their knees and the upper 
body is bent down so that the forehead and nose touch the ground (see Henkel 2005).
down on the floor, pretending to sleep. Then Leila started reciting quietly 
from the Koran in Arabic. She lighted a candle and put it on the floor. Leila 
woke Ismail up, and Ismail went to the window where she pretended to use 
a toothbrush and perfume, and pretended to perform wudu’. She put on her 
headscarf. When Ismail tried to wake Fadwa up, the latter was reluctant. She 
clearly did not want to get up, and only said, “I had such a nice dream.” 
Finally, Fadwa got up only as the other two had started to pray. Fadwa joined 
the two girls who were praying, and she stood very clumsily and imbalanced, 
half asleep with her clothes disheveled. She was wobbling, even leaning on 
the girl praying next to her, and was completely unfocused. When Leila and 
Ismail entered the prayer position where the practitioner goes down to their 
knees and bends the upper body down so that nose and forehead touch the 
ground, Fadwa even let out snoring sounds. Finally, when they sat up, Fadwa 
was tipping over on the two others so that all of them fell on the ground, 
ending the skit.31
In the course of the skit, most of the women, including a newcomer who 
initially looked bored, were laughing. The atmosphere was relaxed. During 
the skit, a cellphone with an American pop song could be heard. When the 
light was turned on again, Fadwa asked, “does anyone think they know what 
this was about?” Someone said an Arabic word, and Fadwa asked, “what 
would that be in German?” (…) “Does anyone know it in one German word?” 
A girl answered, “concentration.” “Yes,” Fadwa said, “we all recognize it. 
I have a brother who is very often tired. Or when you come home from 
school and are tired and want to eat and sit down and then, ‘Oh, no - I need 
to pray first.’ Or when you are in the middle of a movie and think, ‘oh, I will 
wait to the commercial break.’ I have done that sometimes. Then you are 
making the movie more important than the praying and that is not correct. 
You lose track of what is most important.” She continued by suggesting that 
the women dress well when praying. She said, “like, some of us are married 
and then you dress nicely for your husband and put on perfume.” Some of 
the married women protested, and Fadwa corrected herself, “okay, I will use 
another example. When we are invited to a party, we dress up nicely and put 
on perfume. Why should we not do the same for Allah when praying (in 
order to concentrate better)?” One of the younger girls said that she was not 
always sure of the importance of doing the prayer movements correctly 
since it is so dark, “I mean, he [Allah] cannot see it.” A few of the elders 
smiled a bit in despair, explaining that Allah can see all of them, always. 
Fadwa resumed, “when some of the girls wear a [G-string], I can see that, you 
know. And that is not dressing for Allah.” She said that when one of the sis-
ters is not dressed properly, or not according to the Koran, others should talk 
to her about it, although she added that this should of course be done “in a 
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32 In this sense, Michael Lambek’s argument about rituals can specifically be applied to 
the prayer, in that the prayer as a ritual “provides occasion for the unreserved assumption 
of responsibility and obligation in which agents, without distinction between the virtuous 
and the incontinent, acknowledge their agency and commit themselves to bearing respon-
sibility for their actions” (Lambek 2000, 317).
nice way so that she will not turn against you when you explain it. It is not 
for you, but for her. Sometimes it is just that she did not know and then it is 
good when you tell her.” Someone protested: “Of course she knows – every-
one knows what is right and not right in their heart.” Leila disagreed, “no, 
that is not true. Sometimes she would know and sometimes not.” (…) Ismail 
stated that, “every minute is for Allah. It says in the Koran that Allah does not 
need us to pray to him. It is for our own good.” Fadwa inserted, “sometimes 
you hear about it being difficult to pray at work, ‘cause there are no places 
provided for prayer and it is embarrassing to ask or to do it in front of others 
[non-Muslims]. Then you come home in the evening and have not prayed. Is 
it a good enough excuse?”
Many of the youth admitted that they did not pray diligently and often 
explained it by referring to the lack of prayer spaces, distractions, and the 
structuring of the day in Berlin. Praying instead of watching football or 
American blockbusters when returning tired from school could be diffi-
cult. Praying at school in the stairways where their schoolmates could see 
them could be embarrassing or uncomfortable. Fadwa proposed that such 
explanations were not acceptable reasons for not meeting religious 
requirements. Once they realized that praying should be done for its own 
sake, attendees should become motivated to perform the obligatory 
prayers. Whether practitioners pray together or alone, a fundamental fea-
ture of the prayer is that it produces and signals the dedication they have 
to a common moral framework, independently of social or ethnic differ-
ences (Henkel 2005). The prayer can serve as a way to order social practice 
in daily life, in which Muslims have to summon and perform their dedica-
tion to Islam (ibid.).32
Praying is both an individual and group-oriented practice. It is the duty 
of each individual to pray and to perform the external prayer movements 
with the necessary internal intentions. Simultaneously, the role of the 
faith community is highlighted: there is a sense of duty that each individ-
ual should correct peers and friends’ erroneous behavior, as it may be that 
they are unaware of their faults. Indeed, the youth often reminded each 
other to pray on time, and during social events the youth often performed 
the prayer together. Furthermore, more good points are gained when pray-
ing in a group, and collective prayer seemed to deepen the sisterly feelings 
among the youth.
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Practicing How to Desire Correctly
Youth need to deal with different and contesting wills and desires in their 
efforts to adopt a particular Islamic style and taste. In Islam, children 
are considered to be born without sin, but youth (for girls this is marked 
by the moment of their first menstruation) are fully accountable for 
their actions and will have to answer for their actions in their “next life.” 
The possible tension between being young and being religiously active 
was a particularly important reason for the creation of MJD. As Fatima (31) 
told me:
“One of the ideas behind MJD is to inform the young generation in Germany 
that it is possible to be ‘Muslim, German, and still cool.’” She argued that 
they should learn that “to be a Muslim is not something bad, but something 
beautiful.” She continued by noting that “young Muslims should not feel that 
they are stupid, but that they are normal and that faith can also be fun, with-
out segregating themselves from society.”
Here, Fatima suggests that adolescents feel the need to participate in MJD 
not only because they are outsiders in German society because they are 
Muslim, but also because being religious when young can make them feel 
odd in German society. She felt that being religiously active and young in 
a secular society is perceived as being boring or traditional. Additionally, 
temptations and distractions can cause young people to (momentarily or 
permanently) forget their main goal of entering Paradise in the afterlife. 
By practicing Islam in a group, the leaders try to provide the youth with 
emotional support and the motivation to live a religious life, including 
having the correct desires and a better understanding of who they are and 
where they are going.
Practicing to desire correctly is about obtaining a state of mind that 
desires to please God. This state of mind is not considered natural 
(Mahmood 2005), but must be produced and continuously strived towards. 
The youth need to craft themselves in ways that make them desire to try to 
reach these religious ideals. The will to become pious, virtuous, and obser-
vant can be strengthened in a religiously defined space. Older participants 
often contended that failure or lack of enthusiasm to meet their obliga-
tions was a consequence of “not loving God enough,” and that if they loved 
God as much as they should, acts like praying would be a source of joy. The 
creation of the virtuous Self takes place through the realization of why 
one should perform obligatory acts. It relies on equating the pleasing of 
God with benefiting one’s Self, and on generating emotional relationships 
with God.
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The desire to become correct or better Muslims was thus a part of how 
the Self was crafted in MJD. The effort to reach a state of religious proxim-
ity is illustrated by the youths’ exclamations like “I really try,” or “it’s so 
hard,” when talking about, for example, their level of concentration when 
praying. “Fighting the swine dog in oneself” is a commonly used phrase. 
This saying is also used by non-Muslim Germans and refers to having to 
overcome inner temptations or inner fiends that lead to temptation. In the 
Islamic social space, it is used to refer to the continuous struggle and ten-
sion between complying with religious obligations and wanting to engage 
in non-religious acts.
The realization that certain objects, artifacts, and activities are distrac-
tions was encouraged through the argument that these things kept 
participants away from what should be considered important in their 
daily life. Their social environment, including the presence of non- 
religiously active schoolmates, undeniably had a constant effect on the 
crafting of their religious Self. However, the proposed solution was not to 
segregate from the majority non-Muslim society, but rather to work on 
one’s Self—one’s desires and thoughts—through certain techniques of 
the Self that were learned, practiced, and corrected within the group. 
Here, the youth followed ideas similar to those of Aristotle, namely that 
morality must be practiced in order to become part of one’s character 
(Aristotle 1998 [350 bc]). In Aristotle’s view, morality is both achieved 
through and displayed by external behaviors. In the Nichomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle’s contends:
For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing 
them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre players by playing the 
lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate 
acts, brave by doing brave acts. (Ibid., 28–29)
Here, Aristotle presents what has been called “the learning-by-doing” the-
sis, which states that we get a virtuous character by doing the types of 
actions that are characteristic of virtuous people. Similarly, we obtain a 
skill or craft by doing the types of actions that are characteristic of profes-
sionals of that craft. Likewise, MJD encouraged young people to practice 
how to improve their character, in the process of which it was hoped that 
an internal motivation ultimately merged with the performance of exter-
nal motions.
Strategies about how to undermine or overcome certain desires that 
were considered Islamically incorrect can be demonstrated by the follow-
ing episode:
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33 The motto for this meeting was “Recharging batteries” (“Akku wird geladen”) with 
direct connotation to cellphone batteries.
34 The youth in Berlin frequently referred to the organization merely as “MJ,” hence the 
transcript of conversations will frequently make use of the acronym “MJ.”
MJD was holding an information meeting about the upcoming annual sum-
mer camp 2005 (in Bad Orb, Frankfurter Schullandheim Wegscheide) where 
more than 1,000 young Muslim young men and women would gather for a 
religious summer camp in southern Germany. Over three days, they take 
part in religious presentations, sports (football, table tennis, and volleyball), 
handicrafts, listen to music by famous “Muslim artists,” and attend work-
shops. During the camp, the youth would be called for the five prayers, after 
which they read together from the Koran, follow religious workshops and 
seminars with Q&As, and perform skits on the themes of the year’s camp, 
including “Carpe Diem,” “Recharging batteries,” “Why Muslim?” “Moments 
for Eternity,” and “Open your eyes.” During the camp, most youth read the 
Koran after the five daily prayers, pay attention to the way they dress, and 
focus on what are considered to be Islamically-oriented activities.
At the weekly MJD meeting in Berlin during which camp preparations were 
made, Fadwa (23) handed out yellow note pads on which everyone was 
asked to write down their expectations. She said, “just one thought, for 
example sisterly feelings.” Afterwards, the yellow notes on the cupboard 
read: “To be with other Muslims,” “to get to know new people,” “to have fun” 
[2 times], “to strengthen the iman [faith],” “set new goals,” “to meet a lot of 
sisters again,” “recharge batteries,”33 “give and receive,” “a wonderful time,” 
“sisterly feelings,” “to take along others who do not practice as much,” “to do 
my five prayers,” and “an Islamic atmosphere.” Fadwa told the girls that the 
camp was also meant to be an exchange. “Simply being with other sisters 
and seeing how they tie their headscarf will give you ideas,” she noted, con-
tinuing, “we are not only Turks, Arabs, and Palestinians and so on, from dif-
ferent cultures and languages. We are also all different. What brings us all 
together is Islam. The important thing is to give support and advice. I myself 
am not that good at giving advice.” She said that the previous year, some of 
the girls’ feelings had been hurt. There was a sister who thought that she had 
been in MJ for a long time, and was experienced, and therefore she felt able 
to give advice.34 “But,” Fadwa argued, “none of us have come far enough to be 
able to give advice to others about how they should behave. (…) For exam-
ple, last year, there was someone who used perfume, and a sister started to 
kind of sniff the air, and talk about it [negatively]. And also, to go to a sister 
and say ‘I am very fond of you’ and then kind of give advice to her is also not 
right. It’s wrong when it’s not coming naturally.” Leila suggested that perhaps 
it is possible to say, “I also have a problem with that and maybe we can try to 
improve that together.” Some agreed that this would be better. Fadwa carried 
on, “the MJ meeting is also a test for us. How do we get along with the other 
sisters, and how do we relate to them over a longer period of time. Here [in 
Berlin] we only meet once a week. And now we will be together over a longer 
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period, how will that be? And then it is also a place where there are both 
brothers and sisters at the same time. So take care of your clothing and 
make-up. A swimming pool has been rented, so bring your swimming suits. 
But not the bikini!” One of the girls exclaimed, “but I only have a bikini!” The 
other girls laughed, as it was obvious that she was joking. Fadwa persisted, 
“‘cause remember that it is also haram to show the other sisters from knees 
and up to the waist.” Fadwa suggested that they should set a personal goal to 
achieve before next year’s camp. They should tell their goal to other sisters, 
so that the others could “sort of see whether you have fulfilled your goal the 
following year.” She promoted the MJD camps as a place where they could 
test themselves by dressing in an Islamic [Muslimich] way. Fadwa said, “you 
have to bring long clothes with you. Last year some people were asked to put 
on longer clothes, ‘cause they were not covered properly. And they answered 
that they had not brought any with them. That is why I’m reminding you 
now to bring it with you. Last year there were complaints from the brothers 
that the sisters were not dressed properly. The brothers are also sinning 
when they look at you like that [just as the girls themselves are sinning] and 
do you want to be guilty of their receiving punishment? No! So, think about 
dressing properly. No clothes that are tight-fitting. (…) Last year there was a 
lot of competition between the sisters as to who was the most beautiful, and 
how one dressed. There was also a lot of talk about others behind their backs 
(…).” She asked: “Who will be going to the MJ Meeting for the first time?” As 
some young girls raised their hands, she told the others to take good care of 
these youngsters. Later Fadwa added that “the rules are also for the bus, we 
are travelling with the brothers, you know.”
During this discussion, MJD’s efforts to address youth, multi-culturalism 
and gender issues within a religious space are particularly apparent. In 
this example, young people are being prepared for their participation in a 
space in which stricter religious norms are to be followed than those they 
are used to in their daily life in Berlin. The summer camp becomes a space 
where they should practice being diligent in their prayers, dress and bodily 
comportment, and where they must interact correctly with their sisters 
and brothers in faith and have fun with peers who have similar desires. 
One of the focal aims of the various MJD camps appears to be to provide a 
space conducive to the creation of a religiously correct Self. For example, 
although it is not always successful, during the summer camp there is an 
effort to construct a gender-divided and religiously defined sphere, such 
as by housing women in one part of the camp and men in another part of 
the camp.
Fadwa’s comments recognize the importance attached to each individ-
ual person transforming her consciousness and desire to focus on religious 
obligations, like prayer and correct dress, with the aim of making these 
essential and indispensable parts of her everyday life (see Mahmood 1998). 
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Correct dress comportment, for example, is simultaneously an individual 
exercise and an exercise that situates the individual in relation to the reli-
gious group. Fadwa’s concern about the rules about how to dress is pre-
sented not only as an obligation on their religious Selves, but also as part 
of a responsibility for the men’s religious Selves. This double obligation 
puts more pressure on the women to look after their body and comport-
ment than the pressure put on their male counterparts. The space of the 
summer camp and the practices the youth are encouraged to follow also 
allow the individual believer to see their place within a larger community, 
and to adhere to religious rules that become the means by which they 
compare themselves to others and scrutinize themselves. In practice, con-
flicts did arise between the youth during the summer camp, such as when 
someone wanted to sleep while someone else wanted to play music.
The summer camp becomes a social arena and a religious space where 
the youth test their capacities for piousness, become accustomed to the 
ideals of piousness, share feelings of transcendence, and exert their will-
ingness to craft themselves as religious subjects within a larger group. It 
promotes an alternative source of socialization to that which they are 
Figure 10. Entrance to seminar tent at MJD summer camp. Women’s entrance on 
the left, men’s entrance on the right hand side. Photo: Synnøve Bendixsen
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35 Mahmood argues that agency is important among religiously oriented women in 
their efforts to become pious. A brief discussion of the already mentioned term “adab” can 
also shed further light on the weight the youth place on inner intention and outer physical 
comportment. While adab could be understood as referring to outer behavior, it should 
instead be understood as sources of and, at the same time, the results of, the inner Self. 
Metcalf suggests that adab, signifying discipline and training, may “‘mean’ correct outer 
behavior, but it is understood as both the cause of, and then, reciprocally, fruit of one’s 
inner self. Knowing, doing, and being are inescapably one” (Metcalf 1984, 10). Adab directs 
our attention to the fact that actions that appear beautiful can only be defined as such 
when they derive from a beautiful inner soul. As such, the qualities of adab have similari-
ties to Foucault’s “technologies of the self,” in which the comportment of the body mani-
fests and at the same time sustains the application of a particular disciplined mastery of 
oneself (Foucault 1995 [1977]; Rose 1996). It also has similarities to Aristotle’s description of 
the acquisition of virtue. This situates the continuous efforts the youth make to desire to 
obtain the religious ideals and comportment as a disciplining of the Self within the Islamic 
understanding of adab. As the women I worked with rarely made use of the term in their 
daily life or discussions, I do not draw extensively on adab as a term, and instead refer to a 
religious ideal or ethos.
exposed to at school and in daily life in Berlin. This, and similar events, 
represents an effort to create a religious space where behavior (clothing 
and comportment) is located outside their routine, mundane life. The 
summer camp is structured and limited in time and space, and situated 
outside of their everyday life. At the same time, the experience is made 
applicable to their daily life as the practice of piousness that is encouraged 
during the summer camp focuses on their internal intentions and charac-
ters. Furthermore, Fadwa’s suggestion to set personal (religious) goals that 
should be accomplished throughout the year ultimately situates the exer-
cises for the Self as independent of time and space. The summer camp 
becomes a space where the youth should, if not embody, then at least get 
accustomed to a religious lifestyle that should continue when they return 
to their daily life. Far from being the outcome of indoctrination, compli-
ance with religious rules involves, on the contrary, a vigilant crafting of 
the Self.35
Acquiring an Islamic Character
Tariq Ramadan, who is a religious authority for many European youth—in 
Germany and elsewhere—recalls the “Prophet’s call to seek for knowl-
edge” (Ramadan 2004, 148). According to Ramadan and other religious 
authorities, a Muslim should acquire knowledge so as to come closer to 
the truth. The older MJD participants often quoted the following hadith 
during the weekly meeting: “The pursuit of knowledge is obligatory upon 
every Muslim man and woman.” At the same time, they stressed that 
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36 I often heard references to this verse (13:11), which is also discussed by Tariq Ramadan. 
According to Ramadan, it means that individuals must start with themselves and endeavor 
to “reform their being” (Ramadan 2004, 148).
knowledge of Islam is not sufficient in itself. At one meeting, one of the 
longtime members, Sevda (25), said:
“MJD has two main aims; to improve knowledge and to be a community.” She 
stressed that knowledge of Islam is difficult to obtain and not useful when 
you are only sitting by yourself, reading and thinking. Many participants 
nodded when she added that “you need to get knowledge and improve your-
self within a community. Character is half of the faith.” And character, Sevda 
continued, needs to be developed and practiced within a group.
Here, Sevda argues that religious character needs to be practiced with 
similarly oriented others who can then also correct each other, so that 
their characters become more Islamic. The annual three-day MJD summer 
camp is one arena where an individual’s efforts to achieve a more Islamic 
character can evolve. Sevda’s comment also indicates that being a reli-
giously correct Muslim is a continual two-part process: faith and practice. 
Religiosity is not only related to whether one believes (has faith) in God or 
not, but also to the correct practice of the faith: that is, complying with the 
rules for what is haram and halal, and improving one’s Muslim character. 
The evaluation of moral character is based on the notion that what a 
human ought to be is delineated by Islam (Metcalf 1984, 2). Character, 
such as what kind of character is important as a Good Muslim and how to 
control one’s Nafs (soul, self, or ego), was a central topic in many presenta-
tions. The following excerpt from a weekly meeting can illustrate the dis-
cussions about character in Islam:
Leila (21) had made a PowerPoint presentation about “character,” which was 
projected onto the white wall. “Why is this important to talk about?” she 
asked, before answering by quoting a Koran verse in Arabic and providing 
the listeners with the German translation, “God does not change the condi-
tion of a people unless they themselves change that which is in their inner 
selves.”36 This, she said, means that you have to start with yourself before 
calling attention to the mistakes of others. Leila asked the others to name 
some character traits, which she then wrote on the whiteboard in either 
red or black, depending on whether it is positive or negative. Afterwards, 
the whiteboard read: “Egotistic,” “reliable,” “lovable,” “being punctual,” “mod-
esty,” and “honesty.” She turned around and asked, “is ‘shyness’ a bad or 
good character?” They decided to write it with both colors. Then the presen-
tation continued by her asking, “what is characteristic of a Muslim?” Some 
girls suggested “friendly,” “polite,” and “always with a smile.” Others added 
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37 This is a reference to the Koran. This part of the Koran deals with lies and liars, among 
other things.
38 My translation of the PowerPoint from the German original.
“honest,” “patient,” and “lovable.” Not everyone agreed on the latter and 
openly objected. A few continued by suggesting “correct,” “merciful,” “gener-
ous,” and “humble.” The girls started a discussion about “arrogance” and 
being arrogant. Hamida (17) thought that some Muslims were arrogant, 
which, she argued, “they should not be.” Rüya (21) said, “look, if we are arro-
gant about our belief and say that it is the best, then no one would want 
to become Muslim.” Ismail continued, “we should have these characteristics 
to show, not with words, but by being like that, and do du’a so that other 
people also would want to convert.” The attendees agreed. Today, Leila 
wanted to look at three characteristics in particular: being reliable, trustwor-
thy and punctual. She presented a PowerPoint slide that said:




People who have done you good [teachers are given as an example]
Your own community.
The German convert Aysel (20) interruped, saying: “Should not ‘yourself ’ 
also be there. That you are true to yourself?” Leila dismissed her: “No, ‘cause 
that is simple. If you are true to Allah, you are true to yourself.” She contin-
ued, asking the girls: “How can you be true to Allah?”
The next slide answered:
Very easy …;)
- to believe sincerely in Allah (Iman bihi)
- to be loyal to Allah (Ikhlas bihi)
-  to do what He demands of us, and to refrain from what He has forbidden 
us.
Or perhaps not so easy …
(9:75–77)37
To be truthful /faithful to the Prophet
She asked how they could be truthful to the Prophet, to which many girls 
responded: “To do the Sunna.” Leila clicked to the next slide:
- to learn and experience more of his life, how he handled everyday life
- to find out more about his character
- good character qualities & morals are timeless.38
Being a good Muslim is depicted not only as having a personal relation-
ship to Allah, but also as encompassing the youths’ daily relationships 
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39 Keeping a spiritual diary or a diary of conscience to note one’s faults is a tradition 
that has characterized Protestantism since the Reformation, and which was often used 
by Puritans in northern Europe and North America in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries (Gannett 1992). For the Greeks, as Foucault indicates, self-writing was an askêsis 
of truth and the notebooks (hupomnêmata) served as support for one’s ethical behavior 
through self-reflection, self-examination and self-regulation (use of pleasure and the 
care of the self) (McLaren 2002, 145–149). Foucault distinguishes these from the later 
Christian journals where the author tries to write the truth of himself and through this 
construct a narrative of the self. Whereas the Greek and the early Christian notebooks 
focused on the deeds of others, the Christian notebooks had a confessional character, 
focusing on the self (ibid.).
with Muslims and non-Muslims. In part, the exercise aims to help the par-
ticipants learn the correct forms of character, comportment, and social 
responsibility. It is interesting to note the suggestion the German convert 
Aysel made about being true to yourself as independent from any other 
references, such as God. We might ask whether this indicates a more indi-
vidualistic orientation towards the Self. In any case, Leila’s answer is strik-
ing for the indivisible relationship she drew between the ability to be true 
to God and true to one’s Self.
The focus on having the correct character traits, a topic that recurred 
frequently, can also be understood as an indirect consequence of the stig-
matized perception of Muslims in Germany. I suspect that the intense 
focus on external behavior, like smiling, or not looking sad in public, has to 
do with the general negative focus on Muslims. As indicated in chapter 3, 
many youth felt the need to improve the image of Islam in the West 
through their individual behavior. For some, this became a religious duty, 
resembling du’a. Through the verse that Ismail mentioned, “God does not 
change the condition of a people unless they themselves change that 
which is in their inner selves” (Sura number 13, verse 11), it can also become 
a religious duty to display the ideal character traits in order to change the 
negative stereotypes about Muslims among the non-Muslim population 
in Germany.
MJD also offered more technical suggestions about how a person should 
go about improving their character, such as the proposal that the youth 
write down faults that they find in themselves on a daily or weekly basis. 
The youth were thus encouraged to keep a diary of their negligence of 
religious obligations or erroneous performances.39 This critical examina-
tion of their actions, which puts the strategy of self-supervision (muhasa-
bat al-nafs) into practice (Mahmood 1998), resembles the exercise of 
self-writing that Foucault proposes as “a practice of the self that contrib-
utes to the self ’s active constitution” (McLaren 2002, 148). MJD attendees 
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40 As McLaren, in her work on Foucault, argues: “The process of individualization ties 
one to one’s identity through normalizing discourses. Individualization is one aspect of a 
larger problematic that Foucault calls a hermeneutic of the self. A hermeneutic of the self 
refers to the process of self-decipherment, that is, the obligation of individuals to examine 
their desires, thoughts, and actions” (McLaren 2002, 149).
also engaged in informal confessions, in that the youth were frequently 
either encouraged to or spontaneously admitted to flawed acts, such as 
being impatient with their younger brother or gossiping. These confes-
sions were made either to demonstrate the meanings of a presentation or 
to openly acknowledge their individual need for improvement.
Through the act of confession and writing exercises, the young Muslim 
woman is ambivalently positioned. She becomes a subject through the 
confession, and is simultaneously subjected by the dominant discourse 
that induces her to confess. What the youth write or confess is an individ-
ual process, requiring individual self-examination. However, the fact that 
they seem to feel that they need to confess is also an indication of a need 
to seek approval from a wider group. The process of crafting the religious 
Self, or that of becoming a good Muslim, has similarities to the process of 
becoming part of a movement. It also shows that the standards of behav-
ior against which they are trying to monitor themselves have an external 
source.
The youth realize their religious Self in this process, thus this act should 
not be considered passive or reactive (see Mahmood 2005), since it is only 
through conscious acts that the subject can realize herself as a religiously 
virtuous subject. Through the writing assignments or open confessions 
the youth participate in a more individualizing process, as they come to 
understand themselves to be the source of their action and thus respon-
sible actors in an existential sense. Self-writing plays a role in the “subject’s 
own active self-constitution” (McLaren 2002, 149). The practice of writing 
about oneself is a process of individualization.40 Yet such writing simulta-
neously situates the youth in relation to a specific shared discourse, which 
thus involves a process of collectivization. The youth realize the need for 
individual active engagement in order to craft themselves religiously, and 
through this process start to feel part of a larger whole. In the course of 
these practices, the youth go through a process of religiously oriented 
individualization, and at the same time they realize their religious Selves 
by responding to a normalizing discourse embedded in power structures. 
It is thus a process whereby the Self is becoming both individualized and 
collectivized, where the collective is both socially real (MJD) and abstract 
(the umma).
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41 This is particularly the case in Cesari (2002), Karakaşoğlu (2003b), Klinkhammer 
(2000), and Nökel (2002). 
42 Peter (2006a) points to how individualization has become a characteristic narrative 
in literature on Muslims in Europe. Drawing on Amir-Moazami and Salvatore’s work, he 
rejects the explanations that merely address individualization as a fragmentation of the 
structures of Islamic authority and that ignore the doxa in the Muslim tradition.
43 Roy (2004) contends that the individualization process must be understood in rela-
tion to Islam’s objectification, which he associates with the process of globalization. Islam 
and Muslim authorities have moved from the sphere of obviousness into an object of 
reflection. Both the Islamic Humanist and an Islamic neo-fundamentalist are character-
ized by an individualized rationale, through which religion is situated as a personal and 
individual affair. In contrast to Christian traditions, Roy argues, the individualizing tenden-
cies do not lead to the fragmentation of the religious rule. Rather, religious norms and idi-
oms maintain their stability (Roy 2004). Additionally, discussing the interpretation of 
da’wa as an individual obligation, Mahmood (2005, 62–64) contends that this illustrates 
the general tendency of an individualization of moral responsibility which is characteristic 
of modern Islam.
Importantly, this individualization is partly a consequence of how the 
youth actively craft themselves as religious subjects within a framework 
given by Islam (as a discursive tradition) as practiced within this group. 
Thus, the suggestions from scholars that Muslim youths’ emphasis on 
choosing Islam and the headscarf is indicative of their embrace of a mod-
ern, Western discourse where the fulfilled, autonomous subject is the 
choosing subject, needs to be reconsidered.41 The same goes for the sug-
gestion that the triumph of the individual logic is a result of situating 
Islam in a secular context, and the breakdown of ethnic communities 
(Cesari 2000). The individualization of Islamic practice, Cesari argues, is a 
consequence of the Muslim communities in Europe moving out of the 
“‘iron grip’ of authoritarian Muslim states on Islamic tradition” (Cesari 
2005b, 4). In contrast, I view the individualization of these youths’ reli-
gious Selves as a necessity in order to achieve a particular Islamic Self. In 
other words, within MJD a certain individualization must take place in 
order to become what is viewed as a Good Muslim within a religious dis-
course of practicing a pure Islam.42
The individualization of these youths’ religious identification is part of 
their efforts to fulfill specific ideals they take from within Muslim tradi-
tion. In short, the individualization of the Muslim subject must be situ-
ated within the religious discourse to which these subjects are exposed.43 
However, individualization goes hand in hand with a collectivization of 
the religious Self, in that religious practices and self-understanding 
must be situated and accepted within a faith community in order to be 
considered correct. The religious ideals and ideas are not individually cho-
sen or practiced unsystematically, but are learned, corrected, and defined 
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within a group. The individualized subject is situated within a larger set-
ting and in relation to specific religious authorities through the religiously 
defined ideals and to feelings of belonging to the group.
Submission to God
The religious ideals taught within MJD provide a complex, overarching 
recipe for the religious body. They encompass values, practices, behavior, 
thoughts, and bodily comportment, which together are designed to help 
the individual strive for religious proximity—in other words, become as 
close to the religious ideals as possible. How the crafting of the subject 
takes place within or in relation to this religious movement strongly 
resembles the Foucauldian technology of the self as a way to relate to the 
self “epistemologically (know yourself), despotically (master yourself) 
and in other ways (care for yourself)” (Rose 1996, 135). These techniques 
are exercised within the actual or imagined authority of a system of 
truth. Within the space of MJD, technologies of the Self were situated in 
particular technical practices, such as group discussions, emphasis on 
Figure 11. MJD Event with Ammar 114 in Berlin. Photo:  Synnøve Bendixsen
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44 I suspect that this also true for the young Muslim men in MJD, although I cannot 
confirm this empirically.
45 The religious ideals within the movement have similarities (and differences) to 
the pious ideal Mahmood (2005) finds in Egypt. Some of the similarities can be 
explained by these youth being part of an Islamic revival, belonging to an educated 
middle class that returns to the sources, and making references to some of the same 
authoritative figures.
understanding the texts, and assignments that included writing down 
what one needed to improve in oneself. Other practices included confess-
ing mistakes and setting goals together, like how to dress or to pray five 
times a day. MJD and the friendships formed among the members pro-
vided spaces where morality, self-reflection, and the desires of the indi-
vidual were given direction, encouragement, and reminders to follow that 
direction. These youth were focused on Islamic knowledge and on 
improving their (religious) behavior through technologies of ethical self-
perfection in a quest for self-realization. Participating in a forum where 
religious ideals were presented and practiced ultimately shaped the 
youths’ everyday practices, conduct, and the crafting of their Selves.44
As they continuously learned the religiously defined normative stan-
dards of what it meant to be a good Muslim, the youth evaluated their own 
behavior or actions in comparison with the ideal performances, and were 
also evaluated and measured by their peers and members of their faith 
community. These ideals, which the youth continued to try to achieve, 
were not neutral or haphazardly defined, but were legitimated through 
theology. They were taught and formulated through religious refer-
ences,  sources, and authorities. Specific religious authorities, the Koran, 
and particular religious books, provided the authoritative legitimation for 
the religious ideals. Normative expectations were also conveyed to the 
youth through judgmental gazes, utterings, and comparisons, and through 
giving particular women more authority in religious matters than others 
(see chapter 5). In this way, MJD represents an alternative moral commu-
nity, where participants learn how to craft the Self and the content 
thereof.45
Cultivation of a Religious State of Mind: Formation of the Unfree Subject?
The youth and their effort to craft religious Selves are positioned within 
existing power structures and within a discursive tradition. The youth 
attempt to situate their Selves in relation to specific religious and moral 
norms—ideals that impose strict rules, particularly in regard to women 
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46 I view all world religions as dominated by patriarchal structures (Sered 1998), 
although this does not mean that there is no scope of action for women and for women’s 
empowerment.
47 For example, in the leftwing newspaper Taz (March 26, 2008) the article “Islamic 
girls’ camp in the Eifel [a region] – Sisters amongst themselves” (‘Muslimisches 
Mädchencamp in der Eifel – Schwestern unter sich’) by Cigdem Akyol and the interview 
“Youth are indoctrinated” (‘Jugendliche werden indoktriniert’) by Ursula Spuler-
Stegemann, which discussed one of the annual MuMM (annual meeting only for girls), 
argued that the youth are being indoctrinated during this meeting. According to MJD, 
Spuler-Stegemann has not conducted any interviews with the participants. The article pro-
vides a simplistic presentation of the complex process of how Islamic knowledge is formed. 
MJD made a statement against these two articles that declares that Akyol, after MJD 
declined her request to participate at the meeting, registered under a false name. 
Apparently, her strange appearance drew the organizers’ attention and Akyol left the meet-
ing voluntarily after 30 minutes. See www.mj-net.de/node/2032#attachments, accessed 
December 12, 2008.
48 Chapter 7 discusses the motivations and incentives the young women have for par-
ticipating in MJD.
49 Norms are not either consolidated or subverted, but are “performed, inhabited, and 
experienced in a variety of ways” (Mahmood 2005, 22). Butler has pointed to how the undo-
ing of norms cannot take place outside of the actual doing of the very same norms. 
The possibility of agency dwells within a productive reiterability of the norms, “always 
and only opposed to power” (Butler 1997, 17). The limitation of Butler’s focus on agency 
is that she mainly considers agency to be acts that resignify or challenge norms (Mahmood 
2005, 20–22).
and women’s bodies and public comportment.46 To what extent does the 
process of crafting oneself serve to limit the women’s opportunities in the 
public sphere and contribute to the formation of an unfree subject?47 
Should we consider these practices forms of indoctrination or the result of 
a free choice? Do the women participate in practices that not only con-
struct them, but also limit their opportunities to act?
Mahmood contends that feminist theorists, in their exploration of how 
“women contribute to reproducing their own domination, and how … 
they resist or subvert it” (Mahmood 2005, 6), have naturalized their own 
views on agency as well as conceptualizations of freedom based on the 
Enlightenment. She argues that we have to recognize that it is a normative 
liberal assumption that women who actively participate in Muslim reli-
gious movements are acting against their own interests and agendas, an 
assumption that is constructed on the basis of particular liberal meanings 
given to the terms freedom, autonomy, and agency.48 Mahmood persua-
sively argues that agency can also involve acts that do not aim to subvert 
norms, but to fulfill them, such as the desire to follow religiously defined 
ideals.49
The different ways people relate to norms cannot be understood if we 
continue with a universal perception of desire. Rather, our understanding 
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50 In her work on reuniting the subject of anthropology with that of psychoanalysis, 
Moore (2007) correctly points to how anthropologists have failed to incorporate desire and 
the imaginary into an understanding of the making and transforming of the self. By focus-
ing on desire, she argues, we are made more aware of the motivations of the subject posi-
tions and become attentive to the discursive formations and hegemonic orders. Although 
I do not use her framework, I do incorporate desire in my discussion of the youths’ motiva-
tions to take up a religious subject position (see chapter 7).
of desire, as well as of agency, must be detached from progressive politics 
and must open up for different forms of desires, including a religious 
desire to submit to God in order to reach Paradise.50 We can better under-
stand the social actions and endeavors of these youth by recognizing their 
desire to craft their Selves to be Good Muslims, with all that includes. 
At the same time, as I argue in chapter 3, these religiously defined ideals 
can be felt to restrict movement, and in the process of adopting them, 
women risk turning into Woman as symbol. In such a space, Woman 
becomes a symbolic conflation of gender, sex, and sexuality, which in turn 
comprises ideology, metaphor, fantasy, and men’s psychological projec-
tions (Sered 1998). The question thus remains whether the consequences 
of these agentive acts are controlled by the intention of the actor: agentive 
acts can position the actor in a state of mind and space from which her 
future scope of action becomes limited or increasingly regulated. I return 
to this question in the concluding chapter.
In order to understand the practices of these youths, we need to ask 
what form of life they struggle to achieve, which sets of knowledge encour-
age these ideals, and which ethical valorizations they are linked to. I agree 
with Mahmood (2005) that we have to accept the possibility that the reli-
gious attendees have different goals, desires, and motivations than those 
liberal feminists consider liberating and true. Ultimately, reaching the 
ideal of a Good Muslim subject depends upon a certain self-reflection, 
knowledge of oneself and of religious sources, the ability to be in control 
of oneself, and to craft one’s desires and consciousness. The willingness to 
obey norms is essential to obtaining the youths’ goals, which frequently 
are to please God. In a similar way, Lambek (2002) asserts that:
…agents are always partly constructed through their acts – constituted 
through acts of acknowledgement, witnessing, engagement, commitment, 
refusal and consent. In assuming responsibility and rendering themselves 
subject to specific liturgical, political, and discursive regimes and orders, 
people simultaneously lay claim to and accept the terms through which 
their subsequent acts will be judged (Rappaport 1999). People are agents 
insofar as they choose to subject themselves, to perform and conform 
accordingly, to accept responsibility, and to acknowledge their commitment. 
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51 “[T]he act of entering a dissociated state is not itself a dissociated act” (Lambek 2002, 
37). The resemblance to Mahmood’s later and more complex and detailed analysis should 
be clear, although she makes no references to Lambek. Both Lambek (2002) and Mahmood 
(2005) draw extensively on Aristotle in their writing on women who tend to be considered 
to be in disadvantaged positions without scope for agency and who perform acts that are 
found strange within their social context.
Agency here transcends the idea of a lone, heroic individual ostensibly inde-
pendent of her acts and conscious of them as objects. (Lambek 2002, 37–38)
The techniques of the Self that the Muslim women learn and practice in 
Berlin, and which appear to liberal feminists to be a subversion of the 
women’s own interests and agendas, are agentive acts. It is true that these 
acts do not oppose the religious strictures or the governing modes of 
power, in contrast to the acts that liberal feminists have naturalized as the 
form of agency scholars should look for. Nevertheless, following a religious 
ideal where the goal is to submit oneself to God should not in itself be seen 
as oppressive or as signaling a lack of freedom or agency. To paraphrase 
Lambek (2002, 37): the act of entering a submissive state is not itself a 
submissive act.51 On the contrary, if the ability to submit oneself to reli-
gious rules is considered part of crafting oneself as a pious or good Muslim, 
then following the path of becoming such a subject can be considered 
agentive. Becoming a Muslim subject includes the ability to submit one-
self to God and to follow religiously defined obligations and moral prac-
tices. This is the condition for acting as Good Muslim and reaching 
religious proximity within this religious social field. Striving to conform to 
the religiously defined ideals is a matter of personal effort, meeting chal-
lenges and performing acts that involve agency. The means through which 
the successful crafting of a religious Self in Berlin takes place are not real-
izable through being or becoming an unfree, indoctrinated, or passive 
subject.
I would like to push our understanding of how the youth are crafting 
the religious Self in a direction that includes the creative and negotiative 
processes that form part of their everyday life. To understand the process 
of crafting the religious subject in interaction with Islamic ideals, norms, 
and values, we also have to look at the tensions that arise when the youth 
try to enact them in Berlin. Tensions may arise when the youth encounter 
incompatibilities or conflicting demands, desires and expectations, for 
example between the religiously defined traditions and desires that are 
not related to religion (such as wanting something badly that they know is 
not Islamically correct). The individual is not only “contingently made 
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possible by the discursive logic of the ethical traditions she enacts,” as 
Mahmood (2005, 32) notes. I argue that this is only one part of the process 
of crafting the Self—although an important part. The crafting of the Self 
also takes place in the recognition of oneself as part of a group, where an 
individual measures herself and is measured in relation to others. It also 
takes place in the individual’s interaction with norms, desires, and ideals 
that are not situated within the Islamic religious traditions.
During my fieldwork, I became aware that although the young women 
were familiar with ideals, and often made an effort to follow these, they 
did not necessarily succeed. Tensions arose in situations where the youth 
were not motivated, willing, or even able to follow the ideals. Crafting the 
Self is a more creative, interactive process than being summoned and 
actively striving to follow one single discursive logic or ethical tradition. 
How the youth solve these tensions and simultaneously are found to be 
truthful religious subjects (by themselves and socially relevant others) is a 
creative process to which I turn in the next chapter.
1 This celebration marks the arrival of a newborn child.
CHAPTER FIVE
TRAJECTORIES OF RELIGIOUS ACTS AND DESIRES: BARGAINING 
WITH RELIGIOUS NORMS AND IDEALS
Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our 
bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare 
us their morality when we write.
–Foucault 2006 [1969], 19
I am walking in Kreuzberg on a cold October afternoon, searching for VICUM 
hall, a popular, Turkish-owned venue for weddings and religious events. 
Today, MJD and other German-speaking Muslim organizations such as 
DMK, are organizing a large Aquiqua celebration.1 Finally, I see the “VICUM” 
neon sign on a tall brick building, and several men standing outside chat-
ting. As I enter, I pass the many baby carriers in the entrance, and go up the 
stairs noticing women and children walking up in front of me. A young boy, 
perhaps around ten years old, asks if he can help me find what I am looking 
for. When I tell him: “I’m fine, thank you,” he insists: “Who are you looking 
for?” Since I am not really looking for anyone in particular, I shrug my head 
and say, “Noreen,” after which he leaves me alone. Maybe I simply looked 
lost, but my sense is that he perceived me to be in the wrong place, as I am 
not wearing a headscarf and clearly have no discernible Arab or Turkish 
background.
I leave my shoes by the entrance before entering the first room filled with 
men. In the right hand corner, there are several prayer rugs on the floor and 
a few men are praying. There are more than 400 people in the large main 
room, where the space is divided along gendered lines: the men on the right, 
and the women and children on the left. I later notice that when the com-
mon prayer is performed, the division of the room makes it possible for the 
women to pray behind the men. Not everyone wears the headscarf, and I also 
see some I believe to be ethnic Germans sitting at a table, wearing jeans and 
waist-long sweaters. In the main room, Noreen (16) greets me, asking: “Did 
you hear my father speak?” I tell her that I am sorry to have missed him, as 
I had difficulties finding the place. “Is there a program?” a girl asks. Some of 
the other girls complain about poor organization: “It’s all a bit confusing!”
I am told that they are celebrating nine newborns. Sevda (25) explains that 
they have to slaughter two sheep for each boy and one for each girl. Today, 
fourteen sheep were slaughtered. “So much was thrown away, haram!” Sevda 
tells me. “But we didn’t have enough time to give it away. Afterwards so much 
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2 The German word Unterlage means both “documents” and something to sleep on.
3 Eid ul-Fitr is the celebration of the breaking of the fasting period, also called the sugar 
celebration (Zuckerfest) by Turkish migrants in Germany.
was thrown away!” She looks annoyed at the thought. Janna (19) is walking 
around, serving the food. I try to help her, but quickly give up as I find it 
confusing and am anxious about making a mistake. We are busy eating mut-
ton and rice with raisins, when one of the girls exclaims, “hey, there are 
insects in the food!” It turns out to be just a spice. A few of the young girls 
wrinkle their noses, they are not that happy with the food. “I don’t like the 
food,” Sevda exclaims. “They always make Pakistani food at these events. 
I don’t know why.” Reflecting further, she continues, “why do Egyptians and 
Turks make Pakistani food? They must have had it made by someone else.” 
Afterwards, I stand in a group of four young girls telling jokes. “What does a 
blonde say after sex?” one asks, pausing before delivering the punch line, “do 
you all play on the same football team?” Naila (17) tells the next joke. “Why is 
a blonde standing at a bus stop with a mattress? She is going to an interview 
and they asked her to bring her ‘supporting layer’ (Unterlage).”2 One of the 
girls laughs audibly and is quickly hushed by the others, who are constantly 
looking around to see if anyone is approaching. “Wait!” is uttered through 
the group every time an older woman comes within earshot. Another girl, 
Saad (16), joins us and Rezan (18) asks Naila to repeat the joke. Naila is reluc-
tant. “I don’t know her, whether she will like that sort of joke.” Rezan insists, 
“No, she is like us, tell her!” After Naila has told the joke, Saad does not laugh 
and it is clear that she disapproves. Naila turns to Rezan, embarrassed and 
worried, “Now you see, she doesn’t like it! Now what is she going to think of 
me?” The group stops telling jokes and chats about other subjects instead. 
I walk over to Noreen who tells me that she is not coming to DMK the next 
day (Friday) because her parents have invited the entire family in their 
home. Aishegül (31), joining the conversations, says that her whole family is 
also gathering. She explains that she has a large family in Berlin, but having 
them nearby is not always a good thing. She often disagrees with her family 
members, and it is stressful to have everyone in such close proximity. During 
the sugar-celebration (Eid ul-Fitr), Aishegül continues, all the men walk 
from home to home.3 The tradition is for the men to visit everyone in the 
course of the evening, so they only stay in each home for fifteen to twenty 
minutes. The women, meanwhile, organize the food and drinks. Since MJD 
started to celebrate Eid ul-Fitr together, Aishegül does not celebrate it at 
home any more, since she “doesn’t like the Turkish tradition.”
Turning to the table filled with gifts, Noreen shows me that the floor under 
the table is also covered with wrapped presents. Usually people give money, 
she explains, “like, it is tradition to put money in the baby carriage. But now 
we have, like, become modern, and so we give presents - some people like to 
buy something which they can then see on the baby afterwards.” Slowly, 
people leave the venue to pray in another mosque. Janna wonders whether 
to stay or go to the mosque for the prayer. In the end, she decides to stay 
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4 Knowing a rule is to implicitly recognize what one is expected to do in specific situa-
tions; rules are broadly used and sanctioned (Giddens 1984).
since it is cozy now that many have left. A man calls for prayer (adhan) and 
some hurry to the toilets to do wudu’. The prayer starts, the women find their 
places, and the children are left with the women who are not praying or to 
run around. When the event is finished, a young woman complains that 
people were talking too loudly while they were praying. Passing the room in 
front of the main room, we notice that it is filled with cigarette smoke and 
someone is drinking alcohol. A girl comments, “it’s like a bar here.” On my 
arrival, I had noticed that many men in the bar were smoking, which had 
also surprised me. It turns out that a “Turkish” wedding is taking place in the 
room next door. There are many people and cigarette smoke is drifting in 
from the other room. Sevda remarks, “not a lot of people though (given that 
it is a Turkish wedding).” Sevda’s sister (14) adds, “hmm, what a marriage 
celebration. (…) I would never marry like that!”
As this event illustrates, the youth experience religious meetings and 
happenings very differently. During this particular event, some found it 
chaotic or were bored, some spent their time talking to family or friends, 
and others helped organize it. For Aishegül, it represented a space that 
was more religiously correct than the performance of the celebration held 
by her own family in Berlin. For Razan and Naila, it was a place to perform 
religious practice, but also to have fun. It was the first time I became aware 
that youth make great efforts to keep their incorrect behavior hidden from 
view. Good young Muslim women are not supposed to tell sexual jokes 
during religious events, yet this still occurs. The group of youth tried to 
hide their jokes from members of their faith community, knowing that 
most guests would find it inappropriate, an assumption that was con-
firmed by Saad’s obvious disapproval of the joke.
This episode illustrates at least two sets of issues: first, as partly dis-
cussed in chapter 3, youth sometimes tried to hide actions they believed to 
be religiously “incorrect” within a social space that imposes particular 
expectations on their behavior. Indeed, nurturing and learning religious 
norms includes realizing what is not right, and brings a set of obligations 
along with it.4 Following Bourdieu (1990), the entry into a social field 
brings with it a tacit recognition of the rules of the game, which means the 
legitimation of certain forms of struggle and the exclusion of others. 
Second, the youth did not conform consistently or blindly to the ideals 
given to them. The crafting of the religious subject or Self is not a linear or 
homogeneous process within a group. The problem is not a lack of knowl-
edge about the correct standards of behavior, but rather the inability to 
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live up to these standards in practice. The youth cultivated a variety of 
desires and aspirations that were not only guided by Islam. They had to 
relate to a range of rhetoric and ideas about right and wrong, which some-
times produced tensions between different expectations and yearnings. 
In daily life, the youth related not only to the religious ideals and desires, 
but also to secular ideals from their school and peers, or to cultural ideas 
from their parents and their ethnic social field. This endeavor, namely the 
effort to mediate between religious obligations or expectations and non-
religious yearnings that diverge from them, has frequently been perceived 
as youth picking and choosing the parts of Islam that best suits them and 
their social context (see introduction). Such perceptions of Muslim 
youths’ religious identity, I argue, neglect the complex epistemological 
underpinning of the youths’ decisions about which norms to adhere to 
and which to reject and at what time and place.
My aim in this chapter is to illustrate how crafting a religious Self takes 
place in negotiation with a variety of desires and through individual cre-
ativity. As discussed in chapter 4, the religious doctrines and norms com-
prise discursive structures that the youth are expected to adopt and 
embody. The contexts and structures of communication establish obliga-
tions and rights regarding what youth should do as particular religious 
subjects. However, as Cohen recognizes, “they do not determine substan-
tively what he or she will do within these limits” (Cohen 1994, 50). The 
youths’ actions and practices do not merely repeat pre-determined cul-
tural conditions. We cannot understand how these young people are craft-
ing a religious Self merely by looking at pre-established religious doctrines 
and norms. Rather, the religious rules provide a mindset and knowledge in 
the relation to which the individual then takes action. In the process of 
acting out these rules and norms, they are also given meaning and direc-
tion. Consequently, in order to understand the crafting of the subject, it is 
not sufficient to look at established ideals, or to assume that youth respond 
to the religious framework as individual selective consumers or as random 
and increasingly secularized actors.
As an anthropologist, I am interested in the way social actors relate to 
and experience religious doctrines and theology in different social con-
texts. This chapter looks at the ways in which youth deal with how their 
conduct is measured and judged within their religious social field. I want 
to draw attention to how the young women understand and negotiate 
moral standards and how they deal with the impossibility of fulfilling 
these ideals. What is the scope available to them for forming, styling, and 
negotiating a religious Self within their religious social field? How are 
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5 Researching Muslim youth in Germany, Lale Yalçin-Heckmann (1998, 171) found that 
whereas a significant number of youth valued Islamic teaching for the sake of the knowl-
edge that is transmitted, many considered the knowledge as a precondition for belief and 
essential in their life. Others relied upon it to position themselves within the social world, 
as it was important for the individual’s identity within the ethnic community. I did not find 
the latter to apply within this group of Muslim youth where religious knowledge to a large 
extent become a way out of the ethnic social field and stigma attached to the ethnic group 
(see chapter 6). The difference may relate to the fact that I focus on youth who participate 
these youth expressing agency in both reproducing and negotiating Islam 
in their daily life? How can young women pursue personal desires that fall 
outside or are in contradiction with religious doctrine without at the same 
time feeling that they are failing in their efforts at becoming Good 
Muslims?
First, I discuss what I mean by religious trajectories in this context and 
in relation to Islam as a discursive tradition. Second, I trace different tra-
jectories of religious acts, behaviors, and desires in order to demonstrate 
that even if the performance of religious ideals is not a homogeneous or 
uniform process, youth nevertheless do not relate to Islamic norms ran-
domly. Improving one’s behavior and gaining more knowledge is part of 
the effort of constructing oneself as a particular religious subject.5 The 
actions that are thinkable within a social field are relatively unpredictable, 
and a potentially infinite number of patterns of behavior, thoughts, and 
expressions are possible, but at the same time their diversity is limited. 
What is at stake here is understanding the creativity involved in the craft-
ing of the religious Self, without losing sight of the existing strictures that 
the youth continuously relate to. Overall, I argue that the behavior or 
desires of an individual need to be situated within a particular religious 
rhetoric or structure of knowledge in order to be accepted—by the youth 
and their faith community—as a religious performance, desire, or 
behavior.
Defining Religious Agency
Situating Social Behavior in a Discursive Tradition
As discussed in the introductory chapter, this book uses Asad’s concept of 
Islam as a discursive tradition. Conceiving of Islam as a discursive tradi-
tion includes acknowledging that the performance of Islam is not static or 
standardized across time and space, without at the same time dismissing 
the idea of a singular Islam. What is considered correct and incorrect 
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in a multicultural religious organization. Most participants view knowledge of Islam as a 
way to change their behavior and conduct, such as learning to control one’s Nafs (ego).
6 The statements that can be made are part of a changing and dynamic, yet conditional 
multiplicity (Barad 2003, 813).
7 Thus, I do not believe we should talk of several Islams as Khosrokhavar (1997, 23) 
argues or to get rid of the analytical category Islam altogether, as el-Zein (1977) suggests.
Islamic practices and knowledge is frequently a topic of discussion among 
individuals, between religious authorities, and between Islamic organiza-
tions and faith communities. Orthodoxy, “a distinctive relationship – a 
relationship of power” (Asad 1986, 15), exists “[w]herever Muslims have 
the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to 
condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones” (ibid.). Asad 
emphasizes that the orthodoxy of an activity or belief may be a topic of 
discussion. As such, orthodoxy is an effect of power struggles and may be 
continuously subject to reinterpretations and modifications.
The similarity of Asad’s perception of orthodoxy and Foucault’s idea of 
discursive practice is worth noting. Discourse, according to Foucault (1980, 
2006 [1969]), enables and limits what can be said. Whether speech is 
considered legible or not is marked by discursive practices.6 Discursive 
practices, Foucault argues, are the localized socio-historical material 
conditions through which speech acts (i.e. writing, speaking, thinking, 
scheming, measuring, and concentrating) are both made feasible and 
constrained. These localized socio-historical material conditions are not 
transcendental or phenomenological, ahistorical conditions, but are his-
torically situated. “Subjects” and “objects” of knowledge are produced by 
discursive practices, and discursive practices also determine which narra-
tions are recognized as meaningful. The possibilities for meaningful state-
ments are not static, but form a dynamic and contingent multiplicity 
(Barad 2003, 819).
Positioning Behavior as Religious
The religious discourse taught within the space of the youths’ faith com-
munity shapes what is considered possible, correct, or legitimate among 
the adolescents. A religious discourse is not static or singular, but is sub-
ject to contestations. However, although the religious discourse is dynamic 
and situated in a socio-historical process, its legitimating force in the pres-
ent depends upon how an individual conceptualizes the current practice 
in the context of the past (when its purpose and form was instituted) and 
the future (how and why the purpose of a practice should be maintained 
or modified) (Asad 1986).7 In the process of crafting a Self, these young 
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people do not merely conform to or replicate religious discursive prac-
tices. In their daily life, youth partake in different social fields and embrace 
different desires and aspirations. Second-generation migrants act in the 
German society through kindergarten, school, and work, where they often 
develop better socio-cultural competence than their parents. This cultural 
competence involves having access to more than one set of values, codes 
of conduct, languages, and knowledges. In other words, their subject posi-
tions are informed by multiple ways of relating to the Self. These discur-
sive legacies include religious and secular modes of subjectivity. 
Consequently, youth have to relate to incompatible discourses or different 
modes of subjectification on an everyday basis. Abu-Lughod (1986) simi-
larly recognizes that there are always several, often incompatible, dis-
courses at play. At the same time, she argues against the notion of one 
dominant ideology that sets limits to the “thinkable and the unthinkable” 
(Abu-Lughod 1986, 256). Although I share her skepticism of the totalizing 
power of discourse, I argue that people tend to position their accounts or 
actions vis-à-vis the dominant discourse of the social field within which 
they are seeking to situate themselves.
The youths’ behavior is also inconsistent, inasmuch as it does not cor-
respond to apt performances as determined by orthodoxy (Asad 1986, 15). 
I found that to deal with tensions that arise between religious ideals, on 
the one hand, and improper or irreligious behavior or feelings of inade-
quacy on the other, youth legitimate their behavior by relying on certain 
modes of argumentation. By investigating how religious action is explained 
and justified, we can better understand how religiously defined acts and 
behaviors are creative, while simultaneously being shaped by orthodoxy.
As I will show, in order to legitimate their actions, youth are prepared to 
explain why they make certain choices (concerning clothing, food or body 
comportment). I understand the youths’ practice of explaining and justi-
fying their actions as an effort to present themselves as particular religious 
subjects, both to socially relevant others (such as members of the group) 
and in relation to their own Selves. Within the religious social field, most 
wish to be considered (by themselves and socially relevant others) as 
Good Muslims, generally defined by the extent to which they either con-
form to or diverge from the rules of orthodoxy. The following story illus-
trates the internal struggle to desire to act in concurrence with norms and 
the reality of lived behavior:
At a gender-divided wedding the women and girls were dancing, some with-
out their headscarves and wearing short-sleeved tops. Suddenly, women put 
on their headscarves as the groom and his male family members announced 
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their entrance to the female section of the wedding. I was with a group of 
youth who already had their headscarves on and we continued to dance. 
Noticing that no one else was dancing, Janna (19) suddenly took the hands of 
her younger sister Noor (16), her friend Alesha (15), and me, stopping our 
dance. She was upset, saying, “I told you we shouldn’t have danced. It is 
haram!” I asked, “what do you mean?” Janna explained, “we shouldn’t dance 
when the men are here, like move our hips like that, it is [not good]. Some 
women were looking at us, and are now saying ‘that family’… like, as if every-
one from our family are like that.”
Janna was upset both because she felt that she was doing something 
religiously wrong and because of the unwanted attention others paid to 
our haram behavior. When Janna stopped our dancing, her argument 
combined religious references to haram and halal, as well as concern 
regarding what socially relevant others would think of her and her family. 
Her last comment points towards the importance of avoiding a negative 
reputation within the religious and ethnic social sphere, as discussed in 
chapter 3. Here, correct appearance in the public becomes important to 
protect both her own reputation as well as that of her family.
Another episode that I first found puzzling entailed a short encounter 
on the street with a German convert, Nadia (32), during Ramadan:
As I walked towards Nadia on the street, I saw that she was trying to hide that 
she was eating, which I commented on. She explained that since it was not 
yet iftar (the breaking of the fast for that day) she concealed her eating. In 
her words, “because otherwise the older men look so funny at me,” even 
though she was menstruating and thus religiously exempt from fasting.
Although this might be a strategy to hide that she is menstruating, my 
impression is that Nadia’s main concern was to avoid socially relevant oth-
ers believing that she was acting in a religiously incorrect manner. This 
tactic (see chapter 3) exemplifies the felt necessity of situating one’s 
actions in relation to correct religious behavior. When the religious sub-
ject is acting within a religious social field where she or he is being 
measured by socially relevant others vis-à-vis certain standards defined 
by both normative and explicit rules, the subject struggles with both 
performing and becoming a “correct” Muslim. Through these different 
heterogeneous processes and practices, the youth start to relate to each 
other and to themselves as particular kinds of subjects.
The Religious Subject
Crafting the Self religiously is about being a Good Muslim. Yet the craft-
ing of the Self takes place within social fields, and involves a continuous 
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8 Jenkins evokes the complex interlinkages between the individual’s self-image and the 
external perception of her or himself: “That particular identity […] is always a to-ing and 
fro-ing of how the individual sees herself and how others see her. These represent opposite 
ends of a continuum, one her self-image, the other her public image. Each is constructed 
in terms of the other and in terms of the individual’s perceived similarity or difference to 
others. The difference is who is doing the perceiving, who is doing the constructing. This is 
the internal-external dialectic of individual identification” (Jenkins 1996, 52).
9 Religious agency, following Leming is “a personal and collective claiming and enact-
ing of dynamic religious identity. As religious identity, it may include, but is not limited to, 
a received or an acquired identity, whether passed on by family, religious group, or other 
social entity such as an educational community, or actively sought. To constitute religious 
agency, this identity is claimed and lived as one’s own, with an insistence on active owner-
ship” (Leming 2007, 74).
negotiation between how the individual understands herself, how she 
wants others to see her, and how others react to her in social interactions. 
Subjects do not make themselves on their own. Subjects seek to be known 
and recognized, but always through others (Jenkins 1996), which is why 
the youths’ religious actions cannot be chosen or performed at random.8
The youths’ desire to craft themselves as correct religious subjects 
must be understood in relation to personal religious motivations (see 
chapter 7). Yet as social actors, many of these youth were also concerned 
with how they were perceived by their social surroundings, in particular 
by members of their faith community. Participating in a faith community 
brings with it both security, in terms of group belonging, as well as obliga-
tions regarding one’s religious behavior.
In the process of crafting a religious Self, the interpretation of the Koran 
provides guidelines for action or a moral compass for the youth in their 
daily life. The ultimate aspiration is to completely master the Self by 
acquiring a state of being which stays on the “straight path,” meaning that 
one pursues the norms, values, and morals provided by Islam in all aspects 
of life. I see the youths’ behavior and desires as having to be situated in 
relation to a specific religious discourse in order to be considered (by her-
self and socially relevant others) as a particular religious subject and as 
someone knowledgeable about Islam.
Although the youth situated their actions in relation to the religious 
discourse taught in MJD, this should not lead us to imagine a homogenous 
performance of religious norms and ideals. Rather, acts that are 
considered religiously correct or apt may take a variety of forms.9 An act, 
desire, and behavior viewed or defined as religious is not situated in a vac-
uum, but is performed within a particular socio-historical context. Here, 
I investigate how the youth tried to situate their choices and acts as 
performance(s). I suggest that the available acts and performances that 
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10 Asad contends that “even where traditional practices appear to the anthropologists 
to be imitative of what has gone before, it will be the practitioners’ conceptions of what is 
apt performance, and of how the past is related to present practices, that will be crucial for 
tradition, not the apparent repetition of an old form” (Asad 1986, 15). My aim here is to 
make use of ethnographic material in order to examine how Asad’s mainly theoretical 
argument works in the everyday life of Muslims.
I view as apt religious performances should be understood as religious tra-
jectories. I make use of the concept of religious trajectories in order to 
illustrate how individuals shape and fashion the structures they deal with 
in society, including the religious ones, and to indicate that their behavior 
and acts are simultaneously formed by these structures. This is important 
in view of the one-dimensional perception which assumes that youths’ 
relationship to Islam has become individualized, and thus detached from 
religious communities and authorities. In contrast, I identify the processes 
through which a variety of religious performances are produced by point-
ing to the interaction between what is taught within the religious field, 
expectations from the group, and the subject’s own multiple and contest-
ing desires. By looking at available religious trajectories, I argue that youth 
create a variety and plurality of contingent subject positions in relation to 
these multiple discourses.
Not all actions or utterances made by a Muslim can be situated within 
an Islamic discursive tradition.10 In order to be a Good Muslim in everyday 
life, it is important to be able to make the distinction between the acts and 
utterances that can be legitimated as Islamic, and those that cannot. In 
the everyday life of Muslims, the effort to be a Good Muslim who follows 
Islam (as a discursive tradition) is also about acquiring a skill. I see reli-
gious trajectories as encompassing a variety of social acts that are made 
acceptable as religious acts or practices within a religious social field. 
Thus, I am concerned with behaviors that strictly speaking seem to not 
completely fulfill or reproduce the religiously defined norms, but the per-
formance of which are nevertheless made acceptable, or at least tolerable, 
as religious acts.
Trajectories of Religious Acts
Focusing on different trajectories of religious acts and behavior allows us 
to talk of Muslim religiosity as individualized, negotiable, and as providing 
opportunities for creativity. At the same time, it makes it possible to avoid 
falling into the trap of dismantling the relevance of existing strictures or 
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religious discourses within which the youth situate their agency in order 
to be perceived as particular kinds of religious subjects. It is the Self that 
brings the religious rules into life (Cohen 1994, 50). Religious rules and 
norms are pursued or performed by different individuals in different ways 
at different times. However, it does not follow that such variety of actions 
is religiously incorrect or religiously flawed. Rather, whether or not an 
action is religiously proximate depends upon how it is situated—by the 
actor and socially relevant others—in relation to the religious discourse 
provided by the social field.
In what follows, I present four different trajectories for defining an act, 
behavior, or desire as religious: “effort,” “exceptions,” “contesting knowl-
edge,” and “the use of multiple references.” This is not intended to repre-
sent a complete range of possible ways to interact with religious knowledge 
and social surroundings, but rather to illustrate available trajectories of 
religiously defined acts. I emphasize that these categories of social prac-
tice are neither mutually exclusive nor temporally or contextually 
distinct.
Trajectory 1: Effort
The aspiration to “stay on the straight path” is ridden with several chal-
lenges for the youth in Berlin. These are reflected in concerns voiced by 
individuals during meetings about not being able to perform the five daily 
prayers, losing patience with a younger brother, or listening to haram 
music. One way to justify the failure to live up to the religious norms is to 
demonstrate that an effort was made. In the following conversation 
between Fatima (31) and me in her home, Fatima talked extensively about 
the importance of effort:
“Many young Muslims in Germany try to do everything perfectly,” Fatima 
explained. “It can be too much for someone, you know. They set the goals 
very high. I therefore try not to set the goals too high. Like one sister in MJ in 
Stuttgart was from a very strict family and started in MJ. She was very con-
cerned that we be correct, wondering why no one in MJ used a long coat, for 
example, which we should. She was very (insistent) that we should be cor-
rectly dressed. And then one day she ran away from her parents’ place, 
started to wear (Western) clothes and make-up, and took her headscarf off. 
No one understood why. Then, I met her in the street, and since I have been 
taught that we should be tolerant and try not to judge, I asked if we should 
sit down for tea. And then I asked her; she used to be so concerned that we 
should dress properly and such [why had she suddenly changed]? And she 
said that we will never manage to live like hundred percent correct Muslim 
anyway! ‘But we should at least try,’ I replied.” Fatima continued with the 
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11 The status of the beard is disputed among Islamic scholars. In recent years the beard 
has not only considered as a sign of virtue, but also as a sign of Muslim conservatism or 
fundamentalism (Fadil 2008, 153). A Muslim journalist who I met in Berlin suggested that 
the style of a man’s beard can indicate a range of social meanings, including whether 
a person is fundamentalist in his belief, merely religious, politically oriented, or just likes 
the beard. 
story of her brother. He wore a beard for a long time, she explained. “When 
you are a Muslim you should have a beard, like Mohammad, it should be two 
centimeters long. And he had like, all around (his chin), but not long. And 
then after the divorce he took it all off, he shaved completely.” When Fatima 
asked why he had shaved it off, he said, “well, the one before wasn’t hundred 
percent Muslim either!” Fatima maintained that many feel that they must 
either practice Islam correctly or not at all. “They forget that they are human, 
that they should try as much as possible. Always improve themselves, know-
ing that they can never be perfect.” She insisted that to her, “it is a matter of 
trying, to continue to try the whole time! (…) They are so strict with them-
selves, although it is difficult.”
A little later, she related that, “there is this silly story, a story of the woman 
who could not pronounce the letter ‘H’ in Arabic, and so instead of saying 
Herif (“Man” in Turkish) she said Alif all the time, and so when she died she 
had this word on her mind the whole time, ‘cause she had tried so hard cor-
recting it. And then in front of Paradise she was asked who is your book etc. 
and then she was saying this word the whole time, but then Allah said ‘It is 
fine, send her in.’ ‘Cause she had made the effort—that’s what is the most 
important. Effort.” She continued, “we have the alarm clock on for the 
Morning Prayer.” Her husband always got up, but she did not always manage 
to get out of bed. At those times, she would think, “ah, when I didn’t wake up, 
then I don’t have to do it [the prayer], ‘cause sometimes Prophet Muhammad 
slept in and then that was ok. And also in the beginning with [her infant] 
I often couldn’t do the night prayer. That was too hard. (…) But he [her hus-
band] always thinks that I am terrible, so lazy. He always gets up; always 
reads one page of the Quran every night. I try, but then after one, two or 
three days, I can’t anymore. But I make an effort, at least.” She added, “I am 
always too late; when praying at the meetings, it’s always, ‘where is Fatima? 
Get her out of bed.’ And I, half tottering, hurry to get my clothes on. Hopeless.” 
She laughed.
The youth often admitted to neglecting to get up for the Morning Prayer or 
passing over the prayers during the day. Whereas the behavior of Prophet 
Muhammad is the ideal, Fatima called attention to the impossibility of 
completely living up to these ideals, reasoning that as humans they cannot 
possibly be as perfect in their religious performance as the Prophet. Fatima 
positioned her brother’s beard within a religious discourse. Many Muslims 
consider that the beard, in a similar shape as the Prophet wore it, is a sign 
of virtue.11 At the MJD presentations, the Prophet was portrayed not only 
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12 This is in sharp contrast to the women that Mahmood (2005) discusses in her ethnog-
raphy. She found that the most common answer was that a consistent failure to perform 
the five prayers regularly (which I must add was not the case with Fatima) will result in 
being sent to hell in the Hereafter. She also discusses a situation where the women argue 
that the failure is linked to the “vigilance with which one conducts one’s daily affairs and 
the effort one exerts in orienting these towards securing God’s pleasure” (Mahmood 1998, 
110). However, the idea that the desire to pray must be cultivated and created is present 
both in Cairo and in Berlin.
as a role model, but also as the perfect Muslim. Furthermore, Fatima’s ref-
erence to the young woman in Stuttgart demonstrates that it is sometimes 
best to modify one’s cultivation of the moral codes since being too strict 
can lead to the other extreme, namely being discouraged and abandoning 
everything. Failing to live up to ideals and to perform all one’s religious 
obligations can be partly excused by referring to effort. The sign of an 
effort demonstrates that the person is motivated, and that the failure to 
perform the ideal is not about unwillingess, idleness, or carelessness.12
Trajectory 2: Exception
Sometimes young people pursue social behavior that is not considered 
Islamically correct within their religious community, but which they try to 
legitimate by arguing that “they do it like that” or “it’s like that with us.” As 
the following anecdote demonstrates, customs and social behaviors in 
their daily life, and during special occasions like weddings, were some-
times situated within cultural or ethnic discourses:
A 16-year old girl from Bosnia told me that she kisses her cousin on the cheek 
when greeting him. She said that kissing one’s cousin on the cheek is not 
religiously correct as he is a potential marriage partner, a topic that the MJD 
weekly meeting some weeks earlier had dealt with extensively. Yet, she 
added that this is not so bad, “‘cause in Bosnia we are not allowed to marry 
our cousins anyway. It is [true] that in Islam you are allowed, but with us, it 
is not allowed. I grew up like that.”
Furthermore, marriage celebrations and henna parties (engagement par-
ties) sometimes comprise a mixture of religious, cultural, and traditional 
elements:
In the course of a conversation, three young women (16–19 years old) laugh-
ingly declared that they wanted certain celebratory elements in their wed-
dings, like “this last girl’s night out, which Germans do” or “I would like to 
have this tradition that you are carried around the village.” A moment later, 
all of them added that they know it is “about tradition,” and “not Islam,” but 
that they would still like to include these elements.
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13 Xavier Naidoo is a German singer and songwriter of South African descent whose 
style includes soul, R&B, and hip hop.
By displaying knowledge that certain acts or desires are not correct or 
based on Islam, the women legitimate these behaviors or desires within 
the religious social field. In this process, the individual confirms her 
knowledge of the distinction between pure Islam and tradition or culture 
by simultaneously stressing that “we do it like that” where “we” are the 
ethnic social field. I suspect that many youth felt the need to verbally 
emphasize their knowledge that a certain habit or tradition is not from 
Islam in order to present themselves as religious subjects who take the 
distinction between a pure and cultural Islam seriously, even if they 
decided to perform it differently.
Another common way that incorrect actions were rationalized was by 
confessing to being “too weak” and, once the illicit activity had concluded, 
performing a ritual wash (wudu’) in order to “come closer to God again” or 
become religiously clean:
I visited Ines (20) in her home and we listened to German hip hop and pop 
music, including Xavier Naidoo, in her room.13 She confessed that, “it is a sin 
to listen to such music in Islam, but I am too weak. I have to listen to it some-
times.” She added that she would need to do wudu’ afterwards, because there 
were so many bad words in the song.
The ritual wash wudu’ is normally performed when a ritual impurity 
(hadath) has occurred, and before praying. According to Islamic belief, 
impurity is a condition brought about in a variety of ways, including mor-
ally neutral and biologically unavoidable acts, such as falling asleep or 
going to the bathroom (Murata and Chittick 1994, 13). Here, however, Ines 
talked about performing wudu’ in order to become ritually pure (tahara) 
after a specific emotional and moral state, which could close the gap 
between doing an act which made her feel like she was straying away from 
God and the correct state of being.
At times, silence or the attempt to hide failures or flaws was seen as the 
best way to deal with erroneous behaviors. Samira (18) told me that the 
reason she was so silent during the meetings was because she was afraid to 
say something that might “not be correct.” The desire to present oneself as 
a good Muslim and to be accepted as a worthy member of this community 
of practice can lead to impression management tactics, like withholding 
information about one’s private life, which could appear to contradict the 
norms valued within the group. Impression management is particularly 
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important for newer members who may not yet have achieved the skills, 
knowledge, and piety that provide symbolic capital within this social field. 
Activities that are not considered religiously correct were not always 
talked about or justified, but merely performed among trusted friends 
who were not going to evaluate each other according to the ideals they 
were obviously breaking, as in the following example:
On the way to one of the yearly MJD summer camps held in south Germany, 
the brothers sat at the front of the bus, and the sisters sat at the back. One of 
the girls (17) said quietly to her close friend and me, “that’s where we should 
be sitting, where Fadwa and Leila are sitting!” [They were sitting on the first 
row of women after the brothers]. “We could amuse ourselves with the boys,” 
she whispered jokingly, pointing to one of the boys, “nice ass, I want to take 
a picture.” But she had to do it without the other girls noticing and ultimately 
she failed, since someone was constantly standing in the way.
Being close friends, the two girls trusted each other (and me) not to judge 
or talk behind each other’s backs about what would be considered irreli-
gious behavior. In this space, the youth differentiated between individuals 
in the group, and some of the women were considered stricter than others. 
Consequently, not every woman was invited to all home parties and some 
of the more outspoken youth tended to be less blunt in the presence of 
women whom they considered more serious or strict. The joke Nadia told 
during the Aquiqua celebration in the VICUM hall (see the introduction to 
this chapter) demonstrates that the youth try to judge whether or not 
someone will find certain behaviors acceptable or even amusing, and this 
can become a test where one risks losing face. That said, sharing one’s 
weaknesses was also part of the meetings, as discussed in chapter 4, 
although few talked in detail about the stages of their lives prior to their 
having started to actively practice Islam.
Trajectory 3: Contesting Knowledge
Contesting knowledge is a religious trajectory where one casts doubt on 
whether an utterance or action is actually true or religiously defined. As 
such, one challenges the obligation to relate to the practice or custom in 
one’s own daily life. Most of the time, the youth referred to religious 
authorities and sources when they argued for or against a statement or 
practice. As there is room for different interpretations within Islam, this 
frequently caused internal discussions, but such disagreements did 
not constitute a dismantling or individualizing of Islam as a discursive 
tradition. On the contrary, as Asad contends, “argument and conflict over 
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the form and significance of practices are […] a natural part of any Islamic 
tradition”. The following event illustrates the negotiations and internal 
discussions present within the religious community:
During the annual three-day summer camp in 2004, several of the Berliner 
youth and I attended a seminar on “Women in Islam,” which was only open 
to female participants. A woman in her late forties, together with a female 
German convert in her sixties, were invited as experts to discuss concerns 
particular to young Muslim women. After a short presentation in a room 
crowded with around a hundred listeners, the floor was opened for ques-
tions. One of the youth asked whether she could use tampons or not before 
marrying. The elderly woman claimed it would be better if she did not, 
because the tampon could harm her hymen. Protesting openly, Janna (19) 
argued that it should not matter whether the tampon damages the hymen, 
since the hymen should not be important in itself. Rather, Janna argued, the 
actual importance of the hymen is that one should not have sex before mar-
riage, and this was a thing between each individual and Allah. The older 
woman agreed with Janna, but maintained that if the tampon destroyed the 
hymen, there would be difficulties in proving her virginity to the family and 
the husband. Janna responded that if her husband-to-be did not believe her 
when she said that she had not had sex before marriage then she would not 
want to marry that guy anyway! The discussion ended without agreement 
among the women.
The women understood and accepted that the MJD space was open for 
debate and disagreement, and that consensus did not have to prevail. This 
controversial conversation is only one example of discussions, negotia-
tions, and disagreements within the religious space. Here Janna, a younger 
woman, dismissed the older women’s knowledge as unacceptable. Janna 
was particularly outspoken, self-confident, and reflexive, and openly con-
tested generational hierarchies. Furthermore, Janna did not defer to age as 
the marker of authority in religion, but contributed her own style of argu-
mentation reflecting her knowledge and personal thoughts on the matter. 
In following the youth over a longer period of time, I noticed an increase 
in confidence in their own abilities to answer questions or put forth argu-
ments as their knowledge of religious norms progressed.
In this critical intervention, neither Janna nor the elderly woman 
referred to religious sources. Janna ultimately rejected the importance of 
physically proving to outsiders whether she had complied with the reli-
gious duty of abstinence before marriage, as she saw this as a personal 
religious obligation, and her individual duty to fulfill. Janna did not deny 
that having sex before marriage was incorrect from an Islamic point of 
view. She did not contest the principle of virginity, nor did she argue for 
gender equality in terms of extending the same rules regarding intercourse 
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before marriage to men. Rather, she challenged the older woman’s ideas 
about how this principle should be implemented, along with the assump-
tion that she should physically prove her virginity by keeping her hymen 
intact. Her critique was directed towards the idea that she had to prove 
she had not had sex before marriage to her future husband and his family, 
as well as to her own family. To Janna, this was a matter for her own con-
science, and ultimately a matter between herself and Allah.
This conversation illustrates the general individualization of religiosity, 
which scholars have previously pointed to (Roy 2004). However, this indi-
vidual reflection is mediated through broad religiously defined arguments. 
Thus, it points to how disagreement can exist without this meaning that 
each individual produces their own singular, or individualized, line of 
Islamic reasoning.
Trajectory 4: Using Multiple References
One result of the increased religious education, familiarity with the 
canonical sources, and emphasis on self-reflection and personal duty in 
Islam, is that the young women are empowered to actively pursue reli-
gious behavior and to argue against certain perspectives. Self-reflection 
and an understanding of the texts become part of being a Good Muslim. 
When explaining to other Muslims why they dismissed a particular reli-
gious practice, most of the women referred to religious authorities in their 
explanations. The following event illustrates this:
During an MJD weekly meeting, three girls and I sat outside in the bookstore 
while the others prayed in the main room. Alesha (15) offered us sweet 
gummy bears from Haribo as Latifa (17) asked skeptically “are you eating 
that? Isn’t there gelatin in it?” Alesha seemed to have been expecting this 
question and told Latifa that it is fine, “‘cause it has been through so much 
processing.” Latifa took the candy bag from her and read on the back of it. 
She said, “here it says gelatin.” “Yes”, Alesha answered, “me and my sisters 
didn’t eat it for a long time, but in the past few weeks we started eating it 
again. ‘Cause we asked a sheikh [Islamic scholar] about it, and he said that 
‘cause it is so processed, it is not really pork anymore.” She agreed that it was 
debatable, but she ate it anyway. “Don’t you want some?” She again offered 
the bag to Latifa, who was reluctant. “I don’t know,” Latifa hesitantly replied 
without taking the candy, though Alesha reassured her, “it’s so good! We’ve 
been eating them again for three weeks. And my mother was like, ‘are you 
sure that it is not haram’?’” They had reassured her that it was not.
Alesha’s older sister, Hamida (17), joined us and confirmed that they 
had started to eat Haribo again. “‘Cause we asked a sheikh and he said that it 
is so changed in the mix that there is no pork left in it,” she added as an 
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explanation. “That means that you can eat all gelatin,” Latifa commented, 
half doubting and half questioning. Alesha clarified, “yes, when it has been 
processed. We have been told that it is ok, ‘cause it is so processed. We didn’t 
just ask one sheikh, but several. Do you know the sheikh [his name]?” Latifa 
nodded. Alesha added, “he says that we are allowed to eat it.” When Latifa 
commented that Green Palace, where they were standing, also sold gummy 
candies without any gelatin, the two sisters contended that, “it is so expen-
sive!” The conversation drew to an end as we were called into the main room 
to start with the day’s presentation.
Although there seems to be much individual self-reflection and perhaps 
even some pragmatism in this situation, Alesha and Hamida referred to an 
authority (a sheikh) when justifying eating Haribo, which was generally 
considered haram among the youth. Rather than considering this as an 
individualization of religious practices, I understand this type of practice 
as an individual reflection around what to dismiss and what to accept, 
which has to be situated in relation to a particular rhetoric. The two sisters 
explained their action by referring to religious authorities in order for 
their action to be viewed as legitimate within the religious social field. 
This argument partly reassures the Self, and partly confirms for others 
who are evaluating the behavior that the action is religiously correct. 
Acquiring familiarity with the religious sources and the variety of ways to 
make legitimate arguments improves the youths’ comprehension of which 
actions are or can be made acceptable, their rights and obligations, and 
the possible scope for creative action.
Notably, by the end of the conversation, Latifa no longer contested the 
sisters’ actions, but at the same time she did not help herself to the Haribo. 
Latifa might accept Alesha and Hamida’s reasons for their decision, with-
out accepting or trusting it as legitimate enough to guide her own actions. 
This exemplifies both the possibility for different interpretations and 
interactions with the religious rules, but also the necessity of situating 
one’s decision within a particular form of argument.
Among the youth, I noticed that what could be viewed as an individual 
orientation towards certain religious ideals was nevertheless frequently 
situated within Muslim tradition through certain styles of argumentation. 
For example, while on our way to a park for a picnic, I walked down a 
street on a summer day with Nawar (17) and Somaya (17):
The two young women talked about how to dress for the celebration the day 
after, including what color of dress and shoes they were going to wear. Nawar 
turned to Somaya, saying, “you can wear the same color of socks as your 
sandals. That’s what I usually do.” Somaya told Nawar that she doesn’t use 
socks in her sandals, to which Nawar exclaimed, “sandals without socks is 
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14 Notice here also the role of Nawar’s brother in guiding and ultimately forming 
Nawar’s behavior.
15 Thus, as discussed briefly in chapter 4, the idea that an increase in literacy and objec-
tified consciousness reduces the need for young people to turn to religious authorities to 
make sense of their religion must be modified.
haram!” Somaya said, surprised, “what? I have never heard that before.” 
Nawar explained, “yes. Once I went out without socks in my sandals, bare-
foot, and then my brother said, ‘Hey, what are you doing, that is haram.’” 
Somaya sighs, “sorry, hey, but I am not doing that, I have so many sandals. 
I just bought a new pair.” Then Somaya asked which school of Islamic 
thought permits not wearing socks, and said that she would follow that 
school of law on this issue.
Although at first nonchalantly brushing aside the correction by Nawar, 
Somaya followed up by asking which school of religious law she could fol-
low in order for her action not to be religiously flawed. Though this might 
seem like a banal example, my point is that Somaya’s choice to not wear 
socks can become religiously acceptable by referring to a school of thought 
that makes her action religiously legitimate.14 What at first may appear as 
an individual practice is, by reference to Islamic law, again situated within 
a religious framework.
Mass education, Eickelman and Piscatori (1996, 111) contend, has 
opened up the interpretation of religious texts and authorization. Access 
to knowledge has created new spaces of religious contestation (Mandaville 
2000, 283), and youth learn religious arguments to support their choices 
and comportment. There are, of course, limits as to which exceptions will 
be deemed acceptable within this religious community in Berlin. It is dif-
ficult, or probably impossible to legitimate eating pork, drinking alcohol, 
or openly having a sexual relationship outside of marriage. Further, listen-
ers or viewers do not uncritically accept reference to a religious rule in a 
discussion or presentation. Perhaps paradoxically, the new spaces of reli-
gious contestation simultaneously increase the need for authoritative 
sources.15 Muslims compare answers provided by different schools of law, 
and interpretations provided by different Islamic communities. By increas-
ing their knowledge, the youth can compare religious interpretations and 
choose between them, which partly strengthens their moral autonomy.
There are certain rules and customs in Islam that the majority of youth 
did not wish to implement in their lives. For example, the fact that it is 
permissible for a man to have four wives in Islam was an issue that was 
often raised when debating the position of women in Islam. There are 
ways to deal with this principle without rejecting or contesting it, thus 
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16 Literally: “standing.” The reference to Qiyam here implies to spend the night together 
with other Muslims, usually in a mosque, reading the Quran, listening to religious presen-
tations and praying the Qiyaam al-Layl (the voluntary “night prayer”) together.
without promoting spiritual cherry-picking, but also without feeling obli-
gated to personally implement it. The following discussion about wives in 
Islam at an MJD meeting illustrates potential ways to deal with controver-
sial themes in Islam:
It was a very warm summer day and it had been warm the whole weekend. 
I sait on the subway on the way to an MJD meeting, reading a book, as Ismail 
(16) came over to me. She kissed my cheeks and sat down on the plastic 
seats. She was tired, she told me, as she had just been sleeping on the S-bahn 
(subway) and also because she had not sleep much over the weekend, hav-
ing spent the night in the mosque for the Qiyam (the Night Prayer).16 She 
recalled the school in Egypt where she spent two years, and how the teach-
ers would punish her when she was tired. As we walked along the street 
towards the MJD location, we saw Leila (21) standing outside the door. 
“Wow,” Ismail exclaimed when seeing Leila’s motorbike. Fascinated, Ismail 
wanted to sit on the motorbike, which Leila had acquired from her brother. 
Leila was going to take her driving test soon, and she told her, “you have to do 
a lot of du’a for me so that I pass the examination of the driver’s license.” 
Fadwa (23) arrived in her car with ice cream. Since it was the last day of 
school the following day, she had thought she would not do the regular pro-
gram. “Have you prayed?” she asked. They conducedt the prayer together, 
after which the youth read from the Koran. A younger girl, Alesha (15), did 
not want to read a sura from the Koran for the second round, “‘cause the sura 
is too long.” Fadwa suggested that she share it with Ismail. She will recite half 
of the sura and Ismail the rest. Alesha was finally convinced and read it. 
Afterwards, she continued by reading the German translation.
People were tired and not enthusiastic, and Fadwa tried to be ironic to ease 
the atmosphere. She then talked about the Qiyam in the mosque that week-
end, where there had also been a nice presentation: “You missed something,” 
she said. Fadwa continued talking about the Sunday presentation, which 
had been about the wives of Prophet Muhammad. “Fatima was the most 
loved child of Prophet Muhammad and it was like when she was sad, he was 
sad and when she was happy, he was happy, and that only by seeing her, he 
forgot everything. And then it was asked whether it is like that with us 
today—whether we forget everything when we see our mother and father?” 
She continued to talk about having more wives. “It is after all allowed in 
Islam. But there are certain conditions; that the man is strong enough to 
economically provide for them, and that he is able to treat them equally.” 
The girls stressed this aspect and many expreseds doubts that a man would 
be able to treat his wives equally. Leila inserted, “there are occasions when 
the wife also prefers the arrangement. (…) The sheikh was talking about that 
in the presentation yesterday. And he said that the Europeans criticize the 
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Prophet Muhammad a lot, saying that he married so many women, that he 
(liked women a lot). But it wasn’t like that. When he was 25 years old, he mar-
ried a woman 15 years older than himself! And then, 25 years later he mar-
ried the next! And he still really loved her the most, even if she was older.”
Hamida inserted eagerly, “the Europeans always criticize the Prophet, ‘cause 
they misunderstand it [his marriages].” Fadwa agreed, “and he [the sheikh] 
was saying that many men have more than one woman anyway—that they 
have at least a wife and a lover. Many have four wives anyway: one they have 
a legal contract with [being married], one secretary, one for the evenings 
and one for the weekends.” Some of the girls laughed. Leila argued, “some-
times it is really better! Some prefer it. After war and catastrophe, there 
are more women than men, and instead of these women becoming prosti-
tutes and having children outside marriage, it is better that a man marries 
them and they get support like that.” Fadwa turned to Alesha, who was 
frowning, and told her, “you should not look like you think it is disgusting, 
don’t be so one-sided about it. You have to think broader than that. Marriage 
is more than only that [sex]. There are a lot of aspects to marriage. (You 
should think) that the ones who are able to have more than one wife have 
come further [in their thinking], they have managed to think higher. It is 
also like a duty to take on an extra wife, so that she (will have a decent life).”
Amal (22) disagreed decisively, “yes, but then. It is not always like that! My 
husband [who is an imam] was once in Italy and there the men were all talk-
ing about having a second wife, and were all very excited about it, looking at 
the young girls. And then my husband, he was their imam, said that if you 
want to do your (duty), then there is this woman, she is a widow and alone 
and she needs someone. Who wants to marry her? And then none of the 
men answered—then suddenly they were not so eager.” Fadwa agreed that 
men do not always think correctly about it. Leila argued, “it is like that in 
Islam, it is part of it and it is allowed [to have four wives], and we have to 
accept that it is like that. Allah has made (it/us) like that. But it doesn’t mean 
that we have to accept it.”
Amal emphasized that it is problematic in Germany, “‘cause it’s not allowed, 
and so only one woman can be registered, and then you cannot treat all your 
wives equally. Like one of them will not be legally married, and the children 
will not receive (child benefits).” As a result, Amal continued, one of them 
would live without legal status. Hamida asked whether it would be possible 
to write something in the marriage contract about this. Fadwa responded 
that she did that when she got married. Before the wedding, she talked with 
her husband-to-be and said that she would not like it if he wanted more 
wives. Hajja (23), who recently married an imam, now added, “me too. Like 
respectfully. I said that I know it is allowed, and I respect that, and if you 
want to do that, I accept that, but in that case, I am not in.” Amal joined in, 
“I also talked to my husband about it before, that there was no way that 
I would accept that!”
Notably, Fadwa stressed that men are allowed to have more wives accord-
ing to Islam. She actively tried to make the younger ones understand and 
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accept this element of Islam, which is frequently criticized by non- 
Muslims and is a point of contention for critical voices against Islam. At 
first, I was surprised that Fadwa, who has grown up in Germany and has a 
university degree, so readily accepted this part of Islam. Yet, their answers 
exemplify how their style of argument relates to Islam as a discursive 
tradition, while at the same time refusing to incorporate certain Islamic 
practices in their daily life. Significantly, Leila and Fadwa acknowledged 
that polygamy is allowed in Islam, and thus did not hold the position that 
one can simply reject what one disapproves of. None of the women ques-
tioned the validity of the religious norm, and they all viewed the critique 
of the Prophet on the part of Europeans as a misunderstanding of his 
actions and the ideal behind polygamy. Yet, later in the discussion it 
becomes clear that Fadwa would never accept this religious custom in her 
own life. As her own actions demonstrate, the norms do not prescribe that 
the young women must accept polygamy in their lives. Notably, all of the 
married young women in the room, two of whom were married to imams, 
had written into their marriage contract that they would not accept a sec-
ond wife. All of them advanced this claim without contesting the actual 
right of the man as provided by Islam, but instead focused on their own 
personal unwillingness to accept this practice in their lives.
During the debate the women also asserted that the legal reality in 
Germany renders it impossible to follow all the Islamically defined restric-
tions and obligations for polygamy that could make it religiously correct 
(meaning treating one’s wives equally). Notably, none of the women 
expressed sadness or regret that polygamy is not allowed in Germany, but 
rather seem to happily accept this German law. Thus, drawing on a wide 
range of religious knowledge and rights opens up possibilities for exclud-
ing certain religious customs from one’s personal life, without contesting 
Islamic norms.
Pluralization of Religious Acts and Behavior
Alteration of Acceptable Performances
The authority of practices and utterances in MJD were contingent on the 
youths’ relation to more general authoritative discourses. Certain imams, 
preachers, and scholars were more admired than others in the youths’ 
search for religious direction. Seeking answers for actions in their life, the 
youth would sometimes ask more than one authority in order to hear dif-
ferent opinions. New experiences, authoritative information, or age could 
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to some extent alter their perception of what was acceptable behavior. 
According to Julie (28), Aishegül (31), being one of the elders and consid-
ered to be highly knowledgeable about Islam, played a prominent role in 
shaping ideas concerning male-female friendship among MJD partici-
pants. Julie recalled that at one point, Aishegül had said it was not 
Islamically correct to have male friends. However, at a later stage I over-
heard the following conversation between Aishegül and Somaya (17): 
Somaya explained to Aishegül that she had come to better know one of the 
brothers during the MJD Paris trip. Aishegül responded that it is good that 
they should also get to know the brothers, “‘cause they are also our sisters 
and brothers.” Aishegül continued by saying that she used to think that one 
could not be friends with the brothers, but then she asked an Islamic scholar 
and he explained that it was not necessary to be that extreme. As a rule, she 
had stopped talking to brothers when the conversation became personal, 
since she didn’t believe that was right. The Islamic scholar had told her that 
“it is allowed to be friends and to talk, as long as it is done in the right way 
and at the right place.” Somaya asked, “For example where?” Aishegul 
thought about it and was hesitant, “I don’t know. Not in a café, ‘cause people 
can see you and think that there is something between you. Perhaps in a 
mosque, I would think. Hmm, no….” Aishegül changed her mind, adding 
that even more than a café, the mosques can be a place where people 
will think that there is something romantic between them. Finally, she said, 
“I don’t know. It is for sure ok to call to chat and if you need help or 
something.”
Aishegül modified her perception of what is acceptable by talking to sev-
eral imams, which led her to change her understanding of what is most 
correct. The internal diversity of religious authority in Islam makes it pos-
sible for practicing Muslims to choose among different interpretations 
(Yükleyen 2007), without this process entailing a fragmentation of Islam. 
Importantly, within this religious community, Aishegül’s considerations of 
which interpretation should be followed matter, because she is older, has 
a high level of religious knowledge, and is viewed as pious. In sum, 
Aishegül’s reputation represents a symbolic capital that endows her vision 
of the social world with some authority. Noticeably, Somaya accepted 
Aishegül’s reference to an Islamic scholar (without asking for the name) 
and Aishegül’s evaluation of this knowledge as valid. In other situations 
with peers or less knowledgeable youth, I often heard Somaya inquire 
about the sources of knowledge before she accepted or dismissed a state-
ment as religiously valid. The German convert Julie suggested that reli-
gious knowledge is often received more uncritically when it comes from 
someone with a Turkish background than when it comes from someone 
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17 Who represents an authority for youth living in Europe and how this authority is 
established is an under-researched area of study. I believe that German public discourse 
exaggerates the influence and authority of the imams. See Caeiro (2005) who looks at 
Muslim religious authority in Western Europe as expressed via the production of fatwas 
(formal legal judgment or view in Islamic law). He explores how this practice forms and is 
formed by media settings, state institutions, intergenerational change and gender dynam-
ics. The edited volume “Women, Leadership and Mosques” (2012) by Bano & Kalmbach 
(eds.) argues that women base their claims to authority on a number of factors, including 
knowledge attained by formal religious training, a pious reputation, a charismatic style, 
family ties to religious leadership or education, and a dedication to religious outreach 
work.
with a German (a convert) background. My impression is that in this 
space the binding power of religious authority is not merely related to age, 
but is a combination of the sources used, the particular person’s (per-
ceived) piety, style of argument, and knowledge of the religious texts and 
interpretations. Competence in quoting from the Koran or referring to 
ahadith generated respect and authority, and sometimes brought discus-
sion to a halt. However, more research is needed on the process through 
which youth in European cities come to see particular sources as 
authoritative.17
The latter part of the conversation shows that though Aishegül argues 
that it is religiously acceptable to have male friends, how this is conceptu-
alized matters, as socially relevant others in the religious social field may 
still judge such actions negatively and not as apt religious performances. 
The difficulty that Aishegül had in finding a “decent” place where Somaya 
could meet someone of the opposite gender also demonstrates that per-
sonal intent is insufficient in deciding what social activities to perform; 
how (Muslim) outsiders (might) assess or judge one’s social acts also 
matters.
(Per)forming the Religious Self
I would like to take my argument in a different direction. As this chapter 
has illustrated, the youth by no means reproduce all religious norms in 
their social practice. They demonstrate creativity in the process of crafting 
their religious Self. Are the presented trajectories acts that, when per-
formed by these women, contest the norms or ultimately subvert them?
Even if power, discourse, and ideology shape subject positions, these 
forces do not control how individuals take up or relate to these subject 
positions at various times. Furthermore, they do not control how individu-
als engage in transforming discourses of power (Moore 2007, 41). Just as an 
individual’s process of identification is a perpetually unfolding story, the 
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18 In this discussion, the question remains that “if ideology and power are not mono-
lithic, if culture is not simply determining and if becoming a self is not simply a matter of 
socialization, of learning the codes of a particular cultural context, then what makes indi-
viduals identify with certain subject positions, and construct a sense of self through them 
(Moore, 1994; Ewing, 1998; Battaglia, 1995)?” (Moore 2007, 41). See Moore (2007) for an 
extensive discussion on this topic, in which she argues for the need to include the role of 
fantasy, desire and unconscious motivation.
process of crafting the Self never comes to a halt. These trajectories show 
the possibilities for action available to religious subjects, where the inten-
tion is neither to challenge nor to alter religious norms. This should not be 
understood as merely an individualization of Islam; rather, it is a creative 
negotiation of norms and represents ways to resolve the tensions and dis-
crepancies that make up daily life in Berlin. When situated within a reli-
gious group where one’s actions and individual person are (un)consciously 
measured against religious norms, it becomes necessary to position one’s 
actions within or in relation to how one ought to behave.
Rather than positing these trajectories of religious acts as resistance, we 
might examine them as creative bargains or subtle performances in sub-
jects’ “discursive strategies” (Kondo 1990, 227), where religious meanings 
are (re)appropriated and played out in relation to religious orthodoxy. 
This does not simply create a space of resistance, nor is it a repetition of 
norms. These trajectories demonstrate the possibilities for individual cre-
ative agency in a particular space, and as such, they enable individuals to 
situate themselves as religious subjects through what might appear as 
contradictions and incongruities. Furthermore, they indicate the various 
ways of crafting a religious subject and how the “doing of norms” is per-
formed even when the youth are not stringently replicating the norms. 
These various expressions of agency are positioned within the discursive 
field of norms and ideals, which consequently legitimate behavior as 
religious and the actors as specific religious subjects within a religious 
social field.18
A religious identity includes bodily enactments, which comprise “signi-
fying practices” that are mediated through knowledge, exercises, 
reflections, and experiences. A religious subject may be individually self-
determined and self-reflective, but the acting out of her religious Self must 
be understood as mediated through other religious bodies and the exist-
ing orthodoxy to which she decides to orient her religious Self. Through 
performativity, the individual continuously struggles to craft the Self in 
ways that move closer to the ideal religious subject, that is, moves closer to 
being religiously proximate. In this process the individual simultaneously 
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19 This is particularly the case for those writing about Muslims in France. See in particu-
lar Amiraux (2000), Babès (1996), Boubekeur (2004), Cesari (1998, 2002), Roy (2004) and 
Saint-Blancat (1997).
becomes part of and affirms her identification with a particular religious 
group. A Muslim identity is not a universal or substantive subjectivity. 
Rather, this work demonstrates that the youth are creatively crafting 
themselves, constantly becoming, in specific, located situations (see 
Kondo 1990). The performance of a “correct” religious identity needs to be 
learned and practiced without becoming automatic or a habit in a 
Bourdieuian way. The performance of this religious identity is, at the same 
time, the expression and formation of the Self.
As discussed earlier, learning to distinguish between culture and reli-
gion is one of the means through which the subject is constituted as a 
specific religious subject. At the same time, there are also elements of per-
formance involved, as individuals frequently openly contest what is cor-
rect or not in order to show their proficiency in distinguishing between 
these two categories. This act is considered crucial in the crafting of the 
Self as a truthful or authentic religious subject. Inquiring about where a 
particular knowledge originates from reflects a process of self-reflection, 
and the individualizing of religious practice. However, when asking others 
where their knowledge derives from, the youth demonstrate the impor-
tance of being able to distinguish between culture, tradition, ethnicity and 
Islam. The references to religious sources when explaining what is allowed 
or not, confirms that the speaker knows this difference and that she recog-
nizes the need to be critical of sources of knowledge. Furthermore, asking 
for information about sources before accepting the religious legitimacy of 
another’s views is a way that women, in particular, position themselves as 
particular religious subjects. Through the MJD meetings, the youth acquire 
knowledge about how to become proper Muslims. This includes the per-
formative aspects of being a proper as well as “correct” Muslim by provid-
ing what are regarded as religiously legitimate justifications for behavior.
Individualization of Religious Identity?
What impact does looking at the process of how particular behavior is 
legitimized have on the way we look at religiosity? Are we seeing an indi-
vidualization of religion or an individual selection of religious norms? 
Several scholars writing about Muslim youth refer to an individual appro-
priation of religious tradition and a process of individualization.19 The 
so-called pluralism and individualization of religion among young 
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20 This includes in particular Amiraux (2000), Boubekeur (2005), and Cesari (2000, 
2002).
21 As a consequence, Beck argues, the “normal biography thus becomes the ‘elective 
biography’, the ‘do-it yourself biography’ [which] is always a risk biography’ – a state of 
permanent endangerment” (Beck 2002, 3). Zigmun Bauman has likewise suggested that: 
“Nowadays everything seems to conspire against … lifelong projects, permanent bonds, 
eternal alliances, immutable identities. I cannot build for the long term on my job, my 
profession or even my abilities. (…) togetherness lasts no longer than the gratification of 
one of the partners, ties are from the outset only ‘until further notice’” (Bauman 1993, 17).
22 Grace Davie (1994) also coined the idea of “belonging without believing,” which she 
calls “vicarious religion” in relation to Scandinavian countries where a large part of the 
population remain members of the Lutheran church without attending church services. 
Consequently, she suggests that religion is only performed by an active minority on behalf 
of a much larger number.
Muslims born in European societies is commonly explained in terms of an 
increased secularization of the youth and the impact of the European 
social environment on the youths’ religious identity.20 This view, I argue, 
fails to recognize Islam as a discursive tradition within which individuals 
seek to legitimate their acts or behavior as religiously apt or proximate. 
Furthermore, it fails to recognize that religious practices are rarely singu-
lar, individual acts situated outside of a religious social field, however near 
or far that religious field may be.
Clearly, Muslim youth who are socialized in Europe are presented with 
a variety of allegiances and ideals, including secularization and individu-
alization (Klinkhammer 2003). Ulrich Beck and others have suggested that 
individualization in contemporary European societies include, on the one 
hand, “the disintegration of previously existing social forms – for example 
the increasing fragility of such categories as class and social status, gender 
roles, family, neighborhood etc.,” and on the other, “new demands, con-
trols and constraints [that] are being imposed on individuals” (Beck 
2002, 2).21 Just like there has been a decline of communities based on class, 
status, and voting behavior (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), scholars have sug-
gested that Christian religious communities are in decline. Davie coined 
the expression “believing without belonging,” which characterizes “the 
persistence of the sacred in contemporary society despite the undeniable 
decline in churchgoing” (Davie 1994, 94).22 This process of privatization 
and individualization of Christian religious practices has consequences 
for the internal functioning of the religious sphere. It weakens both reli-
gious authority and the feeling of obligation regarding, for example, 
church attendance. Further effects of individualization include the lower-
ing of social status, a reduction in the number of clerics, and the decline of 
adherence to moral values of sacrifice or discipline. This can also be seen 
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23 Amiraux recognizes that this development does not include a detachment from the 
collective, but does not problematize the continued complex social relation between the 
faith an individual claims and her or his faith in the community. However, she acknowl-
edges that there is a lack of research on the question of individual processes of religious 
sentiment. The latter refers to how the individual ascribes meaning to a religious senti-
ment and belonging to a tradition, as well as how to formulate certain practices indepen-
dently of what the community recognizes as legitimate (Amiraux 2003, 88). It is in part this 
gap that I aim to fill in this chapter, as well as chapter 4 and chapter 5.
through individual lifestyles in which self-realization prevails, people are 
more mobile, and there is a decline in inherited identities (ibid.).
One of the main outcomes resulting from the individualization and 
privatization of religion is a shift from religion imagined as a principle of 
heteronomy (which broadly means submission to governance by external 
control) to religion imagined as an identity and as supporting individuals 
in an increasingly uncertain society. The individualization of religious 
experiences of Muslims is meant to capture the idea that religious experi-
ences have become personal and subjective in their endorsement and 
composition (Fadil 2008). The idea is that modern subjects decide whether 
to be religious, as well as when and how to be religious. Religious belief, 
then, is no longer fixed, but experiential and expressive.
As I have briefly discussed, the perception of individualization has also 
found resonance among scholars studying the Muslim population in 
Europe. It has been argued that the main style of individualization among 
the Muslim population in Europe is the attempt to unite personal freedom 
with the conviction of a type of transcendence defined as relative, mean-
ing regulated in relation to the majority society’s constrictions (Cesari 
2005b, 5). Likewise, Amiraux (2003, 85) talks about the “feminization” of 
Islam in Europe, a situation in which Muslim women choose, assume, and 
assert faith. She argues that the practices are no longer “inherited,” but are 
“reinvented” by their actors (ibid., 89). According to Amiraux (2000, 120), 
the individualization of religion among youth can be seen in the individu-
alization of their decision-making. She perceives this to be a structural 
outcome of their daily social organization, the associative environment in 
which they are socialized, and the available modes of participation.23 
Similarly, Roy (2000) suggests that in the plural urban space, Islam is 
largely an individual affair where the community is not given, but must be 
constructed and invented.
I agree with Amiraux (2003) that the decision to be a practicing Muslim 
is actively taken by the individual. Yet I contest the idea that the decision 
to identify with Islam is taken independently from other individual social 
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24 See especially Klinkhammer (2003), Nökel (2002), and Tietze (2002) who argue this 
for Muslims in Germany.
25 This kind of argument, Salvatore claims, “superimposes an allegedly traditional con-
tinuity within religious practice between bodily disciplines and gestures and their ‘spiri-
tual sense’” (Salvatore 2004, 1023). The process of change is simply ascribed to the social 
context of the youth. According to Tietze (2001), the youth often celebrate the end of 
Ramadan without having personally fasted. The religious meaning of fasting, she argues, is 
separated from the practice, bringing about a culturalization of Ramadan. This, Tietze 
claims, reaffirms the idea of a divergence between believing and belonging. Salvatore 
(2004) offers an astute critique of this line of argument.
26 This is suggested also by Amir-Moazami (2007), Nökel (2002) and Salvatore (2004).
positions. Clearly, religious and ethnic identifications are only two among 
several possibilities for identification, although perhaps the most readily 
available for these youth. In that sense, the act of practicing Islam and of 
crafting themselves as religious subjects is largely a matter of choice.24 To 
some extent, the youths’ emphasis on reflection and knowledge of the reli-
gious sources leads to an individualization of religious practice (or rather 
an objectification of their religious practice, as discussed in chapter 4), in 
that they become more autonomous in the process of judging their own 
religious actions. Nonetheless, the understanding of the religious prac-
tices of the young women in my study must be situated in relation to the 
rhetoric and ideals learnt in a group. Furthermore, although the youths’ 
interpretation of religious belief might objectively diverge from each 
other, they share feelings of self-transcendence and concepts of faith. In 
addition, being critical of religious interpretations does not automatically 
mean a dismissal of key religious dogmas.
Still, much research on Muslim youth in Europe overemphasizes choice, 
autonomy, and detachment from religious communities and authorities. 
For example, studying young Muslims in France and Germany, Tietze 
argues that “the identification with Islam becomes an ordinary means, 
one among many, for the construction of subjectivity” (Tietze 2001, 294). 
The problem with seeing Islam as yet another aspect of individual choice 
is that it neglects the role of Muslim traditions in the early socialization of 
the individual.25
A closer view of the religious activities of youth in Europe who practice 
Islam within a faith community demonstrates that while there is a shift in 
the arrangement of authority, in that women and youth both attain and 
transform authority, religious authority as such is not eradicated.26 My 
observation of the youth in MJD illustrates that the idea of a free-floating 
and rationally chosen religious identity does not hold. The youth in MJD 
do not sharply distinguish between their religious belief and orthopraxis, 
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as some scholars (including Tietze 2001) do. The religious agencies of 
these youth are not the outcome of strictly individual choices, and do not 
mark a private Muslim subjectivity, but are situated vis-à-vis Islam as a 
discursive tradition. Recognizing the increase in individualization in the 
religious field, the French sociologist of religion Hervieu-Léger suggests 
that:
Modernity has deconstructed the traditional systems of believing, but has 
not forsaken belief. Believing finds expression in an individualized, subjec-
tive and diffuse form, and resolves into a multiplicity of combinations and 
orderings of meaning which are elaborated independently of control by 
institutions of believing, by religious institutions in particular. (Hervieu-
Léger 2000, 74)
However, at the same time, Hervieu-Léger argues in “Religion as a chain 
of memory” that this independence is limited by the economic and 
socio-cultural positions of the individual, and hence that, “there is no reli-
gion without the authority of a tradition being invoked (whether 
explicitly, half-explicitly or implicitly) in support of the act of believing” 
(ibid., 78).
Hervieu-Légers (2001) suggests that the idea that religion is currently 
individualized must be modified in view of the need for (religious) sub-
jects to be with others who verify their lifeworld and value orientation. In 
other words, modernity does not necessarily mean that a religious person 
no longer needs to invoke the authority of a tradition as a foundation for 
her or his act of believing. This authority need not be a physical local faith 
community in which one regularly participates, but includes online chat 
rooms, Muslim neighbors, family, and religious organizations in or outside 
of Germany.
One may wonder whether religious experiences have not always 
involved a certain individualized form. It is worth evoking Simmel, who in 
1898 considered the dynamism of religion to be an incomplete process 
where the individual person relates to a religious tradition with degrees of 
durability:
One must bear in mind that religion, as a spiritual experience, is not a 
finished product but a vital process that each soul must create for itself, 
no matter how stable the traditional content may be. It is precisely here 
that the power and depth of religion are found – namely, in its persistent 
ability to draw a given item of religious data into the flow of the emotions, 
whose movements must renew it constantly (…). (Simmel 1997 [1898], 
118–19)
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27 It is this project, taken up individually and/or collectively, that Leming calls “religious 
agency.” She argues that: “the actions and adaptations that people adopt, create, and 
refashion to express their religious sensibility both reproduce and transform the tradi-
tional resources of religious groups” (Leming 2007, 74).
28 Casanova (2001), Eickelman (1992) and Mandaville (2000) have suggested that there 
is a pluralization process regarding religious authority in Islam.
Simmel positions the communication between tradition and the “flow of 
emotions” as a process through which the religious project is generated.27
Compared to the Catholic Church, with its clerical and hierarchical 
centralized administrative structure, Islam, at least in its Sunni branch, 
has always been structured in a more decentralized and egalitarian way 
(Casanova 2001). Without centralized institutions defining the authorita-
tive doctrines, Muslims continue to act within an increasingly pluralistic, 
modern society in ways that are multiple, varied, and sometimes inconsis-
tent (ibid., 29). Many scholars of contemporary Islam agree that there has 
been a process of pluralization and fragmentation of religious authority in 
Islamic tradition.28 Rather than advancing the secularization of Muslims, 
this opens up and expands the terrain of religious education. Educated 
Muslims are given spaces—or construct their own spaces—in which to 
discuss Islamic tradition and how Islam is compatible with democracy, 
civil society and human rights. Such spaces tended only to be filled by 
Muslim intellectuals or the traditional ulama. For Casanova (2001), the 
creation of these new spaces within Islam reflects the broader movement 
of all world religions towards modernity, a process through which each 
religion repositions their own respective traditions in an attempt to fash-
ion their own version of modernity. In Germany, MJD exemplifies one of 
these spaces in which young Muslims came together and decided to form 
a new religious group. Being situated outside the frameworks of the 
mosques, which they viewed as dominated by older, ethnically oriented 
leaders, provides the youth with different opportunities for constructing 
authority, enhancing religious understanding, and pursuing religious cel-
ebrations (Bendixsen 2013).
Furthermore, even if people draw upon religious tradition selectively, 
this does not destabilize the integrity of the religion (Asad 1993). Adapting 
a tradition in order to meet new challenges does not necessarily under-
mine the coherency of a tradition. The recognition of religious authority 
or the legitimacy granted to particular practices and utterances depends 
upon how an individual situates these in relation to authorizing discourses 
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29 As Ismail suggests, “in taking account of a discursive tradition, its continuity and 
evolution, one should be careful not to postulate some unchanging Islamic view or posi-
tion on morality. A careful study of Islamic history demonstrates the existence of varying 
conceptions of morality and sexuality and also of a tradition of religious skepticism (Ismail 
2006, 78).”
30 Ismail convincingly argues that, “in its interaction with the social, religion ceases to 
be religion (understood as fixed beliefs, dogma, immutable rites and so on)” (Ismail 2004, 
620). She contends that this is not only the case in the modern or postmodern period, but 
that the argument has “meta-theoretical implications.” This observation is supported by 
the distinction between “religion as faith,” which brings with it personal and individual 
direct contact with the godly and “religion as a set of rules,” which are interpreted and 
bargained upon in social settings. In the latter process, situational factors will have an 
effect on the interpretations and negotiations (ibid., 620–621). I believe that Ismail is here 
touching upon the limitations of Asad’s framework of Islam as a discursive tradition. 
Namely, by remaining on a theoretical level, this framework cannot sufficiently illuminate 
the social practice of crafting a religious Self in a socially specific context where a variety of 
social forces are at hand.
of a more general order.29 Thus, the creative, religious practices performed 
by these young women are not a rejection of Islam as a discursive tradi-
tion. The coherence of Islam is maintained even within variations in prac-
tices (Asad 1986). Orthodoxy in Islam never completely establishes or 
predetermines social relations. It remains a pivotal and idiosyncratic rela-
tionship of power, where discourse and debates determine what is consid-
ered as correct and what should prevail.
The trajectories of young women in Berlin presented here are situated 
in plural, even creative, ways within Islam, without this being synonymous 
with the development of secularization or individualization. It also does 
not mean a decrease in the importance of situating one’s religious acts vis-
à-vis a faith community. Indeed, the young women specifically legitimate 
their behavior through references to orthodoxy and religious rhetoric. By 
examining how these youth practice Islam in their everyday life, I call 
attention to the need to distinguish between the religious as fixed beliefs 
or dogmas, and the religious as personal and collective practices situated 
in social life, where the social material setting has implications for subse-
quent interpretations and practices.30
Women who relate to a religious organization, a faith community, or a 
group, need to situate their actions within a religious framework, so long 
as they seek to be regarded as religious actors. This should modify the con-
clusion drawn by Nökel (2002, 67), among others, that women individually 
decide which religious forms to accept and Klinkhammer (2000, 286), who 
argues that women adopt a mode of individualization and rationalization 
in their orientation towards Islam.
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Although this book recognizes that the women in this study choose to 
situate themselves vis-à-vis religious ideals, which represents a set of 
norms, the young people who make this choice must relate to discursive 
practices partly defined outside of their control. Understanding the sub-
ject to be “compelled to act from within a set of norms through which it 
negotiates its sense of self,” Butler (2005, 19) underscores that the agency 
of the subject must “struggle with the unchosen conditions of one’s life.” 
At the same time, the creativity involved in choosing how to interact with 
religious norms demonstrates the opening up of spaces for individuality 
and agentive decisions, outside of those acts that either comply with or 
reject the norms. The youth do not completely reproduce or subvert the 
religious norms, but they also do not dismiss or actively resist (most of) 
these norms. Mostly, they try to comply with the religiously defined rules 
that are taught in the various spaces of their religious community MJD.
The ways in which they legitimate their accomplishment or failure to 
meet religious norms can take different forms, as exemplified by the vari-
ous possible religious trajectories. Through their education and position 
as self-reflexive, responsible actors, they draw on techniques to deal with 
the norms and ideals that are promoted within the religious field. The turn 
to a pure Islam and literal religious practice introduces orthodoxy into the 
everyday practice of Islam. Even if the youth situate themselves within a 
religiously defined orthodoxy, they remain reflexive and creative in their 
behavior, neither in a pre-given nor purely individualized way.
CHAPTER SIX
MAKING A RELIGIOUS GENDER ORDER
One is not born a woman, but rather becomes one.
–Simone de Beauvoir 1989 [1949], 1:92
The young generation of Muslims born in European societies frequently 
makes a distinction between the traditional Islam of their parents and 
a global, pure Islam detached from national traditions and ethnic 
bonds. Few researchers have explored the effect of the distinction between 
culture and religion on young people’s understanding and performance 
of gender relations and on their ethnic identification. As chapter 4 
explored, distinguishing between tradition, or culture, and religion is 
an effort to practice a so-called universal, pure Islam. The focus in this 
chapter is on how the continuous efforts to disconnect tradition from 
religion shape how Muslim youth in Europe construct their own gender 
identities and how they identify with their parents’ ethnic or national 
group(s).
MJD meetings cultivate a religious gender order whose meanings 
are situational, shaping a religious gendered habitus. Habitus is about 
the incorporation or instruction of the body vis-à-vis moral and social 
values considered proper within the social field, or class, in which one 
is socially situated (Bourdieu 1990; 2004 [1977]). Thinking about gendered 
subjectivity through the idea of habitus is fruitful, as gender is performed 
through embodied acts and dispositions. This chapter will first discuss 
how the young women learn to “make gender” (Ortner 1996) religiously. 
I demonstrate the ways in which a religiously defined gender order is 
constructed and contested within a framework in which a distinction is 
drawn between culture and religion. What gender norms and ideals 
are these youths subjected to in their identification as Muslim women? 
How do they respond to these ideals and discourses? Second, I discuss 
whether the religious discourse taught in MJD and its religious gender 
order, in relation to which they form their Self, can increase the emancipa-
tion of women. What scope of action is available within MJD’s structure 
of values for women to contest and transform the religiously defined 
gender order? 
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1 The moral conduct in Christianity and Judaism is also gender-defined. This does not 
only apply to religion. Different societies define men and women differently (Yanagisako 
and Collier 1987) or, as Butler states, gender is “a variable cultural accomplishment” (Butler 
1990, 142).
2 See Lübcke (2007).
Making Gender through Religion
Gender is socially and culturally constructed, and always acquired (Butler 
1990). Similar to ethnicity and class, gender is an embodied practice 
(Bourdieu 1990; 2004 [1977]). Gender marks space and agency. Being a 
Muslim youth is always a gendered identification. Most religions have 
specific norms on dress, food, or body comportment that are defined 
according to a person’s sex and that dictate how men and women should 
ideally interrelate.1 The Islamic mode of piety or moral conduct is gender-
defined in the sense that the ideals of being pious and how to be a Good 
Muslim are defined differently for women and men. However, the concep-
tualization of Muslim women’s roles that are considered religiously cor-
rect also varies across time and societies, as well as between classes and 
generations within the same society (El-Solh and Mabro 1994). Changes 
in context and education, including religious instruction, can change 
perceptions of social roles and modify an individual’s available bases for 
negotiation and creativity within a specific social field.
Research on young migrant women commonly argues that the process 
of growing up is structured from a traditional, gender-specific role attribu-
tion taught in the family.2 This neglects how a gendered socialization can 
also take form within religious groups and organizations, such as the MJD. 
Gendered expectations, obligations, and rights as suggested by religious 
norms and traditions are taught in the family, as well as in Koran schools, 
mosques, and religious organizations, through the Internet, and by peers. 
The youths in this study also encounter a variety of discursively con-
structed gendered expectations from their families, faith communities, 
schools, and non-Muslim and Muslim peers. The process of learning and 
embodying what is considered correct female behavior, character, and 
dress comportment in a specific social field takes place in different—
sometimes conflicting and sometimes coherent—social spaces such as 
MJD, school, and in the family. In this chapter, I therefore focus on the 
gender order produced in the youths’ faith community, MJD. For these 
youths, familiarizing themselves with a religious gender order through 
which the individual is subjected to a gendered religious habitus is also 
part of the process of crafting a religious Self.
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3 At the same time, Bourdieu stresses that the individual contributes to the reproduc-
tion of existing social structures through bodily behavior (Bourdieu 1990, 2004 [1977]). 
Moi (1991) argues that producing the social body also produces a political body, or an 
embodied politics, which points more in the direction of the possibility of changing social 
structures than Bourdieu’s focus on their reproduction allows.
4 Yet, to the extent that the social fields develop isomorphic properties, including 
perceptions of exclusion and inclusion, and systems of change, the field becomes homolo-
gous (Bourdieu 1990).
5 Additionally, though much of the knowledge taught in this social field is not tacit and 
is expressly stated, as chapter 4 illustrated, there is also a series of unspoken and unarticu-
lated rules about what can be said or perceived in this field. To some extent, then, the social 
field operates with censorship (Bourdieu 1984). As Moi points out: “Within the field, every 
discourse is euphemistic in the sense that it has to observe the correct forms, legislated 
by the field, or risk exclusion as nonsense (…)” (Moi 1991, 1022). Importantly, Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus has rightly been critiqued for not explaining how resistance takes a 
particular form or how that resistance is socio-historically possible (see LiPuma 1993).
The process through which a gender habitus is produced compels a 
complex social process of education (or Bildung). An essential feature of 
this process is how social relations change and mark bodily behavior, since 
habitus is both produced and articulated through gestures, ways of walk-
ing and dressing, and manners (Bourdieu 1990, 2004 [1977]).3 Learning to 
dress, move, and greet is political in the sense that through this process 
one learns a tacit understanding of legitimate ways to (re)present the 
body to others and the Self. As Moi argues: “The body— and its apparel 
such as clothing, gesture, make-up, and so on—becomes a kind of con-
stant reminder (un pense-bête) of sociosexual power relations” (Moi 1991, 
1031). The crafting of a religious Self that is de-ethnicized and defined by a 
religious gender order within a religious youth culture is a continuous 
social process in which the individual actor situates the Self vis-à-vis a 
gender order defined by the group. That said, the youths do not respond 
homogeneously to the particular gender order or dispositions; rather, they 
respond through creative appropriation, as illustrated in chapter 5.4
Much of the knowledge that the young people are expected to internal-
ize needs to remain conscious, and not tacit, in order for the practice of 
this knowledge to remain religiously correct (as discussed in chapter 4). 
Nonetheless, the concept of habitus remains appropriate to our under-
standing of the social processes of the youth, since the social production 
of bodies within this social field also involves basic activities like how one 
moves and how to greet others. These, and similar, bodily behaviors are 
ultimately supposed to become part of the unconscious religious daily 
comportment.5 I have already discussed how corrections, fear of a bad 
reputation, and feelings of discomfort can have a disciplinary effect 
and also promote group attachment, or feelings of belonging to this faith 
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6 I use Ortner’s concept of “making gender” (1996) in order to understand the gender 
formation among the youth in MJD because it incorporates two relevant ideas: on the one 
hand, the idea of the subject as constructed by and subjected to the cultural and historical 
discourses that people have to relate to in their everyday life. Here, the question of what 
kind of identities and subject positions are constructed within a particular cultural, ideo-
logical, and discursive formation is the main focus of attention. On the other hand, it 
emphasizes the ethnographic actor’s point of view, paying attention to how people enact, 
resist, and negotiate the world as given, and how this results in their actually making their 
life-world.
community. Here, I pay attention to how the youth are constructed by 
and subjected to specific religiously defined discourses taught in MJD, as 
well as to the impact that German views of Islam have on their gender 
identities. Simultaneously, I suggest that when the youth are making 
gender through religion, they also enact these discourses differently by 
accepting, resisting, or negotiating gender ideas and ideals.6
The Virtuous Female Body
Research suggests that women are more attracted to religious movements 
than men (Furseth and Repstad 2006; Walter and Davie 1998). MJD is no 
exception: two-thirds of the 600 official MJD members are women. 
According to one of the shura members, this gender ratio has proven to be 
constant and independent of the actual number of members. The weekly, 
gender-divided meetings also see more female than male attendees. 
Further, women seem to participate more actively than men in MJD reli-
gious events and in the administration of MJD events. I have not examined 
the reasons for this; one male shura member suggested that parents are 
enthusiastic about the idea that their daughters participate in a religious 
organization and that many young women feel that if they are involved in 
a Muslim organization, their parent’s social surveillance of their leisure 
activities will diminish.
The process of crafting the Self as a young Muslim woman within the 
religious space of MJD involves perfecting knowledge of religious norms 
about dress, body comportment, and the roles and duties of a Muslim 
woman. In sum, it means making a (new) religious gendered habitus. For 
example, presentations and discussions at MJD meetings refer to the idea 
that Muslim women are the primary Islamic teachers for their children. As 
the mother will be the first teacher for the child, knowledge of and insight 
into Islam becomes a duty in order to be a good Muslim mother. Further, 
the wives of Muhammad are viewed as role models for the Muslim woman, 
which is an identity that is framed in family metaphors such as wife, sister, 
mother, and daughter.
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Through the MJD weekly presentations, the youth become familiar 
with these historical women and their characters, activities, and roles in 
the first Islamic society. Overall, the perception of gender in MJD is pro-
jected through familiarizing its participants with the ideal Muslim Woman 
as provided by the teachings of Islam and in relation to the Muslim Man, 
who I discuss further below. In this process, their understanding of gender 
is distinguished from one, the general (mis)understanding of women 
in Islam by the German, non-Muslim majority; two, their perception of 
the incorrect Muslim woman; and three, their understanding of the non-
Muslim woman as constructed by the Muslim youth’s understanding of 
the German heterosexual matrix.
First, the youth differentiated their religiously defined gender order 
from the more common media stereotypes of women in Islam. For exam-
ple, during one MJD meeting, the young women discussed how the media 
promotes stereotypical views in which Muslim women are seen as with-
out rights and as not emancipated. This perception was then disproved by 
pointing to how women are supposed to be treated in Islam. The youth 
believed that such stereotypes were both a consequence of misinforma-
tion among journalists and people in general about the role of women in 
Islam, and of the fact that people who are identified (by others, though not 
necessarily by themselves) as Muslims do not always behave according to 
Islam. Although they recognized that women are not always treated 
according to the principle of complementary genders in everyday life, 
most of the young women believed that there are ways of strengthening 
women’s situation within Islam. By referring to the role of the wives of 
Muhammad and to prominent religious figures, they pointed to the impor-
tant position of women in Islam historically. The young Muslims also 
made socio-historical comparisons, such as when they stated that Islam 
introduced rights for women that were granted only much later to 
Christian, European women. There was a general belief among the youth 
that if both women and men would only correctly follow the rights and 
obligations stipulated in Islam, such correct behavior would show that 
women are highly regarded in Islam. They believed that behaving accord-
ing to Islamic teachings would assist in changing negative stereotypes of 
women in Islam, and consequently, people would be more likely to con-
vert or at least seek more knowledge of Islam.7
7 As discussed in chapter 4, the potential consequence of this perception leads to a high 
pressure on women to conform their public behavior to gender norms, from herself, peers, 
and significant others.
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Second, the youth frequently drew a distinction between themselves 
and other veiled young people who they considered to not behave in 
a correct Islamic manner. The young women differentiated between 
traditional gender roles (often viewed in ethnic terms, such as Turkish), 
which were practiced among what the youth viewed as less actively reli-
gious people, and the gender roles of de-ethnicized, religiously oriented 
people like themselves. The youth regularly discussed other veiled women 
who dressed sexily at religious youth activities (such as those organized 
by MJD), smoked, or in other ways did not respect Islamic gender rules; 
for example, by mingling improperly with men in public. Through such 
comparisons and distinctions, the youth presented themselves with an 
image of how they should or should not behave in public.
Third, the youth highlighted differences between themselves and 
what they viewed as the typical German woman. This took place through 
discussions about how German women dress (particularly during the 
summer), through critiquing commercials which (mis)use female bodies, 
and by making distinctions between the ideal gender relation between 
men and women in Islam versus in Western societies. These discussions 
fostered stereotypes of German women that are reciprocal to those which 
the majority German society holds about Muslim women, as the young 
people considered the former to be oppressed by the commercialization 
of their sexuality. As I discussed in chapter 3, when Westerners stereotype 
women in Islam as traditional and submissive, this can contribute to the 
construction of Western women as modern and liberated. I have found 
that young Muslim women also stereotype the Western woman as com-
mercialized in order to bolster their construction of women’s position in 
Islam as ideal and emancipated. The following event can illustrate how 
such processes, which resemble Occidentalism, take place:
One cold winter evening, as I was walking with a group of MJD participants 
after visiting the Christmas market at the Schlossplatz, a young woman with 
a short skirt and high-heeled shoes passed us on the way to Alexanderplatz. 
When she was out of sight, Helene (24), a German convert, commented 
to the group: “I am so glad I don’t have to dress like that,” referring to the 
woman’s thin and sexy clothes. A discussion followed about how German 
women feel the need to dress revealingly to attract attention, which not only 
discredits their bodies but is even a health risk.
Women in Islam were considered better off than German women, as 
the former do not have to focus on their outer appearance the whole 
time. Many of the Muslim youth considered the German idea of emanci-
pation to be merely about free sex and about wearing either revealing or 
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8 Founded in 1977, the first German women’s magazine, EMMA, is written “by women, 
for women” and is tied to the name and image of Alice Schwarzer, the most prominent 
feminist in Germany. The name Emma calls to mind the word emancipation in Germany. 
The magazine has since its initiation been a popular forum for discussing abortion, equal 
rights, pornography, and prostitution. The topics it covers have changed from a focus on 
women’s rights and women’s status in the Catholic Church in the 1970s, to issues like eating 
disorders, genital mutilation, and Islam’s treatment of women (Source: Deutsche Welle 
2007). Today EMMA is almost synonymous with feminism in Germany (Eigler and Kord 
1997, 572). In recent years, Alice Schwarzer has also become known for her critical state-
ments about political Islamism and the position of women in Islam. She favors a headscarf 
ban in schools or other public settings, as she considers the headscarf a symbol of oppres-
sion. She warns of a “creeping Islamization” of Europe, which she argues will lead to an 
erosion of Human Rights and women’s rights (ibid.).
unfeminine clothing. The latter stereotype refers to what many considered 
to be the typical feminist ideal in Germany; the so-called “Emmas.”8 The 
German feminists Emmas are Othered by the young women, as the former 
are seen to undermine their own femininity through their bodily perfor-
mances, such as not shaving under their arms.
As discussed in chapter 3, the process of comparing stereotypes of “us” 
and “them” involves making contrasts in terms of status and hierarchy 
and allows differences within social groups, including power differences 
between women and men, to be concealed and controlled (Nader 1989). 
The comparison contributes to social control within the group by produc-
ing the group’s model of womanhood as ideal, in relation to which the 
other group’s model becomes inferior. In both cases, the idealized stereo-
type of the Self, which is compared with a negative stereotype of the Other, 
obscures important power distinctions between women and men within 
these social structures.
Ideals of Gender Relations: Complementarity versus Equality
Through communication with classmates at school, through watching 
German and American blockbusters, and through being exposed to public 
advertisements and the media, the youth experienced or perceived what 
many of them considered to be Western gender-equality ideals, which 
they saw as distinctive from the Islamic gender order. The Western femi-
nist notion of equality was interpreted to mean a specific form of gender 
equality in which the genders are seen as having equal capacities and as 
therefore being entitled to identical opportunities and rights. Such a 
starting point is not compatible with how the MJD youth viewed gender 
relations. Rather, they believed that it is God’s will for men and women to 
be different, and consequently, they believed that space and status must 
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be provided for the realization of specifically female and male potentials 
and values.
Gender relations at the meetings and in discussions among the youth 
are explained in terms of proper roles for women and men. These are 
determined by religious rules and norms, and an effort is made to distin-
guish these from cultural norms and ethnic or national traditional views 
of gender. At the same time, the youth took a clear stance against the 
German ideal of women’s emancipation, which most of them found to be 
focused on sex. Rather than emphasizing equality or sameness, which is 
the focus of Western feminism, MJD encourages young Muslims to view 
each gender as complementing the other: women and men are different, 
and these differences should be given space and lived out in everyday life. 
The Islamic ideal of complementary genders, of what is permitted and 
correct for a Muslim woman both in private and in public, was considered 
different and better than the German emancipation movements that 
focus on the perception of women and men as equal because they are the 
same. The youth distanced themselves from what they perceived to be a 
German interpretation of gender equality and instead emphasized an 
Islamic notion of gender differentiation and gender order. For example, 
while on the subway on our way to a picnic, Ines told me:
I have to do something the whole time. I can’t sit and do nothing; I would 
work even for little money, difficult things even, just ‘cause I cannot sit like 
that and get money from the social office, for example. (…) When I get mar-
ried, in 10, 20 or 30 years, my husband can sit at home and I’ll go to work. [She 
laughs.] No, with us, Muslims, it is like that, that the man should earn the 
money for the family and the woman can work if she likes, but she doesn’t 
have to. They [non-Muslims] make such a fuss about it. That it is oppressing 
the woman. Like, what is it about that (situation) which is not emancipated? 
Isn’t it nice, “nah,” that we can just sit at home with our feet on the table and 
relax and don’t have to work? I don’t see where the problem is. Anyhow, my 
husband can sit at home and I’ll have to work! No, he can work, but I will also 
work, in sha’a Allah (God willing).
Ines recognized that the idea that Muslim women do not necessarily have 
to work is viewed as not emancipatory. However, she found it incredulous 
that women’s right to choose not to work is seen as evidence of oppres-
sion. Yet, although Ines insisted that the Islamic idea of womanhood in 
which a married woman is not obliged to work is unproblematic, at the 
same time she maintained that she personally wanted to work. In fact, 
young women’s aspirations in the educational system were encouraged 
within MJD, where education is promoted as a religious imperative. 
In Islam, employment is considered a right but not a duty for women. 
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9 In her ethnography on Muslim youth in Chicago, Schmidt (2004b, 73) points to a simi-
lar discussion on the rights and obligations of Muslim women to finish high school and to 
work after marriage. She situates the arguments of the youth in terms of the American 
notion of individualism. Although my data suggests that these Muslim youth in Germany 
are shaped by the German gender structure—for example, the encouragement for (West) 
German women to pursue a career—Islamic rather than secular discourses are used in 
MJD to endorse this lifestyle choice.
During MJD meetings and discussions, the first wife of the Prophet 
Muhammad was used as an example: Khadija was a successful business-
woman who employed the Prophet to watch over her caravans.
Within MJD, higher education and employment become part of the 
project to deconstruct the idea of Muslim women as oppressed house-
wives. Working is also important to Muslim women in light of the negative 
stereotypes of Muslim women as not working because they have too many 
children, are prevented from working by their husbands, or because 
Muslim women are perceived to prefer to exploit the welfare state. 
Working while veiled is one way of communicating to German society 
that they, as Muslim women, can also have a career.9 Completing higher 
education and being employed in various occupations thus becomes a 
religious duty (du’a). In other words, the working Muslim woman is pro-
moted as one way to improve the negative stereotypes of Muslim women.
Creating Gendered Religious Spaces
The MJD events that bring men and women together are spaces in which 
youths gain skills in the correct interaction between Muslim men and 
women. In particular, the monthly meetings and the annual summer 
camp establish social spheres where men and women are supposed to 
follow a religious gender order, a process in which the religiously defined 
gender relations become central in shaping the youths’ body-place 
relations. The following ethnographic description of traveling with MJD 
exemplifies this:
As we leave together on a bus, the brothers sit at the front, and the sisters sit 
at the back. In the middle, some seats are reserved for married couples who 
prefer to sit together. The female leaders are at the front, using the micro-
phone to go through the schedule, tell jokes, or initiate games where the 
sisters compete against the brothers. In a similar way to religious meetings at 
some mosques (like DMK in Wedding), children are bringing messages or 
candies between the different gendered parts of the bus. When we stop to 
eat and pray, the prayer is conducted on a grass field next to a petrol station 
and is led by one of the brothers. The sisters pray behind the brothers, as is 
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10 Most mosques insist upon a seating plan where men sit in the front and women 
in the back, physically divided by a screen of some sort, or the men and women sit on 
different floors. Sitting in rows next to each other while on different sides of the room is 
considered too liberal by some Muslims and as too conservative by others.
11 These two suras are often referred to when it comes to dress code. There are some 
differences in the English translations of these suras. Sura 24: 30: “Say to the believing men 
that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty: that will make for greater purity 
for them: And Allah is well acquainted with all that they do.” Sura 24:31: “And say to the 
believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they 
should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear 
thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty 
except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their husbands’ 
sons, their brothers or their brothers’ sons, or their sisters’ sons, or their women, or the 
slaves whom their right hands possess, or male servants free of physical needs, or small 
children who have no sense of the shame of sex; and that they should not strike their feet 
in order to draw attention to their hidden ornaments. And Oye Believers! turn ye all 
together towards Allah, that ye may attain Bliss.” From: http://www.islamicity.com/
mosque/QURAN/24.htm, accessed March 18, 2009.
religiously prescribed. Many women who cannot pray try to hide their 
absence, so that the brothers do not find out that they are menstruating.
Through practices like a gendered division of seating on the bus, there was 
an effort to organize and put spatial boundaries between the two genders. 
The annual MJD summer camps, a kind of “Halal summer camp,” are 
organized with a view to upholding a religiously defined gender order, 
including gender-divided times for sport. Some of the seminars (e.g., “the 
role of women in marriage”) are also geared specifically to women. During 
presentations at the three-day summer camp, women are seated on the 
left-hand side and men on the right-hand side.10 Controlling the gaze is 
another practice that contributes to the symbolic border between the 
genders. By referring to sura 24: 30 and 24: 31, the organizers discourage 
direct eye contact between the genders.11 However, this is mostly in prin-
ciple, as in practice the leaders concentrate on issues like women not 
talking alone with a man or not staring at the men while they play sports. 
Still, contact across the gendered spheres does take place; for instance, 
through glances, taking pictures of brothers on the sly, and in short con-
versations. Indeed, these trips are also a way to get to know brothers who 
are potential marriage partners.
The practice of spatially ordering gender, as practiced on the bus, marks 
the Muslim organization as gendered. The clear rules, firm values, and 
marked spatial arrangements simultaneously differentiate between the 
genders and integrate the group as a whole. In this way MJD becomes a 
sometimes intuitive, sometimes structured, symbolic space for praxeolog-
ical forms. At the same time that practices like greeting, manner, and body 
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management construct symbolic borders between the genders, they also 
create a feeling of belonging to a group or community.
At some MJD events, leaders and participants issued explicit guidelines 
and instructions for dress comportment:
When planning a picnic the forthcoming Sunday, one of the older leaders 
issued directions for the women’s dress, saying: “And we will all wear the 
headscarf there. Remember that the brothers are with us. And I guess I don’t 
have to tell you that we must dress properly. I think we all know what the 
limits are.”
During the same weekly meeting, Fadwa (23) (the leader at that time) 
talked about the upcoming MJD summer camp:
There are going to be around 800 young Muslims there. Let us try to give a 
particularly good impression—in terms of dress—to look good. Think about 
how we will spend three to four days in a Muslim atmosphere and that we 
must also think about (how we present ourselves). It is also a chance to try 
to come further [religiously] with ourselves. At another meeting, we decided 
that for the next meeting we were not going to wear trousers, everyone was 
going to wear skirts. Not that trousers are not allowed, of course. And we did 
Figure 12. Inside the seminar tent at an MJD summer camp. Women sit on the 
left-hand side, men on the right-hand side. Photo: Synnøve Bendixsen.
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12 In so far that gender is central to the construction of collective identity, feminist 
social scientists point to how women often become symbols that mark the borders between 
social groups and categories, and that women come to signify a group or category’s superi-
ority (Moghadam 1994; Yuval-Davis 1997).
it. And the next time we decided that we were not going to wear make-up. 
[Some of the participants make unenthusiastic comments]. And some did 
not wear it for months after, though most have started again. The idea is to 
just little by little break away from some habits. This meeting is also a place 
where one can get used to wearing the headscarf, for example.
Through such speeches the gender roles, norms, and ideals within this 
Islamic faith community are identified and encouraged, which advances 
collectivization. In her speech, Fadwa encouraged specific ideals for the 
young women that they should strive to perform. The upcoming event was 
presented as a space where they could practice and change their habits to 
become proximate to the religious gendered ideals of body and dress 
comportment. Later, I discuss the different ways that the young women 
relate to these discursively constructed subject positions.
The constraints on or expectations related to women’s clothing prac-
tices seem to be more articulated than those for men. For example:
At an MJD meeting, the leader told everyone to take care this year to bring 
along modest clothes to the upcoming three-day MJD summer camp. This 
was an explicit response to the fact that some youth had not brought 
Islamically correct clothes with them the previous year. Bringing modest 
clothes, she said, is not only so that they could get used to wearing these 
kinds of clothes and also to not wearing make-up, but also because “for the 
brothers it is haram to look at you like that, and do you want to cause this to 
your brother?”
Here, the women were partly given responsibility for the male partici-
pants’ transgressions, which were seen as being caused by the women’s 
clothing. The general symbolic elevation of women as bearers of the col-
lective (see Yuval-Davis 1997) is a practice which is brought to the forefront 
in this example.12 One young woman asserted that the brothers should 
also be careful about what they wear:
During the three-day MJD summer camp, Naila (16) complained to her close 
friend and me that she also found it difficult to concentrate on her prayer 
when a handsome man is standing further up in the prayer lines wearing a 
tight t-shirt. Naila further reflected on how as a woman, she was always told 
to be careful in her dress comportment, while the brothers were not 
careful.
228 chapter six
13 The attention I started to pay towards my own dress comportment was a combina-
tion of trying to fit in and trying to make sure that particularly the older leaders of the 
group understood that I respected their way of comportment and that I did not intend to 
try to influence the younger participants with regard to dress. Interestingly, at the same 
time that some of the young women would tell me that “you are dressing more and more 
like a Muslim,” another girl told me “if I was not a Muslim, I would dress the way you do,” 
indirectly indicating that my dress did not pass as that of a Muslim despite my efforts to 
dress modestly.
14 For example, Dunya (25), a student from Austria visiting Berlin for one year, told me 
that she often received the comment “sister, you are wearing the headscarf wrong,” as she 
would tie the knot behind her neck, leaving her neck visible. She found this effort to correct 
her veiling, sometimes also by (Muslim) strangers, annoying.
Apart from Naila’s comment, I rarely heard women discussing the correct-
ness of young men’s clothing in Berlin, though they often discussed the 
clothing of other women. However, I often heard negative comments 
about the incorrect behavior of (Muslim) Turkish or Arabic men in Berlin, 
including the fact that they would talk to unknown (veiled) women, drink, 
swear, and misuse Allah’s name.
Although the above discussion illustrates how MJD offered clear 
instructions about clothing, correct dress comportment was also indi-
rectly developed by participating in a specific atmosphere, something 
I felt in relation to my own body during the fieldwork. After a period of 
time, I started to make sure to cover up extensively when spending time 
with the young women. My desire not to emphasize difference made me 
more conscious of how I dressed during events and meetings with the 
youth. When I failed to do so, such as when too much of my chest was 
revealed, when my sleeves stopped just below my elbows, or my sweater 
did not cover my hips, I noticed that I felt uncomfortable.13 This feeling of 
being ill at ease was not related to any looks or comments (which rarely 
happened) but was more about being in an environment where everyone 
dressed in a particular way and where I felt that I did not fit in with my 
choice of clothing. I understand this as an indicator of the bodily practices 
(Asad 1997) and techniques that are part of the crafting of a specific 
subject.
The Corrections
I noticed that the youths regularly corrected each other when they were in 
public, such as approaching each other if their headscarves were out of 
order or asserting that a friend’s clothing was too sexy.14 Such corrections 
of imperfect performances of conventions have the effect of controlling 
and integrating the individual subject and thus play an essential part in 
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15 I am not suggesting that someone who does not conform to dress and body behavior 
will be excluded from the faith community. However, a person who diverges extensively in 
her comportment and practices when participating in the faith community with which she 
identifies will meet continuous (often well-meaning) corrective comments and sugges-
tions about how she should dress or behave.
16 Gender subjectivity is not a fixed or singular identity, but is based upon a sequence of 
subject positions presented by different discourses, of which some will be in conflict or in 
opposition internally (Moore 2007: 35).
the collectivization process. A social field has rules of inclusion and exclu-
sion, as well as ideas of legitimate and illegitimate practices and discourses 
(Bourdieu 1994). Though much of the knowledge taught in this social field 
is not tacit, but rather articulated explicitly, there is also a series of unspo-
ken and unarticulated rules for what can be said or is considered as legible 
in this field. To some extent, then, the social field operates with censorship 
(Bourdieu 1984). As Moi points out, “within the field, every discourse is 
euphemistic in the sense that it has to observe the correct forms, legislated 
by the field, or risk exclusion as nonsense” (Moi 1991, 1022). There are limits 
on the available choices and room for maneuver: in order to be accepted 
and included in the social field, the individual must operate within the 
borders as normatively defined by the nomos, namely the social rules that 
are of overall importance in a specific social field.15
Moving between different social contexts, such as MJD, school, work, 
and family, the young women were exposed to and engaged with various 
gender orders.16 Consequently, the youth produced gender in relation to 
various social expectations. Furthermore, examining religious discourses 
on gender is insufficient when trying to understand how the young women 
produce gender, as this will not tell us how they react toward these dis-
courses or how they experience the subject positions that they have to 
relate to in their everyday lives. Within the space of MJD, recommenda-
tions or expressions of expectations about dress comportment were not 
necessarily agreed upon or followed homogeneously. For example:
Naila (17) told me that during the three-day summer camp in 2004, she and 
her sister had been approached by a third participant who asked them to put 
on more decent clothes. Naila had responded that she didn’t have any other 
clothing with her. In telling me the story, she also rhetorically asked why a 
young MJD participant should tell her how to dress “when not even my 
mother tells me?”
I understand Naila’s reaction as partly a rejection of, or even resistance to, 
the call to conform, as she could have asked to borrow clothes to conform 
to what her peer considered religiously correct. It further illustrates that 
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youth sometimes felt that MJD was a more restrictive socializing space 
than that of their family. Pressure from peers to conform to group orders 
can feel like a critique of the Self, which can be very effective as the prac-
tices are situated within a religiously defined discourse that the youths 
may find difficult to challenge.
That said, increased knowledge and confidence in the right to be self-
reflective opens up space for individual negotiation or interpretations of 
these ideals. For example, during a wedding, Janna (19), who had become 
more concerned about her religious practice two years previously, told me:
You went to the seminar about marriage, right? [She refers to the seminar on 
women’s and men’s roles in marriage during the annual MJD summer camp 
in 2004, which was only for female participants]. And there was something 
I didn’t agree with, but I didn’t want to argue openly there. Like this idea that 
it is the duty of the women to [have intercourse] with the man if he wants. 
I don’t think it is like that. I mean, Prophet Muhammad s’Allahu ‘alayhe wa 
salam [Peace be upon him] was a perfect man, he would never have made 
the woman do something she didn’t want to… if the woman says no, there is 
a reason for it. Also, I think that if a woman is cheating, it’s ‘cause the man is 
not giving her what she needs, it doesn’t matter if it’s only good sex.
As Prophet Muhammad is particularly relevant to the perception and con-
struction of gender roles, having the knowledge and authority to define 
and narrate the different stories about the Prophet is a symbolic capital. 
Religious proficiency can provide a young MJD participant with status or 
recognition within the religious social field. Janna’s account also illustrates 
internal disagreement over how to understand the duties and rights of 
women in Islam. Although she did not openly express her difference of 
opinion in the group, she seemed determined to follow her understanding 
of the marriage roles of women and men in her own life.
Internal divergences of belief about what is expected of a correct 
Muslim woman in the public sphere is further exemplified in the following 
discussion between Fahra (23) and a recently young German convert (19):
At a Saturday evening party in someone’s home, Fahra tried to convince a 
German convert that wearing the scarf in front of her face (thus resembling 
a Niqab, the piece of cloth worn to cover a woman’s face, sometimes also 
covering the eyes), or looking down when walking the streets in Kreuzberg 
during the evenings was not necessary—as long as she knew how to behave 
correctly in public. Fahra said: “You should not make it so hard on yourself. 
I, for example, know the limits. When I am here with you, I dance and sing 
and am crazy, but when I’m in the streets, outside, then I know how to 
behave. But it doesn’t mean that one needs to walk with one’s head down or 
not be outside at all or be completely covered.” Fahra continued by referring 
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17 I often heard youth discuss the double standards among parents with migrant back-
grounds, in that daughters were treated much stricter than sons. The youth believed that if 
both the daughters and the family were behaving Islamically correctly—that is, following 
what the youth considered to be right and wrong according to Islam—the family would 
not enforce such strict surveillance.
to German converts who stare at the ground when walking in the street, 
which made her think, “Maschalla (what Allah wishes), I hope their hus-
bands are treating them well.” The German convert said that she never 
looked at anyone in the street, always looked down, and sometimes used a 
cover for her face. Fahra found this “extreme,” “unnecessary,” and even 
“unfortunate” because she believed that Muslim women who behave in this 
way send negative signals to non-Muslim society. To her, it was particularly 
problematic that a German convert behaved like this in public. Fahra said 
that she knew many Turkish families who made their daughters come 
straight home after school. She noted that “they are not allowed in the street, 
[the family] only think about honor and reputation—not about Islam. Their 
sons can do everything and their daughters nothing.”
The disagreement about what is necessary and what is extreme exempli-
fies internal differences about what is meant by modesty. Fahra was trying 
to open up the social space for the German convert, who she believed was 
over-performing being a Muslim woman when in public. Fahra argued 
that Muslim women should not limit themselves; it would be enough to 
know how to behave, though Fahra did not really define what that meant. 
Quite joyful and outspoken during the private party, she assured us that 
she knew how to behave as a Good Muslim Woman in public. Fahra 
seemed to fear that what she considered the exaggerated performance of 
the German convert would not make the convert less visible in the public 
sphere. Rather, it would make her more visible to non-Muslims due to the 
negative views of veiled women. Furthermore, Fahra considered the 
stricter treatment of daughters compared to sons to be unrelated to Islam. 
I often heard the youth take a stance against their ethnic group and the 
group’s practices. The youth saw their own increased knowledge of Islam 
as one way to alter what they viewed as the unequal treatment of young 
men and women by their parents’ generation.17
Outside the social space of the faith community, the religious gender 
order seemed to be less actively pursued. For example, I noticed a differ-
ence in how some MJD participants dealt with Muslim brothers at MJD 
events and non-Muslim (male) classmates. Whereas some women did not 
shake hands with a brother, they seemed unconcerned about shaking 
hands with non-Muslim boys at school. On the one hand, this can be 
understood as moving between different social fields, where different role 
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18 Ewing (2008) presents an excellent discussion of the stigmatization of Muslim mas-
culinity in European countries and its effect on men with Turkish backgrounds.
performances are emphasized or considered the correct practice. On the 
other hand, deciding to shake hands with a classmate can also be under-
stood as an effort to not alienate non-Muslims from Islam and may be 
triggered by a fear of being seen as extreme. Clearly, most youths did not 
expect that non-Muslim men would know the rules for how to behave in a 
religiously correct manner toward Muslim women. Additionally, non-
Muslim men were rarely considered potential marriage partners among 
these religious youth, which perhaps made it less important to keep up the 
religious gender order in that social situation.
In their daily lives, the women not only distinguished between Muslim 
and non-Muslim men, but also differentiated between religious and 
ethnic Muslim men. The separation that the youths constructed between 
culture and religion shaped not only the gender order but also has two 
further consequences in the women’s lives—their relations to their ethnic 
social field and their marriage practices. I turn to these next.
Finding a Suitable Husband
Among the youth in Berlin, distinguishing between Islam and culture can 
ultimately facilitate their distancing themselves from negative stereotypes 
of Turks in the German media and public sphere. For example, when 
discussing issues like honor, shame, honor killings, and forced marriages, 
whether among themselves, with other Muslims, or with non-Muslims, 
the young people labelled these issues as un-Islamic and related to tradi-
tional practices. In discussions and when talking with friends, the women 
frequently referred to stereotypical images of Turkish or Arabic men as 
macho and not fulfilling their role as Muslim men.18 The following episode 
illustrates this:
Spending the night for Qiyam al-Layl (“standing at night,” the voluntary 
night prayer), praying, and reading the Koran in a German-speaking mosque 
in Wedding, the youth chatted in between the official program. One of the 
women, Fatima (31), told me, “the [Turkish] woman is not allowed to go out 
[and do the same things as men]. The man can do everything, and the 
woman has to stay at home [in the evening]. The Turkish are machos, 
I know. I can say so, because I am Turkish. But it is not Islam [that makes 
them macho]. In Islam, women and men are equal. It is typical Mediterranean 
temperament, you know. The Spanish and the Italians are also macho. 
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But there are also advantages for the woman, you know. She can feel pro-
tected that way.”
Later the same evening, the Muslim brothers, who were spending the night 
in a different area of the mosque, made dinner for the women. When they 
passed by the women’s part of the house, which was attached to the mosque 
where the food was prepared, Noreen (16) told me, “that is how Islam is 
really; the men should do more than the women. It is just because they are 
not educated that women today do more than the men. You know, the 
Prophet Muhammad used to mend his own socks when he had time. In 
addition to being a statesman, religious (leader), and a good husband.”
The latter comment must be seen as directed toward me, a non-Muslim 
woman who was often invited to convert to Islam. Especially at the begin-
ning of my fieldwork, some of the young women overemphasized what 
they considered positive aspects of Islam in order to combat the negative 
stereotypes they thought I must have been exposed to. That said, the com-
ment also relates to a clear distinction the women made between Turkish 
or Arabic men and men in Islam as defined by the religious gender order 
taught in MJD. During the weekly discussions, the Prophet Muhammad 
was often presented as a role model for any person who is striving to lead 
a correct religious life, and specifically as a role model for how a husband 
should treat his wife. Notably, the young women made a comparison 
between ideal images of religiously devoted Muslim men and stereotyped 
images of culturally oriented men.
The young women also differentiated between Muslims in Germany 
and Muslims in their parents’ countries of origin. The following conversa-
tion among three 17-year-olds during a small friendship gathering illus-
trates this point:
Nawar said, “I am for sure not going to marry an Egyptian. Unless he is mod-
ern. That [he also does housework].” Naila agreed, “the men there, hey! They 
expect women to do everything for them, and with the attitude that ‘that 
is Islam,’ sort of. Like, I often saw men asking women to get them another 
cup of tea or something. Or that the woman is cleaning, lifting the sofa and 
such, while the guy is just sitting in the chair zapping through the television 
channels. Makes me crazy!” Somaya continued, “like, where in the Koran 
does it say that the women are supposed to be cleaning-women? That they 
are only for cooking, cleaning, and giving birth to children? They are really 
bad in Egypt and [the Middle East], not like here. Here, they are different.” 
Naila was of the same mind, “the best Muslims are here! Like there, they kill, 
cheat, lie, and everything. I saw it so often. Like, at least the Muslims I know 
here are really better.” The other girls agreed with her.
Here, the youth drew a sharp contrast between Muslim men in Egypt and 
in Germany. Nawar’s emphasis on marrying a modern man exemplifies 
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19 In contrast, Özyürek (2009) argues that the converted German Muslims in Berlin 
with whom she conducted fieldwork tended to idealize the Turks and Arabs living 
in Turkey and the Middle East and distanced themselves from the Turks and Arabs living 
in Berlin, who they viewed as ignorant and uneducated. The youth in MJD also regularly 
complained about the lack of higher education among the migrant Muslim population in 
Berlin.
20 Strassburger (2003, 217) briefly mentions similar experiences among youth partici-
pating in Milli Görüş, where transnational marriages also occur. In this respect, MJD is 
similar to other leisure and voluntary organizations, such as sports or school bands, where 
youth often find partners.
21 This also is the case in other world religions. The Orthodox Church, for example, 
considers marriage one of the seven sacraments of religion (Khuri 2001, 47). In the Koran, 
how the youth drew on ideas of what it means to be modern. In this con-
text, being modern is not about being a Muslim or not, but about the man’s 
attitude toward and treatment of his wife/ves. Nawar drew a distinction 
between Muslim men in Egypt, who were seen as traditional because they 
pursue gender rules provided by culture, and Muslim men in Germany, 
who were seen as modern because they adhere to gender rules as provided 
by Islam.19 Such rejection of culture and traditions as sources of authority 
establishes a hierarchical distinction between Muslims, namely between 
those who understand and perform their religion in a pure form and those 
who relate their faith to culture and tradition. A modern Muslim is some-
one who struggles for a non-cultural approach to Islam. Thus, to be mod-
ern is not necessarily related to Europe but to how Islam is practiced. 
A modern Muslim is someone who is self-reflexive, seeks to acquire knowl-
edge of the pure Islam, and follows these rules and obligations in their life.
Halal Dating
“I didn’t know MJD was this important to me!” one of the MJD youths 
exclaimed, referring to the large number of young Muslim men at the 
annual MJD summer camp. The youth often complained about how diffi-
cult it was to find a potential husband in Germany. MJD meetings, events, 
and trips became spaces where youth could meet devoted Muslims of the 
opposite sex. Often the youth found their future marriage partners within 
the organization. This is partly a consequence of MJD representing a space 
where there is a relative proximity of participants of the other sex at events 
but also because there is a likelihood of other participants sharing similar 
views about religious beliefs, values, and practices, which in turn enables 
a cultural and religious homogeneity within a relationship.20
Marriage is a central component in regulating sexuality and gender 
relations in the Islamic tradition.21 Marriage can also be a particular 
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one-third of the legal injunctions deal with marriage, the family, and how to properly 
manage and regulate these (El-Hadi 2000). Marriage is deemed a religious duty in the 
course of which one’s religious faith should grow deeper. The contractual frame of 
marriage comprises rights and duties linked to the individual, family, and community 
life (Green and Numrich 2001).
22 Yet, as I suggest later, the young women recognize that the religious men do not 
necessarily follow these ideals.
23 Email dated 24. Dhul Hijja 1426 / January 23, 2006; my translation from the German 
original: “Eine gesunde Gemeinschaft, besteht aus gesunden Familien. Ihr werdet in 
einigen Jahren heiraten, ihr werdet eine Familie gründen und eure Kinder werden die 
zukünftigen Überbringer der Botschaft des Propheten Muhammad sein. Alle Erfahrungen, 
all das Wissen eines Vaters, einer Mutter über die islamische Arbeit wird übergehen auf 
den Sohn oder die Tochter. Deshalb müsst ihr weise sein bei der Wahl eures Ehepartners.”
moment of tension and, in some ways, the ultimate sign of identification 
with the ethnic or religious social field. The importance of having a reli-
giously motivated husband was emphasized in MJD through the assump-
tion that a woman could more easily be persuaded to be lax in performing 
her religious duties than a man. It was also encouraged by the idea that 
a religiously devoted man would be more likely to follow an Islamic, rather 
than a traditional, gender role. These men were therefore believed to treat 
women better.22 The importance of establishing a family and finding 
a marriage partner who was religiously correct was emphasized at MJD 
meetings and in its newsletters. In one weekly group e-mail from MJD, 
a part of the “reform of the Family” item stated:
A healthy community consists of healthy families. In a few years you will 
marry, you are going to establish a family and your children will be future 
bearers of the message of the Prophet Muhammad. All the experiences, all 
the knowledge that a father and a mother have about Islamic work will be 
passed on to the son or daughter. That is why you should be wise about the 
choice of your marriage partner.23
Young men and young women were active in searching for a future spouse, 
and both made use of peers and extended family to initiate contact with a 
potential husband or wife. The young women were sometimes introduced 
to potential suitors through family visits, often initiated by the man and 
his family. These home visits took place mostly between people of the 
same ethnic background. In the course of the visits, the young man and 
woman would be left to talk for a while. I was often told that during these 
conversations, the woman would ask questions about his future plans, 
how he spends his money, his diligence in relation to religious practices, 
and whether his future wife would be allowed to work. The religious 
practice of the man in question was always interrogated in detail. For 
example:
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Ines (20) told me of a situation where her family accepted a request from a 
suitor to visit their home. Ines did not mind that her family was making this 
kind of contact but emphasized to her mother that if the restaurant that the 
man in question owned wasn’t halal, “like if he sells alcohol and the meat 
isn’t proper,” she would not marry him. The mother had responded, “but if he 
has a job in these days?” Ines had answered that, surely, she was not going to 
tell him how to do things, but that for her this was important.
Whereas for her mother economic capital was the most important factor 
in the choice of a marriage partner, Ines insisted that religious or symbolic 
capital had to prevail. In the end, their extended family told them that the 
man was dirty, meaning that he had been with other girls. He was not 
invited back, as moral behavior was “very important to her father.” Thus 
the man turned out to be unacceptable both to her parents and to Ines, as 
his reputation within the ethnic social network was tainted due to unac-
ceptable moral conduct. This shows the continuously overlapping percep-
tions of values between religious and ethnic social fields.
Ines’s story demonstrates how the ethnic social field continues to be 
important in the process of finding a suitable spouse, both as a social 
space to search for a husband or wife and as a source of information con-
cerning the reputation of the suitor or potential wife. Before the woman or 
man decides on engagement, the family interrogates their social network, 
not only in Berlin but also transnationally, about the reputation of the 
man (or woman). This practice became clear to me through the following 
discussion:
Aishegül (31) told me that she was worried that a future marriage was going 
to be difficult for a friend of hers, Kiraz (24). Kiraz lived in Berlin and had 
been engaged to a Turkish man in Istanbul, but she then broke the engage-
ment. Aishegül was afraid Kiraz would consequently face difficulties finding 
a new suitor. When I suggest that if the next suitor lived in Germany he 
would not know about Kiraz’s past engagement in Istanbul, she responded, 
“well, if it is with a Turkish person [in Germany], then they will ask around 
and then they will find out.” In the end, Kiraz married a good friend of her 
sister’s husband, someone who was not Turkish.
Reputation flows across borders, linked through the ethnic social field. 
Moreover, Kiraz’s marriage is one example of the statistically low 
but increasingly common occurrence of mixed marriages among 
Muslims in Germany.24 The increase of multicultural marriages is partly a 
24 According to von Below and Karakoyun (2007, 46) three-fourths of Turkish Muslims 
in Germany marry a Turkish partner. In comparison, half of the Italians in Germany marry 
ethnic Germans.
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25 Symbolic capital is “a credit, it is the power granted to those who have obtained suf-
ficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition” (Bourdieu 1990, 135). I have 
classified the acquisition of religious knowledge as cultural capital rather than religious 
capital. This is because the process strongly resembles that of an educational process 
and includes acquiring technical knowledge, skills, verbal facility, body movements, and 
aesthetic preferences or taste. For example, some youth attended summer courses in Egypt 
(or in Berliner mosques) to improve their Arabic skills and also took weekend seminars 
on religious topics, which also offered course certificates. The power of religious capital 
lies in how it represents a form of objective dispossession through constituting a laity (the 
people of a religious faith, as distinguished from its clergy), who by definition are those 
without, yet desiring, the resources that are controlled by specialists (Bourdieu 1991).
consequence of the focus on a universal Islam detached from an ethnic 
group, where a future partner’s religious knowledge is considered more 
important than his or her ethnic belonging, and partly because many meet 
their future partners in MJD, which is inter-ethnic.
Moreover, just as religious knowledge and the ability to articulate that 
knowledge becomes a symbolic capital and social competence, a reli-
giously devoted and knowledgeable husband can also represent a form of 
symbolic capital. This is particularly so within MJD and the larger religious 
field, where religious devotion and knowledge represents a means through 
which one can gain respect, acknowledgement, and authority. In MJD, 
knowledge and performance of the pure Islam represents cultural capital. 
It is an embodied disposition, including skills learned within the religious 
social field. This cultural capital can be converted into symbolic capital, 
in that religious knowledge, displays of piety, the use of Islamic terms in 
daily conversations, and religious skills are acknowledged and recognized 
within the religious social field.25
Symbolic capital is about accumulated distinction and prestige and 
exists only as far as it is recognized in the eyes of others. It depends upon 
Muslim youths’ capacity to distinguish between what is considered good 
or correct and what is viewed as bad or incorrect within this social field 
(see Bourdieu 1990). These youth, however, must know how to convey 
this knowledge discreetly; although displaying piety openly is part of dem-
onstrating authenticity, to talk about it openly demonstrates a lack of 
authenticity. In order for cultural capital (in this case, religious knowledge 
and skills) to become and remain a symbolic capital, it must be played out 
with care, as it is not considered good practice to boast about one’s hus-
band or one’s own knowledge and abilities in reading the Koran. Modesty 
must prevail. This became clear to me as a German convert, Aysel (20), 
used to talk extensively about the religious excellence of her husband who 
was a hafiz (he knows the Koran by heart) and how he was teaching her. 
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26 Age and experience may, of course, also have an impact on changes in ideas about a 
future marriage partner.
27 It should be noted that some of the MJD participants are themselves children of 
mixed marriages. The group attracts people whose ethnic identification is possibly rela-
tively weak compared to other youths who choose an ethnically homogeneous religious 
organization. Strassburger (2003, 218) refers to a survey among Turkish youth in Germany 
(15–24 years old) about whether the youth would consider marrying someone of a different 
religion. According to Strassburger, the survey indicates that religion is statistically insig-
nificant for inter-ethnic marriage behavior. However, she does not address the level of 
religiosity among the youth answering the survey. Furthermore, 29 percent of the respon-
dents answered that they “think it necessary that their own parents accept the marriage” 
(ibid.), which leaves open the question of whether their parents’ generation is ready to 
accept inter-religious marriages. I also find it important to reflect on the fact that several of 
the married women in their late 20s told me that when they were younger, they never 
thought that they would marry inter-ethnically and that this only changed after they grew 
older and through participating in MJD, which presented them with a multi-cultural space.
One of the older women commented that what Aysel was doing was wrong 
and that she had tried to tell Aysel that she should not boast about this, 
since she believed that it caused other MJD participants to react nega-
tively toward Aysel.
Participating in a youth organization that promotes multiculturalism 
also changes how the young people perceive other ethnic groups. One 
married woman, Fatima (31), recounted that “MJ made me multiculti.” She 
felt that she learned to be tolerant as she interacted with people from dif-
ferent ethnic backgrounds. When she was younger, she had always been 
sure that she would marry a Turk, but then she ended up marrying an 
Egyptian. Similarly, a young Kurdish woman also told me that participat-
ing in MJD shaped her thoughts about life:
When I asked her for an example of how MJD changed her life, she said that 
it had changed how she thought about her future marriage partner. She used 
to think that it was important that her future husband be beautiful, but now 
she had realized that in the long run, his character and his practice of Islam 
were more important. She added that “there is so much crap out there.” She 
told me that she had always practiced Islam, but not “as strict” as since she 
started in MJD.
Her participation in MJD had clearly shaped her worldview, including 
transforming her ideas of what a good husband was.26 Marriages outside 
of the ethnic group of their parents often caused tensions in the MJD 
youths’ family and ethnic social field. Older generations and the extended 
family were particularly skeptical toward marriages outside the ethnic 
group. These marriages often took place after long negotiations between 
the youths and their parents.27 For the youth, stressing the importance of 
selecting a religiously oriented man as a future husband may be a request 
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for cultural homogeneity: because religion is such an important feature 
in their lives and to how they identify, many seek a partner with similar 
values, habits, and practices. It may also be a matter of personal qualities 
that they believe a religiously devoted man will possess; for example, that 
a Good Muslim man will be an attentive husband. Additionally, the role of 
education is particularly relevant: the preferable future husband should 
be an educated man, as he then will be more likely to represent what these 
youths consider a Good Muslim Man.
A mixed marriage can detach the young women further from their eth-
nic group, both emotionally and in terms of their social network. Fatima 
(31) suggested as much:
Sitting in a café in Kreuzberg, I told Fatima that I was interested in MJD in 
part because it has participants with different backgrounds, and she 
exclaimed, “multicultural! Yes, and you know that is quite exceptional. You 
don’t find that, for example, if you go to the Turkish mosques. There they 
only keep to themselves. They don’t want to have contact with others. (…) 
Like with me and my husband [she is married to an Egyptian man]—many 
say that it’s good that we have married and that they respect that and such, 
but we don’t find friends. Like the Turkish men can’t talk with him in Turkish, 
and they don’t like to speak German. You know, when I got married, this man 
who I grew up with and went to school with and had been in the mosque 
with, called me and said that he hoped that I had thought about it all care-
fully [marrying someone not Turkish], that they are so and so (…) and that 
you never know with the Egyptians. Can you imagine? I told him that I am 
27 years old and can think about these matters fine, yes, thank you. Ah yes, 
he called us ‘cause we had asked to have the wedding in the mosque.”
Language was also an important factor in the choice of a husband. I fre-
quently heard that the youths’ parents would prefer that their future 
son-in-law speak their language, as their German skills were often limited. 
Yet, for the youths who were born and socialized in Germany, and whose 
religious social field takes place in German, fluency in German was more 
relevant than Turkish or Arabic. Fatima pointed to how language was a 
barrier for their social interaction with people in her ethnic social field, as 
in her experience Turkish men prefer to speak Turkish. Her comments are 
also indicative of the stereotypes that exist between the various ethnic 
groups in Berlin, although all of them are Muslim.
One opportunity that young people have available to them to find a 
future husband is what might be called “halal dating,” where a couple can 
date with a view to marriage and do so in a religiously correct way. The 
tension between religious norms and the inter-gender socialization pro-
cess is most often resolved by involving a sister or a trusted friend on the 
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28 One active webcam user told me that she was not really sure whether or not this is 
strictly correct but felt that as long as the intention is to get married, which it was for her, 
she thought this would be sufficiently correct.
29 The fact that female experts present in mixed congregations is nevertheless a prac-
tice which is not frequent among Muslims in Germany. In most Islamic organizations, 
including MJD, female experts are only allowed to lead women’s congregations.
30 Scholars (e.g. Ahlberg 1990) have pointed to a general exclusion of women from 
Islamic organizations and argue that the women are not treated as equal to men. Other 
studies, however, have found that women are increasingly making their own spaces and 
becoming more engaged both publicly and privately in the organization of mosques. These 
studies also find that women are activists, da’wa initiators, and teachers (Bendixsen 2009b; 
Göle 1996; Jacobsen 2011; Jonker 2003; Jouili 2009; Spielhaus and Färber 2006). According to 
recent research on mosque organizations in Berlin (Spielhaus and Färber 2006), activities 
for girls and women’s involvement in communal activities have increased from the late 
1990s to 2006. Similar processes were found in Norway, where studies show an increase in 
women’s involvement during the 1990s (Vogt 2000).
date. New technology can also create an acceptable and religiously correct 
space where people can get to know someone of the opposite gender. 
E-mail, MSN, and Skype with webcam have made it possible to create 
more intimate conversations, where the two young people can interact 
with each other in a more private setting while still upholding the reli-
gious norm of not physically being in the same space without supervision 
before marriage.28
Female Emancipation through Religion?
By situating their defense of Islam in a critique of tradition, and by insist-
ing on the privileged position of women in Islam and the particular roles 
of men and women in Islam, the young women try to (re)negotiate the 
perception of Islam both among other Muslims and among the often 
stigmatizing non-Muslim, German public. It is by now a normal practice 
that women from MJD and mosque organizations like DMK give lectures 
on religious themes to mixed congregations.29 Women were also active 
contributors to the monthly newsletter and organize meetings, seminars, 
and social events (such as religious celebrations, picnics, and trips abroad). 
Muslim women are entering and engaging in the administration of reli-
gious organizational structures and are educating themselves to be 
proficient speakers on Islam. In general, women have obtained new roles 
in the organizing and teaching of Islam in several European countries.30
Ironically, the headscarf debate has done much to allow Muslim women 
to develop expertise as public speakers on/for Islam in the German public 
sphere. Muslim women have taken on new functions as they speak in the 
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31 See in particular Ali (1992), Dwyer (2000), Jacobson (1998), Nökel (2006), Salih (2003) 
Shaw (1988), Roy (2004).
media or on the radio, organize events, give lectures, and participate 
in podium discussions. Religious authorities such as Tariq Ramadan 
also advocate for the increased visibility of women in organizations. 
Consequently, many religious organizations use female spokespeople, 
which may well increase their credibility on gender questions in general 
and in the headscarf debate in particular. The representation and public 
involvement of women can be understood as an attempt to counteract 
negative images of Muslim men oppressing women within religious 
congregations and in their homes. Additionally, many of the young MJD 
participants believed they had a serious responsibility to provide role 
models for other young Muslims. The fact that women like them demon-
strably possess organizational expertise and experience in presenting 
religious and political themes can encourage and give self-confidence to 
other women that they can also become involved and have an impact on 
their religious communities.
By increasing their religious knowledge, by behaving religiously cor-
rectly, and by cultivating more religiously observant friends, young women 
can gain social capital and a way out of parental surveillance and control 
while also avoiding criticism that they have become too German. As such, 
identification with Islam can, perhaps paradoxically, lead to an increased 
emancipation from their families. Research on Muslim youths has indi-
cated that young people, and particularly young women, have the option 
of drawing on religious arguments to counter constraints from their 
families and ethnic groups.31 This gives Muslim women a way to avoid tra-
ditional customs, such as forced marriage or withdrawal from the public 
sphere, without damaging the family relationship. In Berlin, I noticed that 
increased knowledge of Islam could provide youth with self-confidence 
and a legitimate foundation from which to challenge some of the restric-
tive attitudes held by the older generation. By reading the Koran and 
familiarizing themselves with the rules and rights within Islam, the youth 
empowered themselves. When their parents tried to restrict their actions 
on the basis of Islam, the girls and young women could “talk back” or chal-
lenge parental prohibitions by referring to Islam and the Koran. Aishegül 
(31) made me aware of this. She was unmarried, lived at home, and studied 
at university. She had joined MJD a few years previously, and started to 
wear the headscarf and to pray regularly. Her parents used to not allow her 
to take part in extra-curricular activities. Aishegül said:
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32 The breakdown of parents’ authority and increased freedom of movement for young 
Muslim women as a result of turning to a pure Islam have been suggested by a variety of 
scholars who disagree on other issues: Amiraux (2001), Brenner (1996), Dwyer (2000), 
Jacobsen (2011), Jouili (2009), Khosrokhavar (1997, 144), Mahmood (2005, 116), Nökel (2002), 
Roy (2004), Salih (2003), Weibel (2000).
“Now I can do whatever I want, and they won’t say no.” Being quite familiar 
with the Koran and its content, she now also argued with her parents. If they 
claimed that a particular action was not in accordance with Islam, she would 
ask: “Where does it say that?” She continued, “and you know, being in the 
Muslim group made me know more about my real rights [according to 
Islam]. Attending Islamic education actually emancipated me. I started to 
know my rights, and that Islam should not be taught at home, but in a 
community and that it is my right to receive Islamic education. At first, 
I asked my parents if I could go (and sometimes I had to argue with them), 
and then I just started to say, ‘I’m going here and there,’ without asking 
permission, ‘cause it is my right. Now I could go to Indonesia, if I wanted to. 
Now they really want me to finish my [university] degree. It is their only 
concern right now.”
Islam can offer a way out of their ethnic social field, and women can try to 
subvert men’s intentions by taking on a religious rhetoric that is detached 
from culture. Here, Aishegül suggests how in some instances, MJD can 
feel like a free space compared to that of the family. The clear distinction 
that is made between culture and religion breaks down hierarchies of 
knowledge, since individuals can wield book-knowledge and sources of 
authority that are necessary for legitimate arguments inside the group. 
This approach to Islam, together with enhanced education and knowledge 
of Islam, makes it possible for young women to de-legitimize their parents’ 
positions by saying that these are based on culture. To some extent, it 
leads to a crisis in their parents’ authority: the youth do not discuss 
religious matters extensively or solely with their parents. Instead, they 
feel that they know more about Islam than their parents and can call upon 
a greater Islamic knowledge and higher moral authority.32 Sometimes the 
young women attempted to shape their own mothers’ practices, such as 
inducing them to veil, and they judged their parents for their lax religious 
lifestyles. In consequence, the age hierarchy can be overturned, and to 
some extent the youth can become the religious educators of their 
parents. This perspective can be seen as an alternative to the oft-cited 
idea that Islam only creates limitations for women and that Islam is a tool 
for parents to control their daughters. As such, the focus on the emancipa-
tory aspects of Islam is an important consideration for those women 
who seek to evade strict controls legitimized as Islamic by their parents 
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but delegitimized as unreligious and traditional by the girls and young 
women.
Reconfiguration of Authority
However, even if I agree with the argument that a young person’s orienta-
tion toward Islam can lead to some degree of emancipation or freedom of 
movement, my fieldwork indicates that this is by no means absolute. 
During fieldwork, I realized that the parents’ authority was often re-
emphasized through Islamic discourses. During presentations, the youths’ 
obligations and duties as daughters or sons and the significant role and 
position of parents within Islam were frequently stressed. It was consid-
ered a great sin to break with one’s family, and the young people avoided 
doing so to the extent possible. The following discussion, which took 
place during the annual MJD regional meeting in a mosque in Wedding, 
illustrates this well:
MJD members from outside Berlin were participating in a one-day event 
with presentations and social activities organized by MJD Berlin. The attend-
ees included about 40 young women and 30 young men from Berlin, Bremen, 
and Cologne. After a presentation by a young, newly trained imam, the 
listeners could ask questions. A woman of about 30 years asked: “What 
about the parents…, if you feel that your parents are too strict, like really too 
much, how should you react?” The young imam answered: “Sometimes there 
are questions to which I feel like saying that it depends on the situation, and 
this is such a question. Allah has told us that after him come the parents. 
And it’s like that, nothing we can do about that. If your parents are doing 
du’a for you, that is a blessing, that is the best. If your parents throw you out 
[that is very bad].” He went on to say that Allah gave them something else at 
the same time, which is that if there is something that goes against His 
wishes, then one should not do it. He continued, “but parents are sometimes 
very strict, we know that. But they have lived longer, have more experience, 
they have seen things. We are modern—we know how it is to live in this 
society. But we don’t always know the right thing to do. We have to think 
about this also.” He added that if they were sure that their parents were 
wrong, “then you have to find a way to tell them that. Like, not in a stressful 
situation, then you will get nowhere. Like, it is the same with your boss at 
work—don’t ask for something when he is in a bad mood. After all, you have 
a goal, and try to achieve that when they are in a good mood. Ask when you 
see that it is a good moment, then start to talk about it (…).”
A young convert put her hand up and continued the discussion: “But how 
should you react when your parents are not Muslims but the opposite, and 
they are saying things against your headscarf and such?” The young imam 
answered: “One should still respect one’s parents and treat them very kindly. 
But not go against Allah.” Another woman insisted, “but what if your parents 
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33 The joke is also available at www.youngmuslims.ca/articles/display.asp?ID=73, 
accessed January 20, 2007.
34 In Protestantism it finds its equivalence in the words of Jesus: “Leave your family, 
leave your friends, leave your home, and join me.” This can also be understood within the 
framework of Alberoni’s (1984) research on movements. He contends that any movement 
creates ethical dilemmas for its members and that each person must show to themself and 
to others that they are a member of the group in order to become part of the movement. 
are making you do things, like forced marriage?” He answered patiently, “as 
I said, parents should not make you do things which are against Allah’s will. 
And in Islam, it is very clear, forced marriage is not allowed! But one has to 
be wise, and find a wise solution to the problem. It is important to find 
people that you respect, and people your parents respect; like that you can 
find a solution. One of the greatest sins, mortal sins, is (to break) with your 
parents. It’s not recommended! There is always a solution to a problem. 
The wiser one is, the wiser solution one can find.” After the question round 
finished, one of the MJD brothers came forward and said, “I want to end the 
meeting with a story. A woman comes to the mosque and tells the imam that 
she wants her daughter to become Muslim. The imam is surprised and asks 
her why. Is she herself a Muslim? No, but our neighbors are Muslims and 
I see how well they treat their parents [i.e. she also wants her daughter 
to treat her like that]. The imam asks, and what about you? She answers: 
‘My mother is already dead!’” The assembled members laughed.33
I noticed that only women asked questions during this discussion, sug-
gesting that these themes might be more imperative for young women in 
their roles as Muslim daughters compared to young men. The young 
women need to find a path between what they see as their Islamic duty to 
remain respectful toward their parents and the imperative to follow what 
is correct according to Islam. This can lead to moments of tension where 
what is considered the right answer is not clear-cut. Young women can 
employ religious arguments in their discussions with their parents, but at 
the same time, the respect and authority that Islam gives to their parents 
create limits to this emancipation process. Islamic teaching frequently 
emphasizes the parents’ role and position in Islam. Being a good daughter 
includes respecting one’s parents, their needs, and their knowledge. For 
example, during an MJD meeting Fadwa contended that “each one of us is 
so fortunate because we have received the best parents.” Another princi-
ple often mentioned is that “the best Muslim is the one who takes proper 
care of their family.” It is an important part of Islamic family law, even if it 
is not tied to any specific legal injunction (Roald 2001). Thus, when young 
people’s knowledge of Islam increases, this does not subvert the authority 
of the family, but it does restructure it. The family’s authority is reinstated 
through the youth’s religiosity.34
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This includes leaving behind old ideas and fidelities: “leave everything and come with me”; 
“leave your father and mother and join us.” At the same time, such dilemmas are expressed 
in a form of double bind: “leave your father and mother” and at the same time the instruc-
tion to “honor father and mother” (Alberoni 1984).
35 The role of women in different Muslim organizations in Berlin varies. In one mosque, 
some women decided to make their own women-only religious community “because the 
men only created problems.” Others complained about male dominance when working in 
certain mosque organizations (outside MJD). However, the solution these Muslim youth 
proposed to improve this situation was not that the men should become more German but 
that they should become more educated, and especially become more educated about 
Islam.
Furthermore, even if the young people themselves understand gender 
roles in a religious way and try, to a greater or lesser degree, to follow this 
in their daily lives, this does not stop them from facing social expectations 
that they personally believe are solely ethnically or culturally based. 
Although the youth themselves turn to what they believe is a true Islam, 
their parents and traditionally or culturally oriented Muslims do not nec-
essarily share this understanding of Islam. This means that the youth must 
mediate between different religious and cultural frames of reference, 
ideals, and values. Social practices and restrictions considered tradition-
ally or culturally defined continue to be asserted and sometimes prevail. 
For example, the father of one eighteen-year-old MJD participant did not 
allow her to move outside Berlin in order to pursue her university degree. 
Additionally, at one point Ines (20) explained that she did not want to visit 
the doctor until she was married because there was always someone who 
would see her and who might start talking about “why she is there.” She 
was worried about the gossip that might damage her reputation, even 
though she was not behaving religiously incorrectly by visiting the doctor 
while not married. This calls to mind the community policing (Dwyer 
2000, 479) that I discussed in chapter 3.
In this representative role the women did accept limitations on the 
subjects they could speak about, as many considered it necessary to focus 
on how Islam empowered their lives. It can be difficult for women to be 
critical of their own group, as their agency becomes oriented toward 
“defending” their group and their men. It is my impression that both 
women and men show a strong preference for arguments or struggles 
against the continued gender discrimination within different Muslim 
congregations to take place in the private sphere, away from the (critical) 
gaze of non-Muslims.35
Although a religiously defined gender order may provide the youth with 
more space for negotiation than culturally defined gender norms, women 
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36 It is not my impression that the young women I worked with were specifically pursu-
ing a so-called Muslim feminist position. For a discussion on the usefulness of the concept 
of “Islamic feminism,” see Mir-Hosseini (2006) and Moghadam (2002). Moghadam, focus-
ing on Iran, contributes to a general understanding of the potentiality and limitation of 
Islamic feminism.
37 Anne Sofie Roald contends that “this segregation is not always visible, but even when 
men and women are present in the same room there will be an invisible barrier due to a 
strong idea of segregation inhibiting interaction between the sexes. The result is that men 
and women have access to different information” (Roald 2001, 76).
38 In several mosques, women listen to the prayer and religious presentation (khutba) 
via a loudspeaker system or a television feed from the men’s section. In conservative theol-
ogy, a woman’s voice is considered erotic and is thus not suitable to hear, especially in ritual 
contexts.
are not able to decide on legitimate interpretations of religious rules and 
texts. As discussed in chapter 5, the youths are not free to define what a 
Good Muslim Woman is and cannot freely choose the actions that are 
legitimated within the religious discourse. In fact, women seldom partici-
pate in the authoritative interpretation of the rules and texts.36 Overall, 
women have limited access to or ability to participate in pivotal discus-
sions about religious interpretations. These discussions are generally con-
trolled by men. In consequence, women’s experiences and interests are 
easily omitted. This gender-divided social space in the religious field 
points to the different sources of information available to men and 
women.37 The physical and spiritual gender separation may lead to men 
and women not adequately sharing knowledge of each other’s experi-
ences and to a situation where women receive insufficient information 
and where there is little room for their opinions. Effectively, there is a risk, 
intended or unintended, that male privilege and male interpretations are 
(re)produced.
Different discourses on what pure Islam is generate conditions for the 
social space within which these youths operate. This space becomes espe-
cially tense in view of the fact that the correct construction of the gender 
order is itself the subject of much disagreement and discussion about 
values and attitudes among Islamic organizations. Although there was a 
balanced gender representation in MJD activities and five of the ten mem-
bers in the shura (religious council) were women (in 2008), the national 
leadership (the Vorsitzende or Amir) of MJD has since its founding been 
male. There are still religious situations where gender remains a crucial 
category. For example, women cannot lead the prayer in mixed congrega-
tions, and the women must pray behind the men, sometimes in a separate 
room.38 There were generally no discussions about gendered prayer spaces 
and ritual performances, and these were accepted as given by Islam. 
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39 See Jonker (2003) for a discussion about the increase in women’s spaces within 
mosques and the entrance of more women with religious education, which she argues in 
the long run may shape religious knowledge formation generally. Jonker argues that the 
production of knowledge among Muslims in Germany is still structurally connected to an 
overall male core. At the same time, she shows that there are Muslim women who produce 
knowledge in “external production sites” (Jonker 2003, 37), outside the domination of male 
authority.
In sum, there were situations where the young women’s religious knowl-
edge might not represent a symbolic capital; in particular, the structure 
and production of religious knowledge formation continues to be largely 
male-dominated.39 A woman’s religious knowledge thus only increases 
her symbolic capital in certain restricted areas, such as when talking to 
other women and when choosing a marriage partner.
An Alternative Space
I see the set of dispositions, knowledge, and forms of behavior that the 
young women acquire through acting within this religious faith commu-
nity as representing the acquisition of a (new) religious habitus and bodily 
hexis—a way of comporting their bodies. The clear distinction that the 
youths made between culture and tradition on the one hand, and religion 
on the other, made it possible for them to not feel betwixt and between 
their parents’ home country and Germany. One of the original MJD initia-
tors, Fatima (31), said that:
“Religion can be a bridge (because it combines both). One can say ‘I am 
a Muslim’ and it does not matter whether one is German, Turkish, or Arabic.” 
She explained that since their parents are Muslims, even if they are not 
necessarily religiously active, the utterance “I am a Muslim” would be 
accepted.
Fatima’s comment exemplifies how identifying foremost with religion 
can form a space for youth who otherwise must struggle between their 
parents’ expectations that they be Turkish or Arabic and those of their 
peers or teachers who do not consider them German. Moreover, through 
becoming skilled at and gaining knowledge of what constitutes correct 
knowledge and how that knowledge is validated (as discussed in chapter 
4), as well as about correct dress and body comportment defined by a 
religious gender order, the youth are crafting a religiously gendered, de-
ethnicized Self in Germany. Separating tradition and culture from religion 
enables the young women to dismiss certain gendered expectations on 
their behavior as cultural. Simultaneously, although there are individual 
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responses and internal disagreements, the religious field (like any social 
field) imposes specific kinds of efforts or struggles on them as actors.
Constructing and encouraging a Muslim identity detached from ethnic 
or national identity may well be an effort to achieve recognition for Islam 
as a religion at home in Germany, and for Muslims as not migrants, but 
German citizens. In the long run, it is likely that Islam and Muslims will be 
more accepted in German society if Islam is viewed as practiced by indi-
viduals who identify and are viewed as citizens of Germany. To some 
extent, then, MJD and its work represent an identity movement that seeks 
to create or underline a social and cultural identity of a group (or category) 
in order to change this group’s status in society. Islam provides a glue 
between them and their friends; one that many are seeking to investigate 
further. The religious sphere offers a way out of the ethnic social field 
without seeking to be embraced by the non-Muslim, German social field. 
Yet following a pure Islam represents an alternative universality through 
which the youth maintain the position of the Other.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE MEANINGS OF AND INCENTIVES FOR A RELIGIOUS 
IDENTIFICATION
To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions 
any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any ele-
ment that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that 
connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any 
kind of relation experienced must be accounted as “real” as anything else in 
the system.
–William James 1996 [1912], 42
At 5 PM, as I enter the weekly MJD meeting in Kreuzberg, there is no one in 
the front room, which is filled with baby strollers. In the inner room, I greet 
all 19 girls and women with “Salam Aleikum,” to which some of them respond 
“Aleikum Salam.” Current female participants and older ex-participants 
(who have children or are older than 30, and several of whom have brought 
their young children) are seated on the floor in the small room, which has a 
window to an inner courtyard. It is the annual membership meeting for all 
female members of MJD in Berlin. When I enter, the discussion concerns the 
decline in participation over the past weeks. One of the older participants 
asks, “why do the younger members not come any more?” Some suggest that 
there is no new generation of “MJD-ers.” Now that the first MJD generation 
has grown up, no recruitment drives have been held to attract younger mem-
bers. Fatima (31) adds, “maybe we are so used to MJ that we are not doing 
enough to promote it to others anymore. That we forget about it?” She asks 
the younger participants, “what would you miss if MJ wasn’t there? Why is 
MJ important?” Before anyone can answer, one of the founders of the orga-
nization, Lana (35), argues that the problem is that MJD has not evolved. 
When she thinks back to how MJD was ten years ago, she thinks it looked the 
same as today. Lana continues, “but the youth today have changed. Look at 
my nine-year-old sister—she doesn’t think the same way as me. We must ask 
them, why they do not come, or what they want. When we started, it was so 
new. (…) Today there are more things, like Finnowstrasse does a lot, and Al 
Nur, and they are very well attended! That is good, of course, but we have to 
think about our concept, our target group and what we want.” Fatima inter-
jects that “it is important for young people today to develop their Muslim 
identity.” Lana persists, saying that “MJ was thought of as being for the young, 
and by the young.” She feels that the older members should retire from the 
organization. Somaya (17), one of the young, currently active members, 
brings up the weekly meetings: “It is always the same people who do the 
presentations and that is not fair for them [i.e. they do all the work]!” She 
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1 The MJD Berlin group went to Paris in fall 2005. Each year, MJD arranges a trip abroad, 
for example to Istanbul, Paris or Spain. On these trips, they visit mosques and make use of 
contacts with Muslim organizations in the respective countries.
says that when she knows she will be presenting, she makes sure to attend 
since she feels more obligated to be there. One of the elders insists that the 
younger members should say what is wrong, but the young girls are reluc-
tant to speak. A woman in her late 20s (married, with two children) says, “for 
me, when I started here [six years ago] it was important, ‘cause it was the 
first place where I could find Muslim friends! I was at a school with only 
Germans and I was the only one at school with a headscarf. For me, it was 
very important to come here and develop friendships. It was important to be 
able to be in a place where the other women were Muslim, to be able to 
develop friendships with Muslims, others who think like me.” Another for-
mer member adds that “it is like a second family.” Aishegül (31) agrees, “that 
is also what it should be. The knowledge isn’t the most important aspect, but 
that a sisterly feeling develops. Like a second family! The community 
[Gemeinschaft] feeling. Knowledge could develop somewhere else. It is 
more important that we do things together, social events like the movies and 
such.” Jenny (26) adds, “and then we have children and they get to know each 
other and perhaps even go to same kindergarten and school!” Somaya sug-
gests that “maybe the themes should be more contemporary? Not so much 
about what the Prophet did and such, but more about themes like, for exam-
ple, how to deal with questions we are asked about the headscarf.”
After some discussion, Fatima inserts, “it is about learning to live as a young 
Muslim in this society, without making it so hard for ourselves. We should 
not pretend to be something we aren’t [being cool], but also not less than we 
are.” Lana refers to the beginning of MJD, when it was first established in 
Berlin: “There weren’t that many of us, and so we did a lot together and like 
that you really came to know each other. It doesn’t mean that you get along 
with everyone. That is not possible. But we developed a sisterly feeling.” 
Jenny says that “it has made me everything I am today! When I first started, I 
didn’t have a headscarf, and I didn’t know anything. I learned everything 
here!”
Turning the discussion towards the young current participants, Latifa (17) 
says that she started in MJD in January, and subsequently donned the veil. 
She admits that she sometimes skips the meetings, but that the Paris trip 
was important to her.1 There, she started to get to know the others more and 
she realized it is important that they experienced this together. Other ado-
lescents agree, adding that the Paris trip was important for developing sis-
terly feelings or a feeling of community; they think it is important to have 
fun together. Lana asks Latifa: “Is it like a family to you?” Latifa is hesitant—
she would not really define it like that, she says. Fatima says, “when I moved 
to Berlin [from Frankfurt] I didn’t know anyone, I only knew that there was 
an MJ here too! So, when people move from one place to another it is also a 
contact network since MJ exists in different regions.”
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2 One of the opportunities provided by a more plural market in the urban sphere is the 
possibility of switching between communities or changing one’s allegiance to a particular 
community if one does not want to associate with their cause or method.
3 Some saw the MJD group in Berlin as more of a family organization at the beginning, 
because of the active involvement of a whole family. The impression that participation in 
MJD Berlin was more intense when it first started can also be understood within the frame-
work of the formative stage of social movements, which Alberoni (1984) discusses. Alberoni 
views social organizations as going through different stages where one of the most funda-
mental characteristics of the first stage is the solidarity of the new group.
This discussion reflects the overall development of religious organizations 
in Germany since the 1990s. When first established in 1994, MJD filled a 
gap for the young generation in terms of available religious spaces. In 
recent years, youth have been given more space within several mosques 
and organizations (Spielhaus and Färber 2006). Some religious organiza-
tions and movements today target Muslim youth specifically, which illus-
trates the development of a diverse religious market, as discussed in 
chapter 2. Although many MJD participants emphasized that this is a posi-
tive development, there was a certain level of rivalry between the organi-
zations over membership and attendance in the different spaces in the 
diverse religious urban sphere.2
In the above discussion, one of the older members felt that MJD was no 
longer meeting the needs of the current Muslim generation. Lana sug-
gested that it was important for religious organizations to not be static, as 
this would affect the (lack of) membership. Rather, religious organizations 
like MJD should evolve in response to each new young generation, and 
each new generation should partly define and form the space. MJD is 
unique in that all members are between 15 and 30 years old, and there are 
no imams. Just as the religious authorities and knowledge accepted as rel-
evant are not static, the space, members, and content of the organization 
also changes. This internal discussion also highlights the heterogeneity 
within the religious group. There are both intra- and inter-generational 
differences in what MJD represents and means for individual members. 
For some (and in particular for German converts), the focus on knowledge 
was most important, whereas others emphasized the feeling of commu-
nity or family within the organization.3
In this chapter, I focus on the different incentives and motivations to 
take up a religious subject position, and to identify with Islam in general 
and with a Muslim faith community in particular. What are the politics 
that bring together a group of youth within an organization that advocates 
piety? What are the experiences that motivate these youth to participate 
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4 In Mitchell’s words: “The setting and situations, therefore, stand in a reflexive relation-
ship to one another. I mean by this that an analyst wishing to interpret a specified type of 
behavior in a town needs to work with two different referents simultaneously. The first of 
these is an appreciation of the set of circumstances in which the actors are placed and 
which determine the arena within which the analyst postulates the behavior must take 
place. The second is an appreciation of the set of meanings the actors themselves attribute 
to the behavior. The analysis then consists of an interpretation in general theoretical terms 
of the behavior as articulated both with the setting and with the actors’ cognitive defini-
tion of the situation” (Mitchell 1987, 17). Thus, there is no universally specific set of contex-
tual parameters that the researcher must include in any research, nor a list of factors which 
must be spelled out in each situation.
in such a religious organization? Put differently: which socio-historical 
structures contribute to creating and forming this local religious youth 
culture?
Research on Muslim youths’ turn to Islam has generally pointed to 
external social forces, such as economic poverty, lack of social capital in 
the non-Muslim society, political Othering of their social identity, and the 
contradictory expectations from their parents on the one hand and teach-
ers and school peers on the other. Although a combination of these expla-
nations may help us understand why youth identify with MJD, I find them 
dissatisfactory as they ignore the meanings the youth ascribe to what they 
are doing. Instead, any effort to comprehend their turn to Islam must 
include both an examination of the broader context and an explanation of 
the meanings the youth, as social actors, ascribe to their own participation 
in the organization. It is necessary to look at the set of circumstances in 
which the young women are situated and which form the arena in which 
the analysis of their behavior must take place. It is also necessary to recog-
nize the set of meanings the young women attach to their behavior.4 It is 
critical that scholars provide an understanding of the turn to Islam as it is 
expressed both within the particular setting and using the young women’s 
cognitive definition of the situation.
I will first briefly discuss the “why” question by examining the norma-
tive standpoint from which this question is posed. Second, I argue that 
identification with this faith community should be understood within the 
socio-cultural, economic, and migratory context in which the youth grow 
up. Third, I show that their turn to Islam can only be understood if we also 
take seriously the set of meanings that they attach to their Muslim iden-
tity. Limiting our understanding of youths’ religious identification to the 
external socio-cultural context is not satisfactory, as it ignores how reli-
giousness and desires play a significant factor in the youth’s identification 
processes and how a religious group may actively seek to attract new 
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5 There is also a long scholarly debate on why Christian women seem to be more reli-
gious than Christian men. For a short overview of this discussion and one way to explain 
Christian women’s religiosity, see Walter and Davie (1998).
6 This includes Hardacre (1993), Moghadam (1994), and Yuval-Davis and Sahgal (1992).
7 For example, Grewal and Kaplan (1994). For a critique of this view, see Bracke (2003) 
and Dwyer (1998). Bracke (2003, 337) reflects upon how the idea of “false consciousness” is 
gendered and ethnicized.
members. Overall, this chapter draws attention to the complexity of indi-
vidual identifications with Islam, where global, national, local, and per-
sonal factors must be considered, and specific characteristics of religious 
experiences must be embraced.
Why Are we Asking Why?
The normative question of why women embrace religious norms and reli-
gious communities has been central in studies about Muslim women 
since the 1990s, and has been addressed in different ways (Bracke 2003).5 
Scholars have found it curious that women embrace, seek comfort in, and 
even find a sense of empowerment in Islam and religious (fundamental-
ist) organizations that many, including the scholars themselves, regard as 
subjecting female bodies to patriarchal gender structures. Several scholars 
(and self-described feminist scholars in particular) have seen women’s 
participation in such organizations as either a paradox or as a perplexing 
question.6 Some scholars tend to consider women who actively partici-
pate in religious organizations to be victims of false consciousness and to 
be disciplined by fundamentalist and repressive formations.7
In debating multiculturalism, Susan Okin (1999), a liberal feminist phi-
losopher, claims that there is an inescapable tension between gender 
equality ideals (or feminism) and cultural recognition of groups (or multi-
culturalism). She argues that individual rights, and particularly women’s 
rights, risk being inadequately protected if group rights are privileged over 
individual rights, since culturally defined groups are led by men. In this 
vein, some researchers (e.g. Badinter 1989) make arguments based on a 
“universal” feminism. These scholars posit that even though Muslim girls 
seem to choose to wear the headscarf, this does not mean that they are 
autonomous, as the headscarf is a symbol of subordination. In this view, 
because the content of the women’s cultural norms, such as modesty, 
self-discipline, and gender segregation, is in opposition to personal auton-
omy, the women risk being subordinated by adhering to their faith 
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8 To a large extent, these arguments follow a conventional explanation of the appeal of 
religion within sociological scholarship on religion, namely that people become religious 
in times of economic hardship, loss or grief, physical suffering, poor health or loneliness 
(see Berger 1967; Glock and Stark 1965). Sociologists of religion tend to investigate the 
problems of the social order more than the individual’s psychological responses.
communities. Mookherjee (2005) points out that these perspectives call to 
mind John Stuart Mill’s statement that “[a] person’s autonomy depends 
not only on how they make their choices, but also on what they choose” 
(Mill in Mookherjee 2005, 33).
Western-oriented scholars seem to be focused on the question of why 
women are turning to what is considered an oppressive religion, thus 
starting from the assumption that the women’s religiosity is irrational or 
an abnormal decision in need of explanation. This starting point takes for 
granted that it is the situation where youth are religiously active or virtu-
ous that needs to be explained, whereas having a distant relationship to 
religion is normalized. Secularization and secular individuals become the 
neutral starting point, which ignores how the secular body is also consti-
tuted by discursive powers (see Asad 2003). Although I recognize the sub-
jective starting point of my inquiry, I nevertheless discuss why young 
women turn to Islam and identify with a faith community. Such discus-
sions contribute to our understanding of the social contexts and spheres 
of power in which the crafting of a religious Self is situated.
The Question of Why: External Social and Cultural Context
How have social scientists explained the turn to Islam among young 
migrants in European cities? In the early 1990s, scholars (and particularly 
French scholars) thought that youth turned to Islam as the only option 
available, due to the conflicting demands of the majority society and their 
ethnic group (Sahgal 1992). The new Islamic revival observed among sec-
ond generation migrants in French cities was explained as a response to 
external forces like discrimination (Cesari 2002, 2003), daily racism, and a 
way out for youth who were more or less excluded or rejected from society 
and who were searching for a sense of direction (Khosrokhavar 1997).8 In 
“Islam of the youth” (L’islam des jeunes), Khosrokhavar (1997) distinguishes 
between the Islam of the excluded (l’islam des exclus) and Islam as a 
source of integration (l’islam de l’intégration). He defines the Islam of the 
excluded as a neo-communitarian construction where Muslim youth 
try to give meaning to their lives in a society where they feel left out and 
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9 As noted, Khosrokhavar argues—erroneously, in my opinion—that there is not one 
Islam in France, but several, that each are subject to their own dynamics and only vaguely 
influenced by the others. Consequently, Khosrokhavar deals with the Islam of the excluded 
and Islam as a source of integration as relatively independent types and approaches by 
different categories of people who hold different social positions in French society. As 
discussed in the introduction, I view Islam as a discursive tradition (Asad 1986) that recog-
nizes that various strategies of responding to Islam and even performing Islam do not lead 
to the fragmentation of Islam that Khosrokhavar suggests, or to different types of Islam. 
Rather, they represent different strategies by which people can orient their practices 
within the Islamic discourse.
10 Author’s translation from the French original: “‘travail’ sur soi et sur les autres.”
11 Not specifically targeting Islam, but all religion, Yuval-Davis and Sahgal argue that 
“religion provides a compass and an anchor; it gives people a sense of stability and mean-
ing, as well as coherent identity (Yuval-Davis and Sahgal 1992, 6).”
without a social space. However, he also shows that Islam can be a source 
of integration: young Muslims use Islam in order to create a social position 
within France.9
Khosrokhavar (1997) argues that for unemployed youth in the suburbs, 
religiosity represents an alternative “‘work’ on the self and on others.”10 
Likewise, in the United Kingdom, Jacobson (1998, 116) sees the turn  to 
Islam as an alternative to unemployment prospects and as a quest for 
certainty, as the youth are “prone to feelings of uncertainty and gen-
eral ambiv alence over questions of identity, in the face of problems per-
ceived to arise from racism, family conflict, life in the secular and immoral 
‘West’, culture clash, or any combination of these and other factors.” Rogers 
and Vertovec (1998, 15) regard the identities of Muslim youth in Europe as 
“often forged in reaction to negative and essentialist representations of 
both Islam and migrants,” whereas Amiraux (2003, 246) argues that “Islam 
furnishes the tools for ‘identity management’ of migrants’ exclusion to 
attain a measure of autonomy and enhance the possibility for ‘integration 
without assimilation’.” It is also viewed as a way for youth to liberate them-
selves from their family without damaging the family relationship (Salih 
2003). Others argue that French Muslims who affirm their Muslim identity 
are “social actors who, deprived of other legitimate means of asserting 
their collective presence, have recourse to the means of expression that 
are closest to them at their cultural level” (Leveau 1988, 107). More broadly, 
in relation to the emergence of Islamist Movements globally Moghadam 
(1994, 11) argues that “Islam provides a stable identity in a rapidly changing 
society.”11
These explanations indirectly suggest a strategic-instrumental reason 
for embracing Islam. Women may engage in religious practices as a 
form of refuge. Islam and the expression of Islam become one of many 
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12 At the same time, there are also internal differences, as some youth were from Turkish 
families, others were from Arab families, and yet others were from mixed marriages where 
one parent was German. However, there seemed to be a common experience of being dif-
ferent from ethnic Germans and of belonging to the migrant population in Germany.
13 The term “horizon” has long been used within German philosophy. Gadamer uses it 
to refer to “the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular 
strategies used in order to overcome the precarious social situation in 
which the youth find themselves. Islam becomes an instrument with 
which to construct an intact subjectivity. This understanding of the turn 
to Islam focuses on Islam presenting youth with tools with which to oper-
ate in society. How does this resonate with the youth in Berlin and with 
their identification with Islam in general and MJD in particular? To what 
extent does the socio-cultural context and economic conditions motivate 
the youth in this study to turn to Islam?
Being with Others like Themselves: Socio-Cultural Background
There is no doubt that the social, cultural, and economic situation of the 
Muslim youth with whom I have been working has real consequences for 
their identifications and their experiences of growing up in Germany. The 
social area in which they live forms young people’s lifestyles and experi-
ences (Jenkins 1983). Youth with a migrant background generally live in 
neighborhoods with social problems, such as high unemployment, social 
stigmatization, and general cultural and social deprivation. The youth in 
Berlin are no exception; most of them grew up in Kreuzberg, Wedding, and 
Neukölln, which are poor neighborhoods with high unemployment rates.
The youth who decide to come to MJD have often already visited differ-
ent mosques and youth groups. The majority of the young female partici-
pants were not sent by their parents, but learned about it from friends, 
schoolmates, or from fliers at various Islamic events. When I asked 
(whether explicitly or indirectly) why they participated in MJD, the youth 
frequently emphasized the need to “be with others like themselves.” To 
some extent, this expression calls attention to the socio-cultural similari-
ties among the MJD participants, since coming from a migrant family 
means that they have different life-narratives or biography formations 
than their ethnic German peers.12 However, being with “others like them” 
also refers to others with a similar lifestyle orientation, forms of religiosity, 
and a shared experience of self-transcendence. I discuss the latter topics 
in greater detail below.
These (mostly) second-generation youths articulated certain shared 
horizons of experience13 that were significant to their lives, including 
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vantage point” (Gadamer 1989 [1975], 302). It has been used in similar ways by Husserl and 
Heidegger. The sociologist Karl Mannheim, as well as the philosopher of science Karl 
Popper, used it with “expectations,” as “horizon of expectations.” In this book, my use of the 
term “horizon of experience” encompasses subjective experiences and visions, as under-
stood by subjects situated within a specific socio-economic context.
14 In this framework, the return to Islam observed among many Muslim youth in Europe 
is considered part of identity politics (Cesari 2003; Khosrokhavar 1997) or a form of “poli-
tics from below” (Leveau 1988). This is seen a modern phenomenon, with similarities to 
social movements (Göle 2003, 812).
experiences of migration, social stigmatization, economic situations, and 
family structure. Further, the youth negotiated between at least two differ-
ent societal systems as a consequence of the choices their parents made. 
The confrontation with so-called cultural differences between their par-
ents and German society structured the youths’ experiences and shaped 
inter-generational relations. The youths’ shared horizons of experience 
also included transnational links with majority-Muslim countries through 
vacations, extended family, and consumption of media.
Through my fieldwork, I realized that the youths’ mode of identification 
with Islam must be viewed in light of their experiences as migrants or 
Others, and of the stereotyped categorizations they are subject to in 
German society (see chapter 3). Charles Taylor (1994) reminds us that any 
identity (be it individual, political, communal, ethnic, or national) is 
shaped by recognition, non-recognition or mis-recognition of others. 
Identification with Islam in general and with a religious organization in 
particular, is one way for youth in Berlin to deal with an otherwise margin-
alized position. Enforcing a religious identity and attempting to modify 
the negative content of the Muslim category can offer these youth mean-
ing, positive self-perception, and a feeling of control. Moreover, it is one 
form of identification that was readably available to them. Trying to be 
identified as a German was frequently impossible, as they were not 
accepted as such by anyone.
Embracing Islam can be a search for a collective identity. Today, many 
Muslim youth search for a public articulation of authenticity. This often 
takes place through symbols that represent their religious identity, and is 
a way to claim recognition from the larger society. In Berlin, the turn to a 
Muslim identity among youth can be understood as expressing difference 
and demanding public recognition of that difference, a process often 
described as identity politics.14 Here, I follow Calhoun’s suggestion that we 
should see identity politics as “collective and public struggles that involve 
both ‘claiming’ certain identities, on the one hand, and questioning and 
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15 I am aware of the extensive discussion of the use of “identity politics” and its conse-
quences. A further discussion of this topic is outside the scope of this book. See the edited 
volume “Identity Politics Reconsidered” (2006) by Alcoff, Hames-Garcia, Mohanty and 
Moya for an overview of this debate.
16 In his sociology of symbolic power, Bourdieu suggests that the fundamental dimen-
sion of all social life is the struggle for social recognition. In this process, Bourdieu (1984) 
contends, cultural symbols and activities, including taste, style of dress, eating habits, and 
language, represent interests and function in a way that develops or increases social 
distinctions.
refusing imposed or prescribed identities, on the other hand” (Calhoun 
1994, 21).15 Identity politics as performed by these youth can be viewed as 
an effort to define and (re)interpret the concepts, practices, and experi-
ences that categorize Islam and Muslims by trying to define, change, or 
control what being Muslim signifies.16 Insofar as the youth participated in 
a Muslim organization and identified with Islam because they sought to 
change the erroneous conception of Islam and Muslims in German soci-
ety, I understand their participation as a form of identity politics.
The continuous focus on Muslim women in the German media and 
public sphere, as well as the daily experiences of Othering gazes, made the 
youth conscious of their differences. Many of the youth were constantly 
categorized and defined as Muslim, and felt that their cultural or family 
background was continuously stigmatized through references to Islam as 
an oppressive religion. This experience seemed to induce many of them to 
seek more knowledge of Islam either as a means to answer their interlocu-
tors better, or to make up their own mind as to whether Islam is as bad as 
the media depicts. Others felt obliged to improve their answers to ques-
tions posed by non-Muslims, and to be more conscious of how they 
behaved in a context in which they had become the “Muslimwoman” 
(Cooke 2007); a term used to describe how, post-9/11, women of Muslim 
origin are constructed as a “Muslim woman,” which is made a primary 
identity whether chosen or not. Being constructed as a “Muslimwoman” 
may lead to a process whereby some women increasingly identify with 
Islam. Islam may thus eventually also become a central element in defin-
ing both the individual Self and the group with which they identify.
Membership in a religious group can play a supportive role in how indi-
viduals experience coming of age. The weekly meetings were not only a 
space for religious knowledge and performance, but were also a space 
where the girls could exchange, discuss, and laugh about everyday life 
experiences. Before and after the official weekly program, the youth dis-
cussed doubts they felt in their religious beliefs, but also problems that 
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arose at school after they started to veil, discrimination they experienced 
in the street or when applying for jobs, and problems related to their 
parents.
Moreover, being familiar with the reactions and worries that were com-
mon among the parents, MJD leaders usually offered to talk with the par-
ents so that the youth might be able to participate in events. Declining 
to participate in social events organized by their school could also be a 
question of finances, though non-participation in extra-curricular activi-
ties was often understood by their teachers (and the media) as a cultural 
rather than an economic issue. MJD organizers were familiar with this 
issue and could sometimes resolve the situation. “If it is a question of 
money,” the leader usually said when someone explained that they could 
not take part, “then let me know, and we can arrange something.” At the 
same time, parents were more likely to accept their daughters’ participa-
tion in a Muslim event with overnight lodging rather than a school camp, 
because the parents had greater confidence that the Muslim event would 
follow certain customary and appreciated rules and norms.
The Question of Difference: Three Sisters with Different Desires
Seeing an individual’s participation in a religious youth organization or 
identification with Islam merely as a form of identity politics and as a 
response to a difficult social situation, reduces the identification process 
to a rational choice based on the socio-cultural, political, and material 
context. Young people who grow up in Berlin have different spheres of 
possibilities to choose from when constructing and directing their lives. 
The following narrative of a family with three siblings illustrates that 
external factors, including experiences of discrimination or racism, are 
insufficient explanations for why someone turns to Islam as a focal point 
of identification whereas others did not:
The three sisters (26, 28, and 31) grew up in a working class family in the 
neighborhood of Neukölln. Their Turkish parents arrived as guest workers in 
Germany at the end of the 1960s, and, like many other guest worker families, 
remained in Berlin. When I got to know them, two of the sisters were mar-
ried and had left the family apartment. The oldest sister, Aishegül, was 
unmarried and living at home while finishing her university degree. Aishegül 
was the only one who veiled, a practice that her mother, who wore what the 
youth consider to be a traditional headscarf (not completely covering her 
hair, and in unfashionable colors), had begged her to put off, “at least until 
she had married.” For a number of years, Aishegül had been actively involved 
in MJD and in inter-religious activities. She was highly respected by her 
local religious community as a knowledgeable, religiously active, and 
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virtuous individual—character traits that she continuously strove to 
improve. Aishegül considered herself as having “always been a Muslim, but 
not so active,” a mode that changed in her mid-twenties. She found it diffi-
cult to find a husband, because while she was indifferent to a potential 
spouse’s ethnic background, she was adamant that he had to be religiously 
active. Aishegül had few Turkish friends, and she considered her Turkish lan-
guage proficiency to be low. During a religious event, this caused an uncom-
fortable situation after a Turkish man complained about her inadequate 
translation from German to Turkish. She recalled that the older man told her 
that “if you forget your language you forget your religion,” to which Aishegül 
had responded, “why, I can learn Islam in German!”
In contrast, her two younger sisters were both married to men with a Turkish 
background. Neither of them veiled, and Aishegül expressed regret that nei-
ther of them actively practiced the religion or attended religious events. 
Instead, they preferred clubs and Turkish pop concerts, and their friendship 
circles were almost exclusively composed of young people with Turkish 
backgrounds. Nuriye (26), the youngest sister, explained that “it’s ‘cause we 
have the same backgrounds: [for all of us], when we were younger we weren’t 
allowed to go swimming, to clubs, or to have boyfriends.” I met Nuriye acci-
dentally on a few occasions, and I conducted an interview with her in their 
family apartment. Nuriye said, “until I was in eighth grade, I only had 
German friends. Then we reached puberty, and they wanted to go to clubs, 
and started to have boyfriends and such, and I could not talk with them 
about that. And they did not understand why I could not go with them, 
because they were allowed to do everything. They didn’t understand when 
I said that I was not allowed to go with them. It was like a division came 
between us.” In eighth grade, she got to know a lot of Turkish youth, to whom 
she didn’t have to explain as much. “Everything was different, we understood 
each other much better. And there was much more hospitality,” Nuriye 
noted. She felt that there was a lack of hospitality among Germans. She 
found that ethnic German youth could not invite people spontaneously 
and that everything needed to be well planned with notification in 
advance.  Nuriye added that, “with the Turks, it is not like that. Then my 
Turkish improved. Before that, it was catastrophic!” She said, “as a Muslim 
and as a woman I feel better in neighborhoods with a high percentage of 
foreigners than in neighborhoods with only Germans. Like, you don’t always 
have to explain yourself when something is happening, and people help you 
immediately. I know I can always ask a Turk for help if there is something, 
and that I will get help! There, I feel safe!”
I asked her if she would feel safer with or without a headscarf. Nuriye consid-
ered this carefully. Then she concluded, “no, it’s not safer with a headscarf. 
‘Cause then there is even more feelings of hate towards foreigners. But you 
should not forget that even if I’m going to clubs and such [and am not wear-
ing a headscarf], I will never be completely integrated. Assimilation will 
never be possible, because I have black hair, my parents come from Turkey 
and I am a Muslim. (…) Regardless of whether I wear a headscarf or not, 
or how much I try to integrate, it is not possible.” She said that when entering 
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17 The lawer Seyran Ates, a Kurdish woman from Turkey, published the book “The 
Multicultural Fallacy. How we can live better together in Germany” (“Der Multikulti- 
Irrtum - Wie wir in Deutschland besser zusammenleben können”) in 2007. In this book, she 
argues against the multi-cultural ideology and its focus on tolerance. According to Ates, 
it has established different and secluded communities where intolerant and archaic 
patriarchs rule and where young women are forced to marry by their fathers, and men 
dispose of women as property. In order for integration policies to succeed, she suggests 
(among other things) that the only religious education allowed in schools should be a 
general religious education about all world religions.
Berlin clubs, she and her friends often encountered discriminatory 
comments and were sometimes denied access “because we are Turks. We 
will not be accepted, with or without headscarves.” She claimed that the 
doormen would say that the club was full or that it was a closed party, even 
if they could see others entering. Even so, she did not “feel ready to wear the 
headscarf,” and was not religiously active—much to her older sister’s dis-
may. Nuriye worked in the retail sector and believed that she would lose her 
job immediately if she started to veil. She noted, that “it’s also difficult to find 
work. You need a strong personality to carry all the problems.” In further 
explaining why she did not veil, she concluded, “so, because of problems, but 
also because I do not feel ready for it. But I find it a pity that women like my 
sister cannot wear it [without facing problems].”
Nuriye liked the fact that her sister actively practiced Islam, because her sis-
ter could teach her a lot. Nuriye continued, “if I had more practicing Muslim 
friends, I would go more to the mosque and such. That makes a big differ-
ence.” Furthermore, she wishes that her parents had not forced her to go to 
Koran school when she was younger, “then I would have been able to read 
the Koran today.” Instead, for her learning the Koran had become tied up 
with negative obligations and feelings. Nuriye believed that this was because 
her parents did not understand pedagogy. She changed the topic slightly and 
argued that “when the Germans say integration, they mean: learn German, 
no headscarf, don’t be a Muslim. (…) But even if it is not clear that I am a 
Muslim, it is not written on my forehead, they do not let me integrate!” 
Nuriye’s teacher had told her that she should read the latest book by Seyran 
Ates.17 Nuriye had responded, “no, I don’t think so, ‘cause I don’t agree with 
what that woman is saying. She is not a Muslim! Why is she presenting her-
self as a Muslim?” Nuriye did not understand why Seyran needed to label 
herself in this way. Nuriye inserted that she could not imagine living 
anywhere but in Berlin. She was born there and considered it her home. 
She emphasized that it is “multicultural, as nowhere else in Germany!” She 
added, “I love Germany because it is a country with social welfare, and 
the German constitution is one of the best in the world. The Human Rights! 
The Germans are just not friendly, that is the only thing. I love the German 
constitution.” I asked, “do you consider Germany your home?” Nuriye’s 
response was clear: “No, Berlin is my home.”
These sisters illustrate that heterogeneous identity processes take place 
within the same family. The different paths the sisters in this family follow 
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18 Similar tendencies among youth with migrant backgrounds have been demonstrated 
in France (Amir-Moazami 2007), the UK (Jacobson 1998) and Norway (Jacobsen 2011). For 
Germany, see e.g. Nökel (2001, 2002).
exemplify that turning to Islam as a prime identity or a main point of 
reference cannot be reduced to feelings of discrimination, social depriva-
tion, or Othering processes. Moreover, it is not merely a direct conse-
quence of socialization and parental expectations, or feelings of being 
different from their German peers. Two sisters turned to an ethnic, non-
religiously active youth group, whereas Aishegul sought a religiously 
oriented group. Siblings within the same local environment and with 
similar socio-economic and cultural experiences can have very different 
ways to express themselves and have very different interests. The sisters 
are only a few years apart, grew up in the same neighborhood, attended 
the same school and two of them later went to the same university. Both 
Aishegul and Nuriye talked about not feeling accepted by German society 
and about discriminatory events throughout their lives. While the older 
sister defined herself foremost as a Muslim, and had few Turkish friends, 
her two younger sisters had mostly Turkish friends who were not practic-
ing Muslims. The two non-practicing younger sisters spoke Turkish much 
better than the older and much more religious sister. Identifying with 
Islam had not brought Aishegül closer to the ethnic social field of her 
parents. On the contrary, her identification with a pure Islam had strength-
ened her religious identification, and not only weakened her Turkish lan-
guage ability, but also her identification with her parents’ ethnic group. 
Nuriye, in contrast, identified more strongly with her parents’ ethnic social 
field through her Turkish friendship group, and throughout the conversa-
tion she referred to herself and her friends as Turks, which seemed to be 
both self-ascribed and a category imposed by German society. While this 
had not necessarily weakened her religious identification, it had not 
strengthened her religious practice either. Notably, though she did not 
veil, actively pray, or visit mosques, Nuriye considerd herself a Muslim. It 
was not her main focus in life, but was nevertheless a part of how she was 
perceived by others and herself. Her critique of Ates must be understood 
in this context. Nuriye also believed that if she had more religiously active 
friends, she would probably also practice her religion more actively, thus 
recognizing the importance of peer groups on lifestyles and life choices.
Nuriye’s experience is illustrative of the studies that argue that at one 
point in their youth, many migrant youth start to feel different from their 
classmates.18 Often, the initial feeling of otherness or difference starts in 
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19 When young, people make decisions that may shape their future developmental 
paths, including peer selection, career choices, and future partner. New major decisions 
puberty and is described as partly caused by the different expectations 
from the woman’s family compared to ethnic German families. As Nuriye 
mentions, at a certain age many youth with migrant backgrounds feel 
that they do not fit in among German youth, in part as a consequence 
of the Othering processes, but also due to different expectations from 
their families.
Growing up in Germany with migrant parents can create certain 
moments of tensions vis-à-vis parents, teachers, and peers. The youths’ 
parents, afraid that their daughters become too German (i.e. do not follow 
the same value system as the parents), often imposed different rules and 
expectations on their daughters than ethnic German parents. This may 
contribute to many young women feeling different compared to the other 
girls in their age group. In contrast, I noticed that in MJD, the youth openly 
asked whether anyone was not allowed to participate in events, and affir-
mative answers rarely led to feelings of shame or embarrassment. Ethnic 
(Turkish) homogenous friendship groups negotiate parental controls in 
similar ways, as Nuryie indicated. In both Turkish and Islamic-oriented 
friendship groups, the youths’ respect for their parents’ decisions seemed 
to be understood in terms of custom or religion. In these spaces, the youth 
did not feel different because of the restrictions their families impose on 
their activities. In consequence, many youth sought out other youth who 
live within a similar socio-cultural framework. The initial feeling of being 
different may at a later stage of adolescence be extended to feelings of 
discrimination from the broader German society. This is illustrated by 
Nuriye’s account of events that she and her Turkish friends encountered, 
for instance in clubs.
In coming of age, both Muslims and non-Muslims struggle to find 
meaning in their existence. Youth are undergoing a period of transforma-
tion where the demands to adapt are more onerous than in other periods 
of life (Krange and Øia 2005, 20), and many experience alienation (Epstein 
1998). The search for meaning and the search to identify with others are 
factors that encourage the creation of youth subcultures. The pathway a 
young person takes through adolescence is shaped by a combination of 
personal characteristics (such as temperament, intelligence, coping style, 
and social skills) and the nature of the environment in which they live 
(such as family, school, peer groups, and neighborhood) (Crockett and 
Crouter 1995).19 Additionally, youth actively seek others with similar 
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will be shaped by individual experiences. Although individuals may experience compara-
ble developmental phases, there are also personal dispositions, distinctive events and 
opportunities made available, in addition to the social contexts, which together shape the 
different pathways individuals take (Crockett and Crouter 1995). The developmental course 
of an individual can be modified by adjustments in family structure, such as divorce, the 
death or serious illness of a loved one, or socio-economic changes. Why someone takes on 
a religious path instead of a more ethnic oriented path, is outside the scope of this book. 
A historically and socially oriented psychoanalysis could potentially provide more insight-
ful answers to such a question.
20 In many ways, research on Muslim youth that argues that the turn to Islam is a reflec-
tion of their socio-economic situation, including feelings of discrimination, strongly 
resemble the sociological framework on youth culture in the 1950s and ‘60s. Albert K. 
Cohen (1997 [1955], 52) argued that social structures and experiences of the social environ-
ment inform the creation and selection of a set of solutions, and that the interaction 
between people with similar feelings of social adjustment makes new forms of references 
available. Notably, Stanley Cohen (1997 [1980], 162) criticizes the structuralist and semiotic 
approaches to subcultures, such as that of Hebdige and Clark, for their failure to capture 
values, morals, interests, and ethnic orientation; in short, a similar 
orientation as the lifestyle they seek for themselves. Shared experiences 
include being Othered, discrimination, negative stereotypes of Islam, 
and belonging to a socio-economically disadvantaged part of the German 
population. Furthermore, youth share religious beliefs and values as 
well as desires to improve a religious Self and to share feelings of self- 
transcendence. I turn to these next.
The Question of Why: Incorporating Religious Experiences
Analyses of youth culture need to include those of the youths’ experiences 
that are not embraced by utilitarian models. Analyses of identity politics 
recognize that people’s social experiences can lead to struggles for politi-
cal representation and efforts to challenge hegemonic discourses. They 
affirm that the body is structured by social and political forces, and that 
social spaces are formed through ideology and subjugation. Experiences 
that mark young people as migrants, Muslims, and as potentially socio-
economically disadvantaged may well lead some towards identifying with 
Islam.
However, the analysis of religious identification as something that is 
ultimately a rational decision made in terms of the socio-economic situa-
tion, sidesteps both specific features involved in the attraction to Islam—
such as emotional experiences—and the effort to attract new members 
that religious organizations actively pursue.20 These explanations fail to 
capture the participants’ own understandings of or the sets of meanings 
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the participants’ own understanding of their subcultural milieu. The struggle against sub-
ordination, he argues, is better recognized when one focuses on the daily life of the partici-
pants through their rituals of dress, attitude, rules and school life. Although there are 
differences among these early theories about youth sub-cultures, these studies share a 
rather deterministic outlook on youth cultures, where socio-economic conditions are seen 
as the main explanation for the youths’ actions. It would be very interesting to compare the 
theoretical arguments in this earlier youth research with Muslim youth research in the late 
1990s and early 2000s.
21 This has also been suggested by Minganti (2007) in Sweden and Prieur (2002) in 
Norway.
they attach to their Muslim identity. The explanations do not account for 
adolescence being a time and space where a variety of lifestyles are dis-
covered and experimented with. These arguments also ignore certain phe-
nomenological characteristics of religiosity and religious experiences that 
lead to a sense of a greater knowledge of one’s identity or an understand-
ing of the Self. Youth cultures and identifications are more than retorts or 
ways out of ethnic or class inequalities. Thus, an analysis of the youths’ 
religious orientation and their participation in what might be considered 
a religious youth culture needs a more dynamic analysis that not only 
includes their everyday life experiences, but the set of meanings that they 
attach to their turn to Islam. In the following I suggest that the expression 
“being with others like me” has a variety of meanings, including a lifestyle 
orientation, a form of religiosity, and a need to share experiences of 
self-transcendence.
Being with Others like Themselves: Lifestyle Orientation
Although it may seem banal, research often fails to consider how the 
nature of the youths’ attraction to Islam is also informed, structured, or 
shaped by their search for religious experiences. A particular religiosity 
can be a motivation for participating in MJD and for crafting the Self in 
relation to certain techniques, practices, and performances. To meet or 
spend time with others who are like them is not only about socio-cultural 
similarities, but also a matter of spending time with people who want to 
spend their leisure time in similar ways.21
As discussed in this book, youth who attended MJD meetings frequently 
struggled to fulfill a desire to be or become Good Muslims or to be with 
people who espouse similar values. Spending time with people who share 
a similar outlook can be a means to not feeling alone and to feel normal. 
Several MJD members said that they search for other religiously active 
youth in an effort to improve themselves as religious subjects, and that 
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they seek motivation and inspiration. For example, during a discussion at 
MJD, a young woman noted that “living in this society, there are distrac-
tions everywhere. It’s more difficult to be motivated to keep all the (reli-
gious rules) and religious requirements.” Two other discussions further 
illustrate this:
During a discussion at a weekly MJD meeting, the young women all agreed 
that it was important to be aware of who they spend time with. Somaya (17) 
noted that “when you spend a lot of time with others who, when you say that 
it’s time for prayer, say that they can’t be bothered, then after a while you also 
become influenced.”
In the course of another MJD discussion on whether certain kinds of music 
are religiously correct or not, Leila (21) added, “we are not living in 
a Muslim society: there is music everywhere, we don’t even think about 
it anymore, when in the shop or in the car. And it’s often easier to forget. (…) 
It makes us concentrate less on the important things.”
The emphasis here is on the fact that they are living in a non-Muslim soci-
ety that makes it more difficult to follow what they consider to be their 
religious rules, values, and obligations. Living in Germany can make it 
harder to remember their religious moral obligations and value orienta-
tion. If a young person feels that her lifestyle is threatened by negative 
influences from a non-religious or non-practicing Muslim environment, 
she can decide to counteract the secular forces by participating in a reli-
gious space where she is called on to craft a religious Self. Becoming or 
being religiously virtuous is not a natural state but a constant struggle with 
oneself, where individual techniques of body management need to be (re)
learned and repeated (see chapter 4). A faith community in which one 
spends time with others who share similar values, difficulties, and desires, 
provides strength to continue improving on a religious lifestyle and reli-
gious Self. For example, during a wedding, Fatima (31) noted:
It is so easy to be influenced by this society. It is difficult to be religious in this 
society, ‘cause you have to excuse yourself and explain why you do this and 
that. You really have to believe strongly in order to carry it out. That is also 
why the community [Gemeinschaft] is so important. I don’t know if I could 
do it without the community. (…) Just that you know that there are other 
sisters in the same situation (…).
At another MJD event, Fatima said that she felt that they (Muslims living 
in Germany) have to justify and think about what they do much more 
than the rest of the German population. She said, “that is why we need 
to meet and to be in such a community. They [the German non-Muslim 
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population] find that dangerous. They feel threatened by that, I don’t 
really understand why.” Several of the youth reflected upon the difficulties 
of being religious in German society. This must be understood not only in 
relation to the negative view of Islam in Germany, but also in relation to 
the position of religion in Berlin in general. The young women daily 
encountered various non-religious temptations and expectations from 
peers and family and in urban spaces, and these may draw their focus 
away from religious obligations and values. Fatima’s comments reflect 
how important she thought it was to have a community in order to con-
tinue practicing Islam and to not feel alone. She situated this importance 
in terms of the constant pressure to explain and legitimate herself as a 
practicing Muslim. She felt in the minority, both as a religious individual 
in general and as a Muslim in particular, and noted how difficult it was to 
not compromise her beliefs in her daily life in Berlin. This increased 
Fatima’s need for social spaces where her religious beliefs could be freely 
expressed and practiced.
Not all youth who identify with Islam and as Muslim seek to belong to 
or even participate in a religious organization. Some Muslim youth I met 
preferred to not be part of a faith community though they had religious 
friends. In contrast, the youth in MJD expressed a need for a religious com-
munity in order to create a universe of meaning where “what makes sense 
to you also makes sense to me” (Hervieu-Léger 2001, 167). As Hervieu-Léger 
argues, “religious identity depends on shared experiences for its reinforce-
ment” (ibid.). For several of the young Muslims in MJD it was particularly 
important to receive confirmation of the meanings they created to make 
sense of their daily life. Fatima’s emphasis on her need for a religious com-
munity and a space where religious values and norms take precedence (as 
a counter to the daily non-religious stimulus) must be understood in this 
context.
Further, by spending time with others who adhere to similar values, 
MJD participants did not need to feel embarrassment about the fact that 
they felt required to perform certain religious duties. For example, at one 
MJD meeting:
The young women discussed the shame many young people feel when they 
want to pray at work or at school, because it is difficult to speak up about 
wanting to pray. One of the young women responded, “if one is really devoted 
to Allah then it does not matter what the others think of you. You are only 
(accountable) to Allah.” She believed that only their relationship with Him 
should matter. Leila added that “if they really are good friends, then why 
should you be ashamed to say that you are praying? What if you tell them 
268 chapter seven
22 Fear as a religious sentiment is relevant here. As Mahmood (2005, 140–145) argues, 
fear not only motivates the women to pursue what they consider religious obligations, but 
learning to be pious is also learning to fear God. Thus, to encourage this fear is one aspect 
of the cultivation of a self-observant character.
that in your religion you have to pray five times a day, but they start thinking, 
‘well, we never saw you praying’?” Another youth commented that some 
Muslims are “afraid of being looked upon as fundamentalists” and thus do 
not want to talk openly about where and when they need to pray.
The discussion refers to the fact that being young and religiously active 
is considered non-normative and that it can be difficult or even embar-
rassing to admit to religious practice. It demonstrates that youth may 
experience non-religious friends and peers, both cultural Muslims and 
non-Muslims, to be distractions or impediments to the performance of 
their religious practices.
Several participants highlighted that MJD was a space where youth 
could get to know other practicing Muslims with whom they shared reli-
gious goals and who they also met outside of MJD meetings:
Somaya (17) asked the other attendees, “why do we come here [to MJD]? 
Think about it.” She encouraged them to also meet outside MJD in order to 
do something for Allah. Somaya said that “it is also good to decide to do 
something together to improve ourselves. It makes it easier. For example, to 
fast together, like you all probably have to catch up on the fasting days, no?” 
One of the girls said that she had been talking with three other Muslim girls 
at her school about working together to catch up on their fasting. Ismail 
interjected that she used to do this with her sister, but after a while they 
stopped, because they put the goals [of what religious practices to perform] 
too high. She stressed that fasting together the whole day and then eating 
well together is enjoyable.
The struggle to become a Good Muslim was framed as a wish to please 
God and ultimately reach their goal of entering Paradise. The willingness 
or wish to acquire a particular kind of self-realization was a desire that 
shaped their experiences and the actions they chose. These goals were 
pursued through learning more about Islam and improving their com-
portment and character, and this pursuit was guided by a particular 
religious discourse.22 In addition to providing religious knowledge, the 
religious organization represents emotional support in the endeavor to 
craft a religious Self.
Being with Others like Themselves: Forms of Religiosity
To some extent, MJD actively seeks out a particular target audience among 
Muslim youth in Germany. These are the youth who seek an educational 
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approach to Islam that is not based on ethnic structures, and who position 
themselves socially in relation to German society. In Germany, the rela-
tively recent establishment of such organizations can partly be seen as a 
generational change; youth born in Germany have had access to higher 
educational levels than most of their parents’ generation and many seek 
religious spaces that can provide them with answers about how to live a 
correct life in Germany. MJD participants often mentioned that they con-
sidered the organization a space where they could find answers, authori-
ties, or learn who they should consider authoritative. The following 
situation illustrates this:
When a young girl asked Selma (18) why she decided to join MJD, she 
answered, “I started to go there ‘cause I wanted to improve myself (…) and to 
meet more correct people, you know.” Other youth confirmed that this also 
accounts for their decision to join MJD. During another a weekly introduc-
tion, Janna (19) declared, “I am 19, Palestinian, and I lack information.” This 
caused laughter from some of the girls before Janna impatiently explained, 
“I feel that I need to gain more knowledge, there is a lot of information that 
I do not have.” 
Frequently the women felt that their parents or guardians did not provide 
them with reliable knowledge about Islam during their childhood. This 
could be either because their parents were not religiously active Muslims 
or were not Muslims at all. Their parents’ religious knowledge may also be 
based on ethnic and traditional beliefs that the young woman at one point 
started to consider inaccurate. Several complained about their parents’ lax 
religious performance, or that they did not understand the reasons behind 
certain religious obligations, or that they mixed religion with tradition and 
culture. Seeking an Islam that is detached from traditional ideas makes it 
imperative to gain more knowledge and information about how best to 
live as a correct Muslim. The content of the local events and workshops 
must be seen in this light: the weekly meetings concentrated on the need 
to be critical and reflexive in regard to religious knowledge, and on how 
the youth could continuously improve themselves as pious Muslims while 
living in Germany (see chapter 4). The fact that MJD promoted this cere-
bral and self-critical approach attracted youth with a high level of educa-
tional achievement and ambition and who might otherwise leave religious 
organizational structures altogether.
Research has indicated that class background shapes the relationship 
individuals have to religious knowledge and authority (Ismail 2004). In 
particular, an individual’s educational level defines how they relate to 
Islamic discourse (Salih 2003) and, I would add, which spaces they decide 
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to participate actively in. The emphasis in MJD on the attainment of 
knowledge as the only way to live Islam correctly appears to attract youth 
who belong to an upwardly mobile part of the migrant population due to 
their parents’ or their own educational success. The fact that this organiza-
tion is composed primarily of upwardly mobile youth also suggests that 
the turn to Islam is not a mere question of oppression, poverty or exclu-
sion. MJD’s organizational structure can partly explain its popularity 
among educated youth; participants were expected to contribute religious 
presentations and participate in discussions about their understanding of 
religious topics. While visiting other Muslim youth groups based in 
mosques, I noticed a difference in how the meetings were structured (see 
chapter 2). In MJD, even the youngest participants were expected to pres-
ent on religious topics, while women in other Muslim youth meetings 
were more passive listeners and less involved in the organization of 
knowledge.
Furthermore, youth who do well in the German educational system 
may start to feel a distance to their ethnic group, the majority of whom the 
youth consider uneducated and traditional. For example, as we walk down 
a crowded shopping street in Wedding, Rüya (21) said:
There are so many Turks here [in Berlin], but there are only a very few whom 
you would want to talk to. Look at them, completely empty-headed. After 
such a long time without really having any people I am interested in spend-
ing time with, [for me] it is so good to have found MJ, like, people you can 
really talk to.
Rüya was not referring to anyone in particular, but she made a clear dis-
tinction between other Turks—with whom she did not identify—and the 
people who participate in her religious community. Her identification 
with the religious social field is clear. It is expressed through a contrast to 
a lack of identification with her parents’ ethnic group: the Turks in an eco-
nomically and socially deprived neighborhood (Wedding) where she had 
lived for the past five years. Her comment that the Turks are empty-headed 
can be considered a speech act in which she distances herself from the 
category “Turk.” Through this speech act, she establishes a critical dissoci-
ation between herself and those who are generally considered working 
class, uneducated Turks. Like most MJD members, Rüya had attained 
more education than the majority of youth with a Turkish background. 
This and similar statements are framed within a perception that their par-
ents’ ethnic social group is uneducated. It illustrates the relevance of class 
or education in the marking of distinctions within the Muslim population. 
Religious identification may not only be a way out of their parents’ ethnic 
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23 This is a global phenomenon: Bayat (2000, 2007) has pointed out that Islamic move-
ments in Cairo and Teheran tend to attract the educated middle-class, and not the poor 
(see also Sanktanber 2002 for Muslim youth in Istanbul).
community, but also (although possibly as an unintended consequence), 
a way out of a disadvantageous social category. To perform a pure Islam 
detached from cultural or ethnic features requires the development of 
advanced knowledge.23 Identifying with an Islam that attaches impor-
tance to knowledge and skills can contribute to class travel, in that the 
youth simultaneously identify with the Islam of an educated middle class 
and disassociate their Muslim identity from the traditional and unedu-
cated guest worker. MJD represents a space in which such religious class 
travel can be developed and pursued.
Incentives to practice Islam within a faith community can also be found 
within Islamic theology. Even if it the individual has to answer for their 
actions, morality, and character on the Day of Judgment (when one dies 
and the afterlife, akhira begins), it is considered better to practice Islam 
within a group. Whether or not an individual enters the garden-like 
Paradise is based on the choices and actions made by the individual. 
However, being part of a religious community is perceived to make it 
easier to strengthen faith (iman), and to provide more opportunities to 
improve and be a Good Muslim. When talking about the community, 
Fatima (31) exclaimed:
It is so important! The Koran talks about the importance of the community 
[Gemeinschaft], of belonging to one. And that is also why it is a duty to per-
form the Friday prayer together, so that at least once a week people come 
together and pray.
To perform the Friday prayer within a religious community is not consid-
ered obligatory for women. Still, praying in a group is considered a better 
religious practice, and spending the night in a mosque where they read 
the Koran together provides participants with important good points that 
increase their chances of entering Paradise. So does setting shared goals 
for improving comportment, as Somaya suggested above, such as in regard 
to dress comportment or doing five good deeds a week.
Being with Others like Themselves: Sharing Experiences of 
Self-Transcendence
Scholars often overlook how the decision to participate in a religious orga-
nization can be shaped by religious or spiritual desires and experiences. 
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24 Weller proposes that “aesthetic or religious ‘experiences’ are not shapeless or amor-
phous; rather, they are sui generis and radically different from theoretical ones. It is up to 
the researcher to reflect upon the real content of these forms, upon what they inform, 
without violating their individual character, but rather to translate them into the theory, 
or yet to encompass them by means of logical forms. This is the purpose of theoretical 
research, a reality-seizing process that signals back towards the initial pre-theoretical 
stages, towards the level of quotidian experience” (Weller et al., 2002, quoted in Weller 
2006, 5).
25 The phenomenologist William James defined religion as the “feeling, acts, and expe-
riences of individual men [and women] in their solitude, so far as they apprehend them-
selves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (James [1903] 1961, 
42). I include this definition of religion here, as it emphasizes the experience and feelings 
involved in a religious identity.
26 Djinn (or genie) are mentioned in the Koran, and a whole sura is named after them 
(Al-Jinn).
Rambo (1999, 264) argues that “religion and spirituality, like aesthetics, 
should be considered a domain of life and experience that has its own 
validity.” There are, he continues, “experiences, both cognitive and affec-
tive, that are distinctive to religion and spirituality” (ibid.). The experi-
ences of religiosity can produce knowledge and play a part in identity 
formation.24 Still, social scientists generally neglect, trivialize, or reject the 
role of spirituality or religiosity when writing about the religious activities 
of or religious revival among youth with migrant backgrounds living in 
Europe. However, I argue that certain aspects of religiosity, such as feel-
ings of transcendence, are relevant to our understanding of the identifica-
tion process among youth.
Many religious people feel a need to articulate their faith or their expe-
rience of transcendence, and this is often difficult to achieve (Joas 2006). 
There is no agreement on how religious people should think, feel, and act, 
as people are religious in different ways. Religious experiences happen to 
individuals and are felt or apprehended rather than cognitively recog-
nized.25 Although this contributes to making the experiences real, they 
make them real only for those who experience them (James [1902] 1961). 
For the young women in MJD, the weekly and monthly meetings repre-
sented spaces in which they could share these feelings and experiences 
with others who acknowledge them, although in different ways.
Spending time with other religious youth makes it possible to talk about 
the existence of angels, the devil, un-earthly creatures, such as djinn (a 
supernatural fiery creature with free will) and demon-possessions, with-
out risking being considered irrational or traditional.26 Once I had spent 
some time with the youth, I started overhearing discussions of other-
worldly encounters, some of which the youth had personally experienced. 
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Within the friendship groups, the youth freely shared episodes of meeting 
otherworldly creatures and discussed the relevance of their dreams when 
making important decisions. Prayer was incorporated in social activities 
in that the youth prayed when they faced specific issues, such as whether 
they should accept a suitor or not, when waiting for answers from educa-
tional institutions or jobs, when sitting an examination, or when experi-
encing an illness in the family. Individuals could involve the group by, for 
example, asking, “please can you do a lot of du’a for me so that I get my 
driving license.” Some would send group emails with requests such as, 
“please do du’a for the exams I take next week,” or to make du’a for an MJD 
participant’s ill daughter or relative. This exemplifies not only the rele-
vance of God in their daily life and in relation to decisions they have to 
make, but also the role of the faith community in these important life 
events.
The need or desire to be with other youth with a religious lifestyle, to 
gain knowledge about how to live correctly according to Islam, and to 
share experiences of self-transcendence is not a unidirectional path. On 
the contrary, in the following I show that some of the Muslim youth in 
MJD turned to Islam at a specific moment of their life. Simultaneously, 
I suggest that the young Muslims’ turn to Islam is not a unidirectional 
process of identification where they become increasingly religious. Rather, 
the crafting of a religious Self is a process that takes various paths 
and directions in which youth may be more focused on religion in some 
periods of their life than in others. Why youth turn to Islam or turn away 
from Islam is thus a complex ongoing dynamic that can take new and 
unexpected turns.
Variations in Religious Careers
Narratives about the decision to veil or to join a religious organization, 
such as MJD often involved dreams and religious experiences, which the 
individuals related to their (previous) lax religious praxis, visions, or par-
ticular emotional experiences. The content of narratives about religious 
experiences that MJD participants shared with their peers often involved 
processes of discovering parts or qualities about themselves, or focused on 
how they arrived at a new or expanded recognition of the importance of 
their values. For example, Dunya (25), who grow up in Switzerland, talked 
about an event in Turkey that boosted her religiosity:
During the summer holidays in Istanbul, Dunya visited a small historical 
mosque. As she stood alone in the courtyard, the light hit an old well in the 
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courtyard and she felt a presence of something otherworldly. She explained 
that this affected her attitude to her religious practice when she returned to 
Germany, where she started to actively seek a religious space with other 
practicing Muslim youth.
Dunya was not particularly religiously active before this episode, which 
occurred when she was 18 years old, and in this period she had been con-
templating taking off her headscarf. After coming to Berlin on a university 
exchange, she enthusiastically sought a religious space in which she could 
feel that she belonged. Initially, she told me, she had been looking forward 
to coming to Berlin as she was certain that she would find a religious group 
among all the religious offers available. However, after her one-year 
exchange, Dunya left Berlin without having found any spaces that she felt 
were appropriate for her, though she had visited several religious organi-
zations and groups.
The desire to improve their religious selves—to have a pious career—is 
not a unidirectional process, and can grow both stronger and weaker. Over 
time, the religiousness of MJD participants varies as they gain more knowl-
edge of Islam, experience changes in their social status, and spend more 
time with other religious people. Such changes can increase awareness of 
the current stigmatized group image and the young women may conse-
quently adopt an identity politics in which efforts to change the negative 
stereotypes of Islam and Muslims in Germany become a major factor in 
their Islamic identity formation. How they engage in religious movements 
can also depend on their childhood experiences, as Ines’s (20) story 
suggests:
Ines had been a member of MJD for nearly two years when I first met her. 
She was active both in MJD and DMK, did voluntary work in Green Palace 
(the bookshop affiliated with MJD), and also volunteered elsewhere. During 
one of our conversations she told me that the DMK “is like my home, it’s like 
my family.” Her father had arrived in Germany forty years previously to work 
in a factory. Her mother followed him nineteen years later, one year before 
Ines was born. Due to his work with lasers in the factory, her father gradually 
went blind. When Ines was 15 years old, she and her mother would spend the 
days between their home and the supermarket, because her father did not 
want them to go out. This period of her life was a turbulent time at home. 
Ines would listen to loud music in her room and not communicate with her 
parents. The situation escalated when her mother threw their television out 
of the window. Ines said, “I think she was ill, mentally I mean. She didn’t 
know what she was doing anymore.” After this, Ines stayed in a community 
children’s home with several other teenagers, mostly ethnic Germans. At the 
children’s home, they were given a lot of freedom. In describing this time, 
she said, “when I was 15, I went to a children’s home where I lived for one and 
 religious identification 275
a half years. There, I had so much freedom that I did not need. I could stay 
out until midnight, go to bars and clubs. It was always, ‘come on Ines, let’s go 
to the bar’ (…). I have been to bars and clubs, it doesn’t interest me. Once 
I was even forced (by the youth workers) to go to the club ‘cause I was the 
only one who did not want to go and then someone would have to be left 
behind, since you could not be there [in the children’s home] alone. So 
I came with them, and I was sitting like that [lips sulking] the whole time, 
and they asked me to come and dance, and I did not want to dance (…). Then 
once I went to a church, because one of the girls was having a - what is it 
called again, when you are 14 years old …c….?” “A confirmation?” I suggested. 
She said, “yes, she was getting confirmed. And I was in the church, and it was 
so beautiful and I started to cry, and I asked myself ‘where is my religion?’ 
And then when we moved here [to Berlin], it was …the summer 2002, I saw 
foreigners, I was shocked. It was a different mentality. I saw people go to the 
mosque and pray there. It was a whole new world for me here. And I started 
to learn more about my religion, and the more I read, the greater was my 
(desire) to wear the headscarf. Here they think that you are ‘easy,’ the Turkish 
men also think that. I wanted to show that I am a Muslim. To limit [abgren-
zen], not like limit so that I don’t belong here, but to show that I am a Muslim. 
When I told my employer [she worked in a bakery after school at that time] 
that I would like to wear the headscarf, she said ‘that is such a shame, you 
have such a nice hair, don’t cover it up’—so typical. (…) Then when I stopped 
work … it was the 17th of June… I started wearing it the day after, so strong 
was the need for me to wear the headscarf, I could not wait! You see, it does 
not have to do with oppression, but with wanting to wear it. Then from one 
day to the other, I was worthless. The teachers started to ignore me at 
school… It could have been different, easier. But it is not impossible here [to 
wear the headscarf], (…) there are many here who wear the headscarf, and 
the worst is that many women wear headscarves and are not living like 
Muslims. Instead, there should be less headscarves and more Muslims who 
live right.”
Ines’s story illustrates one path of a young woman living in Germany who 
saw Islam as a point of identification in her daily life. Despite having been 
brought up in a Muslim family, Ines was first personally drawn to Islam 
during a turbulent youth by being exposed to a Christian ritual. She told 
me that while she was growing up, her parents made her feel that Islam 
was only about rules and restrictions. Moving to Berlin became a turning 
point for Ines in that she met practicing Muslims and she started to learn 
more about Islam. Exposed to a variety of lifestyles through her experi-
ences in the children’s home, she dismissed the freedom that she was 
given as superfluous, and not what she needed. Additionally, Ines felt 
that in Berlin, people may believe that she was “easy,” a stigma she 
believed  that the headscarf would offset. This suggests how the heads-
carf can mark a boundary, not vis-à-vis German society, but in the sense 
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27 That Ines pointed to the fact that even though many women veil they are not neces-
sarily behaving as Good Muslims, further reflects the idea that the headscarf should 
produce certain bodily comportments.
that it creates a gendered distance within the religious and ethnic 
community.27
After a few months, Ines stopped participating in MJD due to a lack 
of time and, I believe, because she never developed strong friendships 
with any of the other participants. She continued visiting other Islamic 
organizations such as DMK and Al Nur, and continued to craft herself 
as a religious subject in the sense that she focused on knowledge, prayer, 
and doing good deeds. Islam continued to provide an important direction 
in her life. She energetically performed du’a while waiting to hear whether 
she had been admitted to the Evangelical Church School. She volunteered, 
was generally rigorous in performing her religious obligations such 
as praying, and whenever I spent the night at her place she read from the 
Koran before falling asleep. Her religious crafting of the Self may well 
have changed, but did not appear to come to a halt after she stopped 
attending MJD.
Ines’s story suggests that her move to Berlin had an effect on her identi-
fication with Islam. The turn to Islam has been considered an urban phe-
nomenon, also taking place for example in Cairo (Ismail 2006) and 
Istanbul (Sanktanber 2002). A city offers a variety of religious spaces rep-
resenting different religious orientations and congregations and providing 
particular “infrastructures of action” (Ismail 2006, 12). Ines pointed out 
that her turn to Islam in the urban space related to seeing others practic-
ing Islam in a different way than what she was used to. Consequently, a 
turn to religion in the urban setting is not simply a consequence of alien-
ation in the urban anonymity and the weakening of community structures 
when moving from the rural to the urban. Rather, how religious organiza-
tions situate their message within the social antagonisms and positions 
that have historically always been a part of the urban landscape (Ismail 
2006) are more important. In fact, the variety of religious spaces in urban 
Berlin makes it possible for youth to choose between various spaces (see 
chapter 2), or leave a space if they choose to do so.
Not all Muslim youth prefer to participate in religious organizations or 
mosques. Some develop their religious identity through independent 
study, by using the Internet, or in private religious groups based in homes. 
Additionally, not all MJD participants were equally religiously active in 
their everyday life. Samira (18) exemplifies this:
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28 Many of the youth who left MJD continued to build their religious knowledge and 
craft a religious Self in another space or in private.
When Samira returned after some months away from the MJD meetings, we 
walked together to the subway after the meeting. I asked why she decided to 
come back to MJD. Samira said that she was not managing to do her prayers 
every day, and that this year she had not even been able to motivate herself 
to fast during Ramadan. But she was trying to be a better person and to pay 
Zakat (Alms, one of the five pillars). “That is also being a Muslim,” she added. 
She explained that by going to MJD meetings, she focused on her faith at 
least once a week.
Samira is obviously discontented with her failure to perform what she 
considered to be her religious obligations. Her story shows that MJD pro-
vides a space to spend time with religiously oriented people, and that par-
ticipants hope to be inspired to become more religiously active, at least 
once a week. During the time I was in the organization, Samira (like Ines) 
was never really included in any of the friendship cliques that developed 
among the attendees. She dressed differently from the others (headscarf 
with jeans and a sweater which ended at her waist, though never in a sexu-
alized way), she was not studying for an Abitur, and she was also active in 
cultural activities arranged by multicultural Berliner initiatives.
When I met former MJD participants by chance (often in mosques) 
I sometimes asked why they were no longer attending MJD meetings. 
I noticed that a few participants left the organization when they felt that 
they had gained enough knowledge, or felt that they were not learning 
anything new by participating. Others continued, even though they 
considered their level of knowledge to be higher than the one taught 
at MJD, either because of friendships or in order to be in a religious 
atmosphere. This suggests that participating in a group such as MJD is 
also about developing and nurturing friendships with people of similar 
taste and leisure interests. I noticed that some youths stopped coming 
if they did not like the program, or if they found the leaders or members 
too strict. Most of the time this explanation was combined with a state-
ment about how they felt (dissatisfied) with the other participants and 
that MJD was not a place they found friends (sometimes due to age differ-
ences).28 Similarly, I also talked to youth who had heard about MJD, 
but who did not want to attend because they “prefer to learn about Islam 




The status of belonging to a religious minority and still being viewed as 
migrants (although as second or third generation migrants) shape how the 
youth identify with Islam. Explanations of youths’ turn to Islam as a con-
sequence of their experiences of how the nation state, politicians, and 
media treat them, acknowledge that the women act as rational socio-
political agents. Participating in a religious organization can be a form of 
identity politics, as taking up a Muslim identity can be a strategy to deal 
with not feeling accepted as German or as an effort to change the negative 
categorizations of Islam in Germany. These external factors, which consti-
tute the set of circumstances in which the youth were located, may be 
con sidered push factors for some youth who start developing an Islamic 
identity.
The descriptions of young people’s actions that reduce identification 
with Islam and a religious youth organization to “a vector for collective 
action and protest” as Cesari (2003, 146) does, or that simplify them as 
merely a reaction to Othering or discrimination as Khosrokhavar (1997) 
tends to do, or to an “available feminist strategy” (Salih 2003), at best ignores 
and at worst belittles the young women’s religious experiences and desires. 
In this framework, identity is diminished to a question of rational strate-
gies, made up of political or social projects. In part, these explanations 
reduce the agency of Muslim youth, and define them through external 
social orders and rational choice. Identity politics constructs the Muslim 
agent as part of a universal modern actor. Although this partly avoids 
Othering Muslim youth, it tends to allow subjects to be actors only insofar 
as they react to their social environment. As this perspective does not rec-
ognize the desires that motivate the youths’ actions, their agency is under-
stood as solely a response to social collective constraints. The youth are 
considered agentive only insofar as they struggle against oppression or 
discrimination. This constrains our understanding of the individual 
choices taken, desires, identifications sought, and the process of crafting 
the Self as a religious subject.
Educated young Muslims may be attracted by (or pulled to) MJD due to 
its focus on knowledge and self-development and because it is an autono-
mous organization. MJD advertises itself and its events and meetings, by 
fliers and seminars with catchy slogans and titles. Their events that com-
bine religious messages with popular, well-known artists are particularly 
appealing to youth. Thus, religious organizations can actively attract youth 
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29 An individual’s motivation for improving her religious comportment can also be 
structured or informed by her family, friends, and social field.
by establishing a specific profile in terms of their attendees, religious ori-
entation, and events.
Moreover, the set of meanings that the actors ascribe to their behavior 
and actions must be included in the analysis of youths’ identification with 
Islam and with a faith community. As this chapter has illustrated, youth 
participate in MJD specifically to be with others like them, which includes 
people with similar religious orientations, lifestyles, and socio-economic 
backgrounds. They want to feel normal in being young and religiously 
active individuals, and to share experiences of self-transcendence. These 
factors can impel youth to identify with this particular faith community, 
where their Muslim identity is further crafted. According to Islamic tradi-
tion, they also gain more points by performing religious rituals together. 
Consequently, participating in a Muslim community may even become a 
rational choice from a religious point of view.
Reflections on the turn to Islam and the individual’s motivation to craft 
herself as a female Muslim subject must be understood in relation to the 
individual’s values, morals, and desires. What image does she seek to con-
vey to socially relevant others, and to the social fields within which she 
acts? The effort to gain knowledge, improve one’s religious performance, 
and to be(come) a virtuous subject can be a vehicle for action and for 
identifying as a Muslim. Likewise, the desire to be(come) a virtuous sub-
ject or a better Muslim may be the main reason to join MJD, although for 
some this desire may gradually become an aspiration only while partici-
pating in the group.
Nevertheless, most of the youth have some sense of attraction or curios-
ity towards Islam before their initial visit to MJD. This initial attraction 
may be a consequence of the negative image of Islam in Germany and less 
a matter of more internal religious emotions. Searching for better answers 
to provide non-Muslims was mentioned as a reason for visiting MJD. Later, 
participation in a group where the center of attention is on becoming bet-
ter Muslims can reinforce participants’ willingness to follow certain reli-
gious duties and can form and strengthen a desire to become pious.29 
Indeed, the reasons for remaining in MJD may well be different than the 
initial reasons for approaching this faith community. For example, the 
group’s focus on religious subjectification could eventually alienate peo-
ple who do not have a more personal desire to become a religious subject. 
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30 The variety of ways in which these desires or motivations are brought to life is 
another question which needs to be asked, but which is outside the scope of this book.
31 For example, Mahmood (2005) does not consider which opportunities are available 
to the women she works with in the Egyptian mosque movements. This is a problem when 
she insists on using the term “agency” about the women’s devotion to a particular religious 
life. It should be noted that she is not referring explicitly to questions of identity or identi-
fication, but rather talking about agency, autonomy, freedom and choice.
As MJD meetings focus on crafting the Self as a religious subject, it is likely 
that some will leave the organization quite soon if they do not feel com-
pelled, or desire, to become Good Muslims.
A more multifaceted understanding of women’s religious identity and 
how they orient their actions must take seriously their aspirations to 
become Good Muslims, to come closer to God, and to reach Paradise.30 
Aspirations, morals, and values must be taken seriously when analyzing 
why an individual turn to a specific node of identification. Yet this is not 
sufficient. An analysis of these young women’s turn to Islam needs to 
include both the set of circumstances in which they are located and the 
set of meanings that they attribute to their behavior. By ignoring the for-
mer, the analysis risks becoming ahistorical. Desires and motivations are 
formed in contexts defined by time and space. Ignoring the larger social, 
political, economic, and cultural milieu risks also ignoring why and how 
specific desires and subjectivities are formed in a particular context.31 
Such an analysis cannot illuminate how religious organizations seek to 
attract particular individuals. The particular place and political discourse 
must be included when accounting for the life of pious young Muslim 
women in Europe. In order to present a deeper analysis of the youths’ 
identification with Islam, we must therefore consider the complex inter-
action of factors at the global level (the “war against terror” in which Islam 
is constructed as the enemy, and the revival of Islam as a social force), the 
national level (migration processes, and the specifically German Othering 
processes in the media and policies), the local level (the urban context, 
experiences of discrimination, religious community structures, family 
structures, as well as the socio-economic material conditions of migrant 
families) and the personal level (horizons of experience, goals, desires, 
and interests), in addition to the specific characteristics of religiosity (the 
need to share transcendental experiences and practice rituals and beliefs 
in a group).
CONCLUSION
This book has investigated how religious qualities and norms are learned, 
shared and challenged within a Muslim youth group. By participating in 
MJD, young people are both familiarized with Islamic virtues and offered 
incentives to practice them. Religious discourses are taught and discussed 
within a specific faith community, thus producing ideas of how a correct 
and Good Muslim should be crafting herself in order to become religiously 
proximate. This includes instruction in the gender order as given by a reli-
gious tradition, thereby learning what it means to be a young woman, a 
daughter, a mother, and a wife in Islam. It also involves learning the dis-
tinction made between culture and religion, how to relate external actions 
to internal motivation, how to desire correctly, and the importance of pur-
suing a specific Muslim character. MJD encourages its participants to con-
tinuously craft their Selves in relation to these religious values, attributes, 
and ideals. The youth were largely motivated by a desire to cultivate their 
Selves according to the ideals of how to be a correct and Good Muslim, 
which is considered a universal standard that is situated outside of time 
and space. But at the same time, as this study has examined, the religious 
space for virtuous young people that MJD provides also represents an 
alternative space to be a Muslim youth in a secular, modern Berlin. On the 
basis of this space, youth can position themselves in relation to their par-
ents’ ethnic social field, peers, family, and other youths.
The youths that were part of this study belong to a generation of 
Muslims who differentiate between their parents’ ethnic, traditional Islam 
and what they describe as a pure Islam. By distinguishing between tradi-
tional and authentic religious knowledge, values, and practices, the youth 
make a discursive differentiation between the behavior, customs, dress, 
and tastes that are religiously proximate versus those they view as defined 
by an ethnic culture or habitus. In my research, I found that the gendered 
expectations among the youth partly changed in relation to their religious 
orientation, but also that the young women were partly taking on and 
partly given a representative role in guarding a religious integrity. The 
effort to distinguish between culture and religion emerged during the 
youths’ discussions about the proper roles and behaviors of men and 
women. These discussions promote ideas of the Good Muslim Woman as 
an ultimate standard to aim for.
282 conclusion
Much of the literature on Muslims’ individualized religious identifica-
tion seems to suggest that the religious subject is autonomous. However, 
Selves are also social and cultural (Cohen 1994). My concern has not been 
with the individual Self in isolation but with how the Self is crafted in rela-
tion to desires, motivations, and discourses, and within social relation-
ships. The religious Self is not crafted passively or blindly vis-à-vis certain 
ideas; the subject is active and creative. The social individual is continu-
ously dealing (consciously and unconsciously) with different and some-
times contradictory desires and expectations. Youth do not follow religious 
ideals or religious discourses homogeneously, nor are these ideals and 
discourses all-encompassing. I have endeavored to reveal how the reli-
gious Self is formed through complex processes: individuals go through 
more than a binary choice of either simply viewing and accepting the pro-
cess as a submissive agent or completely rejecting religious discourses. 
My research uncovered many internal differences in the ways in which 
the young women appropriate religion or respond to religious norms, but 
these do not represent an individualization of religion. Rather, when 
investigating these differences, I found that the youths’ behavior substan-
tiates the internal flexibility of Islam as a discursive tradition. By consider-
ing how the participants deal with religious principles by analyzing the 
variety of ways in which they legitimate their actions (in religious trajecto-
ries), I have sought to bring attention to the creativity and negotiations 
involved in the crafting of the religious Self. These trajectories do not chal-
lenge or subvert norms; they are means through which the youths can 
position themselves within a social field in which the effort to be authen-
tic and religiously proximate is highly valued. I have also sought to high-
light the limitations of these processes of negotiation.
Thus, in social practice, there is creativity in the form, style, and perfor-
mance of the youths’ religiosity; and far from being universal it is firmly 
localized in time and space. In the process of interacting with religious 
texts and normative ideas, and participating in specific religious spaces, 
the youth also localize their religious youthfulness as a specifically twenty-
first century, Berliner religious youth culture. The young women negotiate 
between enjoying modern, consumerist society and dedicating them-
selves to their religion and its practices, and they see no contradiction 
between these two endeavors.
Rather than conforming homogeneously to a religious or cultural 
matrix, the youth craft composite and multi-faceted Selves. The individual 
is not only responding to one specific social, material context but also to 
the nomos of several social fields and expectations, in addition to their 
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self-motivation. Religion does not completely govern the women’s agency 
but is rather activating ideas of what being a Good Muslim involves, which 
guides their acts and aspirations. Tension arises in situations where differ-
ent expectations and desires come into conflict. How they deal with these 
tensions depends on the individuals and includes confrontation, use of 
multiple references, contesting knowledge, joking, or silence.
Nonetheless, crafting the Self as a religious subject brings with it restric-
tions, obligations, and (potential) group identification, which are all rein-
forced by the excessive public focus on Muslim women and the headscarf. 
For these women, the crafting of a religious Self also takes place within a 
context of representing Islam, at the local, national, and global level. Being 
a religious minority in a secular society shapes both the process of crafting 
the Self and the identification process. Within MJD, the perception of the 
youths’ roles in representing Islam is situated within a religious discourse 
of inviting others to Islam, and thus is seen as a religious duty. Accordingly, 
many youth considered it their religious obligation to alter the negative 
view of Islam and Muslims in Europe. I see this as participating in a public 
struggle over who can define, or at least form, the normative content 
within the tarnished Muslim category.
As young women are deepening their religious orientation, they face 
their own and others’ expectations that they also take on a role as repre-
sentatives and transmitters of the meaning of Islam in twenty-first cen-
tury Germany. By striving to imitate the internal, religiously defined 
gender order of what a Good Muslim Woman is, the women also seek to 
represent this ideal in the public sphere through their own bodies. One of 
the primary aims of this representation is to combat the stereotypes 
and stigmas attached to Islam and Muslims by the non-Muslim society. 
The consequences that this responsibility has in the youths’ everyday life, 
however, cannot be overstated. Social pressure from themselves, their 
peers, and other Muslims becomes a component of their efforts to develop 
into Good Muslims, as defined by an Islamic discourse situated in a socio-
historically defined context.
Being a Modern Muslim Youth
The shift to a religious lifestyle is broader than what is commonly called 
Islamic revival, since similar trends for religious renewal can be found in 
Christianity and in New Religious Movements. It is a phenomenon that 
takes place on a global scale, encompassing several countries around the 
world. The turn to a so-called pure Islam as found among these youth 
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should not be understood as a mere trend caused by migration, as it also 
takes place outside the European and North American contexts. This kind 
of religiosity needs to be situated as part of a larger, ongoing process within 
Muslim tradition as a living tradition that embraces continued negotia-
tions and struggles of interpretation and authority (Amir-Moazami and 
Salvatore 2003). We should not consider the youths’ performance of Islam 
as merely a return to tradition, a re-Islamification or a coming out as 
Muslims, or only as a consequence of the specific European migration 
situation. To do so would ignore the dynamics within Islam. The youths’ 
beliefs and practices (the religious culture) of Islam must be situated 
within a discursive Muslim tradition that is constantly subject to internal 
transformations (see Asad 1986; Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003). Thus, 
we must also emphasize the continuity of the internal logic of interven-
tions within Islamic traditions. However, the consequences of European 
youths’ turn to Islam do need to be understood within the European 
context, in which Muslims are a religious minority. For the young people 
in my study, values and moral norms are learned within a religious, de-
ethnicized social field located in Germany generally and Berlin specifi-
cally. This contributes to a situation whereby the youth increasingly 
identify with a non-ethnically defined, so-called universally-oriented reli-
gious sphere. At the same time, their religious practices become localized 
within the Berlin context, encouraging them to find ways to practice Islam 
in the manner best suited for their specific socio-cultural sphere.
The increasing number of mixed ethnic marriages among the youth 
testifies to the greater value accorded to religious knowledge and body 
comportment as symbolic capital. For many of the women in this study, 
religiosity is more important in the selection of a future spouse than eth-
nicity or nationality. Identification with the ethnic social field diminishes 
as a premium is placed on religious knowledge and as points of religious 
reference are increasingly found outside of an ethnically defined social 
field. Consequently, the social network of the youth is increasingly ethni-
cally mixed, and social emphasis is placed on common religious goals 
rather than on ethnic relations. This de-ethnicization of Islam may assist 
in strengthening their identification as German, although this remains 
an open, and pressing, research question. I expect that whether or not a 
German identification develops partly depends on whether or not public, 
non-Muslim actors and Muslim organizations and individuals persist in 
trying to make being Muslim incompatible with being German.
For some young women, the quest to perform a pure Islam can emanci-
pate them, to some extent, from their parents and ethnic social field. 
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However, the discourse of pure Islam also emphasizes the value and place 
of parents in Islam, which means that there is a re-structuring of parental 
authority. This double-edged emancipation also exists when looking at 
education as a means of empowerment for the young women: in so far 
that women acquire knowledge and master Islamic discourse, language, 
and laws, they can set their own agenda within the otherwise patriarchal 
structure typically found in any of the world religions (Cooke 2001). 
However, at the same time, the fact that the women want to use their edu-
cational attainments not to reform their community but to defend it from 
the negative stereotypes prevalent in German society means that they 
decide (consciously or unconsciously) to subordinate the creation of a 
more liberal, emancipatory agenda as defined by secular oriented femi-
nists. The manner by which the women have chosen to fight the idea of 
Islam being traditional, patriarchal, and backward-looking is through pre-
senting themselves as Good Muslim Women, an ideal informed by their 
understanding of scripture. In this struggle, personal and social pressure is 
placed on young women, both by themselves and by their peers, to con-
form to the standard of Good Muslim Woman. Such pressure can itself be 
transformed into a means of social control by themselves and others in 
regard to the women’s public behavior.
While some young women joined MJD in order to acquire the correct 
knowledge and body comportment necessary for entering Paradise in the 
afterlife (akhira), others were looking for a space that includes youth with 
similar socio-economic backgrounds, or wanted to improve their answers 
to questions posed by non-Muslims about Islam. Thus, to some extent, 
I agree with social research on Muslim youth in Europe that positions the 
youths’ identification with Islam as a reaction to racism, discrimination, 
and economic disadvantages and as a way to gain more empowerment in 
relation to their traditional parents. The turn to Islam can be a response to 
the youths’ family situation, the poverty of their neighborhood, and not 
being accepted as German. Living in a society where they constantly need 
to provide answers to questions that teachers, friends, schoolmates, and 
strangers on the street believe are related to Islam has led many young 
people to feel the need to spend time with people in the same situation or 
to be with others like them. A religious identification becomes an alterna-
tive to, or even a way out of, the ethnic social environment or traditionally 
defined practices and is in this sense an urban identity politics in a context 
in which the youth are rejected as German.
At the same time, this explanation largely ignores the set of meanings 
that the youth ascribe to their religiosity. Furthermore, it overlooks how 
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desires to become virtuous or Good Muslims also inform their choices and 
acts. Most analyses of Muslim youth in Europe fail to include worship, 
godliness, holiness, piety, devotion, and ideas of religiousness in the 
understanding of the youths’ activities, interests, and choices. Conse-
quently, not only are religious desires and motivations not taken suffi-
ciently seriously, but the role that communities play in shaping and 
actively forming a young person’s Self is also neglected. Those who decide 
to form their Selves into religious subjects undertake this process in rela-
tion to Islam where socially relevant Others, including peers, family, other 
Muslims, and strangers, play an extensive role in the subject formation.
The dependency on religious authorities is decreasing across the 
Muslim world as a result of increased education and literacy, and this 
leads to an objectification process where Muslims reflect on what it means 
to be Muslim (Eickelman and Piscatori 1992). The young Muslims in Berlin 
emphasize and promote their Islamic identification as a conscious choice 
and as related to individual reflection. They voice their religious identity 
as a matter of personal decision, moral choice, and religious faith. As such, 
the youths’ religious identification must be understood as individualized 
in terms of how they choose which religious group to identify with or not, 
whether or not to continue identifying with Islam, and in which form. 
They develop their personal networks of social relationships and peer 
groups through school, leisure, and virtual networks. In addition, their 
focus on Islamic knowledge and improving their religious behavior 
involves individual self-reflection and work on the Self by the individual. 
However, this latter process must be considered an effect of the youths’ 
religious orientation, in which self-reflection, responsibility for the Self, 
and increased knowledge and skills are required to become a Good 
Muslim. The individualization forms parts of and is a prerequisite for the 
religious discourse to which they relate. Moreover, the process involves 
submission to a specific value system that endorses specific kinds of con-
formity and thus leads to a reduction of autonomy, even if this is autono-
mously chosen. In the search for a pure, Islam, the acquisition of correct 
knowledge and body comportment is alpha and omega.
My research indicates that we should modify, if not totally dismiss, the 
presumption that the young generation of Muslims born in European 
societies does not face social constraints on how to behave as Muslims. 
Oliver Roy (2000) contends that Muslim youth with migration back-
grounds face no social constraints in their pursuits of religious rituals or 
practices and that individual Muslims must independently shape their 
religious lifestyle. I find that this argument overstates the anonymity and 
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individualization of the Muslim subject in Europe. Roy argues that each 
individual has to create their own pattern of a Muslim daily life. This might 
be the case for religious actors who do not participate in or identify with 
any religious faith community or group. Where religious actors do belong 
to or identify with a particular faith community or group, group norms 
and values, which inevitably impact the behavior of group members, must 
be taken into account in order to understand the formation of a Muslim 
identity. Moreover, some of the social constraints and expectations that 
I have examined throughout this book also affect individual religious 
actors who are not directly involved in a religious organization. For exam-
ple, when a young woman encounters other Muslim youth on the street, 
assessments are often made about the religiousness of her behavior, in 
particular in terms of her dress comportment, veil, and other signals of 
religious praxis. Overall, this study has stressed the collective content of 
identity formation even if the activity is, of course individualized. Thus 
the religious movement that I encountered in the MJD cannot be under-
stood as individualizing but rather as individual engagement in a clearly 
collective project.
Religion as a Modern Urban Identity
The youths’ turn to a pure or de-ethnicized Islam is not only a conse-
quence of their high educational levels, new technology, or the general 
characteristics of Islam—it is also an urban phenomenon. The mobilizing 
opportunities that exist in the urban milieu make it possible for religious 
organizations to position their messages within the social antagonisms 
that characterize the urban landscape (Ismail 2006; Bendixsen 2011). 
A religious urban lifestyle makes it possible to choose between a variety of 
religious spaces, largely detached from one’s family. At the same time, the 
perception that “people pick and choose what they like” (Dikomitis and 
Pinxten 2006, 9) because they are not bound by their neighborhood or 
tradition and are sheltered by the anonymity of the city ignores the con-
tinued relevance of public discourse or Othering processes that categorize 
people. A veiled Muslim woman is not anonymous in the city, as she is not 
in control of the meanings that strangers, both Muslim and non-Muslim, 
assign to her.
The young people I have studied hold a vision of modernity that is dis-
similar to the Western models. This alternative modernity combines 
more typical Western ideas of modernity—such as Western-style urban 
288 conclusion
clothing, an emphasis on education, taking pleasure in (Islamic) hip hop, 
and marking a distance from their parent’s generation—with deep religi-
osity. The latter takes the form of a strong place for religion and practical 
religious observance in their daily lives, as well as pious fun and religious 
consumption (see also Bendixsen 2011). Their life choices call attention to 
the complex amalgamation young people make in leading a life that is 
both religiously observant and reflective of their situation as young, mod-
ern, urban individuals. European discourses suggest that this amalgama-
tion is contradictory and see it as impossible to be both modern and 
religious, and in particular to be both modern and Muslim. In the European 
media, “Islam” and “Muslim” stand for everything that is traditional, con-
servative, and conventional. Salwa Ismail (2006) argues that “the view of 
Islamism as anti-modern rests on the assumption that modernization is 
associated with secularization and the retreat of religion from the public 
sphere. Islamism thus appears as an expression of an anti-modern strand 
that, for some, is inherent in the religion” (Ismail 2006, 3).1 Instead of con-
sidering Islamism to be an anti-modern movement, Ismail refocuses our 
attention to its rejection of the perceived Western hegemonic ownership 
or meta-narrative of the modern.
Indeed, my research suggests that young Berliner Muslims do not 
believe that there are contradictions between consuming a modern life-
style and being religiously diligent. Rather than seeing being modern and 
being religious as belonging in two different spheres, to my subjects, these 
activities are both integral parts of being young. Indirectly, this normalizes 
Islam as part of a modern way of life. Religious spaces like MJD promote 
ways for youth to live an active, practicing Muslim life in a Western urban 
society. The activities, presentations, and roles of more experienced active 
participants construct a specific image of how the modern, young, Muslim 
woman should look, behave, and consume. This image is inspired by trans-
national media and situated within a local space. The image creates a feel-
ing of belonging to a group of highly literate Muslims that is characterized 
not only by knowledge of religious and non-religious matters, and by an 
1 Islamism is a contested term, and rightly so. Ismail (2006) refers to “Islamism” as both 
Islamist politics and re-Islamization, the latter of which relates to my usage here. 
Islamization is “the process whereby various domains of social life are invested with signs 
and symbols associated with Islamic cultural traditions. Examples of this process include 
the wearing of the hijab (veil), the consumption of religious literature and other religious 
commodities, the publicizing of symbols of religious identity, the reframing of economic 
activity in Islamic terms” (Ismail 2006, 2).
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awareness of social, cultural, and political issues, but also by socio- 
economic ambitions. This image can provide young people with a sense of 
direction that helps them not feel inferior to so-called modern Western 
youth, and by which they can contest, at least internally, the traditional 
and backward image of religious Muslim youth. Such practices 
suggest that it is possible to be modern and young while maintaining 
a commitment to religiously defined strictures. Furthermore, the young 
participants in MJD consider their chosen path to crafting the Self 
to be more modern than a path that remains affiliated with ethnically 
oriented group discourses that they view as traditional, uneducated, and 
misinformed.
At this moment in history, when Islam is being socially, politically, and 
culturally positioned in European society, young people play an extensive, 
visible, and creative role in the establishment of new institutions and 
structures like MJD, which target young people specifically. The aims of 
this Muslim youth organization include raising awareness among 
young Muslims as to how they should behave in daily interaction with 
non-Muslims and how they should represent Islam in the German public 
sphere. The organizational approach that MJD assumes is part of a 
struggle to provide a social space where youth can learn or affirm that it 
is not contradictory to be modern and Muslim. The upward social mobil-
ity  among the youth—mostly acquired through higher education 
and work—also entails a move from private to public life. Future 
research  should examine how these actions and engagements affect 
the ongoing German public discussion about, and perceptions of, Islam in 
Germany.
By representing themselves as enlightened and well-informed in order 
to locate a modern Islam within Europe (which is contrasted to tradi-
tional, cultural, and misinformed Others), the youth are unintentionally 
sacrificing their parents and other fellow Muslims who embrace a tradi-
tional version of Islam. The youths’ universalist approach to Islam privi-
leges scripture over practice and traditions and promotes the idea of Islam 
as a single, universal tradition. According to universalists, the local form of 
Islam is contemporary and divergent (Ismail 2007). Scholars need to be 
conscious of not taking sides in this largely theological discussion. 
Whether or not a practice is more or less religiously correct according to 
theology should not be the focus of ethnographic attention. The main 
focus should rather be on how religious beliefs and practices shape social 
life, and on their socio-political implications.
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Politics of the Religious Self
I have provided a description of the young women’s experiences without 
pretending to disclose the whole truth about their lives. I have attempted 
to construct “new, less false stories” (Griffith 1997, 23) than those often 
conveyed about young Muslim women living in European societies. By 
engaging with the youth over an extended period, I had the privilege of 
understanding their aspirations, ideas, and thoughts in more detail than 
I would have through interviews alone. By observing their social behavior, 
listening to discussions among peers, and sometimes being an outsider-
insider to whom they could confess their dislikes and disagreements, I was 
able to gain access to a deeper understanding of how the individual 
women form a religious Self in relation to peers and socially significant 
others, and how this formation is neither a one-dimensional, homogenous 
process nor a case of picking-and-choosing.
As noted, the process of young people identifying with Islam has long 
been considered a response to discrimination in European societies. 
Detached from their parents’ form of religiosity and their parents’ ethnic 
group, these youths are thought of as individualized and sometimes even 
agentive. While this approach must be commended for leaving behind the 
idea that religious (non-liberal) women are deluded, or brainwashed by 
the patriarchal structures of traditional religion, it ignores the complex 
social process in which this religious identification takes form and what is 
at stake. I agree with Abu-Lughod (2002), who argues that feminists, and 
social scientists in general, must recognize that individuals are called to 
selves in a variety of ways and that ideas of the good life are manifold. 
Abu-Lughod notes that “we may want justice for women, but can we 
accept that there might be different ideas about justice and that different 
women might want, or choose, different futures from what we envision as 
best (see Ong 1988)?” (Abu-Lughod 2002, 788).
Nevertheless, I simultaneously believe we also have a duty to investigate 
the social consequences of what the young women are doing. Thus, I take 
seriously how religious practices are activated, how they relate to broader 
social matrices, and how they shape everyday life. I have addressed these 
questions by investigating how the social and sacred power in MJD works 
on both individual and group levels, and how these powers affect identifi-
cation with Islam and the crafting of the young women’s religious Selves. 
Additionally, I have asked whether norms of discipline and authority 
are resisted or retained, and what the available scope for resistance and 
individual agency is. Here, we have to avoid binary distinctions between 
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resistance and subordination and rather recognize the scope for more 
subtle social bargaining, tactics, and compositions.
Yet, this approach is most valuable if it can assist us in better under-
standing the potential restrictions religious devotion places upon the 
women, thus incorporating dimensions that are oppressive and liberating 
(see Griffith 1997). The acquisition of religious knowledge and the reli-
gious crafting of the Self seem to create opportunities to develop a positive 
understanding of the Self, partly liberating young women from the tradi-
tional structures of their parents and ethnic group, and thus empowering 
them in Germany. This kind of interaction with Islam potentially makes it 
more possible for the young women to identify as German. It may also 
bring about the opposite effect, namely solidifying gendered roles and 
boundaries that restrict women’s room for action.
If we consider this form of devotion as a kind of “cultural resistance” 
(ibid., 211), we can recognize how religious submission can become a safe 
haven in an increasingly unstable, immoral, and individualized society. 
The discipline of prayer, religious moral duties, and obedience to Islamic 
rules and norms represents integrity, responsibility, and a meaningful 
direction in life within the context of the wider German society where, 
according to many Muslim youths’ worldview, moral and family break-
down is the rule. This process includes identification with a faith commu-
nity and its religious discourse, which includes opportunities and 
responsibilities such as representing Islam in general and a Muslim faith 
community in particular in the public sphere. In this space, they may feel 
pious or virtuous, as well as liberated and fulfilled. However, in this pro-
cess the subject also remains dependent by being willing to subordinate to 
a collective project (see Friedman 1994, 249). As Friedman, drawing on 
Alberoni, argues:
The re-identification of the subject with the larger project, while eliminating 
the ego-project and submerging the subject within the dictates of the group, 
simultaneously provides a new-found meaning in life and an ontological 
security. This relation is the core of movement organization. It consists in 
the formation of new sodalities where there was previously social disinte-
gration and consequent individual regression. (ibid., 249)
Consequently, the process of individualization, or “the establishment of 
the complete self-directed person” (ibid., 216) among the youth, is not 
absolute, as interpersonal unities are re-established or created. Rather, the 
personal project is partly replaced by an engagement in a larger social 
project where the female Muslim subject identifies with the gaze of the 
Other.
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Sympathy and recognition of subjective desires aside, we have to recog-
nize the risk posed by the politics of the Self in which the youth take part. 
While the young people may defend religious values and ideals in relation 
to the hegemonic non-Muslim culture, these same values contain ele-
ments that some participants are uncomfortable with, as they feel they 
subordinate them as women. By seeking to advance an “ideal” image of 
Islam and Muslims, any failings in an individual Muslim’s public behavior 
can leave them exposed to critique by their peers, their Muslim neighbors, 
or strangers in the street. The by-now classical feminist postcolonial 
dilemma is reiterated: To what extent should women struggle to improve 
their situation inside the group, or focus on more common struggles 
together with male members (Yuval-Davis 1994, 414)? Again, we have to 
allow for differences among women and recognize that individuals are 
called to different subject positions, situated within a socio-cultural and 
historical context. “Rescuing women” is a dubious, frequently ethnocen-
tric project (Abu-Lughod 2002). However, we must also reflect on the limi-
tations within which individuals make their choices, and the social 
consequences their choices may lead to. I am grateful to Moore for putting 
it so clearly:
If we imagine that individuals take up certain subject positions because of 
the way in which those positions provide pleasure, satisfaction, or reward on 
the individual or personal level, we must also recognize that such individual 
satisfactions have power and meaning only in the context of various institu-
tionalized discourses and practices, that is, in the context of certain sanc-
tioned modes of subjectivity. (Moore 1994, 65)
Moore incorporates politics and the importance of including a thick 
understanding of the social context within which certain desires are pur-
sued and expressed. We have to recognize that it is never possible for indi-
viduals to completely reflect upon what they are doing with their body, or 
their linguistic statements, even if their intentions are clear (ibid., 52–3). 
The youths’ thoughts are always situated: they contemplate their world 
from a specific place with specific available resources.
Importantly, Western society and its media and public figures play an 
extensive part in bringing forth a dynamic that triggers these subject posi-
tions. Paradoxically, Western efforts to rescue the Muslim subject from 
oppressive strictures have the counter-productive effect of increasing 
social demands on women who are seeking to craft a religious Self within 
this context. The headscarf law restricts employment possibilities in the 
public sector for Muslim women who veil. More subtle constraints include 
how the image of Muslim women brings forth a politics of Self in which 
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women take on a role as the incarnation of the Good Muslim Woman and 
which silences effective internal critiques of patriarchal aspects of Islam.
The social relationship between Islam in Germany and the non-Muslim 
German public is shaped by the demands Muslims make for their partici-
pation in, and formation of, the public sphere. The non-Muslim popula-
tion may potentially react with suspicion or uncertainty toward a religious 
group that poses new demands in (and on) the public sphere. Such suspi-
cion can easily be perpetuated by negative and sensational media cover-
age of Islam. The negative public assessment of Islam may well play a 
factor when individuals who otherwise were not particularly religious are 
turning to Islam as their main source of identification. The social Self of 
those whose religious identification is not foremost a reaction to the nega-
tive assessment of Islam is also clearly formed by these processes. Crafting 
a religious, Muslim Self in Berlin today is a complex process, clearly formed 
in relation to Islam as a religious discourse, as well as to the various local, 
national, and global dynamics around Islam and Muslims in Europe. The 
future public role of these German-educated young Muslims who seek to 
live out a pure Islam in German society remains to be seen.

1 In an extensive study of mosques and Muslim organizations in Berlin, Färber and 
Spielhaus (2006) argue that it is difficult to estimate with certainty the actual number of 
Muslim organizations in Berlin.
APPENDIX
SITUATING THE MOVEMENTS STUDIED WITHIN THE WIDER ISLAMIC 
FIELD IN GERMANY
The Islamic community in Germany is not officially recognized as a reli-
gious community. Consequently, Muslims pursue their various interests in 
Germany through organizations registered as Einzelverbände (single asso-
ciations), Dachverbände (umbrella organizations), or Spitzenverbände 
(Central organizations). These often collaborate with each other, but there 
are also misunderstandings and disputes between them (Şen 2008).
There are approximately 2,400 mosque communities or unions in 
Germany (ibid.). The mosque unions carry out a range of assignments of a 
political, cultural, and religious nature. The majority are run by Turkish-
Muslim participants. Around 15 percent of Sunni Muslims in Germany 
belong to a Muslim organization (ibid.). Membership in organizations is 
rarely compulsory and non-members can usually also participate in orga-
nizations and mosques.
In Berlin, there are approximately 83 registered Islamic organizations 
(Vereine, e.V.).1 There are 76 mosques, four Islamic prayer rooms, one Cem, 
and two mosque associations that do not have a permanent location 
(Spielhaus 2006). Around 90 percent of the mosques and prayer rooms in 
Berlin belong to Sunni Islam. There are two Alevi community centers, 
seven Shiite community centers, and two Ahmadiyya community centers 
(Spielhaus and Färber 2006).
In the 1980s, several of the Islamic organizations came together in city- 
and nation-wide umbrella organizations (see table 1-3). Less than half of 
Berlin’s Muslim communities are organized in local and/or national 
umbrella organizations (Speilhaus 2006). Two Spitzenverbände (umbrella 
organizations) are the dominant public actors at the national level: 
Islamrat für die Bundesrepublic Deutschland (Islamic Council for the 
Republic of Germany, IR) and the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland 
(ZDM, Central Council of Muslims in Germany) (Şen 2008). The former is 
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viewed as a more conservative organization than the latter. Along with 
the Türkish Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion (Turkish Islamic 
Union Organization for Religion, DITIB), which is under the administra-
tion and control of the Turkish state religious authority, and the Verband 
der Islamischen Kulturzentren (Union of the Islamic Culture, VIKZ), 
these two umbrella organizations came together in 2007 to form the 
Koordinattionsrat der Muslime (KRM, Coordinating Council of Muslims). 
This was in response to a need to appoint a representative for Muslims 
(Shiite and Sunni) in Germany to act in relation to the government (Open 
Society Institute 2010).
Most of the Muslim communities in Berlin that are part of an umbrella 
organization are organized according to ethnic or national ties. One 
exception is the Berlin-specific Initiative Berliner Muslime (Initiative 
Berliner Muslims, IBMUS), in which the main organization in this study, 
Muslimische Jugend Deutschland (Muslim Youth in Germany, MJD), as well 
as Deutschsprachiger Muslimkreis (the German-speaking Muslim circle, 
DMK), the intercultural association Inssan e.V., the Islamische Kultur und 
Erziehungszentrum Berlin e.V. (IKEZ-Berlin e.V.) and the al Nur mosque 
organization participate. The three first organizations explicitly target 
members from different ethnic and national backgrounds and most of 
their activities take place in German. The organizations in IKEZ are not 
Turkish-Muslim, but represent members from a variety of background or 
from Arab countries.
Other umbrella organizations are also making efforts to represent 
Muslims and member mosques at the national and local level. The Alevi 
Turks, which is a relatively large group in Germany but whose Islamic 
identity is still contested, are not represented in the larger unions. Instead, 
Alevi Turks have formed their own union (Föderation der Aliviten 
Gemeinden in Europa e.V., Federation of the Alevi Turks Union in Europe, 
AABF) and are in the process of forming a second (Şen 2008).
A Brief Overview of the Three Main Organizations Mentioned in this Study
Muslimische Jugend in Deutschland e.V.
The religious youth organization Muslimische Jugend in Deutschland e.V. 
(Muslim Youth in Germany, MJD) was established in 1994 under Haus des 
Islam e.V (HDI, based in Lützelbach). For a number of years it was located 
in an office behind the Muslim bookshop “Green Palace,” which in turn is 
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2 When the bookshop went out of business 2010, MJD moved its meetings to the 
Bosnian mosque (Islamische Kulturzentrum der Bosniaken) close to Kottbusser Tor, 
Kreuzberg. Currently (2012), it meets in the Bilal mosque (Islami Tahrik e.V. Berlin, which is 
run by Pakistani and Indian Muslims and participates in IBMUS), in Wedding. The German-
speaking Muslim organization DMK (Deutchesprachlige Muslimkreis Berlin e.V.) also meets 
in this mosque.
3 From homepage of IKEZ-Berlin e.V., http://www.almarkaz.de/, accessed September 5, 
2012.
next to the offices of Islamic Relief along a trafficked Kreuzberg street with 
little pedestrian activity.2 MJD started modestly with the idea of providing 
religious teaching and activities for youth born in Germany. However, MJD 
then broke from Haus des Islam e.V and registered as an independent orga-
nization headquartered in a small village in Baden-Württemberg. Compris-
ing approximately 50 branches Germany-wide, today the organization is 
the second-largest Muslim youth organization in Germany, after the youth 
section of Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs e.V. (IGMG). MJD partici-
pates in the umbrella organization Initiative Berliner Muslime (IBMUS).
The Islamische Kultur und Erziehungszentrum Berlin e.V.
The Islamische Kultur und Erziehungszentrum Berlin e.V. (IKEZ-Berlin e.V.), 
where Youth Club Assalam (Jugendtreff Assalam) meets, is located in a 
populous residential area of Neukölln. Its homepage presents IKEZ as a 
socially and culturally active non-profit organization. It was founded in 
1995, on the initiative of Muslim students who needed a place for their 
community.3 Since then, it has grown to 250 official members. In addition 
to the more general religious seminars and Friday prayer, IKEZ offers 
Islamic lessons in German every Friday for girls and every Saturday after-
noon for women. The youth and women who frequent the mosque mostly 
have Arabic backgrounds, and there are also some German converts. IKEZ 
participates in the umbrella organization Initiative Berliner Muslime 
(IBMUS).
Al Nur mosque
The Al Nur mosque (the islamische Gemeinschaft in Berlin e.V.) is located 
across the street from a cigarette factory, at the outskirts of an industrial 
area in Neukölln, a neighborhood characterized by high unemployment 
and many immigrants. Al Nur was founded in 2001 by one Saudi and 
two  Lebanese citizens. The Saudi Al-Haramain Foundation, which is 
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now  banned, provided 75 percent of the funding necessary to buy the   
property for the mosque. In the first few years, around 1,200 Muslims 
came  to the Friday prayers. At that time, it was run by the Lebanese 
preacher Dr. Salem Rafei, who openly defended Palestinian suicide 
attacks and allegedly called on Muslims to kill all unbelievers standing in 
the way of Islam. When Salem Rafei was denied reentrance to Germany in 
2006, he was replaced by Abdel Hadime Kamouss (also known as Abdul 
Adhim).
The Al Nur mosque is very popular among young Muslims across a rela-
tively wide age span (15–45 years old) of both genders and with various 
ethnic and national backgrounds (although a majority are Arabs). For the 
Sunday religious service, participants come from all over Berlin. The 
mosque has been presented in the German media as a place where radical 
Muslims are recruited, partly because it invites preachers such as the 
Salafist Pierre Vogel, who is popular among youth. The media considers 
Pierre Vogel (who was born in 1978) to be a radical Muslim. He is a former 
professional boxer who converted to Islam in 2001. In 2006, when he 
returned to Berlin from his religious studies at the Om Al-Quara in Mecca, 
he started teaching Islam in the Al Nur mosque. The charismatic Moroccan 
preacher Abdul Adhim, who preaches regularly on Sundays, is also a con-
troversial figure in Germany. He is widely known due to his sermons and 
commentaries on YouTube. In 2009, the German news magazine Focus 
presented him (under the name Abdel Hadim Kamouss) as one of the 
German Islamists and a “star” in the Islamist scene. According to Focus, 
the Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office, BKA) investigated 
“Kamouss and other extremists” in the community centered on the Al-Nur 
mosque because they had allegedly founded a terrorist cell. In 2005, 
Kamouss was found not guilty due to lack of evidence.
The 2011 report from the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (Verfassungschutzbericht) presents the Al-Nur-mosque as 
one of two Salafi mosques in Berlin. The report stresses that the mosque is 
also frequented by non-Salafi participants. Al-Nur is a mosque where con-
version (both by non-Muslim Germans and “born again” Muslims) take 
place regularly. There are several film clips available on Youtube that show 
Germans converting to Islam and interviews with German converts in this 
mosque. In late 2010, several Muslim centers in Berlin, including the 
Al-Nur mosque, were the target of arson attacks. IBMUS represents the 
Al-Nur mosque (on the homepage it is named the Islamische Gemeinschaft 
in Berlin e.V., or the Islamic community in Berlin).
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Overview of Selected Islamic Organizations in Germany and Berlin4
Table 1. Religious associations in Berlin (national)
Name Established Characteristics
DITIB,  
Türkish Islamische  
Union der Anstalt für 




1982 Berlin  
1984 Kölln 
(nationwide)
Collaborates closely with 
the Turkish state and  
the Turkish embassy in 
Germany on religious 
matters. The member 
organizations are 
provided with Imams 
from Turkey who are 
appointed by the  
Turkish state (through 





1980 Focuses on providing 
Islamic religious 
instruction in schools. 
They achieved this goal 
when they were rec-
ognized as a reli gious 
community by the 
Oberverwaltungsgericht 
(Higher administrative 
court, OVG) in Berlin 
(1998). Cooperates with 




Gemeinschaft Milli  
Görüs e.V. (Islamic 
Community,  
National View  
Union)
1976 as  
Vereinigung Neue 
Weltschift in 





Officially no member 
mosque in Berlin. How-
ever, I interviewed 
Berlin mosque spokes-
men who confirmed 
their connection to 
IGMG. It is considered 
to be close
4 Information on the year of establishment and the main focus of the organizations is 





to the Islamist Saadet 
Partisi (Felicity Party, 
successor to the Virtue 
Party, which was 
banned 2001) in Turkey. 
IFB has taken legal 
steps to not be publicly 
tied to IGMG.
ADÜTDF/TF,  




Europa e.V. (Promotion 
of Turkish Democratic 
idealism in Europe)
1978 main office  
in Frankfurt/M
Considered to be the 
foreign organization of 
the Turkish party 
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 
(the Nationalist 
Movement Party, Mhp). 
It is often called “the 
Grey Wolf.” It is influ-
enced by the Turkish-
Islamic synthesis, 
dreams of a “Great 
Turk ish Empire,” and is 
considered to be 
opposed to gays, Kurds, 
Armenians, and Jews.
VIKZ,  
Verband der  
Isalmischen 
Kulturzentren  
(Union of the  
Islamic Culture)
1973 Kölln  
1976 Berlin
Viewed as very 
hierarchical and 
focuses on offering 
religious instruction. 
Oriented towards 
Islamic mys ticism 
(Sufism). It is con-
sidered the German 
branch of the 
Süleymancı sect in 
Turkey. It was one of 
the initiators of IR and 
ZMD, but withdrew 
from these umbrella 
organizations after a 
few years.
 situating the movements  301
Table 1. (Cont.)
Name Established Characteristics
AABF, Föderation der 
Aliviten Gemeinden  
in Europa e.V., 
(Federation of the Alevi 






Focuses on promoting 
Alevism among the 
Alevi Turks in Germany 
also as a way to oppose 
“Sunnization” (Sen 
2008). Favors a secular 
legal state.





1994 Relatively loose union of 
eight Islamic 
organizations, of which 
four are mosques. 
Mainly cooperates on 
stand-alone events, such 
as the Berlin Islam week. 
Focuses on promoting 
dialogue between 
Muslims in Berlin and 
all parts of German 
society, as well
as on representing 
Muslims in Germany 
nationwide. Linked to 
ZMD, although not a 
member Participating 
organizations that this 










Muslim circle, DMK), 
The Islamische Kultur 
und Erziehungszentrum 
Berlin e.V. and  
Al-Nur-mosque (referred 
to online as Islamische 





1990 former  
DDR
They were recognized as a 
religious community in 
the former East Berlin, a 
status contested by the 
Senate of Berlin. 
Includes IFB and the 
mosques organized 
within IFB, as well as 
“Islam Vakfi” and 
individual members.
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There are also organizations that are not represented at the national level. 
For a more detailed overview of the Islamic organizations in Germany and 
Berlin, see Spielhaus (2006), and Grübel/Rademacher (2003).
Table 3. National umbrella organizations
Name Established Characteristics
ZMD, Zentralrat der 
Muslime in  
Deutschland  
(Central Council of 
Muslims in Germany).
1995 Different nationalities and 
confessional orientations. 
Both Sunni and Shiite 
organizations are 
represented. Dominated by 
the Islamische Gemeinschaft 
Deutschland (Islamic 
Community Germany, IGD) 
that was established by 
Egyptian Muslim activists. 
IGD is dominated by Arab 
Muslims. The media and 
some politicians consider 
IGD to represent or be close 
to the Muslim Brotherhood.
IR, Islamrat für die 
Bundesrepublikk 
Deutschland  
(Islamic Council  
for the Republic of 
Germany)
1986 IGMG is the dominant member. 
Focuses on becoming 
recognized as a corporation 
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